Smarter Approaches to Nuclear Expenditures Act

The United States continues to maintain an excessively large and costly arsenal of nuclear delivery systems and warheads that are a holdover from the Cold War.

The current nuclear arsenal of the United States includes approximately 3,708 total nuclear warheads in its military stockpile, of which approximately 1,744 are deployed with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear gravity bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-range fighter aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity bombs. The strategic bomber fleet of the United States comprises 87 B–52 and 20 B–2 aircraft, over 66 of which contribute to the nuclear mission. The United States also maintains 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14 Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are deployed. Each of those submarines is armed with approximately 90 nuclear warheads.

Between fiscal years 2021 and 2030, the United States will spend an estimated $634,000,000,000 to maintain and recapitalize its nuclear force, according to a January 2019 estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, an increase of $140,000,000,000 from the Congressional Budget Office’s 2019 estimate, with 36 percent of that additional cost stemming “mainly from new plans for modernizing [the Department of Energy's] production facilities and from [the Department of Defense’s] modernization programs moving more fully into production” .

Adjusted for inflation, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States will spend $634,000,000,000 between 2021 and 2030 on new nuclear weapons and modernization and infrastructure programs, an estimate that in total is 28 percent higher than the Congressional Budget Office’s most recent previous estimate of the 10-year costs of nuclear forces.

Inaccurate budget forecasting is likely to continue to plague the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, as evidenced by the fiscal year 2023 budget request of the President for the National Nuclear Security Administration “Weapon Activities” account, which far exceeded what the National Nuclear Security Administration had projected in previous years.

The projected growth in nuclear weapons spending is coming due as the Department of Defense is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces to better compete with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China and as internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of, and perhaps reduce, military spending. As then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Dave Goldfein said in 2020, “I think a debate is that this will be the first time that the nation has tried to simultaneously modernize the nuclear enterprise while it's trying to modernize an aging conventional enterprise. The current budget does not allow you to do both.”.

In 2023, the Government Accountability Office released a report entitled “Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a Comprehensive Schedule or Cost Estimate for Pit Production Capability”, stating the National Nuclear Security Administration “had limited assurance that it would be able to produce sufficient numbers of pits in time” to meet the requirement under section 4219 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2538a) that the National Nuclear Security Administration produce 80 plutonium pits by 2030.

According to the Government Accountability Office, the National Nuclear Security Administration has still not factored affordability concerns into its planning as was recommended by the Government Accountability Office in 2017, with the warning that “it is essential for NNSA to present information to Congress and other key decision makers indicating whether the agency has prioritized certain modernization programs or considered trade-offs (such as deferring or cancelling specific modernization programs)”. Instead, the budget estimate of the Department of Energy for nuclear modernization activities during the period of fiscal years 2021 through 2025 was $81,000,000,000—$15,000,000,000 more than the 2020 budget estimate of the Department for the same period.

A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office analysis showed that the projected costs of nuclear forces over the next decade can be reduced by $12,400,000,000 to $13,600,000,000 by trimming back current plans, while still maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Even larger savings would accrue over the subsequent decade.

The Department of Defense’s June 2013 nuclear policy guidance entitled “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States” found that force levels under the April 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and the Russian Federation (commonly known as the “New START Treaty”) “are more than adequate for what the United States needs to fulfill its national security objectives” and can be reduced by up to 1/3 below levels under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.

Former President Trump expanded the role of, and spending on, nuclear weapons in United States policy at the same time that he withdrew from, unsigned, or otherwise terminated a series of important arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

Reduction of nuclear-Armed submarines— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than eight Columbia-class submarines.

Reduction of ground-Based missiles— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2024, the forces of the Air Force shall include not more than 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Reduction of deployed strategic warheads— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2024, the forces of the United States Military shall include not more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, as that term is defined in the New START Treaty.

Limitation on new long-Range penetrating bomber aircraft— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any of fiscal years 2024 through 2028 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than 80 B–21 long-range penetrating bomber aircraft.

Prohibition on F–35 nuclear mission— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be used to make the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Prohibition on new air-Launched cruise missile— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of the long-range stand-off weapon or any other new air-launched cruise missile or for the W80 warhead life extension program.

Prohibition on new intercontinental ballistic missile— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of the LGM–35 Sentinel, previously known as the ground-based strategic deterrent, or any new intercontinental ballistic missile.

Termination of uranium processing facility— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing Facility located at the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Prohibition on procurement and deployment of new low-Yield warhead— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended to deploy the W76–2 low-yield nuclear warhead or any other low-yield or nonstrategic nuclear warhead.

Prohibition on new submarine-Launched cruise missile— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of a new submarine-launched cruise missile capable of carrying a low-yield or nonstrategic nuclear warhead, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review found this system “no longer necessary”.

Prohibition on sustainment of B83–1 bomb— Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the sustainment of the B83–1 bomb, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review declared the B83–1 “will be retired”.

Prohibition on space-Based missile defense— Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of a space-based missile defense system.

Prohibition on the W–93 warhead— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the procurement and deployment of a W–93 warhead on a submarine launched ballistic missile.

Initial report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3.

Annual report— Not later than March 1, 2024, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3, including any updates to previously submitted reports.

Annual nuclear weapons accounting— Not later than September 30, 2024, and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing a comprehensive accounting by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget of the amounts obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during—

Cost estimate report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the estimated cost savings that result from carrying out section 3.

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.