It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components represent one of the United States most effective defenses of this foundational technology;
(2)
advanced computing applications like artificial intelligence are transforming military affairs and the balance of power;
(3)
the United States and its allies have an advantage in the foundational technologies that underpin advanced computing applications, including advanced-node integrated circuits and production, and the equipment and software required to design and produce advanced-node integrated circuits;
(4)
robust controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components have been a bipartisan priority across multiple administrations, reflecting a shared recognition that protecting America’s semiconductor advantage is essential to national security;
(5)
the adversaries of the United States are exploiting gaps in the current export control regime;
(6)
certain entities, including ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), Hua Hong, Semiconductor Ltd. (Hua Hong), Huawei, Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei), Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (YMTC), Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc. China (AMEC), Beijing E-Town Semiconductor Technology Co., Ltd. (E-Town Semiconductor), NAURA Technology Group Co., Ltd. (NAURA), Piotech Semiconductor Equipment Co., Ltd. (Piotech), ACM Research, Inc. (ACM Research), PNC Process Systems Co., Ltd. (PNC Process Systems), Skyverse Technology Co. (Skyverse), Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (Group) (SMEE), Kingsemi Co., Ltd. (Kingsemi), and Hwatsing Technology Co. Ltd. (Hwatsing) are engaged in efforts to produce advanced-node integrated circuits and especially crucial for the Military-Civil Fusion efforts of the People’s Republic of China and warrant comprehensive export controls to prevent those companies from accessing items made with United States technologies;
(7)
companies located in adversary countries that produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment are critical to adversaries’ efforts to develop advanced-node integrated circuit production capabilities and overcome export controls, and should not be permitted to utilize or benefit from United States or allied technology or components; and
(8)
the United States Government should work closely with allies and partners of the United States to align export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components to prevent gaps in controls, reduce the risk of circumvention, and ensure a level global playing field.