SEC. 1. Short Title.
This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022”.
Division X — Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2022
DIVISION X Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2022
SEC. 2. Definitions.
In this division:
Congressional intelligence committees.— The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
Intelligence community.— The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SEC. 3. Explanatory Statement.
The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.
TITLE I Intelligence Activities
SEC. 101. Authorization of Appropriations.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2022 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency.
The Department of Defense.
The Defense Intelligence Agency.
The National Security Agency.
The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
The Coast Guard.
The Department of State.
The Department of the Treasury.
The Department of Energy.
The Department of Justice.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Drug Enforcement Administration.
The National Reconnaissance Office.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
The Department of Homeland Security.
The Space Force.
SEC. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Specifications of Amounts.— The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (17) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.—
Availability.— The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.
Distribution by the president.— Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.
Limits on disclosure.— The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Authorization of Appropriations.— There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2022 the sum of $587,100,000.
Classified Authorization of Appropriations.— In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2022 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
TITLE II Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
SEC. 201. Authorization of Appropriations.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
TITLE III General Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 301. Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized by Law.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 303. Prohibition on Collection and Maintenance of Information of United States Persons by Intelligence Community Based on First Amendment-Protected Activities.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105B the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 105C. PROHIBITION ON COLLECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION OF UNITED STATES PERSONS BASED ON FIRST AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITIES.
“No element of the intelligence community may collect or maintain information concerning a United States person (as defined in section 105A) solely for the purpose of monitoring an activity protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”
SEC. 304. Authorization of Support by Director of National Intelligence for Certain Activities Relating to Intelligence Community Workforce.
Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1024 the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN WORKFORCE ACTIVITIES.
“(a) Authorization.—The Director may, with or without reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for covered workforce activities for the purpose of supporting a covered workforce activity of an element of the intelligence community.
“(b) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director exercises the authority in subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate written notification of such exercise.
“(c) Covered Workforce Activity Defined.—In this section, the term ‘covered workforce activity’ means an activity relating to—
“(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence community workforce; or
“(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, with respect to such workforce.”
SEC. 305. Requirements Relating to Construction of Facilities to Be Used Primarily by Intelligence Community.
Section 602(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3304(a)) is amended—
in paragraph (1), by striking “ $5,000,000” and inserting “ $6,000,000”; and
in paragraph (2), by striking “ $5,000,000” and inserting “ $6,000,000”.
SEC. 306. Authority for Transportation of Federally Owned Canines Associated with Force Protection Duties of Intelligence Community.
Section 1344(a)(2)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting “ , or transportation of federally owned canines associated with force protection duties of any part of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003))” after “ duties”.
SEC. 307. Publication of Unclassified Appendices from Reports on Intelligence Community Participation in Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
Section 6720(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3316a(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(4) Publication.—The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the public each unclassified appendix submitted with a report under paragraph (1) pursuant to paragraph (2).”
SEC. 308. Requirements for Certain Employment Activities by Former Intelligence Officers and Employees.
Modifications to Requirement.—
In general.— Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) is amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
“(a) Temporary Restriction.—
“(1) Covered post-service position.—Except as provided by paragraph (2), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may not occupy a covered post-service position during the 30-month period following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
“(2) Waiver.—
“(A) Authority.—On a case-by-case basis, the Director of National Intelligence may temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction if—
“(i) the employee or former employee submits to the Director a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the Director determines appropriate; and
“(ii) the Director determines that such waiver is necessary to advance the national security interests of the United States.
“(B) Period of waiver.—A waiver issued under subparagraph (A) shall apply for a period not exceeding 5 years. The Director may renew such a waiver.
“(C) Revocation.—The Director may revoke a waiver issued under subparagraph (A) to an employee or former employee, effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the Director provides the employee or former employee written notice of such revocation.
“(D) Tolling.—The 30-month restriction in paragraph (1) shall be tolled for an employee or former employee during the period beginning on the date on which a waiver is issued under subparagraph (A) and ending on the date on which the waiver expires or on the effective date of a revocation under subparagraph (C), as the case may be.
“(E) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director issues a waiver under subparagraph (A) or a revocation of a waiver under subparagraph (C), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification of the waiver or revocation, as the case may be. Such notification shall include the following:
“(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—
“(I) the details of the application, including the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee;
“(II) the nature of the activities of the employee or former employee after ceasing to occupy a covered intelligence position;
“(III) a description of the national security interests that will be advanced by reason of issuing such waiver; and
“(IV) the specific reasons why the Director determines that issuing such waiver will advance such interests.
“(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—
“(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and
“(II) the specific reasons why the Director determined that such revocation is warranted.
“(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.—
“(1) Requirement.—During the period described in paragraph (2), an employee who ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position shall—
“(A) report covered post-service employment to the head of the element of the intelligence community that employed such employee in such covered intelligence position upon accepting such covered post-service employment; and
“(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of such element considers it appropriate) report covered post-service employment to the head of such element.
“(2) Period described.—The period described in this paragraph is the period beginning on the date on which an employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position and ending on the date that is—
“(A) 5 years after the employee ceases to occupy such position, plus
“(B) the number of months for which the employee is issued a waiver under subsection (a)(2).
“(3) Regulations.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee of such element occupying a covered intelligence position to sign a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered post-service employment to the head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).
“(c) Penalties.—
“(1) Criminal penalties.—A former employee who knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a) or who knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each report under subsection (b) shall be subject to section 1001 of title 18, United States Code.
“(2) Security clearances.—The head of an element of the intelligence community shall revoke the security clearance of a former employee if the former employee knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b) or knowingly and willfully makes a false report under such subsection.
“(d) Provision of Information.—
“(1) Training.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall regularly provide training on the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to employees of that element who occupy a covered intelligence position.
“(2) Written notice.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall provide written notice of the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an employee when the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
“(e) Annual Reports.—
“(1) Requirement.—Not later than March 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on covered post-service employment occurring during the year covered by the report.
“(2) Elements.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
“(A) The number of former employees who occupy a covered post-service position, broken down by—
“(i) the name of the employer;
“(ii) the foreign government, including by the specific foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-service employment is being performed; and
“(iii) the nature of the services provided as part of the covered post-service employment.
“(B) A certification by the Director that—
“(i) each element of the intelligence community maintains adequate systems and processes for ensuring that former employees are submitting reports required under subsection (b);
“(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, all former employees who occupy a covered post-service position are in compliance with this section;
“(iii) the services provided by former employees who occupy a covered post-service position do not—
“(I) pose a current or future threat to the national security of the United States; or
“(II) pose a counterintelligence risk; and
“(iv) the Director and the heads of such elements are not aware of any credible information or reporting that any former employee who occupies a covered post-service position has engaged in activities that violate Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United States persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
“(3) Form.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
“(f) Notification.—In addition to the annual reports under subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence community determines that the services provided by a former employee who occupies a covered post-service position pose a threat or risk described in clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of such subsection, or include activities described in clause (iv) of such paragraph, the head shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such determination by not later than 7 days after making such determination. The notification shall include the following:
“(1) The name of the former employee.
“(2) The name of the employer.
“(3) The foreign government, including the specific foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-service employment is being performed.
“(4) As applicable, a description of—
“(A) the risk to national security, the counterintelligence risk, or both; and
“(B) the activities that may violate Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United States persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
“(g) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) Covered intelligence position.—The term ‘covered intelligence position’ means a position within an element of the intelligence community that, based on the level of access of a person occupying such position to information regarding sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such element determines should be subject to the requirements of this section.
“(2) Covered post-service employment.—The term ‘covered post-service employment’ means direct or indirect employment by, representation of, or any provision of advice or services relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to, the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country.
“(3) Covered post-service position.—The term ‘covered post-service position’ means a position of employment described in paragraph (2).
“(4) Employee.—The term ‘employee’, with respect to an employee occupying a covered intelligence position, includes an officer or official of an element of the intelligence community, a contractor of such an element, a detailee to such an element, or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to such an element.
“(5) Former employee.—The term ‘former employee’ means an individual—
“(A) who was an employee occupying a covered intelligence position; and
“(B) who is subject to the requirements under subsection (a) or (b).
“(6) Government of a foreign country.—The term ‘government of a foreign country’ has the meaning given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).”
Application.— Such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to employees who occupy covered intelligence positions (as defined in such section) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Revised regulations.—
Submission.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees new or updated regulations issued under such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1).
Certification.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
a written certification for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has issued the updated regulations under such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1); and
for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has not issued such updated regulations, an explanation for the failure to issue such updated regulations.
Initial report.— In the first report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (e) of such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1), the Director shall include an assessment of the licensing requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and recommendations with respect to strengthening the activities regulated under such section 304.
Clerical Amendment.— The table of sections at the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and inserting the following new item:
“Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees.”.
SEC. 309. Development of Definitions for Certain Terms Relating to Intelligence.
Development.— Not later than September 30, 2023, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall jointly develop and publish definitions for the following terms:
Acoustic intelligence.
All-source intelligence.
Communications intelligence.
Critical intelligence.
Cyber-threat intelligence.
Electronic intelligence.
Explosive ordnance intelligence.
General military intelligence.
Imagery intelligence.
Geospatial intelligence.
Instrumentation signals intelligence.
Intelligence-related activity.
Joint intelligence.
Measurement and signature intelligence.
Medical intelligence.
Open-source intelligence.
Operational intelligence.
Scientific and technical intelligence.
Signals intelligence.
Strategic intelligence.
Tactical intelligence.
Target intelligence.
Technical intelligence.
Such others terms as may be jointly determined necessary by the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
Application to Activities of Intelligence Community.— The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the definitions developed under subsection (a) are used uniformly across activities of the intelligence community with respect to the corresponding terms specified in such subsection.
Notice of Modifications.— The Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees notification of any modification by the Director and Under Secretary to a definition of a term specified in subsection (a) following the initial publication of the definition under such subsection.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 310. Director of National Intelligence Declassification Review of Information Relating to Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
Declassification Review Required.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate, commence a declassification review (which the Director of National Intelligence shall complete by not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act) to determine what, if any, additional information relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, can be appropriately declassified and shared with the public.
Information Covered.— The information reviewed under subsection (a) shall include the following:
Information relating to the direction, facilitation, and other support provided to the individuals who carried out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Information from Operation Encore and the PENTTBOM investigation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Report.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the declassification review conducted under subsection (a).
SEC. 311. Performance Measures Regarding Timeliness for Personnel Mobility.
Policy Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a policy for measuring the total time it takes to transfer personnel with security clearances and eligibility for access to information commonly referred to as “sensitive compartmented information” from one element of the intelligence community to another, or from one contract to another in the case of a contractor.
Requirements.— The policy issued under subsection (a) shall—
to the degree practicable, cover all personnel who are moving to positions that require a security clearance and access to sensitive compartmented information;
cover the period from the first time an element of the intelligence community or company submits a request to an element of the intelligence community for the transfer of the employment of an individual with a clearance access or eligibility determination to another element of the intelligence community, to the time the individual is authorized by that receiving element to start to work in the new position; and
include analysis of all appropriate phases of the process, including polygraph, suitability determination, fitness determination, human resources review, transfer of the sensitive compartmented information access, and contract actions.
Updated Policies.—
Modifications.— Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director issues the policy under subsection (a), the Director shall issue modifications to such policies as the Director determines were issued before the issuance of the policy under such subsection and are relevant to such updated policy, as the Director considers appropriate.
Recommendations.— Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director issues the policy under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees recommendations for legislative action to update metrics specified elsewhere in statute to measure parts of the process that support transfers described in subsection (a).
Annual Reports.— Not later than 180 days after issuing the policy required by subsection (a) and not less frequently than once each year thereafter until the date that is 3 years after the date of such issuance, the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of such policy. Such report shall address performance by department or agency and by clearance type in meeting such policy.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
TITLE IV Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community
Subtitle A Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Redesignation of Center.— Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057) is amended by striking “ National Counter Proliferation Center” each place it appears and inserting “ National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center”.
Establishment and Head.— Subsection (a) of such section is amended—
in paragraph (1)—
by striking “ government tools to prevent” and inserting
“(A) prevent”
by striking the period at the end and inserting “ ; and”; and
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
“(B) lead integration and mission management of all intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats.”
; and
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for the intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity and foreign biological threats.”
Missions and Objectives.— Subsection (b) of such section is amended—
by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as so redesignated, by striking “ In establishing” and inserting the following:
“(1) Counterproliferation.—In establishing”
; and
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) Biosecurity.—In establishing the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure that the Center serves as the lead for the intelligence community for the integration, mission management, and coordination of intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats, regardless of origin:
“(A) Ensuring that the elements of the intelligence community provide timely and effective warnings to the President and the Director of National Intelligence regarding emerging foreign biological threats, including diseases with pandemic potential.
“(B) Overseeing and coordinating the collection and analysis of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign biological threats in support of the intelligence needs of the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health, including by conveying collection priorities to elements of the intelligence community.
“(C) Coordinating intelligence support to the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health, including by ensuring that intelligence pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats is disseminated among appropriately cleared personnel of such departments and agencies.
“(D) Coordinating with the Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health to encourage information sharing with the intelligence community.
“(E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of the intelligence community regarding biosecurity and countering foreign biological threats and providing to the Director of National Intelligence recommended solutions for such gaps, including by encouraging research and development of new capabilities to counter foreign biological threats.”
Conforming Amendments.— Such section is further amended—
by striking “ counter proliferation” each place it appears and inserting “ counterproliferation”; and
in the section heading, by striking “ counter proliferation” and inserting “ counterproliferation and biosecurity” (and conforming the table of sections at the beginning of such Act accordingly).
References.— Any reference in any law, regulation, guidance, instruction, or other document of the United States Government to the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be deemed to refer to the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
SEC. 402. Clarification of Certain Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence.
Section 102A(f)(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(8)) is amended by striking “ such other functions” and inserting “ such other intelligence-related functions”.
SEC. 403. Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended—
in subsection (c)(5), by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
“(D) Consistent with subparagraph (C), the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program, including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are structured and executed in a manner than enables budget traceability.”
; and
in subsection (p)—
by striking the heading and inserting “ Certain Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence Relating to National Intelligence Program”;
by striking “ Subject to” and inserting “ (1) Subject to”; and
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part of the National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner that conforms with the requirements of the national intelligence strategy under section 108A of this Act and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of such programs and activities).”
SEC. 404. Climate Security Advisory Council.
Reports.— Subsection (d) of section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) is amended—
by striking “ Not later” and inserting the following:
“(1) Requirement.—Not later”
; and
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) Matters included.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of any obstacles or gaps relating to—
“(A) the Council fulfilling its duties and responsibilities under subsection (c); or
“(B) the responsiveness of the intelligence community to the climate security needs and priorities of the policymaking elements of the Federal Government.”
Extension of Sunset; Technical Amendments.— Such section 120 is amended—
in subsection (b)(1)(B)(v), by inserting “ and Security” after “ for Intelligence”;
by redesignating the second subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
in subsection (e), by striking “ the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this section” and inserting “ December 31, 2025”.
SEC. 405. Removal of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community from Level Iv of the Executive Schedule.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking “ Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.”.
Subtitle B Other Elements
SEC. 411. Establishment of Chaplain Corps of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“SEC. 26. CHAPLAIN CORPS AND CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS.
“(a) Establishment of Chaplain Corps.—There is in the Agency a Chaplain Corps for the provision of spiritual or religious pastoral services.
“(b) Chief of Chaplains.—The head of the Chaplain Corps shall be the Chief of Chaplains, who shall be appointed by the Director.
“(c) Staff and Administration.—
“(1) Staff.—The Director may appoint and fix the compensation of such staff of the Chaplain Corps as the Director considers appropriate, except that the Director may not—
“(A) appoint more than 10 full-time equivalent positions; or
“(B) provide basic pay to any member of the staff of the Chaplain Corps at an annual rate of basic pay in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay for grade GS–15 as provided in section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
“(2) Administration.—The Director may—
“(A) reimburse members of the staff of the Chaplain Corps for work-related travel expenses;
“(B) provide security clearances to such members;
“(C) furnish such physical workspace at the headquarters building of the Agency as the Director considers appropriate; and
“(D) certify that all Chaplains meet common standards for professional chaplaincy and board certification by a national chaplaincy and pastoral care organization or equivalent.”
SEC. 412. Modification of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Personnel Management Authority to Attract Experts in Science and Engineering.
Section 4092(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and
by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph (B):
“(B) in the case of employees appointed pursuant to paragraph (1)(G), to any of 2 positions of administration or management designated by the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for purposes of this subparagraph; and”
SEC. 413. Support for and Oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.
Availability of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.— The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly require that each element of the intelligence community and component of the Department of Defense with data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, and to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center.
Quarterly Reports.—
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than quarterly thereafter, the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the findings of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity.
Contents.— Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the period covered by the report.
All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than the period covered by the report but were not included in an earlier report.
Form.— Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
The congressional intelligence committees.
The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Unidentified aerial phenomena task force.— The term “Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force” means the task force established by the Department of Defense on August 4, 2020, to be led by the Department of the Navy, under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
SEC. 414. Limitation on Procurement by Federal Bureau of Investigation of People’s Republic of China Products and Services.
Security Assessment.— The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may not procure a People’s Republic of China product or service unless, before such procurement—
the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts a security assessment of such product or service, including with respect to any physical, counterintelligence, or cyber vulnerabilities;
there is included in the process of conducting such security assessment a formal mechanism through which input shall be submitted by the Counterintelligence Division and Cyber Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding such security assessment, including with respect to any such vulnerabilities; and
the Director (or a designee of the Director) approves a recommendation, based on the results of such security assessment, to procure such product or service.
Submission.— Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director (or a designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the recommendation and a copy of the security assessment upon which the recommendation was based.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
People’s republic of china product or service.— The term “People’s Republic of China product or service” means an information or communication technology product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau, or a product or service provided by an entity that is fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China.
SEC. 415. Counterintelligence Units at Non-Intelligence Community Federal Departments and Agencies.
Establishment.— The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish counterintelligence units in the departments and agencies described in subsection (b). Such units shall be composed of officers of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Departments and Agencies Described.— The departments and agencies described in this subsection are the following departments and agencies of the United States Government:
The Department of Agriculture.
Any other department or agency that the Director, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, determines appropriate.
Duties.— The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each counterintelligence unit established under subsection (a) in a department or agency described in subsection (b) carries out the following duties:
Conducts assessments, in coordination with the leadership of the department or agency, to determine the counterintelligence posture of the department or agency, including any components thereof.
Informs and consults with the leadership of the department or agency, including any components thereof, and provides recommendations with respect to any counterintelligence threats identified by the intelligence community.
Provides such administrative and technical support as is necessary to develop, in coordination with the leadership of the department or agency, a plan to eliminate or reduce the threats described in paragraph (2).
Serves as the primary point of contact for the department or agency with respect to counterintelligence for the intelligence community.
Intelligence Community Support.— The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall ensure that relevant counterintelligence information is provided to counterintelligence units established under subsection (a) in a manner that is consistent with the need to protect sources and methods.
Report.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing options for the intelligence community to improve intelligence support to the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 416. Pilot Program on Recruitment and Retention in Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
Pilot Program Required.— The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury shall carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using adjustments of rates of pay to recruit and retain staff for high-demand positions in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
Duration.— The Assistant Secretary shall carry out the pilot program required by subsection (a) during the 4-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
Additional Pay.— Under the pilot program required by subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary shall, notwithstanding any provision of title 5, United States Code, governing the rates of pay or classification of employees in the executive branch, prescribe the rate of basic pay for financial and cyber intelligence analyst positions designated under subsection (d) at rates—
not greater than 130 percent of the maximum basic rate of pay and locality pay for which such positions would otherwise be eligible; and
not greater than the rate of basic pay payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code.
Designated Positions.—
In general.— Subject to paragraph (2), under the pilot program required by subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary shall designate not fewer than 5 percent of the total number of positions in the Office, including positions to be filled by new hires, as financial or cyber intelligence analyst positions eligible for the additional pay under subsection (c).
Current employees.— The Assistant Secretary may designate under paragraph (1) a position filled by an employee who was employed in that position on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act only if the employee was in the top one-third of performance rankings for the position within the Office for the duration of the 2-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act.
Briefing on the Pilot Program.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each year thereafter for the duration of the period specified in subsection (b), the Assistant Secretary shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees and the Director of National Intelligence a briefing on the pilot program required by subsection (a).
Report on the Pilot Program.— Not later than 180 days before the last day of the period specified in subsection (b), the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives, and the Director of National Intelligence a report on the effectiveness of the pilot program required by subsection (a) and recommendations as to whether such pilot program should be extended, modified, or ended.
Recommendations of Director of National Intelligence.— Not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees recommendations as to—
which, if any, other elements of the intelligence community would benefit from a program similar to the pilot program required by subsection (a); and
what, if any, modifications the Director would recommend for such elements.
Retention of Prescribed Rates of Pay After Termination of Pilot Program.— After the conclusion of the period specified in subsection (b), the Assistant Secretary may continue to pay a person, who received pay during such period pursuant to a rate of basic pay prescribed under subsection (c), at a rate of basic pay not to exceed the rate of basic pay that was in effect for the person pursuant to such subsection on the day before the last day of such period, until such time as the applicable rate of basic pay for the person under the General Schedule exceeds the rate of basic pay that was so in effect under subsection (c).
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 417. Designation of Senator Roy Blunt Geospatial Learning Center.
Designation.— The Geospatial Learning Center in the Next NGA West facility in St. Louis, Missouri, shall after the date of the enactment of this Act be known and designated as the “Senator Roy Blunt Geospatial Learning Center”.
References.— Any reference in any law, regulation, map, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Geospatial Learning Center in the Next NGA West facility referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the “Senator Roy Blunt Geospatial Learning Center”.
TITLE V Matters Relating to Oversight
SEC. 501. Harmonization of Whistleblower Protections.
Prohibited Personnel Practices in the Intelligence Community.—
Threats relating to personnel actions.—
Agency employees.— Section 1104(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)) is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—
by striking “ Any employee of an agency” and inserting “ Any employee of a covered intelligence community element or an agency”; and
by inserting “ , or threaten to take or fail to take,” after “ take or fail to take”.
Contractor employees.— Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting “ , or threaten to take or fail to take,” after “ take or fail to take”.
Protection for contractor employees against reprisal from agency employees.— Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)), as amended by paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, is further amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting “ of an agency or” after “ Any employee”.
Enforcement.— Subsection (d) of section 1104 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended to read as follows:
“(d) Enforcement.—The President shall provide for the enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with the policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.”
Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access Determinations.—
Enforcement.— Section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)) is amended—
by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
“(8) Enforcement.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with the policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.”
Tolling of deadline for appeal of prohibited reprisal.— Section 3001(j)(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended—
in subparagraph (A), by inserting “ (except as provided by subparagraph (D))” after “ within 90 days”; and
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
“(D) Tolling.—The time requirement established by subparagraph (A) for an employee or former employee to appeal the decision of an agency may be tolled if the employee or former employee presents substantial credible evidence showing why the employee or former employee did not timely initiate the appeal and why the enforcement of the time requirement would be unfair, such as evidence showing that the employee or former employee—
“(i) did not receive notice of the decision; or
“(ii) could not timely initiate the appeal because of factors beyond the control of the employee or former employee.”
Correction of Definition of Agency.— Section 3001(a)(1)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)(1)(B)) is amended by striking “ and” and inserting “ or”.
Establishing Consistency With Respect to Protections for Disclosures of Mismanagement.—
Security clearance and access determinations.— Section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)) is amended—
in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking “ gross mismanagement” and inserting “ mismanagement”; and
in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “ gross mismanagement” and inserting “ mismanagement”.
Personnel actions against contractor employees.— Section 1104(c)(1)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking “ gross mismanagement” and inserting “ mismanagement”.
Protected Disclosures to Supervisors.—
Personnel actions.—
Disclosures by agency employees to supervisors.— Section 1104(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)), as amended by subsection (a)(1)(A), is further amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting “ a supervisor in the employee’s direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the employing agency with responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including” before “ the head of the employing agency”.
Disclosures by contractor employees to supervisors.— Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting “ a supervisor in the contractor employee’s direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the contracting agency with responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including” before “ the head of the contracting agency”.
Security clearance and access determinations.— Section 3001(j)(1)(A) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)(A)) is amended, in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting “ a supervisor in the employee’s direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the employing agency with responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including” before “ the head of the employing agency”.
Establishing Parity for Protected Disclosures.— Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended—
in subsection (b), as amended by subsections (a)(1)(A) and (e)(1)(A)—
by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, by striking “ for a lawful disclosure” and inserting the following:
“(1) any lawful disclosure”
; and
by adding at the end the following:
“(2) any lawful disclosure that complies with—
“(A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
“(B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
“(C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section 103H(k)(5); or
“(3) if the actions do not result in the employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with—
“(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation;
“(B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (A); or
“(C) cooperation with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General.”
; and
in subsection (c)(1), as amended by subsections (a), (d)(2), and (e)(1)(B)—
by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively, and moving such clauses, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
in the matter preceding clause (i), as redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, by striking “ for a lawful disclosure” and inserting the following:
“(A) any lawful disclosure”
; and
by adding at the end the following:
“(B) any lawful disclosure that complies with—
“(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
“(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
“(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section 103H(k)(5); or
“(C) if the actions do not result in the contractor employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with—
“(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation;
“(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in clause (i); or
“(iii) cooperation with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with applicable provisions of law in connection with an audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the Inspector General.”
Clarification Relating to Protected Disclosures.— Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended—
by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and
by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
“(d) Rule of Construction.—Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be construed to authorize—
“(1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
“(2) the taking of any personnel action against an employee who lawfully discloses information to Congress.
“(e) Disclosures.—A disclosure shall not be excluded from this section because—
“(1) the disclosure was made to an individual, including a supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (b)(1)(B) or the contractor employee reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii);
“(2) the disclosure revealed information that had been previously disclosed;
“(3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
“(4) the disclosure was made while the employee was off duty;
“(5) of the amount of time which has passed since the occurrence of the events described in the disclosure; or
“(6) the disclosure was made during the normal course of duties of an employee or contractor employee.”
Correction Relating to Normal Course Disclosures.— Section 3001(j)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(3)) is amended—
by striking “ Disclosures.—” and all that follows through “ because—” and inserting “ Disclosures.—A disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because—”;
by striking subparagraph (B);
by redesignating clauses (i) through (v) as subparagraphs (A) through (E), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the left;
in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking “ or” at the end;
in subparagraph (E), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “ ; or”; and
by adding at the end the following:
“(F) the disclosure was made during the normal course of duties of an employee.”
Clarification Relating to Rule of Construction.— Section 3001(j)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(2)) is amended by inserting “ or clearance action” after “ personnel action”.
Clarification Relating to Prohibited Practices.— Section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)), as amended by this section, is further amended by striking “ over” and inserting “ to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve”.
Technical Correction.— Section 3001(j)(1)(C)(i) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)(C)(i)) is amended by striking “ (h)” and inserting “ (g)”.
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the extent to which protections provided under Presidential Policy Directive 19 (relating to protecting whistleblowers with access to classified information) have been codified in statutes.
SEC. 502. Authorities Regarding Whistleblower Complaints and Information of Urgent Concern Received by Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.
Authority of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to Determine Matters of Urgent Concern.— Section 103H(k)(5)(G) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(G)) is amended—
by redesignating clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) as subclauses (I), (II), and (III), respectively;
in the matter preceding subclause (I), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by inserting “ (i)” before “ In this”; and
by adding at the end the following new clause:
“(ii) Within the executive branch, the Inspector General shall have sole authority to determine whether any complaint or information reported to the Inspector General is a matter of urgent concern under this paragraph.”
Authority of Inspectors General to Determine Matters of Urgent Concern.— Subsection (h) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—
in paragraph (1), by redesignating paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively (and indenting such clauses accordingly);
by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively (and indenting such subparagraphs accordingly);
in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting “ (1)” before “ In this”; and
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) Within the executive branch, an Inspector General to whom any complaint or information is reported under this section shall have sole authority to determine whether the complaint or information is a matter of urgent concern under this section.”
Authority of Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency to Determine Matters of Urgent Concern.— Section 17(d)(5)(G) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(G)) is amended—
in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I), (II), and (III) as items (aa), (bb), and (cc), respectively (and indenting such items accordingly);
by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively (and indenting such subclauses accordingly);
in the matter preceding clause (I), as redesignated by subparagraph (B), by inserting “ (i)” before “ In this”; and
by adding at the end the following new clause:
“(ii) Within the executive branch, the Inspector General shall have sole authority to determine whether any complaint or information reported to the Inspector General is a matter of urgent concern under this paragraph.”
SEC. 503. Clarification of Requirement for Authorization of Funding for Intelligence Activities.
Paragraph (1) of section 504(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(a)) is amended to read as follows:
“(1) those funds were specifically authorized by Congress for use for such intelligence or intelligence-related activities; or”
SEC. 504. Congressional Oversight of Controlled Access Programs.
In General.— Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 501 the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 501A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CONTROLLED ACCESS PROGRAMS.
“(a) Periodic Briefings.—
“(1) Requirement.—Not less frequently than semiannually or upon request by one of the appropriate congressional committees or a member of congressional leadership, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to such committees and congressional leadership a briefing on each controlled access program in effect.
“(2) Contents.—Each briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
“(A) A description of the activity of the controlled access programs during the period covered by the briefing.
“(B) Documentation with respect to how the controlled access programs have achieved outcomes consistent with requirements documented by the Director and, as applicable, the Secretary of Defense.
“(b) Limitation on Establishment.—A head of an element of the intelligence community may not establish a controlled access program, or a compartment or subcompartment therein, until the head notifies the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership of such controlled access program, compartment, or subcompartment, as the case may be.
“(c) Annual Reports.—
“(1) Requirement.—On an annual basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a report on controlled access programs administered by the head.
“(2) Matters included.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
“(A) A list of all compartments and subcompartments of controlled access programs active as of the date of the report.
“(B) A list of all compartments and subcompartments of controlled access programs terminated during the period covered by the report.
“(C) With respect to the report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence, in addition to the matters specified in clauses (A) and (B)—
“(i) a certification regarding whether the creation, validation, or substantial modification, including termination, for all existing and proposed controlled access programs, and the compartments and subcompartments within each, are substantiated and justified based on the information required by clause (ii); and
“(ii) for each certification—
“(I) the rationale for the revalidation, validation, or substantial modification, including termination, of each controlled access program, compartment, and subcompartment;
“(II) the identification of a control officer for each controlled access program; and
“(III) a statement of protection requirements for each controlled access program.
“(d) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
“(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
“(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
“(2) Congressional leadership.—The term ‘congressional leadership’ means—
“(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
“(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
“(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
“(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
“(3) Controlled access program.—The term ‘controlled access program’ means a program created or managed pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 906, or successor directive.”
First Reports.—
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a report on all controlled access programs of the element in effect.
Matters addressed.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall address, for each controlled access program covered by the report, the following:
Date of initial operational capability.
Rationale.
Annual level of funding.
Current operational use.
Briefing.—
Requirement.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a briefing on all controlled access programs established during the 3-year period preceding such date of enactment that have not been previously briefed to such committees and leadership.
Limitation.— If the Director does not carry out paragraph (1) by the date specified in that paragraph, no funds may be obligated or expended by an element of the intelligence community to carry out a controlled access program described in that paragraph, or a compartment or subcompartment therein, until the head of that element has provided to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a briefing on the controlled access program.
Definitions.— In this section, the terms “appropriate congressional committees”, “congressional leadership”, and “controlled access programs” have the meanings given those terms in section 501A of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
Conforming Repeal.— Section 608 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 833; 50 U.S.C. 3315) is amended by striking subsection (b).
SEC. 505. Annual Reports on Domestic Activities of Intelligence Community.
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that—
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security conduct vital work in enforcing the rule of law and safeguarding the people of the United States from harm;
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3638) sought to facilitate greater information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence communities for the purpose of thwarting attacks on the homeland from international terrorist organizations;
National Intelligence Program funds should be expended only in support of intelligence activities with a foreign nexus, consistent with the definition of “intelligence” provided by Congress in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); and
the intelligence community should not engage in the collection, assessment, or analysis of information that pertains exclusively to United States persons absent a foreign nexus.
Requirement.— Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 513. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
“(a) Reports.—Not later than January 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report—
“(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by each element of the intelligence community during the prior fiscal year; and
“(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), a statement of the legal authority authorizing such activity to be undertaken.
“(b) Form.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”
First Report.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the first report required under section 513 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and the Subcommittees on Homeland Security of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 506. Reports Relating to Inspector General of Defense Intelligence Agency.
Report on Responses by Inspector General to Substantiated Allegations.—
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on allegations of reprisal or abuse of authority determined to be substantiated by the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency during the 5-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.
Matters included.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to each allegation determined to be substantiated during the 5-year period specified in such paragraph, a description of the following:
Details of each substantiated allegation.
The rank or grade of the individuals involved in the allegation.
Any disciplinary action recommended by the Inspector General in response to the allegation, or, if the Inspector General recommended no disciplinary action be taken in response, any justification for such recommendation.
Any disciplinary action taken by the relevant manager of the Defense Intelligence Agency in response to the allegation.
Whether the relevant manager reduced, or declined to take, a disciplinary action recommended by the Inspector General in response to the allegation.
Any justification from the relevant manager regarding the decision to take, reduce, or decline to take, a disciplinary action recommended by the Inspector General in response to the allegation.
The process by which Defense Intelligence Agency management reviews and makes decisions regarding disciplinary actions in response to substantiated allegations, including—
the criteria applied by management in making the decision to take, reduce, or decline to take, a disciplinary action;
a description of which managers have the authority to make such decisions, including the rank or grade of the managers; and
a description of any formal or informal appeals processes available with respect to such decisions.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Report on Processes for Ensuring Independence of Inspector General.—
Report.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency established under section 11 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) a report on the processes of the Defense Intelligence Agency for ensuring the independence of the position of the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Matters included.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of the following:
The selection criteria used by the Director in the appointment of the Inspector General.
The methods used by the Director to ensure the independence of the position of the Inspector General, including—
the process for vetting candidates for such position for independence from leadership of the Defense Intelligence Agency and from officials occupying positions in the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service; and
the process for evaluating such candidates for conflicts of interest.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Assessment by Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.—
Assessment.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency shall—
conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the selection criteria and methods specified in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the position of the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of such assessment.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
TITLE VI Anomalous Health Incidents and Other Health Care Matters
SEC. 601. Compensation and Professional Standards for Certain Medical Officers of Central Intelligence Agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by section 411, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
“SEC. 27. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL OFFICERS.
“(a) Office of Medical Services.—There is in the Agency an Office of Medical Services.
“(b) Compensation.—Beginning not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, each medical officer of the Office of Medical Services who meets the qualifications under subsection (c) shall be compensated during a pay period pursuant to a pay range that is equal to the pay range published in the Federal Register pursuant to section 7431(e)(1)(C) of title 38, United States Code (for the corresponding pay period), for a physician in the Veterans Health Administration in the District of Columbia region with a medical subspecialty that is the equivalent of the medical subspecialty of the officer.
“(c) Clinical Practice Qualifications.—A medical officer meets the qualifications under this subsection if the officer provides direct care services to patients in connection with the official duties of the officer and—
“(1) maintains current, active, full, and unrestricted licensure or registration as a physician from a State, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth or territory of the United States;
“(2) holds active board certification and maintains accreditation in an American Board of Medical Specialties direct care clinical specialty; and
“(3) except as provided in subsection (d), maintains a minimum of 96 hours per year of clinical practice in an accredited clinic or hospital facility that is not affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency.
“(d) Exception for Overseas Service.—If a medical officer is a medical officer located in a duty station outside of the United States pursuant to a permanent change of station and greater than 50 percent of the official duties of the officer in such duty station involve direct patient care, the officer, in lieu of performing the minimum hours under subsection (c)(3) on an annual basis, may count up to 480 hours of clinical practice performed as specified in such subsection prior to such change of station, to fulfill in advance the requirement under such subsection for up to 3 years.
“(e) Clinical Practice Hours.—The head of the Office of Medical Services shall make available to medical officers excused absence time to allow for the maintenance of clinical practice hours in accordance with subsection (c)(3).”
SEC. 602. Medical Advisory Board of Central Intelligence Agency.
Establishment.— The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by section 601, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
“SEC. 28. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.
“(a) Establishment.—The Director shall establish within the Agency a medical advisory board (in this section referred to as the ‘Board’).
“(b) Duties.—The Board shall—
“(1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical Services of the Agency, and submit reports regarding such study, in accordance with subsection (c); and
“(2) upon request, provide advice and guidance in connection with any independent review of the Office conducted by an inspector general.
“(c) Study.—
“(1) Objectives.—In conducting the study under subsection (b)(1), the Board shall seek to—
“(A) contribute to the modernization and reform of the Office of Medical Services;
“(B) ensure that the activities of the Office are of the highest professional quality; and
“(C) ensure that all medical care provided by the Office is provided in accordance with the highest professional medical standards.
“(2) Reports.—The Board shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, in writing—
“(A) interim reports on the study; and
“(B) a final report on the study, which shall—
“(i) set forth in detail the findings of the study and the recommendations of the Board, based on such findings and taking into consideration the objectives under paragraph (1), regarding any changes to the activities of the Office of Medical Services; and
“(ii) include, as applicable, any additional or dissenting views submitted by a member of the Board.
“(d) Membership.—
“(1) Number and appointment.—The Board shall be composed of 9 members, appointed as follows:
“(A) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
“(B) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
“(C) 1 member appointed by the majority leader of the Senate.
“(D) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.
“(E) 1 member appointed by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
“(F) 1 member appointed by the ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
“(G) 1 member appointed by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
“(H) 1 member appointed by the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
“(I) 1 member appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
“(2) Chairperson.—During the first meeting under subsection (e)(1), the members of the Board shall elect a Chairperson of the Board. In addition to meeting the criteria under paragraph (3), the Chairperson may not be an employee, or former employee, of the Agency.
“(3) Criteria.—The members appointed under paragraph (1) shall meet the following criteria:
“(A) Each member shall be a recognized expert in at least 1 medical field, as demonstrated by appropriate credentials.
“(B) Each member shall possess significant and diverse medical experience, including clinical experience.
“(C) Each member shall be eligible to hold an appropriate security clearance.
“(4) Terms.—
“(A) In general.—Each member, including the Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as applicable, for the life of the Board.
“(B) Vacancies.—Any vacancy in the Board occurring prior to the expiration of the term under subparagraph (A) shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment or election was made.
“(5) Compensation and travel expenses.—
“(A) Compensation.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), each member of the Board, including the Chairperson, may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties under subsection (b).
“(B) Exception for federal employees.—Members of the Board, including the Chairperson, who are officers or employees of the United States shall receive no additional pay by reason of the service of the member on the Board.
“(C) Travel expenses.—Each member of the Board, including the Chairperson, while away from the home or regular places of business of the member in the performance of services for the Board, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.
“(6) Detailees.—
“(A) In general.—Upon request of the Board, the Director of National Intelligence may detail to the Board, without reimbursement from the Board, any of the personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to assist in carrying out the duties under subsection (b). Any such detailed personnel shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the regular employment of the personnel without interruption.
“(B) Clearance.—Any personnel detailed to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information.
“(e) Meetings.—
“(1) Board meetings.—The Board shall meet not less frequently than on a quarterly basis.
“(2) Meetings with congress.—The Board shall meet with the congressional intelligence committees on a biannual basis.
“(f) Information Access.—
“(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Board may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States Government information necessary to enable it to carry out the duties under subsection (b) and, upon request of the Chairperson of the Board, the head of that department or agency shall furnish such information to the Board.
“(2) Exception.—The Director (without delegation) may deny a request for information made by the Board pursuant to paragraph (1), regardless of the agency from which such information is requested.
“(3) Notification requirement.—If the Director denies a request under paragraph (2), not later than 15 days after the date of such denial, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of such denial.
“(4) Briefings.—The Director shall ensure that the Board receives comprehensive briefings on all activities of the Office of Medical Services, including by promptly scheduling such briefings at the request of the Board.
“(g) Termination.—The Board shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
“(h) Definitions.—In this section, the terms ‘congressional intelligence committees’ and ‘intelligence community’ have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”
Deadline for Appointments; First Meetings.—
Deadline for appointments.— Each member of the medical advisory board established under section 28 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)), including the Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as applicable, in accordance with subsection (d) of such section by not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
First board meeting.— Not later than 30 days after the first date on which at least 5 members of the Board described in paragraph (1) hold the security clearance and are able to access information in accordance with subsection (d)(3)(C) of such section 28, the Board shall meet. During such meeting, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide to the Board a comprehensive briefing on all aspects of the Office of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
First meeting with congress.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the briefing under paragraph (2), the Board described in such paragraph shall meet with the staff members of the congressional intelligence committees to discuss topics for the Board to examine in carrying out the duties under subsection (b) of such section 28.
SEC. 603. Clarification of Effect of Certain Benefits Relating to Injuries to the Brain.
Personnel of Central Intelligence Agency.— Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(5) No effect on other benefits.—Payments made under paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished by the United States Government for which a covered dependent, covered employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the receipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility of such a person to any other benefit furnished by the United States Government.”
Personnel of Department of State.— Section 901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(5) No effect on other benefits.—Payments made under paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished by the United States Government for which a covered dependent, dependent of a former employee, covered employee, former employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the receipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility of such a person to any other benefit furnished by the United States Government.”
SEC. 604. Access to Certain Facilities of United States Government for Assessment of Anomalous Health Conditions.
Assessment.— The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the elements of the intelligence community provide to individuals described in subsection (c) who are experiencing symptoms of anomalous health conditions timely access for medical assessment to facilities of the United States Government with expertise in traumatic brain injury.
Process for Assessment and Treatment.— In carrying out subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate to ensure that, by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is a process to provide the individuals described in subsection (c) with timely access to the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, an Intrepid Spirit Center, or an appropriate medical treatment facility for assessment as described in subsection (a) and, if necessary, treatment.
Individuals Described.— The individuals described in this subsection are employees of elements of the intelligence community and the dependents or other immediate family members of such employees.
SEC. 605. Report on Protocols for Certain Intelligence Community Employees and Dependents.
In General.— Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall develop, for uniform implementation across the elements of the intelligence community, each of the protocols described in subsections (c) through (f). Such protocols shall be subject to review and revision on a periodic basis, and any implementation of such protocols shall be conducted in accordance with applicable laws and current clinical and professional practices of the interagency medical community.
Privacy.— No data collected pursuant to any protocol under this section may be used for research or analytical purposes without the written consent of the individual from whom such data was collected with respect to such use.
Protocol on Baseline Medical Testing.— The protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for conducting voluntary baseline medical testing of covered employees, covered individuals, and the dependents of covered employees who are included on the overseas travel orders of the covered employee. Such protocol shall set forth the required elements of such baseline medical testing, such as—
standard lab collection and testing of relevant biofluids;
the conduct of relevant visual and auditory examinations;
the conduct of Acquired Brain Injury Tool assessments, or other relevant assessments for balance, eye motion, and cognition;
the assessment of relevant medical histories; and
the conduct of any other standard relevant medical or neurological examinations, testing, or assessments.
Protocols on Post-incident Medical Testing.— The protocols described in this subsection are protocols to enable voluntary medical testing and the coordination of treatment for covered employees, covered individuals, and the dependents of covered employees, following a reported anomalous health incident, such as—
a protocol that sets forth elements, similar to the elements described in subsection (c), of such testing;
a protocol pertaining to the voluntary testing and treatment for victims of anomalous health incidents who are children;
a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous health incidents receive access to prompt and consistent medical treatment, including from medical professionals holding appropriate security clearances and medical professionals with expertise in child care;
a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous health incidents are offered options for psychological treatment for the effects of such incidents; and
a protocol for ensuring that any testing, evaluation, or collection of biofluids or other samples following a reported anomalous health incident may be compared against the baseline for the victim of the anomalous health incident, to the extent the individual participated in the baseline medical testing, consistent with subsections (b) and (c).
Protocol on Information Collection, Storage, and Safeguarding.— The protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for the collection, storage, and safeguarding of information acquired as a result of the protocols described in subsections (c) and (d).
Protocol on Reporting Mechanisms.— The protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for the reporting of matters relating to anomalous health incidents by covered employees, covered individuals, and the dependents of covered employees, including the development of a system for the adjudication of complaints regarding medical treatment received by such covered employees, covered individuals, and dependents of covered employees.
Report and Briefings.—
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the protocols described in subsections (c) through (f).
Elements.— Such report shall include the following elements:
A copy of each protocol under this section.
A description of the following:
Any interagency agreements, authorities, or policies required to effectively implement the protocols under this section.
Any new facilities, medical equipment, tools, training, or other resources required to effectively implement such protocols.
A timeline for the implementation of the protocols under this section, including a proposal for the prioritization of implementation with respect to various categories of covered employees and the dependents of covered employees.
Briefing.— Not later than 60 days following the date of submission of the report under paragraph (1), and biannually thereafter, the Director shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing regarding the implementation of the protocols under this section.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Covered employee.— The term “covered employee” means an individual who is an employee, assignee, or detailee of an element of the intelligence community.
Covered individual.— The term “covered individual” means a contractor to an element of the intelligence community.
Dependent of a covered employee.— The term “dependent of a covered employee” means, with respect to a covered employee, a family member (including a child), as defined by the Director of National Intelligence.
Victim of an anomalous health incident.— The term “victim of an anomalous health incident” means a covered employee, covered individual, or dependent of a covered employee, who is, or is suspected to have been, affected by an anomalous health incident.
SEC. 606. Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency Inspection of Office of Medical Services.
Inspection.— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with, and with the support of, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an inspection of the responsibilities, authorities, resources, and performance of the Office of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency (in this section referred to as the “Office”).
Matters Included.— The inspection under subsection (a) shall include the following:
A detailed description of the responsibilities and authorities of the Office, as set forth in Federal law and any applicable regulation, policy, or other document of the Central Intelligence Agency.
A detailed description of the budgetary, human, and other resources available to the Office, including with respect to employees and any other personnel.
An assessment of the ability of the Office to consistently discharge the responsibilities of the Office, with an emphasis on the provision of medical treatment and care by personnel of the Office, including with respect to—
the roles of personnel of the Office, and of senior officials of the Agency outside of the Office, in determining what medical evaluation, treatment, and care should be provided in a particular case, including the provision of specialty care by medical personnel outside of the Office;
whether personnel of the Office consistently provide appropriate and high-quality medical treatment and care in accordance with standards set independently by the professional medical community;
whether the Office has sufficient human and other resources, including personnel with specialized background, qualifications, or expertise, to consistently provide high-quality medical treatment and care in accordance with standards set independently by the professional medical community;
whether personnel of the Office, including personnel claiming specialized medical backgrounds and expertise, are required by the Agency to maintain current board certifications or other certifications and licenses, and the extent to which the Office verifies such certifications and licenses;
the extent to which the Office makes consistent and effective use of the specialized medical background, qualifications, and expertise of the personnel of the Office in providing medical treatment and care;
an assessment of whether personnel of the Office who provide medical treatment and care, or who make decisions with respect to such treatment or care, are required to have extensive clinical or other experience in directly treating patients, including in areas requiring specialized background, qualifications, or expertise;
any factors that have frustrated or delayed the provision of medical treatment and care by personnel of the Office in significant cases; and
any factors that have frustrated or could frustrate prompt detection, effective oversight, and swift remediation of problems within the Office, including such factors that frustrate or delay the provision of medical treatment and care in significant cases.
Independent Advice.— In conducting the inspection under subsection (a), the Inspector General may obtain the advice of the medical advisory board established under section 28 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by section 602).
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form to the extent practicable, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, but may include a classified annex.
TITLE VII Matters Relating to Foreign Countries
Subtitle A Matters Relating to China
SEC. 701. Updates to Annual Reports on Influence Operations and Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.
Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended—
by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (10); and
by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraph:
“(9) A listing of all known Chinese talent recruitment programs operating in the United States as of the date of the report.”
SEC. 702. Assessment of Genomic Collection by China.
Assessment Submitted to Congressional Intelligence Committees.—
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other entities of the United States Government the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the plans, intentions, capabilities, and resources of China devoted to biotechnology, and the objectives underlying those plans, intentions, capabilities, and resources.
Elements.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include—
a detailed analysis of efforts undertaken by China to acquire foreign-origin biotechnology, research and development, and genetic information, including technology owned by United States companies, research by United States institutions, and the genetic information of United States citizens;
identification of China-based organizations conducting or directing efforts described in subparagraph (A), including information about the ties between those organizations and the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, or the People’s Liberation Army; and
a detailed analysis of the resources of the intelligence community devoted to biotechnology, including synthetic biology and genomic-related issues, and a plan to improve understanding of these issues and ensure the intelligence community has the requisite expertise.
Form.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Assessment Submitted to Certain Other Committees.—
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other entities of the United States Government the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the plans, intentions, capabilities, and resources of China devoted to biotechnology, and the objectives underlying those plans, intentions, capabilities, and resources.
Elements.— The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the elements described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2).
Form.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
Appropriate congressional committees defined.— In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 703. Report on Threat Posed by Emerging Chinese Technology Companies.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the threat to the economic and security interests of the United States posed by emerging Chinese technology companies.
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
An assessment of the threat to the economic and security interests of the United States posed by emerging Chinese technology companies, including with respect to—
the practices of such companies and the relationships of such companies to the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party;
the extent to which such companies benefit from government financing or contracting vehicles outside of China;
the extent to which such companies facilitate the targeting of dissidents and other vulnerable populations;
the market penetration of such companies among allies and strategic partners of the United States;
the security of the communications, data, and commercial interests of consumer and commercial end-users of the products of such companies; and
the privacy interests of such consumers and commercial end-users.
An assessment of the ability of the United States to counter any such threat, including with respect to different tools that could counter such a threat.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate; and
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
Emerging chinese technology companies.— The term “emerging Chinese technology companies” means a Chinese technology company, including a company listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, that the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis determines poses a significant threat to the national security of the United States.
SEC. 704. Report and Briefing on Cooperation Between China and United Arab Emirates.
Requirement.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing, and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, containing the following:
Details on the cooperation between China and the United Arab Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the United States.
The most recent (as of the date of the report or briefing, as the case may be) quarterly assessment by the intelligence community of measures that the United Arab Emirates has implemented to safeguard technology of the United States and the reliability of any assurances by the United Arab Emirates (with respect to both current assurances and assurances being considered as of such date).
A certification by the Director regarding whether such assurances described in paragraph (2) are viable and sufficient to protect technology of the United States from being transferred to China or other third parties.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 705. Report on Creation of Official Digital Currency by China.
Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the short-, medium-, and long-term national security risks associated with the creation and use of the official digital renminbi of China, including—
risks arising from potential surveillance of transactions;
risks relating to security and illicit finance; and
risks relating to economic coercion and social control by China.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 706. Report on Influence of China Through Belt and Road Initiative Projects with Other Countries.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on recent projects negotiated by China with other countries as part of the Belt and Road Initiative of China. The Director shall include in the report information about the types of such projects, costs of such projects, and the potential national security implications of such projects.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 707. Report on Efforts of Chinese Communist Party to Erode Freedom and Autonomy in Hong Kong.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to stifle political freedoms in Hong Kong, influence or manipulate the judiciary of Hong Kong, destroy freedom of the press and speech in Hong Kong, and take actions to otherwise undermine the democratic processes of Hong Kong.
Contents.— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the implications of the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party described in such subsection for international business, investors, academic institutions, and other individuals operating in Hong Kong.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 708. Report on Targeting of Renewable Sectors by China.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the efforts and advancements of China in the wind power, solar power, and electric vehicle battery production sectors (or key components of such sectors).
Contents.— The report under subsection (b) shall include the following:
An assessment of how China is targeting rare earth minerals and the effect of such targeting on the sectors described in subsection (a).
Details of the use by the Chinese Communist Party of state-sanctioned forced labor schemes, including forced labor and the transfer of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups, and other human rights abuses in such sectors.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle B Matters Relating to Other Countries
SEC. 711. National Intelligence Estimate on Security Situation in Afghanistan and Related Region.
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan and the covered region.
Matters.— The National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the 2-year period beginning on the date on which the Estimate is produced, an assessment of the following:
The presence in Afghanistan (including financial contributions to the Taliban, political relations with the Taliban, military presence in the covered region, economic presence in the covered region, and diplomatic presence in the covered region) of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and any other foreign country determined relevant by the Director, respectively, and an assessment of the potential risks, or benefits, of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
Any change in the threat to the United States homeland or United States entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, including an assessment of the risk of al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates thereof, or any other similar international terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a safe haven for launching attacks on the United States and its interests abroad.
The political composition and sustainability of the governing body of Afghanistan, including an assessment of the ability of the United States Government to influence the policies of such governing body on the following:
Counterterrorism.
Counternarcotics.
Human rights (particularly regarding women and girls and traditionally targeted ethnic groups).
The treatment and safe transit of Afghans holding special immigrant visa status under section 602 of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note) and other Afghans who, during the period beginning in 2001, assisted efforts of the United States in Afghanistan or the covered region.
The effect on the covered region, and Europe, of refugees leaving Afghanistan.
The commitments of the Taliban relating to counterterrorism, including an assessment of—
whether such commitments required under the agreement entered into between the United States Government and the Taliban in February 2020, have been tested, or will be tested during the 2-year period covered by the Estimate, and what such commitments entail;
whether any additional commitments relating to counterterrorism agreed to by the Taliban pursuant to subsequent negotiations with the United States Government following February 2020, have been tested, or will be tested during the 2-year period covered by the Estimate, and, if applicable, what such commitments entail;
any benchmarks against which the Taliban are to be evaluated with respect to commitments relating to counterterrorism; and
the intentions and capabilities of the Taliban with respect to counterterrorism (as such term is understood by the United States and by the Taliban, respectively), including the relations of the Taliban with al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates thereof, or any other similar international terrorist group.
Submission to Congress.—
Submission.— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a). In so submitting the Estimate to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director shall include all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
Form.— The National Intelligence Estimate shall be submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form.
Public Version.— Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the appropriate congressional committees the National Intelligence Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make publicly available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Covered region.— The term “covered region” includes the following countries:
China.
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
India.
Iran.
Pakistan.
Tajikistan.
Turkey.
Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan.
United states entity.— The term “United States entity” means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate of the United States, or an installation, facility, or personnel of the United States Government.
SEC. 712. Report on Intelligence Collection Posture and Other Matters Relating to Afghanistan and Related Region.
Report.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the collection posture of the intelligence community and other matters relating to Afghanistan and the covered region.
Matters.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
A detailed description of the collection posture of the intelligence community with respect to Afghanistan, including with respect to the following:
The countering of terrorism threats that are directed at the United States homeland or United States entities abroad.
The finances of the Taliban, including financial and nonfinancial contributions to the Taliban from foreign countries (particularly from China, Iran, Russia, and any other foreign country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere) determined relevant by the Director, respectively).
The detection, and prevention of, any increased threat to the United States homeland or United States entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, including any such increased threat resulting from al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates thereof, or any other similar international terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a safe harbor.
A detailed description of any plans, strategies, or efforts to improve the collection posture described in paragraph (1)(A), including by filling any gaps identified pursuant to such paragraph.
An assessment of the effect of publicly documenting abuses engaged in by the Taliban, and a description of the efforts of the intelligence community to support other departments and agencies in the Federal Government with respect to the collection and documentation of such abuses.
An assessment of the relationship between the intelligence community and countries in the covered region, including an assessment of the following:
Intelligence and information sharing with such countries.
Any change in the collection posture of the intelligence community with respect to the nuclear activities of such countries as a result of the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.
The collection posture of the intelligence community with respect to the presence of such countries in Afghanistan (including financial contributions to the Taliban, political relations with the Taliban, military presence in Afghanistan, economic presence in Afghanistan, and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan) and the understanding of the intelligence community regarding the potential risks, or benefits, of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
The ability of the intelligence community to use the airspace of any such countries.
An assessment of any financial contributions to the Taliban from foreign countries (particularly from China, Iran, Russia, and any other foreign country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere) determined relevant by the Director, respectively) made during the year preceding the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
Biannual Updates.— On a biannual basis during the 5-year period following the date of the submission of the report under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an update to such report.
Definitions.— In this section:
Covered region.— The term “covered region” includes the following countries:
China.
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
India.
Iran.
Pakistan.
Tajikistan.
Turkey.
Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan.
United states entity.— The term “United States entity” means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate of the United States, or an installation, facility, or personnel of the United States Government.
SEC. 713. Report on Propagation of Extremist Ideologies from Saudi Arabia.
Report.— Not later than May 30, 2022, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the threat of extremist ideologies propagated from Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Government of Saudi Arabia to prevent the propagation of such ideologies. Such report shall include a detailed description of—
the role of governmental and nongovernmental entities and individuals of Saudi Arabia in promoting, funding, and exporting ideologies, including so-called “Wahhabist ideology”, that inspire extremism or extremist groups in other countries; and
the practical and strategic consequences for vital national security interests of the United States as a result of such promotion, funding, or export.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 714. Report on Likelihood of Military Action by Countries of the South Caucasus.
Report.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the likelihood of a South Caucasus country taking military action against another country (including in Nagorno-Karabakh or any other disputed territory). Such report shall include an indication of the strategic balance in the region, including with respect to the offensive military capabilities of each South Caucasus country.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
South caucasus country.— The term “South Caucasus country” means any of the following:
Armenia.
Azerbaijan.
Georgia.
SEC. 715. Report on Nord Stream Ii Companies and Intelligence Ties.
Report.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and in consultation with the heads of other departments and agencies of the United States Government as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on Nord Stream II efforts, including—
an unclassified list of all companies supporting the Nord Stream II project; and
an updated assessment of current or former ties between Nord Stream’s Chief Executive Officer and Russian, East German, or other hostile intelligence agencies.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 716. Assessment of Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research Activities.
Assessment.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and in consultation with the heads of other departments and agencies of the United States Government as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the activities and objectives of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research. The Director shall include in the assessment information about the composition of the organization, the relationship of the personnel of the organization to any research on weapons of mass destruction, and any sources of financial and material support that such organization receives, including from the Government of Iran.
Form.— The assessment under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 717. Report on Effects of Economic Sanctions by United States.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the effects of economic sanctions imposed by the United States.
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall—
cover entities, individuals, and governments that the Director, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, determines appropriate as case studies for the purposes of the report, including with respect to China and Iran; and
include—
an assessment of whether economic sanctions imposed by the United States on entities, individuals, or governments have constrained, modified, or otherwise affected the ability of the individuals, entities, or governments to continue the activities for which they were sanctioned; and
an assessment of the effectiveness of imposing additional sanctions.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
TITLE VIII Reports and Other Matters
Subtitle A Matters Relating to Personnel
SEC. 801. Periodic Report on Positions in Intelligence Community That Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified Information, Networks, or Facilities.
Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is amended—
by striking “ this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter,” and inserting “ this Act, and biennially thereafter,”; and
by adding at the end the following new sentence: “ Such report shall take into account the potential effect of maintaining continuity of operations during a covered national emergency (as defined by section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public Law 116–260)) and the assessed needs of the intelligence community to maintain such continuity of operations.”.
SEC. 802. Improvements to Annual Report on Demographic Data of Employees of Intelligence Community.
Section 5704(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334b(c)) is amended—
in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “ After making available a report under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall annually provide a report” and inserting “ Not later than March 31 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report”; and
by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new paragraph:
“(1) demographic data and information on the status of diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence community, including demographic data relating to—
“(A) the average years of service;
“(B) the average number of years of service for each level in the General Schedule, Senior Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or equivalent; and
“(C) career categories;”
SEC. 803. Plan for Authority to Enter into Contracts with Providers of Services Relating to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
Plan Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for providing elements of the intelligence community with the authority to enter into contracts with providers of services relating to sensitive compartmented information facilities for the providers to facilitate the use of such facilities by businesses and organizations performing work, at multiple security levels, in such facilities pursuant to contracts with the element.
Elements.— The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
An explanation of how the Director of National Intelligence will leverage the contracting methodology of the National Reconnaissance Office for leasing sensitive compartmented information facilities, or space therein, to businesses and organizations.
Policy and budget guidance to incentivize the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to implement such plan.
Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 804. Study on Utility of Expanded Personnel Management Authority.
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a study on the utility of providing elements of the intelligence community of the Department of Defense, other than the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, personnel management authority to attract experts in science and engineering under section 4092 of title 10, United States Code.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the congressional defense committees.
SEC. 805. Report on Prospective Ability to Administer Covid–19 Vaccines and Other Medical Interventions to Certain Intelligence Community Personnel.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in consultation with the elements of the intelligence community and relevant public health agencies of the United States, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the prospective ability of the intelligence community to administer COVID–19 vaccines, and such other medical interventions as may be relevant in the case of a future covered national emergency, to covered personnel (particularly with respect to essential covered personnel and covered personnel deployed outside of the United States).
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the following:
The prospective ability of the elements of the intelligence community to administer COVID–19 vaccines (including subsequent booster shots for COVID–19), to covered personnel, and whether additional authorities or resources are necessary for, or may otherwise facilitate, such administration.
The potential risks and benefits of granting the additional authorities or resources described in paragraph (1) to the Director, the Under Secretary, or both.
With respect to potential future covered national emergencies, including future outbreaks of an infectious pandemic disease or similar public health emergencies, the following:
The ability of the intelligence community to ensure the timely administration of medical interventions to covered personnel during the covered national emergency.
Whether additional authorities or resources are necessary to ensure, or may otherwise facilitate, such timely administration, including with respect to the ability of the Director or Under Secretary to provide an alternative means of access to covered personnel with reduced access to the interventions provided by the respective element.
The potential risks and benefits of granting the additional authorities or resources described in subparagraph (B) to the Director, the Under Secretary, or both.
A summary of the findings of the survey under subsection (c).
Survey.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and prior to submitting the report under subsection (a), the Director and the Under Secretary shall jointly conduct a survey to determine the process by which each element of the intelligence community has administered COVID–19 vaccines to covered personnel, to inform continued medical care relating to COVID–19 and future responses to covered national emergencies. Such survey shall address, with respect to each element, the following:
The timeline of the element with respect to the administration of COVID–19 vaccines prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.
The process by which the element determined when covered personnel would become eligible to receive the COVID–19 vaccine (including if certain categories of such personnel became eligible before others).
A general approximation of the percentage of covered personnel of the element that received the COVID–19 vaccine from the element versus through an alternative means (such as a private sector entity, foreign government, State, or local government), particularly with respect to covered personnel deployed outside of the United States.
Any challenges encountered by the element with respect to the administration of COVID–19 vaccines prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.
Any other feedback determined relevant for purposes of the survey.
Privacy Considerations.— In carrying out the report and survey requirements under this section, the Director, the Under Secretary, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall ensure, to the extent practicable, the preservation of medical privacy and the anonymity of data.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Covered national emergency.— The term “covered national emergency” has the meaning given such term in section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3316b).
Covered personnel.— The term “covered personnel” means personnel who are—
employees of, or otherwise detailed or assigned to, an element of the intelligence community; or
funded under the National Intelligence Program or the Military Intelligence Program.
Essential covered personnel.— The term “essential covered personnel” means covered personnel deemed essential to—
continuity of operations of the intelligence community;
continuity of operations of the United States Government; or
other purposes related to the national security of the United States.
National intelligence program.— The term “National Intelligence Program” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SEC. 806. Federal Policy on Sharing of Covered Insider Threat Information Pertaining to Contractor Employees in the Trusted Workforce.
Policy Required.— Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Attorney General, shall issue a policy for the Federal Government on sharing covered insider threat information pertaining to contractor employees.
Consent Requirement.— The Director shall ensure that the policy issued under subsection (a) requires, as a condition of obtaining and maintaining a security clearance with the Federal Government, that a contractor employee provide prior written consent for the Federal Government to share covered insider threat information with the senior official responsible for the insider threat program of the contracting agency. The Director may include in such policy restrictions on the further disclosure of such information.
Consultation.— On a quarterly basis during the period in which the Director is developing the policy under subsection (a), the Director shall consult with Congress and industry partners with respect to such development.
Review.—
Submission.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the issuance of the policy under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to Congress and make available to such industry partners as the Director and the Secretary consider appropriate a review of the policy.
Contents.— The review under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
An assessment of the utility and effectiveness of the policy issued under subsection (a).
Such recommendations as the Director and the Secretary determine appropriate with respect to legislative or administrative action relevant to such policy.
Definitions.— In this section:
Covered insider threat information.— The term “covered insider threat information”—
means information that—
is relevant with respect to adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information;
an agency or department of the Federal Government has vetted and verified; and
according to Director of National Intelligence policy, is considered relevant to the ability of a contractor employee to protect against insider threats as required by section 117.7(d) of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulation; and
includes pertinent information considered in the counter-threat assessment, as authorized by a provision of Federal law or Executive Order.
Contractor employee.— The term “contractor employee” means an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor, of a department or agency of the Federal Government.
SEC. 807. Governance of Trusted Workforce 2.0 Initiative.
Governance.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management in the Office of Management and Budget, acting as the chairman of the Performance Accountability Council, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall jointly—
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, publish, in the Federal Register as appropriate, a policy with guidelines and standards for Federal Government agencies and industry partners to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative;
not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once every 6 months thereafter, submit to Congress a report on the timing, delivery, and adoption of Federal Government agencies’ policies, products, and services to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, including those associated with the National Background Investigation Service; and
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress performance management metrics for the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, including performance metrics regarding timeliness, cost, and measures of effectiveness.
Independent Study on Trusted Workforce 2.0.—
Study required.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall enter into an agreement with an entity that is not part of the Federal Government to conduct a study on the effectiveness of the initiatives of the Federal Government known as Trusted Workforce 1.25, 1.5, and 2.0.
Elements.— The study required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
An assessment of how effective such initiatives are or will be in determining who should or should not have access to classified information.
A comparison of the effectiveness of such initiatives with the system of periodic reinvestigations that was in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.
Identification of what is lost from the suspension of universal periodic reinvestigations in favor of a system of continuous vetting.
An assessment of the relative effectiveness of Trusted Workforce 1.25, Trusted Workforce 1.5, and Trusted Workforce 2.0.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report on the findings from the study conducted under paragraph (1) to the following:
The congressional intelligence committees.
The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle B Matters Relating to Organizations and Capabilities
SEC. 811. Plan to Establish Integrated Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data Program Office.
Plan.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to establish an integrated commercial geospatial intelligence data program office.
Contents.— The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following:
An explanation of how the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office will elevate the commercial space program office within the organizational structure of the National Reconnaissance Office.
An explanation of how the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency will integrate the commercial space program office within the National Reconnaissance Office to include empowered functional manager personnel to ensure imagery purchases are responsive to functional manager-provided requirements and priorities.
An explanation of—
an approach that will rapidly leverage innovative commercial geospatial intelligence data capabilities to meet new intelligence challenges and inform operational requirements;
how the Directors will annually evaluate new commercially available capabilities and provide opportunities for new entrants; and
how the Directors will synchronize the procurement of commercial geospatial intelligence data and commercial geospatial intelligence analytic services, respectively.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 812. Central Intelligence Agency Acquisition Innovation Center Report, Strategy, and Plan.
Requirement for Report and Strategy.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
a report stating the mission and purpose of the Acquisition Innovation Center of the Agency; and
a strategy for incorporating the Acquisition Innovation Center into the standard operating procedures and procurement and acquisition practices of the Agency.
Requirement for Implementation Plan.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, using the findings of the Director with respect to the report submitted under subsection (a)(1), submit to the congressional intelligence committees an implementation plan that addresses—
how the Director will ensure the contracting officers of the Agency and the technical representatives of the Acquisition Innovation Center for the contracting officers have access to the technical expertise required to inform requirements development, technology maturity assessments, and monitoring of acquisitions;
how the plan specifically applies to technical industries, including telecommunications, software, aerospace, and large-scale construction; and
projections for resources necessary to support the Acquisition Innovation Center, including staff, training, and contracting support tools.
SEC. 813. Report on United States Southern Command Intelligence Capabilities.
Report Required.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other Federal Government entities as the Director considers relevant, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the status of the intelligence collection, analysis, and operational capabilities of the United States Southern Command to support Latin America-based missions.
Form.— The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the congressional defense committees.
SEC. 814. Report on Project Maven Transition.
Report Required.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other Federal Government entities as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the transition of Project Maven to operational mission support.
Plan of Action and Milestones.— The report required by subsection (a) shall include a detailed plan of action and milestones that identifies—
the milestones and decision points leading up to the transition of successful geospatial intelligence capabilities developed under Project Maven to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
the metrics of success regarding the transition described in paragraph (1) and mission support provided to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023.
Form.— The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the congressional defense committees.
SEC. 815. Report on Future Structure and Responsibilities of Foreign Malign Influence Center.
Assessment and Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
conduct an assessment as to the future structure, responsibilities, and organizational placement of the Foreign Malign Influence Center; and
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment conducted under paragraph (1).
Elements.— The assessment conducted under subsection (a)(1) shall include—
an assessment of whether the statutory functions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center are optimized to the needs of the intelligence community and policymakers;
a description of potential changes to the statutory functions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center that might further advance the counter-foreign malign influence mission of the Center and the intelligence community, including whether the Director of the Foreign Malign Influence Center should continue to report directly to the Director of National Intelligence and whether the Foreign Malign Influence Center should remain a separate, stand-alone center; and
an assessment of the risks, benefits, and feasibility of predominantly staffing the Foreign Malign Influence Center with detailees from other agencies, including from outside the intelligence community.
Subtitle C Other Matters
SEC. 821. Biennial Reports on Foreign Biological Threats.
Requirement.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.
“(a) Reports.—On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the intelligence community with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country.
“(b) Matters Included.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the following:
“(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to such threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities.
“(2) A detailed description of all duties and responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly authorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any identified gaps in such duties or responsibilities.
“(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant elements of the intelligence community with respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and responsibilities specified in paragraph (2).
“(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats, and an assessment of any identified gaps therein.
“(5) A description of the coordination and interactions among the relevant elements of the intelligence community and non-intelligence community partners.
“(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts relating to such threats, including any foreign academics engaged in such efforts, and a description of how the intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-intelligence community partners to counter such foreign malign influence.
“(c) Form.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
“(d) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) Covered country.—The term ‘covered country’ means—
“(A) China;
“(B) Iran;
“(C) North Korea;
“(D) Russia; and
“(E) any other foreign country—
“(i) from which the Director of National Intelligence determines a biological threat emanates; or
“(ii) that the Director determines has a known history of, or has been assessed as having conditions present for, infectious disease outbreaks or epidemics.
“(2) Foreign biological threat.—The term ‘foreign biological threat’ means biological warfare, bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases, or accidental exposures to biological materials, without regard to whether the threat originates from a state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, or an undetermined source.
“(3) Foreign malign influence.—The term ‘foreign malign influence’ has the meaning given such term in section 119C(e) of this Act.
“(4) Non-intelligence community partner.—The term ‘non-intelligence community partner’ means a Federal department or agency that is not an element of the intelligence community.”
First Report.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report required under section 1111 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 822. Annual Reports on Certain Cyber Vulnerabilities Procured by Intelligence Community and Foreign Commercial Providers of Cyber Vulnerabilities.
Requirement.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 821, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.
“(a) Annual Reports.—On an annual basis through 2026, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing information on foreign commercial providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence community through foreign commercial providers.
“(b) Elements.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
“(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured through a foreign commercial provider, including—
“(A) a description of the vulnerability;
“(B) the date of the procurement;
“(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
“(D) the cost of the procurement;
“(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if the commercial provider was not the original supplier of the vulnerability, a description of the original supplier;
“(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and
“(G) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to use the vulnerability, including whether such use will be operational or for research and development, and the approximate timeline for such use.
“(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that—
“(A) pose a significant threat to the national security of the United States; or
“(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any foreign government that—
“(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to target United States persons, the United States Government, journalists, or dissidents; or
“(ii) has an established pattern or practice of violating human rights or suppressing dissent.
“(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence community has conducted business with the foreign commercial providers identified under paragraph (2) during the 5-year period preceding the date of the report.
“(c) Form.—Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
“(d) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) Commercial provider.—The term ‘commercial provider’ means any person that sells, or acts as a broker, for a cyber vulnerability.
“(2) Cyber vulnerability.—The term ‘cyber vulnerability’ means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code that is intended to compromise a device, network, or system, including such a tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code procured by the intelligence community for purposes of research and development.”
First Report.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency shall jointly submit the first report required under section 1112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 823. Periodic Reports on Technology Strategy of Intelligence Community.
Periodic Reports Required.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 822, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 1113. PERIODIC REPORTS ON TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
“(a) Reports.—On a basis that is not less frequent than once every 4 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of such other agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the technology strategy of the intelligence community, which shall be designed to support the maintenance of the leadership of the United States in critical and emerging technologies essential to the national security of the United States.
“(b) Elements.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
“(1) An assessment of technologies critical to the national security of the United States, particularly those technologies with respect to which foreign countries that are adversarial to the United States have or are poised to match or surpass the technology leadership of the United States.
“(2) A review of current technology policies of the intelligence community, including long-term goals.
“(3) An identification of sectors and supply chains the Director determines to be of the greatest strategic importance to national security.
“(4) An identification of opportunities to protect the leadership of the United States, and the allies and partners of the United States, in critical technologies, including through targeted export controls, investment screening, and counterintelligence activities.
“(5) An identification of research and development areas the Director determines critical to the national security of the United States, including areas in which the private sector does not focus.
“(6) Recommendations for growing talent in key critical and emerging technologies and enhancing the ability of the intelligence community to recruit and retain individuals with critical skills relating to such technologies.
“(7) An identification of opportunities to improve the leadership of the United States in critical technologies, including opportunities to develop international partnerships to reinforce domestic policy actions, develop new markets, engage in collaborative research, and maintain an international environment that reflects the values of the United States and protects the interests of the United States.
“(8) A technology annex to establish an approach for the identification, prioritization, development, and fielding of emerging technologies critical to the mission of the intelligence community.
“(9) Such other information as the Director determines may be necessary to inform Congress on matters relating to the technology strategy of the intelligence community and related implications for the national security of the United States.
“(c) Form of Annex.—Each annex submitted under subsection (b)(8) may be submitted in classified form.”
First Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report required under section 1113 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 824. Intelligence Assessment and Reports on Foreign Racially Motivated Violent Extremists.
Intelligence Assessment.—
Requirement.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence assessment on significant threats to the United States associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist organizations.
Elements.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
A list of foreign racially motivated violent extremist organizations that pose a significant threat to the national security of the United States.
With respect to each such organization—
an overview of the membership, ideology, and activities;
a description of any transnational links to the United States or United States persons;
a description of the leadership, plans, intentions, and capabilities;
whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign governments or their proxies provide any manner of support to such organizations, including a list of each such foreign government or proxy;
a description of the composition and characteristics of the members and support networks, including whether (and if so, to what extent) the members are also a part of a military, security service, or police;
a description of financing and other forms of material support;
an assessment of trends and patterns relative to communications, travel, and training (including whether and to what extent the organization is engaged in or facilitating military or paramilitary training);
an assessment of the radicalization and recruitment, including an analysis of the extremist messaging motivating members and supporters; and
whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign governments have sufficient laws and policies to counter threats to the United States associated with the organization, including best practices and gaps.
An assessment of the status and extent of information sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign police cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between the United States and foreign governments relative to countering threats to the United States associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist organizations.
An assessment of intelligence gaps and recommendations on how to remedy such gaps.
An opportunity analysis regarding countering such threats, including, at a minimum, with respect to mitigating and disrupting the transnational nexus.
Standards.— The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) shall be conducted in a manner that meets the analytic integrity and tradecraft standards of the intelligence community.
Form.— The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials responsible for submitting such assessment shall ensure that the assessment is unclassified to the extent practicable.
Report.—
Requirement.— Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in a manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such Secretary or Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the use of Federal laws, regulations, and policies by the Federal Government to counter significant threats to the United States and United States persons associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist organizations.
Elements.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
An identification, description, and assessment of the use and efficacy of, Federal laws, regulations, and policies used by the Federal Government to address significant threats to the United States and United States persons associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist organizations, including pursuant to—
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and section 119 of the National Security Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3056), particularly with respect to the coordination and integration of all instruments of national power;
Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note), as amended;
the designation of foreign terrorist organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);
the designation of specially designated terrorists, specially designated global terrorists, or specially designated nationals and blocked persons, pursuant to Executive Orders 13886, 13372, and 13224 and parts 594, 595, 596, and 597 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations;
National Security Presidential Memorandums 7 and 9, particularly with respect to the sharing of terrorism information and screening and vetting activities; and
any other applicable Federal laws, regulations, or policies.
An assessment of whether (and if so, to what extent and why) such Federal laws, regulations, and policies are sufficient to counter such threats, including a description of any gaps and specific examples to illustrate such gaps.
Recommendations regarding how to remedy the gaps under subparagraph (B).
Privacy and civil liberties assessment.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in consultation with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the Federal departments and agencies the Board determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—
an assessment of the impacts on the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons concerning the use or recommended use of any Federal laws, regulations, and policies specified in paragraph (2); and
recommendations on options to develop protections to mitigate such impacts.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials responsible for submitting such report shall ensure that the report is unclassified to the extent practicable.
Separate submission.— The Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the report under paragraph (1) as a separate report from the report submitted under section 826(a)(2).
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government, the Subcommittees on Homeland Security, and the Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Terrorism information.— The term “terrorism information” has the meaning given that term in section 1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)).
United states person.— The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
SEC. 825. National Intelligence Estimate on Escalation and De-Escalation of Gray Zone Activities in Great Power Competition.
Findings.— Congress finds the following:
The conventional power of the United States has driven foreign adversaries to a level of competition that does not always depend on military confrontation with the United States.
Rather than challenging the United States in a manner that could provoke a kinetic military response, foreign adversaries of the United States have turned to carrying out gray zone activities to advance the interests of such adversaries, weaken the power of the United States, and erode the norms that underpin the United States-led international order.
Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of attribution and deniability that ranges from covert adversary operations, to detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open adversary operations.
To adequately address such a shift to gray zone activity, the United States must understand what actions tend to either escalate or de-escalate such activity by its adversaries.
The laws, principles, and values of the United States are strategic advantages in great power competition with authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and the United States-led international order, to states and peoples around the world.
The international security environment has demonstrated numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by foreign adversaries, including the following activities of foreign adversaries:
Information operations, such as efforts by Russia to influence the 2020 United States Federal elections (as described in the March 15, 2021, intelligence community assessment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence made publicly available on March 15, 2021).
Adversary political coercion operations, such as the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in the context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its neighbors into compliance with its policies.
Adversary economic coercion operations, such as the threat, and use, by China of economic retaliation to coerce sovereign countries into compliance with its policies or to blunt any criticism of its violations of the rules-based international order and its perpetration of severe human rights abuses.
Cyber operations, such as the use by China of cyber tools to conduct industrial espionage.
Provision of support to proxy forces, such as the support provided by Iran to Hezbollah and Shia militia groups.
Provocation by armed forces controlled by the government of the foreign adversary through measures that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, such as the use of the China Coast Guard and maritime militia by China to harass the fishing vessels of other countries in the South China Sea.
Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign soil, such as the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal in London by Russia.
The potential use by an adversary of technology that causes anomalous health incidents among United States Government personnel.
National Intelligence Estimate.—
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on how foreign adversaries use gray zone activities to advance interests, what responses by the United States (or the allies or partners of the United States) would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any opportunities for the United States to minimize the extent to which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in furtherance of great power competition.
Matters included.— To the extent determined appropriate by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment of the following topics:
Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray zone activities carried out against the United States by foreign adversaries, including against United States Government employees and United States persons, whether located within or outside of the United States.
To the extent such activities have occurred, or are predicted to occur—
opportunities to reduce or deter any such activities; and
any actions of the United States Government that would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation of such activities.
Any incidents in which foreign adversaries could have used, but ultimately did not use, gray zone activities to advance the interests of such adversaries, including an assessment as to why the foreign adversary ultimately did not use gray zone activities.
The effect of lowering the United States Government threshold for the public attribution of detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary operations, and deniable adversary operations.
The effect of lowering the United States Government threshold for responding to detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary operations, and deniable adversary operations.
The extent to which the governments of foreign adversaries exercise control over any proxies or parastate actors used by such governments in carrying out gray zone activities.
The extent to which gray zone activities carried out by foreign adversaries affect the private sector of the United States.
The international norms that provide the greatest deterrence to gray zone activities carried out by foreign adversaries, and opportunities for strengthening those norms.
The effect, if any, of the strengthening of democratic governance abroad on the resilience of United States allies and partners to gray zone activities.
Opportunities to strengthen the resilience of United States allies and partners to gray zone activities, and associated tactics, carried out by foreign adversaries.
Opportunities for the United States to improve the detection of, and early warning for, such activities and tactics.
Opportunities for the United States to galvanize international support in responding to such activities and tactics.
Submission to congress.—
Submission.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1). In so submitting the Estimate to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director shall include all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
Notice regarding submission.— If at any time before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before such deadline) submit to the committees specified in subparagraph (A) a report setting forth the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such deadline and an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate.
Form.— Any report under subparagraph (B) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
Public version.— Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1), the Director shall make publicly available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
Definitions.— In this subsection:
Gray zone activity.— The term “gray zone activity” means an activity to advance the national interests of a State that—
falls between ordinary statecraft and open warfare;
is carried out with an intent to maximize the advancement of interests of the state without provoking a kinetic military response by the United States; and
falls on a spectrum that ranges from covert adversary operations, to detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open adversary operations.
Covert adversary operation.— The term “covert adversary operation” means an operation by an adversary that—
the adversary intends to remain below the threshold at which the United States detects the operation; and
does stay below such threshold.
Detectible covert adversary operation.— The term “detectible covert adversary operation” means an operation by an adversary that—
the adversary intends to remain below the threshold at which the United States detects the operation; but
is ultimately detected by the United States at a level below the level at which the United States will publicly attribute the operation to the adversary.
Unattributable adversary operation.— The term “unattributable adversary operation” means an operation by an adversary that the adversary intends to be detected by the United States, but remains below the threshold at which the United States will publicly attribute the operation to the adversary.
Deniable adversary operation.— The term “deniable adversary operation” means an operation by an adversary that—
the adversary intends to be detected and publicly or privately attributed by the United States; and
the adversary intends to deny, to limit the response by the United States, and any allies of the United States.
Open adversary operation.— The term “open adversary operation” means an operation by an adversary that the adversary openly acknowledges as attributable to the adversary.
Requirement to Develop Lexicon.—
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.
Considerations.— In developing the lexicon under paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Council shall include in the lexicon each term (and the corresponding definition for each term) specified in subsection (b)(5), unless the National Intelligence Council determines that an alternative term (or alternative definition)—
more accurately describes a concept associated with gray zone activities; or
is preferable for any other reason.
Report.—
Publication.— The Director of National Intelligence shall publish a report containing the lexicon developed under paragraph (1).
Form.— The report under subparagraph (A) shall be published in unclassified form.
SEC. 826. Assessment of Role of Foreign Groups in Domestic Violent Extremism.
Assessment.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall—
complete an assessment to identify the role of foreign groups, including entities, adversaries, governments, or other groups, in domestic violent extremist activities in the United States; and
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment.
Form.— The report under subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Separate Submission.— The Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the report under subsection (a)(2) as a separate report from the report submitted under section 824(b)(1).
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 827. Report on Potential Inclusion Within Intelligence Community of the Office of National Security of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the potential advantages and disadvantages of adding the Office of National Security of the Department of Health and Human Services as a new element of the intelligence community.
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
An assessment of the following:
The likelihood that the addition of the Office of National Security as a new element of the intelligence community would increase connectivity between other elements of the intelligence community working on health security topics and the Department of Health and Human Services.
The likelihood that such addition would increase the flow of raw intelligence and finished intelligence products to officials of the Department of Health and Human Services.
The likelihood that such addition would facilitate the flow of information relating to health security topics to intelligence analysts of various other elements of the intelligence community working on such topics.
The extent to which such addition would clearly demonstrate to both the national security community and the public health community that health security is national security.
Any anticipated impediments to such addition relating to additional budgetary oversight by the executive branch or Congress.
Any other significant advantages or disadvantages of such addition, as identified by either the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
A joint recommendation by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Health and Human Services as to whether to add the Office of National Security as a new element of the intelligence community.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; and
the Subcommittees on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 828. Report on Efforts to Build an Integrated Hybrid Space Architecture.
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the efforts of the intelligence community to build an integrated hybrid space architecture that combines national and commercial capabilities and large and small satellites.
Elements.— The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
An assessment of how the integrated hybrid space architecture approach is being realized in the overhead architecture of the National Reconnaissance Office.
An assessment of the benefits to the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office and the cost of integrating capabilities from smaller, proliferated satellites and data from commercial satellites with the national technical means architecture.
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees; and
the congressional defense committees.
SEC. 829. Report on Certain Actions Taken by Intelligence Community with Respect to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.
Report.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on certain actions taken by the intelligence community with respect to human rights and international humanitarian law.
Elements.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent, each element of the intelligence community has provided intelligence products relating to the efforts of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury regarding the categorization, determinations on eligibility for assistance and training, and general understanding, of covered entities that commit, engage, or are otherwise complicit in, violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent, each element of the intelligence community has provided intelligence products relating to any of the following:
Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note).
The visa restriction policy of the Department of State announced on February 26, 2021, and commonly referred to as the “Khashoggi Ban”.
The annual report requirement of the Department of Defense under section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (131 Stat. 1572).
The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
A detailed explanation of the following processes:
The process of each element of the intelligence community for monitoring covered entities for derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information.
The process of each element of the intelligence community for determining the credibility of derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information.
The process of each element of the intelligence community for determining what further action is appropriate if derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information is determined to be credible.
An unredacted copy of each policy or similar document that describes a process specified in paragraph (3).
A detailed explanation of whether, with respect to each element of the intelligence community, the head of the element has changed or restricted any activities of the element in response to derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information.
Examples of any changes or restrictions specified in paragraph (5) taken by the head of the element of the intelligence community during the two years preceding the date of the submission of the report.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government and the Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Covered entity.— The term “covered entity”—
means an individual, unit, or foreign government that—
has a cooperative relationship with the United States Government; or
is the target of an intelligence collection activity carried out by the United States Government; but
does not include an employee of the United States Government.
Derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information.— The term “derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law information” means information tending to suggest that a covered entity committed, participated, or was otherwise complicit in, a violation of human rights or international humanitarian law, regardless of the credibility of such information, the source of the information, or the level of classification of the information.
Violation of human rights or international humanitarian law.— The term “violation of human rights or international humanitarian law” includes a violation of any authority or obligation of the United States Government related to human rights or international humanitarian law, without regard to whether such authority or obligation is codified in a provision of law, regulation, or policy.
SEC. 830. Report on Rare Earth Elements.
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, and any other head of an element of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines relevant, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on rare earth elements.
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
An assessment coordinated by the National Intelligence Council of—
long-term trends in the global rare earth element industry;
the national security, economic, and industrial risks to the United States, and to the partners and allies of the United States, with respect to relying on foreign countries, including China, for rare earth mining and the processing or production of rare earth elements;
the intentions of foreign governments, including the government of China, with respect to limiting, reducing, or ending access of the United States or the partners and allies of the United States to—
rare earth elements; or
any aspect of the rare earth mining, processing, or production chain; and
opportunities for the United States, and for the partners and allies of the United States, to assure continued access to—
rare earth elements; and
the rare earth mining, processing, or production chain.
A description of—
any relevant procurement, use, and supply chain needs of the intelligence community with respect to rare earth elements;
any relevant planning or efforts by the intelligence community to assure secured access to rare earth elements;
any assessed vulnerabilities or risks to the intelligence community with respect to rare earth elements;
any relevant planning or efforts by the intelligence community to coordinate with departments and agencies of the United States Government that are not elements of the intelligence community on securing the rare earth element supply chain; and
any previous or anticipated efforts by the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370) with respect to rare earth elements.
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Rare Earth Elements Defined.— In this section, the term “rare earth elements” includes products that contain rare earth elements, including rare earth magnets.
SEC. 831. Report on Assessment of All-Source Cyber Intelligence Information.
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Inspector General of the National Security Agency and the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the effectiveness of the intelligence community with respect to the integration and dissemination of all-source intelligence relating to foreign cyber threats.
Contents.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
An assessment of the effectiveness of the all-source cyber intelligence integration capabilities of the intelligence community, including the identification of capability gaps relating to the integration of all-source intelligence, or any deficiencies associated with the timely dissemination of such intelligence.
An assessment of the effectiveness of the intelligence community in analyzing and reporting on cyber supply chain risks, including with respect to interagency coordination and the leadership of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 832. Briefing on Trainings Relating to Blockchain Technology.
Briefing.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the feasibility and benefits of providing training described in subsection (b).
Training Described.— Training described in this subsection is training that meets the following criteria:
The training is on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, or both subjects.
The training may be provided through partnerships with universities or private sector entities.
SEC. 833. Report on Trends in Technologies of Strategic Importance to United States.
In General.— Not less frequently than once every 2 years until the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing commercial and foreign trends in technologies the Director considers of strategic importance to the national and economic security of the United States.
Contents.— Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
A list of the top technology focus areas the Director determines to be of the greatest strategic importance to the United States.
A list of the top technology focus areas in which the Director determines foreign countries that are adversarial to the United States are poised to match or surpass the technological leadership of the United States.
Form.— Each report under subsection (a)—
may be submitted in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate; and
shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
SEC. 834. Plan for Artificial Intelligence Digital Ecosystem.
Plan.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate with the heads of other elements of the intelligence community and, in conjunction with the heads of those elements, shall—
develop a plan for the development and resourcing of a modern digital ecosystem that embraces state-of-the-art tools and modern processes to enable development, testing, fielding, and continuous updating of artificial intelligence-powered applications at speed and scale from headquarters to the tactical edge; and
submit to the congressional intelligence committees the plan developed under paragraph (1).
Contents of Plan.— At a minimum, the plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
Policies to enable elements of the intelligence community to adopt a hoteling model to allow trusted small- and medium-sized artificial intelligence companies access to classified facilities on a flexible basis.
Policies for an open architecture and an evolving reference design and guidance for needed technical investments in the proposed ecosystem that address issues, including common interfaces, authentication, applications, platforms, software, hardware, and data infrastructure.
Policies to ensure, to the extent possible, interoperability, and the reduction of duplication, of artificial intelligence capabilities developed or acquired by elements of the intelligence community.
A governance structure, together with associated policies and guidance, to drive the implementation of the reference throughout the intelligence community on a federated basis.
Community standards for the use of artificial intelligence and associated data, as appropriate.
Recommendations to ensure that use of artificial intelligence and associated data by the Federal Government related to United States persons comport with rights relating to freedom of expression, equal protection, privacy, and due process.
Form.— The plan submitted under subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 835. Reports on Intelligence Support for and Capacity of the Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the United States Capitol Police.
Report on Intelligence Support.—
Requirement.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies and the Subcommittees on Homeland Security of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and congressional leadership a report on intelligence support provided to the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police.
Elements.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of the following:
Policies related to the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police as customers of intelligence.
How the intelligence community, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, are structured, staffed, and resourced to provide intelligence support to the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police.
The classified electronic and telephony interoperability of the intelligence community, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security with the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police.
Any expedited security clearances provided for the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police.
Counterterrorism intelligence and other intelligence relevant to the physical security of Congress that are provided to the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police, including—
strategic analysis and real-time warning; and
access to classified systems for transmitting and posting intelligence.
Cyber intelligence relevant to the protection of cyber networks of Congress and the personal devices and accounts of Members and employees of Congress, including—
strategic and real-time warnings, such as malware signatures and other indications of attack; and
access to classified systems for transmitting and posting intelligence.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Government Accountability Office Report.—
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership a report on the capacity of the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police to access and use intelligence and threat information relevant to the physical and cyber security of Congress.
Elements.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
An assessment of the extent to which the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police have the resources, including facilities, cleared personnel, and necessary training, and authorities to adequately access, analyze, manage, and use intelligence and threat information necessary to defend the physical and cyber security of Congress.
The extent to which the Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Police communicate and coordinate threat data with each other and with other local law enforcement entities.
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Definitions.— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the congressional intelligence committees;
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Rules and Administration, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on House Administration, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Congressional leadership.— The term “congressional leadership” means—
the majority leader of the Senate;
the minority leader of the Senate;
the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
Sergeants at arms.— The term “Sergeants at Arms” means the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives.