Taiwan Policy Act of 2022
A BILL
To support the security of Taiwan and its right of self-determination, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Findings
Congress finds the following:
Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both parties and to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.
The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) has enabled the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan to maintain a strong and important relationship that promotes regional security, prosperity, and shared democratic values.
The security of Taiwan and the ability for the people of Taiwan to determine their own future is fundamental to United States interests and values.
The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan facilitate critical consular relations that—
protect the interests of the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan; and
strengthen people-to-people ties.
Increased engagement between public officials, commercial interests, civil society leaders, and others enhances Taiwanese-American relations and its economic, security, and democratic dimensions.
Taiwan serves as a critical partner on regional and transnational issues, such as public health, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, trade, and freedom of navigation.
Taiwan exemplifies a thriving democracy consisting of more than 23,000,000 people who value their suffrage, free markets, right to due process, freedom of expression, and other individual liberties.
President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as the “PRC”) continues to repeat his desire to stifle the freedom of Taiwan, as evidenced by his July 2021 proclamation, in which he stated, “All sons and daughters of China, including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must work together and move forward in solidarity, resolutely smashing any Taiwan independence plots.”.
As President Xi Jinping concentrates his power in the Chinese Communist Party (referred to in this Act as the “CCP”), he is escalating the PRC’s campaign of coercion and intimidation against Taiwan, as evidenced by—
the accelerated preparations made by the PRC and its People’s Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the “PLA”) for an offensive attack against Taiwan, such as the PLA's January 2022 incursion of nearly 40 fighters, bombers, and other warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone;
the PLA’s growing offensive preparations in the Taiwan Strait, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises and record-scale incursions into Taiwanese air space;
the Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan, such as abusing its position in international intuitions and multilateral fora to exclude Taiwanese participation despite Taiwan’s demonstrated expertise in relevant subjects, such as public health;
threats and actions to compromise Taiwan’s economy and critical suppliers, such as draconian export controls and the “31 Measures” intended to lure Taiwanese talent to mainland China and away from Taiwan;
persistent and targeted cyberattacks, numbering nearly 20,000,000 per month, which are intended to compromise Taiwan’s critical infrastructure and inflict civilian harm; and
political and economic pressure on other countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan, such as recent export controls related to Lithuania after Lithuania announced a permanent Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.
On multiple occasions, through both formal and informal channels, the United States has expressed its concern for the PRC’s destabilizing activities in the Taiwan Strait and on the international stage that aim to subvert Taiwan’s democratic intuitions.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States—
identifies Taiwan as an important leading regional partner;
seeks to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities; and
reaffirms that Taiwan’s future must be determined peacefully and in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.
The PRC considers stifling the freedom of Taiwan as a critical and necessary step to displacing the United States as the preeminent military power in the Indo-Pacific and continues its modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the PLA and its ability to conduct joint operations.
Taiwan maintains a modern, ready, self-defense force that adheres to the highest democratic principles and benefits from continued state of the art security assistance.
It is a vital national security interest of the United States to defend Taiwan for the purposes of—
mitigating the PLA’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains and limiting the PLA’s freedom of maneuver to conduct unconstrained power projection capabilities beyond the First Island Chain in order to protect United States territory, such as Hawaii and Guam;
defending the territorial integrity of Indo-Pacific allies, such as Japan;
deterring other countries and competitors from exercising force as a means to revise the established status quo;
championing democratic institutions and societies in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world; and
maintaining a rules-based international order that—
constrains authoritarian powers;
enshrines collective security;
promotes democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
promotes peace and prosperity.
Sec. 3 Definitions
In this Act:
Appropriate committees of Congress— Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Counter intervention capabilities— The term counter intervention capabilities includes, in such quantities as the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be necessary to achieve the purpose described in section 204(c)—
mobile, ground-based coastal defense cruise missiles and launchers;
mobile, ground-based short-range and medium-range air defense systems;
smart, self-propelled naval mines and coastal minelaying platforms;
missile boats and fast-attack craft equipped with anti-ship and anti-landing craft missiles;
manned and unmanned aerial and other mobile, resilient surveillance systems to support coastal and air defense operations;
equipment to support target location, tracking, identification, and targeting, especially at the local level, in communications degraded or denied environments;
man-portable anti-armor weapons, mortars, and small arms for ground combat operations;
equipment and technical assistance for the purpose of developing civil defense forces, composed of civilian volunteers and militia;
training and equipment, including appropriate war reserves, required for Taiwan forces to independently maintain, sustain, and employ the capabilities described in subparagraphs (A) through (H);
concept development for coastal defense, air defense, decentralized command and control, civil defense, logistics, planning, and other critical military functions, with an emphasis on operations in a communications degraded or denied environment; and
any other capability that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, considers appropriate for the purpose described in section 204(d).
Republic of China— The term Republic of China means the East Asia island country commonly known as “Taiwan”.
Sharp power— The term sharp power means the coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship that is intended—
to corrupt political and nongovernmental institutions and interfere in democratic elections and encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or
to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.