Section 1 Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Critical Minerals Trade Security Act”.
Critical Minerals Trade Security Act
A BILL
To establish within the Office of the United States Trade Representative a Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Findings
Congress finds the following:
Critical minerals, including rare earth elements, are essential for national security and economic resilience.
Processed critical minerals and their derivative products are key building blocks of the defense industrial base of the United States and integral to applications such as jet engines, missile guidance systems, advanced computing, radar systems, advanced optics, and secure communications equipment.
The United States remains heavily dependent on foreign sources of critical minerals which exposes the economy and defense sector to supply chain disruptions and economic coercion.
Foreign producers of critical minerals have engaged in price manipulation, overcapacity, and arbitrary export restrictions, using their supply chain dominance as a tool for geopolitical and economic leverage over the United States.
Sec. 3 Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator
Section 141 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2171(b)) is amended as follows:
In subsection (b)(2)—
in the first sentence, by inserting “one Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator,” after “one Chief Agricultural Negotiator,”; and
by inserting “the Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator,” after “the Chief Agricultural Negotiator,” each place it appears.
In subsection (c), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(7) The principal functions of the Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator shall be to conduct trade negotiations regarding critical minerals, enforce trade agreements relating to United States critical minerals resources, take appropriate action to address the acts, policies, or practices of trade partners with respect to critical minerals, and lead the coordination of the Office’s critical minerals policy in consultation with the following individuals:
“(A) The Secretary of State or his designee.
“(B) The Secretary of Energy or his designee.
“(C) The Secretary of the Interior or his designee.
“(D) Any other individual the United States Trade Representative determines appropriate.”
By adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(i) Annual report by Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator
“(1) In general—Not later than September 30, 2026, and annually thereafter, the Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and concurrently publish on a publicly available website of the United States Trade Representative, a report that—
“(A) describes in detail the results of a review with respect to the acts, policies, and practices relating to the trade in critical minerals in the preceding fiscal year of countries determined by such negotiator to—
“(i) have a significant trade relationship with the United States; or
“(ii) pose a risk to the supply chains of the United States; and
“(B) determines whether each such act, policy, or practice reviewed under subparagraph (A)—
“(i) creates a supply chain vulnerability which would be detrimental to the United States defense, energy, and critical infrastructure sectors; or
“(ii) violates, is inconsistent with, or otherwise denies the United States of a benefit under a bilateral or multilateral trade agreement with such identified country; and
“(C) provides an update for each plan previously submitted under paragraph (2).
“(2) Response to adverse actions—Not later than 30 days after the submission of the report under paragraph (1), the Chief Critical Minerals Negotiator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to respond to the findings of the report, including any action taken under title III of this Act, to each act, policy, or practice identified in such report that was determined under paragraph (1)(B) to violate, be inconsistent with, or otherwise deny to the United States a benefit under a bilateral or multilateral trade agreement with such identified country or create a supply chain vulnerability which would be detrimental to the United States defense, energy, and critical infrastructure sectors.
“(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.”