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Securing Essential and Critical U.S. Resources and Elements Minerals Act of 2026

S. 3659 · 119th Congress · Jan 15, 2026 · Lineage

A BILL

To establish a Strategic Resilience Reserve of the United States, and for other purposes.

Section 1 Short title; table of contents

(a)
Short title— This Act may be cited as the “Securing Essential and Critical U.S. Resources and Elements Minerals Act of 2026” or the “SECURE Minerals Act of 2026”.
(b)
Table of contents— The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 2 Findings

Congress finds that—
(1)
critical minerals and materials are essential to the ongoing economic and national security of the United States, playing a vital role in the manufacturing, transportation, medical, technology, defense, and energy sectors;
(2)
the global demand for critical minerals and materials has been rapidly increasing due to advancements in technology, whether defense, dual-use, or commercial, and the increasing adoption of renewable energy sources and next-generation automotive systems, all of which rely heavily on critical minerals and materials for the production of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, high-speed computing, advanced magnetic systems, and other high-tech applications;
(3)
the People's Republic of China—
(A)
currently controls a significant portion of the global supply chain for critical minerals and materials through extensive mining, integrated midstream operations, significant domestic subsidies and incentives, and strategic investments in resource-rich countries, dominating the global market infrastructure for critical minerals and materials and enhancing the ability of the People's Republic of China to manipulate pricing to the detriment of competitors;
(B)
centrally controls its dominant market share across multiple critical mineral vertical markets, preventing fair competition and hindering the ability of United States firms and firms in partner countries to innovate and scale production;
(C)
predatorily leverages its position as sponsor or consumer, as applicable, over mining projects globally, resulting in a dearth of feedstocks to the great detriment of downstream industries, regions, and countries, including the United States;
(D)
the integrated operations of which are subservient to the Chinese state, is calibrated to weaponize its influence over prices and volumes in the contest for access to critical minerals and materials, as well as the end-use components and applications produced from critical minerals and materials; and
(E)
acts to undercut efforts in the United States and partner countries to develop alternative sources of supply;
(4)
producers of critical minerals and materials in the United States often face artificially low prices set by supply chains controlled by the People's Republic of China, discouraging private investment in domestic extraction and processing;
(5)
the lack of transparent, competitive, and market-driven pricing mechanisms for critical minerals and materials outside of the People's Republic of China compounds market problems, creating systemic risk and limiting the viability of an independent supply chain for critical minerals and materials in the United States;
(6)
the United States is heavily reliant on imports for many of the most critical minerals and materials, including rare earth elements, making the United States vulnerable to supply disruptions, geopolitical tensions, and economic manipulation by countries that dominate the market, specifically the People's Republic of China;
(7)
the vulnerabilities to the United States defense industrial base posed by reliance on imports of critical minerals and materials are significant, and given the long lead times for investments in both mining and processing of critical minerals, domestic critical minerals production projects are particularly susceptible to price shocks induced by the People's Republic of China, which can depress critical mineral prices for an extended period;
(8)
increasing domestic primary feedstock production, processing, conversion, recycling, reuse, and repurposing to advanced materials and products, as well as increasing alternative market supply in partner countries, are imperative to reduce the impact of market manipulation by foreign state actors, such as the People's Republic of China;
(9)
the United States must ensure that a stable and secure supply chain of essential resources is available to our domestic innovation and manufacturing ecosystems;
(10)
sustainable and responsible corporate behavior in the direct operations of companies and across their global value chains is important to ensuring a resilient domestic critical minerals supply;
(11)
investments in domestic extraction and processing infrastructure, as well as reuse, repurposing, and recycling, are necessary to build a resilient and diversified supply chain for critical minerals and materials, supporting the economic growth and national security interests of the United States; and
(12)
government support to develop and ensure the integrity of Western and partner country markets for critical minerals and materials as a countermeasure against the anti-competitive tactics of the People's Republic of China and the supply chain co-collaborators of the People's Republic of China will fill the most acute strategic gap, which cannot be otherwise achieved by private industry participants acting alone.

Sec. 3 Definitions

In this Act:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate;
(B)
the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives;
(C)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(D)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
(E)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(F)
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
(G)
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(H)
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives;
(I)
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
(J)
the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives;
(K)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(L)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Authorized intermediary— The term authorized intermediary means an entity that—
(A)
is a private entity;
(B)
has expertise in more than 1 critical mineral or material;
(C)
has expertise in commodities trading, market making, capital management, or finance;
(D)
does not have any management influenced by a foreign entity of concern or a citizen of a covered country, including any entities affiliated with the private entity or the ownership of the private entity;
(E)
is not owned, controlled, directed, financed, or otherwise influenced, directly or indirectly, in whole or in any part greater than 25 percent, by a foreign entity of concern, a citizen of a covered country, or the government of a covered country; and
(F)
has been approved to be an authorized intermediary by the Board.
(3)
Board— The term Board means the board of governors of the Reserve established by section 102(a).
(4)
Chairperson— The term Chairperson means the Chairperson of the Board.
(5)
Covered country— The term covered country means a country that—
(A)
is a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code); or
(B)
the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence, determines to be engaged in conduct that is detrimental to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
(6)
Critical mineral or material— The term critical mineral or material means mineral or material included in the list of eligible critical minerals and materials established by the Reserve under section 202(a).
(7)
Dependence rate— The term dependence rate means the percentage of domestic end-use consumption of a critical mineral or material that is supplied by production by a foreign entity of concern or in a covered country, in aggregate.
(8)
Foreign entity of concern— The term foreign entity of concern means a foreign entity that—
(A)
meets the requirements described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (D), or (E) of section 10638(3) of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19237(3)); or
(B)
(i)
is owned, controlled, directed, financed, or otherwise influenced, directly or indirectly, in whole or in any part greater than 25 percent, by the government of a foreign country that is a covered country; or
(ii)
is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a covered country;
(9)
Partner country— The term partner country means—
(A)
a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
(B)
a country that has been designated as a major non-NATO ally under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321k); or
(C)
a foreign country, including any market or any producer in a foreign country—
(i)
with which the United States has entered into a mutual defense treaty or other mutual defense agreement, but not including Venezuela;
(ii)
that is recognized by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense as a strategic partner due to an established bilateral agreement that emphasizes mutual interests in security, defense, and critical mineral supply chains, including countries designated under United States strategic frameworks and agreements;
(iii)
with which the United States has entered into a comprehensive economic and trade agreement that includes provisions for the collaboration on critical mineral resources and to safeguard supply chains critical to national security and economic stability;
(iv)
with which the United States Geological Survey has in effect a memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in earth sciences, unless that country is a covered country; or
(v)
with which the Department of State, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, or the United States Trade and Development Agency is working to advance an active critical mineral project.
(10)
Production rate— The term production rate means the percentage of domestic end-use consumption of a critical mineral or material that is supplied by domestic and partner country production in aggregate.
(11)
Purposes of the Reserve— The term purposes of the Reserve means the purposes of the Reserve described in section 101(b).
(12)
Recycle— The term recycle means an action or process to convert a critical mineral or material contained within a finished or semi-finished product into a form suitable for repurposing or reuse of the critical mineral or material.
(13)
Repurpose— The term repurpose means any operation that results, in whole or in part, in a critical mineral or material being used for a different purpose or application than the purpose or application for which the critical mineral or material, or the product into which the critical mineral or material is manufactured into, was originally intended.
(14)
Reserve— The term Reserve means the Strategic Resilience Reserve Corporation of the United States established by section 101(a)(1).
(15)
Reuse— The term reuse means the complete or partial direct use of a critical mineral or material after use for the original purposes for which the critical mineral or material was intended.
(16)
Vice-chairperson— The term Vice-chairperson means the Vice-chairperson of the Board.