Think Tank Transparency Act

Think tanks have provided Congress and the executive branch with a wealth of research and scholarship that largely has benefitted the public in the United States by improving the drafting, enactment, and enforcement of policy in the United States.

There is broad bipartisan agreement that think tanks possess enormous influence on the passage and enforcement of policies, particularly those that relate to foreign policy.

In recent years, foreign funding of think tanks has increased substantially.

Congress, the executive branch, and especially the people of the United States have a right to—

The United States House of Representatives has already recognized the national security issues inherent in undue foreign influence of entities with covert sources of foreign funding that testify before Congress. Since 2015, representatives of entities who testify before the United States House of Representatives have been required to disclose relevant foreign funding sources directed to them or their employers in Truth-in-Testimony disclosure forms required under clause 2(g)(5) of rule XI of the United States House of Representatives.

Almost 30 years ago, Congress enacted section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) (hereinafter referred to as “section 117”) in light of concerns about the growing financial relationship between universities in the United States and foreign sources. In enacting that legislation, Congress balanced academic freedom and national security by mandating financial transparency through required reporting of contracts with, and gifts from, any foreign source.

Section 117 does not prohibit institutions of higher education from taking foreign money, but rather mandates accurate and transparent disclosures of sources and amounts received by those institutions to the Department of Education. In 2019, the Department of Education took concrete steps to enforce section 117 by ensuring the integrity of reporting requirements, confirming the correct reporting and categorization of donations, and prohibiting the use of domestic conduits and intermediaries to avoid the disclosures of foreign gifts.

Between 2011 and 2021, the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as “Russia”) has given not less than $160,000,000 to universities in the United States. The People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “China”) alone has given not less than $2,700,000,000 to universities in the United States during the same time frame. Further, during that span, the State of Qatar (hereinafter referred to as “Qatar”) has given not less than $5,000,000,000 to universities in the United States.

Russia, China, and Qatar each have repressive and deeply troubling records relating to human rights, and all 3 have engaged in cyber espionage targeting individuals in the United States.

Russia, China, and Qatar all pose grave threats to the national security interests of the United States, yet those countries have successfully lavished billions of dollars to cultivate strong ties with institutions of higher education and research across the United States.

There is also evidence suggesting that Qatar encouraged, and potentially facilitated, universities in the United States receiving the largess of Qatar to flout disclosure requirements of the United States under section 117.

Although the Center for International Policy conducted a study in 2020 that concluded that think tanks focused on Federal policy received not less than $174,000,000 in funding from foreign governmental entities between 2014 and 2018, there is currently no means to determine the actual level or extent of foreign influence on those think tanks.

What is clear is the vast amount of foreign funding that United States-based think tanks receive, and that such foreign funding affects the direction of their policy recommendations.

One prominent think tank, the EastWest Institute, received substantial funding from the People's Liberation Army of China, which conducts cyber espionage attacks, including against individuals in the United States.

The Stimson Center worked to significantly alter the Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (H.R. 1607, 117th Congress, as introduced on March 8, 2021) (hereinafter referred to as the “HACT Act”). The HACT Act, which would provide an exception to chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code (commonly known as the “Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976”), to allow United States persons harmed by foreign-government sponsored cyberattacks to bring civil claims for damages. The changes advocated by the Stimson Center would gut the bill and render it completely ineffective in holding foreign nations and their agents responsible for cyberattacks on and in the United States.

One of the main sources of the funding of the Stimson Center is Qatar, a major sponsor of terrorism worldwide and one of the most notorious sponsors of cyberattacks against entities in the United States. In 2019 alone (the last year for which public figures are available) the Stimson Center received over $600,000 in contributions from the government of Qatar.

The Brookings Institution has received at least $22,000,000 from Qatar from 2013 through 2021, but the exact amount has not been disclosed publicly.

There is also significant concern in Congress about potential contractual stipulations tied to foreign funding that could be leveraged by foreign powers to exert even greater influence over the research and policy recommendations of think tanks that the Federal Government and the public in the United States would otherwise believe to be independent.

In a 2007 “Establishment Agreement” between the Brookings Institution and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar—which appears to have been in place in its original form through the end of 2021—the Doha “branch” of the Brookings Institution, called Brookings Doha Center, was effectively owned and controlled by the Emir of Qatar. Under the terms of the contract, the role of the Brookings Institution in the Brookings Doha Center was limited to that of a “promoter”.

As only revealed publicly in June 2022, the Brookings Doha Center was a separate and distinct legal entity from the Brookings Institution, specifically a Private Foundation for the Public Benefit, the same incorporation status as the propaganda arm of Qatar, Al Jazeera.

Pursuant to the 2007 Establishment Agreement, the Director of the Brookings Doha Center was required to report directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, including to “engage in regular consultation . . . regarding the development and ongoing operations” and for prior approval of “programs that will be developed by the [Brookings Doha] Center.”.

The Brookings Doha Center was renamed the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, and evidence indicates that the Middle East Council on Global Affairs is now entirely under the control of the Qatari Government. According to a January 2022 amendment to the 2007 articles of incorporation of the Brookings Doha Center, the Brookings Institution ceded the “promoter” role for Brookings Doha Center to a senior employee of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Majed Al-Ansari. This amendment also called on the Middle East Council on Global Affairs to assume control of intellectual property rights that had been under the “Brookings Institution” brand, including the content from and followers of the “@BrookingsDoha” Twitter account.

Congress currently is unable to determine what other agreements that the Brookings Institution or other influential think tanks have with foreign governmental entities, a void which has already been exploited by at least Qatar in obtaining prior approval of budgets and research projects conducted under the branding of the Brookings Institution and the Brookings Doha Center in the aforementioned 2007 contract, or the transference of valuable intellectual property to the Qatari Government pursuant to the 2022 amendment to the articles of incorporation of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

There is broad bipartisan agreement that undue foreign influence obscured through the use of proxies—or hidden by the powerful brand of a highly respected think tank—threatens the national security interests of the United States. There is also broad agreement that transparency is the most important and effective tool for reducing the harm of foreign influence targeting United States public policy or public opinion.

As such, this bill aims to provide critical transparency regarding the foreign funding provided to, and the related contractual agreements with, think tanks whose work includes influencing United States policies or public opinion.

In general— A covered entity shall file an initial disclosure report, in accordance with subsection (b) or (c), with the Attorney General not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act if, during the period beginning on January 1 of the most recent calendar year that ended before the date of enactment of this Act and ending on the effective date of this Act—

Prior gifts, donations, or contributions— The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall detail the following:

Contract, memorandum of understanding, or agreement— The report required under subsection (a)(2) shall detail the following:

Labeling of written materials— If a covered entity provides a briefing, testimony, or similar form of presentation of research to a member or employee of Congress, or to an executive branch official, the covered entity shall identify prominently on any written materials provided to the member or employee of Congress, or to the executive branch official, the name of the relevant foreign principal and the country of citizenship, if the foreign principal is not a government, who provided funding for such briefing, testimony, or similar form of presentation of research.

Addendum to briefing, testimony, presentation— In the event that no written materials are provided in a briefing, testimony, or similar form of presentation of research described in subsection (a), the covered entity shall convey the information required under subsection (a) in writing to the member or employee of Congress, or executive branch official, before or not later than 10 days after the date of the briefing, testimony, or presentation.

Federal reports— If a covered entity receives a gift, donation, or contribution from, or enters into a contract or agreement with, a foreign principal, and if any other department, agency, or bureau of the executive branch requires a report containing requirements substantially similar to those required under this Act, a copy of the report may be filed with the Attorney General in lieu of a report required under this Act.

Publication— All disclosure reports required by this Act and the information and records required to be furnished pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A) shall be made available to the public through a database maintained on the official website of the Department of Justice.

Civil monetary penalty— Any covered entity that fails to comply with the requirements of this Act, including any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be prescribed by law, to a civil money penalty of not less than $1,000 for each day of the failure described by this Act—during which the covered entity is in violation of this Act.

Regulations— The Attorney General may promulgate such regulations as the Attorney General considers necessary to implement the requirements of this Act.

Conduct intending to directly or indirectly influence public policy or public opinion— The term conduct intending to directly or indirectly to influence public policy or public opinion means, with respect to a covered entity, any activity that the covered entity engaging in believes will, or that the covered entity intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States, or any section of the public within the United States, with respect to—

Contract— The term contract means any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services by the foreign principal, for the direct benefit or use of either of the parties.

Country of citizenship— The term country of citizenship, with respect to a foreign principal, includes—

Covered entity— The term covered entity—

Foreign principal— The term foreign principal includes—

Gift, donation, or contribution— The term gift, donation, or contribution means any gift of money, property, or in-kind contribution given directly or indirectly to a covered entity by a foreign principal.

Not-for-profit social welfare organization— The term not-for-profit social welfare organization means an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code.

Nonprofit organization— The term nonprofit organization means an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code.

Restricted or conditional gift or contract— The term restricted or conditional gift or contract means any endowment, gift, grant, contract, award, present, or property of any kind that includes provisions regarding—