Prioritizing Offensive Agricultural Disputes and Enforcement Act

Agricultural competitiveness through access to international markets is a vital part of the economy of the United States.

A healthy, well-functioning, rules-based trading system is the basis for the success of agriculture exports of the United States.

When foreign governments erect trade barriers, that makes it difficult for agricultural exporters in the United States to compete in the global marketplace and undermines the rules-based trading system.

Those trade barriers can harm farmers, ranchers, workers, and businesses in the United States and can also lead to higher prices for consumers and a less resilient international trading system.

Dispute settlement is available to the President through trade agreements with 163 countries, and there are protectionist trade barriers to agriculture exports of the United States in many of those countries.

Many of those barriers are systemically important. For example, the use by the Government of India of unrestrained price support programs violates the commitments by that government under the World Trade Organization.

The Government of India recognizes that its price support programs violate its commitments under the World Trade Organization, so instead of reforming its programs, it has repeatedly demanded an exemption from disputes for those programs. Moreover, the Government of India has tried to prevent discussions at the World Trade Organization of any other significant agricultural trade issue unless it gets a permanent exemption from disputes for those programs.

The Government of India has repeatedly raised its minimum price supports, which has had negative effects on several commodity markets and most notably has led to its dominance of the global rice trade, with a 40-percent share of the global market since marketing year 2020 through 2021. India is also the world's largest producer of pulses and second largest producer of wheat, peanuts, and cotton.

The United States Trade Representative submitted a counter notification at the World Trade Organization in 2023 showing that price supports by the Government of India for rice increased from 78.6 percent of the value of production in marketing year 2014 through 2015 to 93.9 percent of the value of production in marketing year 2020 through 2021, compared to the limit at the World Trade Organization on increased price supports of 10 percent of the value of production. That counter notification also showed price supports by the Government of India for wheat increasing from 77.7 percent to 81.3 percent during the same period. Previous counter notifications have shown similar violations by the Government of India for other commodities. For example, in the marketing year 2016 through 2017, price supports by the Government of Indian were 67.9 percent for cotton, 31.7 percent for chickpeas, 41 percent for lentils, and 47.4 percent for pulses overall.

Minor attempts to reform the agriculture subsidy system in India in marketing year 2020 through 2021 failed to produce results. Reforms enacted as a result of those attempts would not have changed the policies that violate commitments under the World Trade Organization, but would have merely provided farmers in India with opportunities to sell their products outside of the government-run mandi system, but those reforms were ultimately repealed.

Dispute settlement is an effective way to provide a neutral assessment of compliance with terms of trade agreements and empower internal reformers who recognize a problem but have not been able to overcome entrenched resistance.

Global agriculture is uniquely susceptible to trade barriers and requires special attention to resolve myriad systemic and economically significant trade violations that impede the development of a resilient, sustainable, and rules-based agricultural trading system.

the President should accelerate efforts to address foreign trade barriers that harm agriculture exports of the United States;

the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Agriculture both have a critical role in developing agricultural trade disputes;

Congress and the private sector have key roles to play in the development of disputes and agricultural trade enforcement strategy;

in the case of price supports by the Government of India, the President has exhausted other options available through the World Trade Organization short of requesting consultations under the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organization;

there should be a plan and definitive deadlines in place for a request for consultations and establishment of a panel under the Dispute Settlement Understanding;

the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with Congress and the private sector, should jointly develop a proactive enforcement strategy for addressing systemic and economically significant trade barriers in the agriculture sector; and

the Office of the United States Trade Representative is the lead agency for trade policy of the United States.

Establishment— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a joint task force to be known as the “Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force” (in this section referred to as the “Task Force”).

Membership— The Task Force shall be comprised of the following members: