According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—
(1)
the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances;
(2)
a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States military operations;
(3)
in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;
(4)
in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Government of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private investors;
(5)
in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Center and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base since December 2023; and
(6)
in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many countries.