Congress finds the following:
(1)
Think tanks have provided Congress and the Administration with a wealth of research and scholarship that largely has benefitted the American public by improving the drafting, enactment, and enforcement of U.S. policy.
(2)
There is broad bipartisan agreement that think tanks possess enormous influence on the passage and enforcement of policies, particularly those that relate to foreign policy.
(3)
In recent years, foreign funding of think tanks has increased substantially.
(4)
Congress, the Administration, and especially the American people have a right to know which think tanks receive foreign funds and to assess for themselves the extent that foreign influence should be considered when analyzing the credibility and value of research and scholarship produced by such organizations that receive foreign funds.
(5)
The House has already recognized the national security issues inherent in undue foreign influence of entities with covert sources of foreign funding who testify before Congress. Since 2015, individuals who testify before the U.S. House of Representatives have been required to disclose relevant foreign funding sources directed to them or their employers in Truth in Testimony disclosure forms. (The original looser requirement was enacted in 1997.)
(6)
Over 30 years ago, Congress enacted section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) in light of concerns about the growing financial relationship between U.S. universities and foreign sources. Congress balanced academic freedom and national security by mandating financial transparency through required reporting of contracts with and gifts from a foreign source.
(7)
Section 117 does not prohibit institutions from taking foreign money; it mandates accurate and transparent disclosures of sources and amounts to the Department of Education. In 2019, the Department took concrete steps to enforce section 117 by ensuring the integrity of reporting requirements, confirming the correct reporting and categorization of donations, and prohibiting the use of domestic conduits and intermediaries to avoid the disclosures of foreign gifts.
(8)
Between 2011 and 2021, Russia has given at least $160 million to U.S. universities. China alone has given at least $2.7 billion during the same time frame. And during that span, the State of Qatar has given at least $5 billion to U.S. universities.
(9)
Each of these nations has a repressive and deeply troubling record on human rights, and all three have engaged in cyber espionage targeting Americans.
(10)
Russia, China, and Qatar all pose grave threats to U.S. national security interests, yet they have successfully lavished billions of dollars to cultivate strong ties with institutions of higher education and research across the United States.
(11)
There is also evidence suggesting that Qatar encouraged and potentially facilitated U.S. universities receiving its largess to flout U.S. disclosure requirements under section 117 of the Higher Education Act.
(12)
Although the Center for International Policy conducted a study in 2020 that concluded that think tanks focused on federal policy received at least $174 million in funding from foreign governmental entities between 2014 and 2018, there is currently no means to determine the actual level or extent of foreign influence on such think tanks.
(13)
What is clear is the vast amount of foreign funding that U.S. based think tanks receive, and that it affects the direction of their policy recommendations.
(14)
One prominent think tank, the East West Institute, received substantial funding from China’s People’s Liberation Army (which conducts cyber espionage attacks, including against Americans).
(15)
The Stimson Center worked to significantly alter the Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (H.R. 1607, introduced into the 117th Congress on March 8, 2021). The HACT Act, which would provide an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) to allow U.S. persons harmed by foreign-government sponsored cyberattacks to bring civil claims for damages, passed in the last Congress with broad bipartisan support. The changes advocated by the Stimson Center would gut the bill and render it completely ineffective in holding foreign nations and their agents responsible for cyberattacks on and in the United States.
(16)
One of the main sources of the Stimson Center’s funding is the State of Qatar, a major sponsor of terrorism worldwide and one of the most notorious sponsors of cyberattacks against U.S. entities. In 2019 alone (the last year public figures are available) the Stimson Center took over $600,000 in contributions from the Government of Qatar.
(17)
The Brookings Institution has received at least $22 million from the State of Qatar from 2013 through 2021, but the exact amount has not been disclosed publicly.
(18)
There is also significant concern in Congress about potential contractual stipulations tied to foreign funding that could be leveraged by foreign powers to exert even greater influence over the research and policy recommendations of think tanks that the Federal Government and the American public would otherwise believe to be independent.
(19)
In a 2007 “Establishment Agreement” between the Brookings Institution and Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which appears to have been in place in its original form through the end of 2021—the Doha “branch” of the Brookings Institution, called Brookings Doha Center, was effectively owned and controlled by the Emir of Qatar. Under the terms of the contract, the Brookings Institution’s role in the Doha Center was limited to that of a “Promoter”.
(20)
As only revealed publicly in June 2022, the Brookings Doha Center was a separate and distinct legal entity, specifically a Private Foundation for the Public Benefit, the same incorporation status as the State of Qatar’s propaganda arm, Al Jazeera.
(21)
Pursuant to the 2007 Establishment Agreement, the Director of the Brookings Doha Center was required to report directly to Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including to “engage in regular consultation … regarding the development and ongoing operations” and for prior approval of “programs that will be developed by the [Brookings Doha] Center”.
(22)
The Brookings Doha Center was renamed the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, and evidence indicates that it is now entirely under the control of the Qatari Government. According to a January 2022 “Amendment” to the 2007 Articles of Incorporation, the Brookings Institution ceded the “Promoter” role for Brookings Doha Center to a senior employee of Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Majed Al-Ansari. This Amendment also called on the Middle East Council to assume control of intellectual property rights that had been under the “Brookings” brand, including the content from and followers of the “@BrookingsDoha” Twitter account.
(23)
Congress currently is unable to determine what other agreements that the Brookings Institution or other influential think tanks have with foreign governmental entities, a void which has already been exploited by at least the State of Qatar in obtaining prior approval of budgets and research projects conducted under the branding of the Brookings Institution and the Brookings Doha Center in the aforementioned 2007 contract, or the transference of valuable intellectual property to the Qatari Government pursuant to the 2022 amendment.
(24)
There is broad bipartisan agreement that undue foreign influence obscured through the use of proxies—or hidden by the powerful brand of a highly respected think tank—threatens the national security interests of the United States. There is also broad agreement that transparency is the most important and effective tool for reducing the harm of foreign influence targeting U.S. public policy or public opinion.
(25)
As such, this bill aims to provide critical transparency regarding the foreign funding provided to and the related contractual agreements with think tanks whose work includes influencing U.S. policies or public opinion.