Section 1 Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Countering Gray-zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act”.
Countering Gray-zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State and relevant executive branch agencies to monitor and address gray-zone operations of the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, to hold accountable gray-zone activities by national and international actors, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
gray-zone operations employed in the Indo-Pacific region with the purpose of expanding Chinese interest via coercion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a growing threat to the United States, national security, regional partners in the Indo-Pacific and economic interests globally, with the Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan being a vital area of interest to the United States;
gray-zone tactics are employed by the PRC with the specific purpose of reunification with Taiwan through slow erosion of political cohesion, economic independence and societal confidence without kinetic escalation, among other objectives;
gray-zone tactics are becoming increasingly prevalent in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region with the increased incursions of Chinese vessels in national waters, airspace incursions, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion, in which Taiwan and the Philippines are identified as main targets;
the PRC is continuously increasing the scope of targets and disputed territories in the Pacific, broadening the list of target territories beyond Taiwan and the Philippines;
PRC-Russia gray-zone tactic coordination is becoming an increasing security risk for the United States in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, with the involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan;
the United States Indo-Pacific allies and partners find themselves at the forefront of aggression by the PRC, which they cannot effectively counter without substantive intelligence sharing, coordination, and publicization of PRC aggression, which can be further supplemented by United States coordination;
the United States Government should redouble efforts to hold the PRC accountable, including partnering with non-governmental groups who are documenting and exposing the PRC's coercive and destabilizing activities, for the purpose of deterrence; and
to effectively address PRC use of gray-zone tactics, the United States Government should work with partner governments, civil society experts, and private stakeholders to improve information sharing, strengthen preventative measures, raise public awareness, and increase coordination on regional law enforcement.
Sec. 3 Definitions
In general— In this Act:
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
Gray-zone tactics— The term gray-zone tactics means the use of activities, short of open warfare, to advance a state’s interests by maximizing advancement while avoiding kinetic military responses, including a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational and paramilitary tools.
Strategy— The term Strategy means the strategy to monitor and counter gray-zone tactics and hold the PRC accountable required under section 4.
Rule of construction— The definitions under this section are exclusive to this Act and may not be construed to affect any other provision of United States law.
Sec. 4 Strategy to enhance and enact the monitoring of Chinese gray-zone activities within the Indo-Pacific
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Attorney General, the heads of intelligence community agencies, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy (in this section referred to as the “Strategy”) that—
is designed to monitor and make public gray-zone tactics used by the PRC to the detriment of our allies and partners, as a means of exposing PRC methods and limiting their damage;
consults with the intelligence community on best practices of increasing intelligence sharing;
is global in scope; and
may prioritize efforts focused on the PRC activities in the Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait.
Contents— The Strategy shall—
provide an assessment of gaps in capabilities or resourcing regarding our ability to monitor PRC gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific;
outline a list of territories or areas currently impacted by or imminently vulnerable to PRC gray-zone operations with an assessment the capabilities of United States allies and partners to respond, and describe the status of efforts to engage with these partners at governmental and local levels;
identify all active, relevant United States foreign assistance programs and diplomatic efforts underway to mitigate and counter gray-zone tactics;
identify, if applicable, any additional capabilities or resources inherent to allies and partners, the private sector, or academia that would enhance the response to PRC gray-zone activities;
outline additional resources or authorities needed to adequately counter PRC gray-zone activities and any obstacles to responding to gray-zone tactic incidents;
outline an action plan for how the Federal Government will monitor, prevent, and deter PRC gray-zone activities, including in coordination with allies and partners, including strategic efforts to raise awareness and public exposure of PRC gray-zone activities; and
establish objectives and performance indicators to achieve this strategy.
Limitation— Nothing in the Strategy may affect, apply to, or create obligations related to past, present, or future criminal or civil law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision of a State.
Classification— The Strategy shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex.
Sec. 5 Establishing a task force to implement the Strategy
In general— Not later than 90 days after submitting the Strategy pursuant to section 4(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall establish an interagency task force (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”)—
to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy;
to conduct and enhance regular monitoring and analysis of gray-zone operations internationally;
to track, formulate and strengthen tools for the purpose of countering and mitigating gray-zone operations internationally, including determining and reporting funding requirements;
to track and evaluate progress toward the objectives, activities, and performance indicators of the Strategy described in section 4(b)(5); and
to update the Strategy, in consultation with the appropriate congressional committees, as needed.
Annual reviews and reports— Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the Task Force, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall—
conduct a status review of the Strategy and the overall state gray-zone operations by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific;
include a list of impacted allies and partners, as well as actors who may be enabling the PRC’s gray zone activity in the Indo-Pacific; and
submit the results of such review in a public report to the appropriate congressional committees, which may contain a classified annex.
Task force termination— The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date on which it is established.