Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has demonstrated the strategic risks of Europe’s dependence on the Russian Federation for energy, specifically oil and gas.
(2)
Following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and their partners imposed broad, punitive sanctions on the Russian Federation that limited the Russian Federation’s income from energy.
(3)
In May 2022, the European Commission launched the REPowerEU initiative to phase out dependence on Russian energy sources before 2028.
(4)
Since February 2022, the European Union has subsequently reduced its dependence on Russian fossil fuels by approximately 90 percent by cutting oil imports by more than 90 percent and reducing pipeline gas deliveries by roughly 80 percent.
(5)
Most European countries have undertaken significant measures to reduce their Russian energy imports in accordance with the REPowerEU initiative, but Hungary and Slovakia requested exemptions to the timeline.
(6)
Since February 2022, Hungary increased its dependence on Russian energy by an estimated 30 percent, providing approximately $6,700,000,000 in crude oil revenue to the Russian Federation between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2024.
(7)
On September 23, 2025, President Donald Trump said member countries of the European Union had “to immediately cease all energy purchases from Russia”.
(8)
On October 23, 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, including—
(A)
a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas into the European Union;
(B)
a full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft;
(C)
measures against third-country operators (which enable the Russian Federation’s revenue streams), 2 Chinese refineries, and a Chinese oil trader; and
(D)
strengthened enforcement against maritime circumvention and the “shadow fleet”.
(9)
In October 2025, the United States imposed secondary sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft.
(10)
Hungary has shown no sign of reducing its dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
(11)
In November 2025, Hungary reportedly received an exemption from sanctions imposed by the United States related to its continued purchase of Russian oil and gas.
(12)
In February 2026, Hungary blocked a €90,000,000,000 loan package by the European Union intended for Ukraine’s military and budget support and blocked the proposed 20th European Union sanctions package, demanding in exchange the resumption of Russian oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline.
(13)
Slovakia has vowed to follow Hungary’s example and block the provision of European Union funds to Ukraine if Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban loses his election.