Section 1 Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Undersea Cable Security and Protection Act”.
Undersea Cable Security and Protection Act
A BILL
To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Interagency working group and report on ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables
Interagency working group—
Preparation of report— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Federal Communications Commission, shall convene an interagency working group (in this section referred to as the “working group”) to prepare the report under subsection (b) and provide the briefing under subsection (c).
Chairperson— The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as the chairperson of the working group.
Membership— The working group shall be composed of participants with relevant background or expertise, as determined by the Security of Homeland Security, with the approval of the head of the relevant Federal department, agency, or component, as appropriate, from each of the following:
The Department of Homeland Security.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department.
The United States Coast Guard.
The Department of Justice.
The Department of Defense.
The Federal Communications Commission.
The Department of Commerce.
Any other component of the United States Government, regardless of whether such component is an element of the intelligence community, that the Secretary, in consultation with the head of such component, determines would materially assist in the activities of the interagency working group.
Report—
Requirement— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Federal Communications Commission, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—
assessing the challenges of protecting commercial undersea telecommunications cables landing in the United States (in this section referred to as “undersea cables”) and cable landing stations in the United States from security threats posed by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity of concern; and
examining the roles and responsibilities of the United States Government and the private sector to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of such undersea cables and cable landing stations.
Matters to be included— The report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of each of the following:
Past, ongoing, or planned efforts by the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to its role and responsibilities as the Sector Risk Management Agency for the communications sector in accordance with National Security Memorandum–22, issued April 30, 2024 (relating to critical infrastructure security and resilience), and the Federal Communications Commission, to protect undersea cables and cable landing stations in the United States from acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats, and from physical damage or disruption, including the cutting of such cables, and efforts to protect cable landing stations in the United States from vandalism, sabotage, and related terrorism threats.
The capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity of concern to target and compromise undersea cables, or to intercept data transmissions or sensitive information originating from such cables.
The potential for espionage or malicious cyber activity by repair vessels that are owned, controlled, or operated by state-owned entities of the People’s Republic of China and involved in the construction, maintenance, or repair of undersea cables.
The risks, including an associated assessment, posed to undersea cables by natural causes, the lack of geographic undersea diversity of cable landing stations in the United States, and accidental damage, and the extent to which United States cable operators and telecommunications companies rely on repair vessels that are owned, controlled, or operated by state-owned entities of the People’s Republic of China.
Past, ongoing, or planned actions of the Department and the Commission to conduct outreach to allies and partners of the United States relating to countering the security threats posed to commercial undersea telecommunications cables of such allies and partners by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity of concern.
Current mechanisms in place within the Department, the Commission, and the private sector to detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, mitigate, and respond to any acts or threats referred to in subparagraph (A) affecting undersea cables or at cable landing stations in the United States.
The resources required for the Department and Commission to initiate new, or expand existing, operations to protect undersea cables from acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats, or physical damage or disruption, including the cutting of undersea cables, and to protect cable landing stations in the United States from vandalism, sabotage, or related terrorism threats.
Recommendations for expanding operations by the Department and the Commission to protect undersea cables from acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats, or physical damage or disruption, including the cutting of undersea cables, and to protect cable landing stations in the United States from vandalism, sabotage, or related terrorism threats, including an assessment of the feasibility of the following:
Establishing an interagency and public-private coordination and incident and threat reporting mechanism to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the United States.
Training a dedicated intelligence officer or analyst cadre of the Department composed of undersea cable experts to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the United States.
Recommendations for the Department, the Commission, private sector partners, and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to jointly develop and establish standards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, or processes to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the United States.
The benefits and drawbacks, and associated analysis, of designating the Department of Homeland Security as the lead Federal entity responsible for ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the United States.
Form— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified annex.
Briefing— Not later than 30 days after the submission of the report under paragraph (1), the working group shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the findings and recommendations contained in such report.
Definitions— In this section:
Appropriate congressional committees— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
Cybersecurity threat— The term “cybersecurity threat” has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).
Foreign entity of concern— The term “foreign entity of concern” has the meaning given such term in section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651).
Intelligence community— The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
Malicious cyber activity— The term “malicious cyber activity” means activities, other than those authorized by or in accordance with United States law, that seek to compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of computers, information or communications systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems (as such term is defined in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650)), or information resident thereon.
Sector risk management agency— The term “Sector Risk Management Agency” has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).