To provide for the establishment of a task force to identify trade barriers to United States agricultural exports and carry out other related duties.

Agricultural competitiveness through access to international markets is a vital part of the United States economy.

A healthy, well-functioning rules-based trading system is the basis for the success of United States agricultural exports.

When foreign governments erect trade barriers this makes it difficult for United States agricultural exporters to compete in the global marketplace while undermining the rules-based trading system.

These trade barriers can harm United States farmers, ranchers, workers, and businesses, and they can also lead to higher prices for consumers and a less resilient international trading system.

Dispute settlement is available through trade agreements with 163 other countries and there are protectionist trade barriers to United States agricultural exports in many of these countries.

Many of these barriers are systemically important. For example, India’s unrestrained use of price support programs violates its commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

India recognizes that its price support programs violate its WTO commitments, so instead of reforming its programs, it has repeatedly demanded a permanent exemption from disputes for these programs. Moreover, India has tried to prevent discussions at the WTO of any other significant agricultural trade issue unless it receives such a permanent exemption.

The Government of India has repeatedly raised its minimum price supports, which has had negative effects on several commodity markets and most notably has led to its dominance of the global rice trade, with a 40-percent share of the global market since marketing year 2020 through 2021. India is also the world's largest producer of pulses and second largest producer of wheat, peanuts, and cotton.

The United States Trade Representative submitted a counter notification at the World Trade Organization in 2023 showing that price supports by the Government of India for rice increased from 78.6 percent of the value of production in marketing year 2014 through 2015 to 93.9 percent of the value of production in marketing year 2020 through 2021, compared to the limit at the World Trade Organization on increased price supports of 10 percent of the value of production. That counter notification also showed price supports by the Government of India for wheat increasing from 77.7 percent to 81.3 percent during the same period. Previous counter notifications have shown similar violations by the government of India for other commodities. For example, in the 2016/17 marketing year, the support level was 67.9 percent for cotton, 31.7 percent for chickpeas, 41 percent for lentils, and 47.4 percent for pulses overall.

Minor attempts to reform the Indian agriculture subsidy system in the marketing year 2020/2021 failed to produce results. The enacted reforms would not have changed the policies that violate WTO commitments but would have merely provided farmers with opportunities to sell their products outside of the government-run “mandi” system, but those were ultimately repealed.

Dispute settlement is an effective way to provide a neutral assessment of compliance with trade agreement terms and empower internal reformers who recognize a problem but have not been able to overcome entrenched resistance.

Global agriculture is uniquely susceptible to trade barriers and requires special attention to resolve myriad systemic and economically significant trade violations that impede the development of a resilient, sustainable, and rules-based agricultural trading system.

the United States should accelerate efforts to address foreign trade barriers that harm United States agricultural exports;

the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Agriculture both have a critical role in developing agricultural trade disputes;

Congress and the private sector have key roles to play in the development of disputes and agricultural trade enforcement strategy;

in the case of India’s minimum price supports, the United States has exhausted other options available through the World Trade Organization short of requesting consultations under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);

there should be a plan and definitive deadlines in place for a request for consultations and establishment of a panel under the DSU;

the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Agriculture should jointly develop a proactive enforcement strategy for addressing systemic and economically significant trade barriers in the agriculture sector, in consultation with Congress and the private sector; and

the Office of the United States Trade Representative is the lead agency for United States trade policy.

Establishment— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a joint task force to be known as the “Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force” (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”).

Congressional briefings— The United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Agriculture shall provide briefings on the Task Force to appropriate Members of Congress and congressional staff.