Section 1 Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Restoring American Deterrence Act of 2024”.
Restoring American Deterrence Act of 2024
A BILL
To implement the recommendations of the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Findings
Congress finds the following:
On October 12, 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (referred to in this section as the “Commission”) released a final report entitled “America’s Strategic Posture”.
The report, the consensus product of a 12-person bipartisan commission led by the Honorable Madelyn Creedon and former Senator Jon Kyl—
examined the latest intelligence available on current and projected global strategic threats;
assessed the adequacy of existing United States strategies, policies, and capabilities for addressing such threats; and
provided a series of findings and recommendations, which were subsequently made available to the President, Congress, and the general public.
The findings of the Commission reflect a rapidly deteriorating international security situation that is becoming far more dangerous for the United States and its allies and partners.
The rapid and unprecedented growth of the nuclear arsenal of the People's Republic of China and the massive expansion of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China across all domains have forever altered the global balance of power.
The various arms of the People’s Liberation Army can no longer be dismissed as an afterthought, and increasingly aggressive behavior by the People's Republic of China, particularly with regard to the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, offers little assurance that the rise of the People's Republic of China will remain peaceful.
The Government of the Russian Federation owns, and will likely maintain for the foreseeable future, the largest nuclear arsenal on Earth.
While the war following the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has diminished the conventional armed forces of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation—
continues to expand and diversify the nuclear arsenal, air and missile defenses, and space, cyber, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities of the Russian Federation; and
regularly flaunts such capabilities as to threaten and intimidate regional neighbors.
Continued efforts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal, long-range missile systems, and chemical and biological weapons programs and the clear willingness to leverage such systems and programs to threaten and intimidate regional neighbors poses a growing danger to stability in Northeast Asia.
The growth of the intercontinental ballistic missile forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presents an acute danger to the people of the United States, considering such systems may soon be capable of overwhelming the mainland missile defenses of the United States.
The long history of aggression and support for global terrorism by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through recent use of Hamas proxies to brutally attack Israeli and United States citizens, demonstrates that the Islamic Republic of Iran has no interest in the goals of international stability and peaceful coexistence.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to a long-term goal of further developing increasingly destabilizing missile technologies and acquiring nuclear weapons to dominate the greater Middle East.
Taken together, such findings reflect a global security environment very different from any the United States has ever encountered.
While the United States served as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, enduring the distant existential threat the Government of the Soviet Union posed for decades, and defied the persistent daily threat of terrorism from the earliest days of the 21st century, the United States has never faced a more complex set of global threats than are arrayed before it as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
The United States, in order to maintain its position in the international order, or quite possibly its very survival, must recognize this new threat environment, and urgently take prompt, decisive action to transform its aging array of defenses, renovate long-neglected industrial capabilities, rebuild a strong and vibrant workforce, rebuild allied confidence in the support and leadership of the United States, and craft a common, unifying vision of purpose for all United States citizens.
Sec. 3 Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
that the deterrence of strategic attacks, and in particular nuclear attacks, against the United States and its allies is the highest defense priority of the United States; and
to marshal the full weight of statutory and regulatory measures available to the United States Government to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy are provided with all necessary authorities and resources required to ensure the maintenance of a modern, effective strategic deterrent to meet the emerging suite of unprecedented strategic threats against the United States.
Sec. 4 Assessment of updated force sizing requirements
In general— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy that enables the United States to concurrently—
achieve the nuclear employment objectives of the President against any adversary that conducts a strategic attack against the United States or its allies;
hold at risk all classes of adversary targets described in the nuclear weapons employment guidance issued by the President as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
defeat the conventional military aggression of a major adversary in one geographic theater, while simultaneously providing a credible conventional deterrent to opportunistic aggression in a separate geographic theater;
provide a credible defense against limited long-range strikes against the United States homeland;
satisfy requirements of the combatant commands for the presence of surface and subsurface Navy forces at rates of 80 percent or more; and
maintain the capacity to regularly place a portion of the strategic bomber fleets of the United States on alert while not substantially undermining the requirements of the combatant commands for the presence of conventional bombers.
Elements— The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
An assessment of the amount of nuclear and conventional forces necessary to implement such strategy.
A description of the classes of targets necessary to hold at risk via nuclear forces in order to achieve the requirements of the United States Strategic Command and the deterrence and assurance objectives of the United States.
A comparison of the quantity of targets held at risk via the nuclear forces of the United States at the end of each presidential administration since January 21, 1977, and targets that are held at risk as of the date of the submission of the strategy.
A projection of the planned growth in potential target quantities due to the expansion and diversification of likely adversary capabilities during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
A comparison of the quantities and various employment options available in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States at the end of each presidential administration since January 21, 1977, and options that are available as of the date of the submission of the strategy.
A projection of the planned quantities and employment options that will be available in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
An assessment of the impact of delays in ongoing or planned modernization programs of nuclear, missile defense, space, or conventional military forces of the United States.
Any other factors the Secretary or the Chairman believe pertinent for assessing force sizing requirements.
Form— The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form and shall include a unclassified summary.
Congressional defense committees defined— In this section, the term congressional defense committees means—
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Sec. 5 Modernization of the integrated tactical warning and attack assessment system
In general— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander of United States Strategic Command, the Commander of the United States Space Command, and the Commander of the United States Northern Command, shall develop a plan for the comprehensive modernization of the United States integrated tactical warning and attack assessment system (referred to in this section as the “system”).
Inclusion of nontraditional sensors— The plan required by subsection (a) shall include a strategy for incorporating information from nontraditional data streams of the system, including sensor architectures designed for missile defenses, to provide Federal Government officials with greater fidelity and improved threat characterization, while minimizing potential degradation in system reliability and integrity.
Report required— Not later than 30 days after concluding the development of the plan required by subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees—
a report summarizing the plan; and
initial acquisition cost estimates and timelines necessary to implement the plan.
Format— The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in a classified form and shall include an unclassified summary.
Congressional defense committees defined— In this section, the term congressional defense committees means—
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Sec. 6 National workforce development strategy
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Education, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall develop a strategy for collaborating with State and local governments to promote the development of a skilled manufacturing and high-demand vocational trade workforce to support the expansion of the national technology and industrial base and nuclear security enterprise.
Reports required—
Strategy implementation— Not later than 120 days after the development of the strategy described in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report that outlines the strategy and includes a detailed description of measures to implement the strategy, including planned schedules and progress milestones.
Annual implementation progress— Not later than November 15, 2024, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on any progress made in implementing the strategy.
Definitions— In this section:
National technology and industrial base— The term national technology and industrial base has the meaning given that term in section 4801 of title 10, United States Code.
Nuclear security enterprise— The term nuclear security enterprise has the meaning given that term in section 4002 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501).
Sec. 7 Establishment of a national integrated air and missile defense architecture for the United States
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander of the United States Northern Command, the Commander of the United States Space Command, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, shall develop a comprehensive integrated architecture for defending the United States against all forms of missile attacks.
Elements— The architecture required by subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
An identification of terrestrial, maritime, orbital, and cyber technological capabilities to address nonballistic and ballistic missile threats to the United States, including the sensor, command and control, and missile defeat systems that the Secretary and Chairman determine are required for the operation of an integrated missile defense architecture for the United States during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
The technological requirements to ensure compatibility with the integrated air and missile defense capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and integrated air and missile defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific region that is under development as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
An integrated, time-phased development, procurement, and deployment schedule for the systems comprising the specified architecture.
The development and integration risk of the proposed architecture.
The personnel required to operate the proposed architecture, including opportunities for reducing the anticipated personnel requirements through increased use of automation.
Any other matters the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider appropriate.
Designation of official responsible for architecture development—
Designation— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall designate a senior official of the Department of Defense who shall be responsible for the architecture specified in subsection (a).
Duties— The duties of the official designated under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
Designing the defensive architecture for the United States.
Overseeing development of an integrated missile defense acquisition strategy for the United States.
Ensuring the budgets of each military department and defense agency are appropriate for the architecture required by subsection (a).
Siting the integrated missile defense systems comprising the architecture described in subsection (a).
Overseeing long-term acquisition and sustainment of the architecture.
Such other duties as the Secretary determines appropriate.
Report required— Concurrent with the submission of each budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, until the end of the period specified in paragraph (4), the official designated under paragraph (1) shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the actions taken by the official to carry out the duties set forth under paragraph (2).
Termination— The authority of this subsection shall terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date on which the official designated under paragraph (1) determines that the integrated missile defense architecture described in subsection (a) has achieved initial operational capability.
Congressional defense committees defined— In this section, the term congressional defense committees means—
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Sec. 8 Preparations for possible deployment of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles
Activation plan— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Commander of United States Strategic Command, shall develop a plan for deploying not more than 50 Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles in addition to the 400 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles currently deployed, during the planned life of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system.
Alternative acquisition strategy— In developing the plan required by subsection (a), the Secretary shall direct the Program Executive Officer for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to prepare an alternative acquisition strategy for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system that accommodates the deployment of not more than 50 additional Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles, which shall include—
a plan to procure booster sets that will accommodate the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles during the planned life of the system and satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
a plan develop and to procure reentry vehicles necessary to support the planned life of the weapon system and satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
a plan develop and to procure countermeasures to support the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles during the planned life of the system and satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
a plan to procure ground support and maintenance equipment to support the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles during the planned life of the system; and
recommendations for adjustments to the baseline acquisition strategy as the Program Executive Officer determines necessary to achieve the plan required by subsection (a).
Report required— Not later than 30 days after the development of the plan required by subsection (a), the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing a summary of the plan and initial acquisition cost estimates and timelines for executing the plan.
Congressional defense committees defined— In this section, the term congressional defense committees means—
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Sec. 9 Office of the Secretary of Defense Management and Process Improvements
Establishment of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Programs— Section 138(b)(4) of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
“(4) One of the Assistant Secretaries is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Programs. The principal duty of the Assistant Secretary shall be the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of nuclear deterrence activities of the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary is the principal civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on nuclear deterrence policies, operations, and associated programs within the senior management of the Department of Defense.
“(A) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary shall—
“(i) advise and assist the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the development and supervision of policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense on all matters relating to the sustainment, operation, and modernization of United States nuclear forces;
“(ii) communicate views on issues within the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense without obtaining the approval or concurrence of any other official within the Department of Defense;
“(iii) serve as the Staff Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 of this title;
“(iv) serve as the principal interface with the Department of Energy on issues relating to nuclear fuels, and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, advise the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy matters; and
“(v) advise the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on all matters relating to defending against chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction.
“(B) In the discharge of the responsibilities specified in subparagraph (A), the Assistant Secretary is immediately subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. Unless otherwise directed by the President or statute, no officer other than those specified in subparagraph (A)(i) may intervene to exercise authority, direction, or control over the Assistant Secretary in the discharge of such responsibilities.”
Modification of duties for Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment— Section 133b of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
in paragraph (5)—
in subparagraph (B), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon; and
by adding after subparagraph (C), the following:
“(D) chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 of this title; and
“(E) co-chairman of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System established by section 171a of this title;”
by amending paragraph (6) to read as follows:
“(6) overseeing—
“(A) the sustainment and modernization of United States nuclear forces, including the nuclear command, control, and communications system; and
“(B) military department and Defense Agency programs to develop capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction;”
Conforming amendments— Section 179 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs” each place it appears and inserting “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Programs”.
Sec. 10 National Nuclear Security Administration management and process improvements
Modifications to National Nuclear Security Administration Act— The National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.) is amended—
in section 3211—
by amending subsection (b)(2) to read as follows:
“(2) To support the deterrence of strategic attacks against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, security, and safety of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test nuclear weapons as necessary in order to meet national security requirements.”
in subsection (c), by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (3) as paragraphs (2) through (4), respectively, and inserting the following new paragraph (1):
“(1) fulfilling, to the maximum extent possible, the requirements for nuclear weapons of the Department of Defense;”
in section 3213(a)(2), by inserting “infrastructure construction and maintenance,” after “nuclear weapons,”;
by amending section 3214(b)(1) to read as follows:
“(1) Supporting the deterrence of strategic attacks by maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test as necessary in order to meet national security requirements.”
in section 3264, by striking “for the use” and inserting “for the cost-reimbursable use”.
Modifications to nonproliferation and national security scholarship and fellowship programs— Section 3113 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (50 U.S.C. 2444) is amended—
by striking “Department of Energy” each place it appears and inserting “National Nuclear Security Administration”; and
by striking “of the Department” each place it appears and inserting “of the Administration”;
Modifications to certain nuclear weapons stockpile matters— The Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) is amended—
in section 4201(b)—
by striking paragraph (5);
by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively;
by inserting after the matter preceding paragraph (2), as so redesignated, the following new paragraph (1):
“(1) An increased level of effort for the construction of new facilities and the modernization of existing facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to support the deterrence of strategic attacks against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including—
“(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
“(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.”
in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking “An increased level of effort” and inserting “Support”;
in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by striking “An increased level of effort” and inserting “Support”; and
by amending paragraph (4), as so redesignated, to read as follows:
“(4) Support for the modernization of facilities and projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States that support the sustainment and modernization of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile and the capabilities required to assess nuclear weapons effects.”
in section 4204—
in subsection (a)—
in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—
by inserting “, modernization, and replacement, as required,” after “effective management”; and
by striking “, including the extension of the effective life of such weapons”;
in paragraph (1), by striking “increase the reliability, safety, and security” and inserting “enhance the performance and reliability”;
by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) as paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), respectively;
by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):
“(3) To maintain the safety and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile.”
by amending paragraph (4), as so redesignated, to read as follows:
“(4) To optimize the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.”
in subsection (b)—
in paragraph (1)—
by striking “made to achieve” and inserting “consistent with”; and
by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;
by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2):
“(2) any changes made to the stockpile consistent with the objectives identified in subsection (a) are carried out in a cost effective manner; and”
in paragraph (3)—
by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:
“(A) are well understood and certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing”
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
“(C) develop future generations of design, certification, and production expertise in the nuclear security enterprise to support the fulfillment of mission requirements of the future stockpile.”
in section 4209(a)(1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “phase 1 or phase 6.1” and inserting “phase 2 or phase 6.2”;
in section 4212—
in subsection (a)(1), by striking, “as specified in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review”;
in subsection (b)—
in paragraph (1), by inserting “and high explosives manufacturing” after “weapons assembly”;
in paragraph (3), by striking “fissile materials components processing and fabrication” and inserting “processing”;
by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
by inserting after paragraph (3), the following new paragraph (4):
“(4) The fissile material component processing and fabrication capabilities of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.”
by striking subsection (c);
by striking section 4216;
in section 4405—
by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
“(a) Accelerated cleanup—The Secretary of Energy shall accelerate the schedule for defense environmental cleanup activities and projects for a site at a Department of Energy defense nuclear facility if the Secretary determines that such an accelerated schedule will accelerate the recapitalization, modernization, or replacement of National Nuclear Security Administration facilities supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile, achieve meaningful, long-term cost savings to the Federal Government, or could substantially accelerate the release of land for local reuse without undermining national security objectives.”
in subsection (b)—
by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively; and
by inserting after the matter preceding paragraph (2), as so redesignated, the following new paragraph (1):
“(1) The extent to which accelerated cleanup schedules can contribute to a more rapid modernization of National Nuclear Security Administration facilities.”
in section 4713—
in the heading of subsection (a)(1), by inserting “and new nuclear weapon program” after “extension”; and
by inserting “or new nuclear weapon program” after “stockpile life extension” each place it appears.
Sec. 11 Matters relating to the Defense Production Act
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.) is amended—
in section 301—
in subsection(a)(3)(A)(i), by striking “, in advance,”; and
in subsection (d)(1)(A), by striking “$50,000,000” and inserting “$150,000,000”; and
in section 304(e), by striking “$750,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$1,500,000,000”.
Sec. 12 Restoration of a domestic uranium enrichment capability
Sense of Congress— It is the Sense of Congress that—
the inability of the United States to domestically produce unencumbered enriched uranium undermines the national security of the United States and represents an unnecessary hurdle on the path to energy independence of the United States;
existing programs within the Department of Energy to explore various enrichment technologies are not advancing on a pace to rectify such inability with any apparent urgency; and
without clear statutory guidance to the contrary, bureaucratic inertia will prevail and continue to drag out the to domestically produce unencumbered enriched uranium for another decade or longer with little demonstrable progress toward restoring a scalable domestic uranium enrichment capability.
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall conduct an assessment to evaluate at least 2, but not more than 4, geographically disparate possible locations in the United States that would be best suited to host a modular, scalable facility for the domestic enrichment of unencumbered uranium, including highly-enriched uranium suitable for defense applications.
Environmental documentation— Once a location has been selected pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the Secretary shall issue a notice of intent to prepare an environmental document in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
Report required— Not later than 150 days after commencing the assessment required by subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report outlining the results of such assessment, including—
an initial cost assessment for the construction at least one facility; and
a statement declaring a preferred location or locations from among the locations evaluated pursuant to subsection (b).
Congressional defense committees defined— In this section, the term congressional defense committees means—
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.