US Codex
Bill
Notes

H.R. 7159 — what changed

Pacific Partnership Act

From Introduced in House to Engrossed in House. 3 sections amended between Introduced in House and Engrossed in House.

Sec. 2 Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1)
The United States has longstanding and enduring cultural, historic, economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the Pacific Islands, based on shared values, cultural histories, common interests, and a commitment to fostering mutual understanding and cooperation.
(2)
Successive United States administrations have recognized the critical importance of the Pacific Islands, to the world in high-level strategic documents, including the—
(A)
2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands;
(B)
2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to “shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters”;
(C)
2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as “critical to United States strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments”;
(D)
2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which recognized the need to engage further with the Pacific Islands on shared security goals; and
(E)
2022 Strategy for Pacific Partnership, which outlined goals and methods for deepening the United States partnerships with Pacific Island nations.
(3)
The United States Government should further develop, expand, and support a comprehensive and multifaceted United States policy for the Pacific Islands that—
(A)
promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;
(B)
preserves the Pacific Ocean as a corridor for international maritime economic opportunities and growth and promotes sustainable development;
(C)
supports regional efforts to address shared challenges, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and stewardship of natural resources; and
(D)
strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region’s cultural heritages.
(4)
changed The United States should support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, including—Community.
(A)
removed the 2000 Biketawa Declaration;
(B)
removed the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
(C)
removed the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security;
(D)
removed the Boe Declaration Action Plan; and
(E)
removed the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
(5)
The United States should work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Taiwan, and regional institutions like the Pacific Islands Forum.

Sec. 3 Strategy for Pacific Partnership

(a)
changed In general— Not later than January 1, 2026, and every 4 years thereafter, again not later than January 1, 2030, the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy entitled the “Strategy for Pacific Partnership” (in this section referred to as the “Strategy”).
(b)
Matters To be included— The Strategy shall include each of the following:
(1)
A description of overarching goals for United States engagement in the Pacific Islands region, including United States diplomatic posts, defense posture, and economic engagement.
(2)
An assessment of threats and pressures to the Pacific Islands region including those caused by factors such as—
(A)
natural disasters;
(B)
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;
(C)
non-United States military presence and activity;
(D)
developmental challenges;
(E)
economic coercion and corruption; and
(F)
other factors assessed to be causing a direct risk to the United States national interests in the Pacific Islands.
(3)
A plan to address the threats assessed pursuant to paragraph (2).
(4)
An analysis of the needs and goals expressed by governments of the Pacific Islands region, including at or through multilateral institutions, evaluated in light of the United States national interests.
(5)
A plan for the resources necessary for the United States to meet its goals in the Pacific Islands region.
(6)
Mechanisms, including existing forums, for coordinating and cooperating on shared goals among the following, as appropriate:
(A)
the governments of Pacific Island countries;
(B)
regional partners in the Pacific Islands region, including multilateral forums and organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum;
(C)
civil society in the Pacific Islands; and
(D)
United States subnational governments in the Pacific.
(c)
Consultation— In developing the Strategy, the President should consult, as appropriate, with—
(1)
relevant United States governmental agencies;
(2)
regional organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community, the Forum Fisheries Agency, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme;
(3)
the governments of the countries in the Pacific Islands;
(4)
civil society stakeholders;
(5)
United States allies and partners; and
(6)
United States Pacific territories and States.

Sec. 6 Allies and partners in the pacific islands region

(a)
In general— The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and the relevant heads of other Federal departments and agencies, should consult and coordinate with allies and partners in the Pacific Islands region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community and Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, with respect to programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including for purposes of—
(1)
deconflicting programming;
(2)
ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands;
(3)
ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent practicable; and
(4)
changed ensuring that programming aligns with regional development goals, as outlined by documents such as the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent in order goals to support sustainable development and promote a shared vision for the future of the Pacific Islands.
(b)
Formal consultative process— The President should establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years programming.