(2)
Reportable activity— For purposes of this section, reportable activity is any of the following:
(A)
Behavior expressing that the model is attempting to evade human oversight, deceive evaluators or operators, circumvent safeguards, resist shutdown or modification, obtain unauthorized access to tools, systems, or privileges, or otherwise undermine the ability of human operators to reliably control the model, but does not include behavior elicited solely through an evaluation designed to elicit such behavior, in which the model is not in production deployment and the behavior is not indicative of analogous behavior in deployment.
(B)
Unauthorized access to, theft of, or attempted theft of model weights that the developer reasonably assesses had a credible prospect of obtaining, evidence that model weights have been exfiltrated or materially compromised, or behavior suggesting that a model is autonomously attempting to exfiltrate model weights without authorization or otherwise facilitate unauthorized transfer of model weights or related model artifacts outside of a testing environment.
(C)
Capabilities that could materially enable or accelerate offensive cyber operations against important software, widely used digital infrastructure, industrial systems, or critical infrastructure, including through the discovery, exploitation, chaining, weaponization, or operationalization of vulnerabilities at a scale, speed, or level of sophistication that could pose serious risks to the national security of the United States or to public safety.
(D)
Evidence that a covered model, when unprompted, has demonstrated the ability to materially accelerate or automate the research, development, evaluation, engineering, or improvement of advanced artificial intelligence systems, including in ways that could significantly compress timelines for the development or deployment of more capable systems, where the model developer knows, or reasonably believes, that such developments could have serious implications for the national security of the United States or for public safety.
(E)
Capabilities that could materially enable or accelerate the development, acquisition, or use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive weapons by providing uplift to actors that would not otherwise possess such capabilities at a scale, speed, or level of sophistication that could pose serious risks to the national security of the United States or to public safety.
(F)
Any circumstance in which an incident or harm of a type described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) was reasonably likely to occur and would have posed a serious risk to the national security of the United States or to public safety, but was prevented only because of circumstances unrelated to the safeguards, controls, or mitigations of the developer, such as the conduct of a third party, the absence of capability or intent on the part of a user, or other fortuity.
(G)
Any other capability, incident, or combination of circumstances that the Secretary determines, by rulemaking, appropriate relating to serious harm to the national security of the United States or to public safety.