Congress finds the following:
(1)
Undersea communication cables (in this Act referred to as “undersea cables”) are critical infrastructure essential for global communication, commerce, and national security, particularly for Taiwan, whose economic and security stability relies heavily on undersea cable connectivity.
(2)
The Government of the People's Republic of China has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
(3)
Undersea cables are a primary target in the strategy of the Government of the People's Republic of China to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of undersea cables would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions.
(4)
The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on undersea cables has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(5)
The ability of the Government of the People's Republic of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a critical element of its military strategy aimed at softening Taiwan's defenses and isolating Taiwan from international support in the event of an invasion or military confrontation.
(6)
Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the People's Republic of China, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving Taiwan and other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands of Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to two undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing toward deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an international undersea cable and identified a “suspicious vessel”—the Chinese-linked cargo ship Shunxin39—near the affected area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated concerns that that vessel may have been involved in deliberately cutting the cable. In a subsequent incident, Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58, suspected of deliberately severing an undersea cable. The Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the possibility of China's involvement as part of a “grey area intrusion”.
(7)
Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting Chinese and Russian involvement in several incidents, although some damages have been attributed to natural causes. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of those critical systems to gray zone tactics and the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
(8)
The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security without direct military confrontation.
(9)
Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific.
(10)
To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets.