Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025

Short title— This Act may be cited as the “Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025”.

Table of contents— The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Vladimir Putin has demonstrated his intent to continue his war of aggression against Ukraine, including through violating ceasefires over the last decade, laying out maximalist demands, employing stall tactics, and repeatedly firing weapons into civilian areas;

the Russian Federation poses a threat beyond Ukraine, with Russian Government officials stating territorial ambitions in Poland and in the Baltic States, and carrying out acts of hybrid war, including sabotage and assassinations, across the NATO Alliance and in partner nations;

since 2014, the United States has stood firmly with Ukraine in its defense of its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and democratic character, and has reaffirmed this commitment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022;

continued support for Ukraine serves vital national security interests of the United States by helping to uphold international law, deter aggression, and promote stability in Europe and around the world;

since 2014, and particularly following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine has employed adaptive, innovative, and asymmetric defense strategies to resist aggression from the Russian Federation;

the United States has a compelling national interest in learning from partners' combat experience to inform its own defense strategies, procurement processes, and military doctrine;

Ukraine’s adaptive and resourceful defense strategies, particularly its use of emerging technologies, unmanned systems, cyber defense, and decentralized operations, have yielded critical insights into modern warfare, and have directly informed United States military research, development, and doctrine;

such innovations are directly relevant to deterring and responding to potential aggression in the Indo-Pacific region;

the lessons learned in Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s aggression should be immediately and directly applied to deterring aggression by foreign adversaries, including the People's Republic of China, and where possible, bilateral and multilateral initiatives to build upon these innovations should be encouraged and sponsored;

initiatives, such as Operation Spiderweb, have exposed potential vulnerabilities within United States and allied defense systems, and have offered valuable opportunities to enhance readiness;

lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience may help the United States identify vulnerabilities, improve resilience, and enhance innovation in its own defense posture;

the People's Republic of China is watching the extent to which the United States continues to vigorously support and provide military assistance to Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression and to evaluate the practical strength of the United States commitment to deterring potential aggression in the Indo-Pacific region;

what the United States does or does not do to support Ukraine could directly influence the People's Republic of China’s calculus with respect to its own territorial aspirations;

while there can only be a diplomatic resolution to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, decreasing or ceasing United States military and financial support to Ukraine would only strengthen Vladimir Putin’s bargaining power in such negotiations by weakening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield;

demonstrating the United States resolve in support of Ukraine is the only way to force Vladimir Putin to negotiate seriously to end the war on fair and equitable terms; and

it is therefore in the vital national security interest of the United States to continue strategic investments in Ukraine’s defenses in order to strengthen the defenses of the United States and its allies to advance President Trump’s “Peace through Strength” agenda.

Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

Russian aggressor state sovereign asset— The term Russian aggressor state sovereign asset has the meaning given such term in section 2 of the REPO for Ukrainians Act (division F of Public Law 118–50; 22 U.S.C. 9521 note).