Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act
A BILL
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
Sec. 2 Definitions
In this Act:
Appropriate congressional committees— Unless otherwise defined, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
CCP— The term CCP means the Chinese Communist Party.
People’s liberation army; PLA— The terms People’s Liberation Army and PLA mean the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.
PRC; China— The terms PRC and China mean the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 3 Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the interests and values of the United States, its partners, and much of the rest of the world.
A number of policies being pursued by the PRC—
threaten the future character of the international order and are shaping the rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among states;
will put at risk the ability of the United States to secure its national interests; and
will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, and freedom of the international community in the coming decades.
After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC’s economic and social development to ensure that it participated in, and benefited from, the free and open international order. The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by—
increasing the PRC’s trade relations and access to global capital markets;
promoting the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization;
providing development finance and technical assistance;
promoting research collaboration;
educating the PRC’s top students;
permitting transfers of cutting-edge technologies and scientific knowledge; and
providing intelligence and military assistance.
It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model at home through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary to core United States values and the values of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the international order.
The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands—
strong, centralized CCP leadership;
concentration of military power;
a dominant role for the CCP in the state and the economy;
an aggressive foreign policy seeking control over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
the denial of any universal values and individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, “We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of development will have increasingly greater influence on the world.”.
The PRC’s objectives are to first establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant position to propel the PRC to become the “leading world power”, shaping an international order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other countries’ interests.
The PRC is reshaping the current international order, which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals and principles, by conducting global information and influence operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense of the interests of the United States and the international community.
The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its model of development and governance. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model of development for other countries by utilizing “Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solving problems”.
The PRC is promoting its governance model and attempting to weaken other models of governance by—
undermining democratic institutions;
subverting financial institutions;
coercing businesses to accommodate the policies of the PRC; and
using disinformation to disguise the nature of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor to be a major world center for science and innovation”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research and development and established joint scientific research centers and science universities.
The PRC’s drive to become a “manufacturing and technological superpower” and to promote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is coming at the expense of human rights and longstanding international rules and norms with respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to United States national security and the security of allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over its citizens’ everyday lives. Its national strategy of “civil-military fusion” mandates that civil and commercial research, which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to develop new military capabilities.
The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively undermine a free and open international market, such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements between Chinese and foreign companies.
The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and development security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.
The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of economic relations with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets, enhances the PRC’s political leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic dependence.
The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has built and supported enduring alliances and economic partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep the United States military from operating in the Western Pacific and erodes United States security guarantees.
The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of security operations in areas permitted under international law.
The PRC seeks so-called “reunification” with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism challenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi’s September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi announced that “construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.
The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a level of capacity and capability superior to the United States in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations by shifting its military doctrine from having a force “adequate [for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force “commensurate with China’s international status”. Ultimately, this transformation could enable China to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi established the following developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
A mechanized force with increased informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.
The complete modernization of China’s national defense by 2035.
The full transformation of the PLA into a world-class force by 2050.
The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies described in this section undermine United States interests, such as—
upholding a free and open international order;
maintaining the integrity of international institutions with liberal norms and values;
preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific;
ensuring the defense of its allies;
preserving open sea and air lanes;
fostering the free flow of commerce through open and transparent markets; and
promoting individual freedom and human rights.
The global COVID–19 pandemic has intensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s behavior and therefore increased the need for United States global leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the COVID–19 pandemic by—
moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called “national security law” on Hong Kong;
aggressively imposing its will in the East and South China Seas;
increasing its territorial aggression in South Asia, including against India; and
engaging in a widespread and government-directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion about the origination of the outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, and global health efforts.
The CCP’s disinformation campaign referred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—
concerted efforts, in the early days of the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of person-to-person transmission;
claims that the virus originated in United States biological defense research at Fort Detrick, Maryland;
Chinese state media reports insinuating a possible link between the virus and other United States biological facilities; and
efforts to block access to qualified international infectious disease experts who might contradict the CCP’s narrative.
In response to the PRC’s strategy and policies, the United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
The United States policy of strategic competition with respect to the People’s Republic of China is part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with cooperation with United States allies and partners to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse region.
The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for promoting United State security interests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years—
to support greater security and defense cooperation between the United States and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
to advance democracy and the protection and promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;
to deepen people-to-people engagement through programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and
to enhance energy cooperation and energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 4 Statement of policy
Objectives— It is the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:
The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, technological, and military domains.
The United States position as an indispensable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement.
The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
The United States and its allies maintain a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
The allies and partners of the United States—
maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; and
work closely with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community.
The combined economic and military strength of the United States and its allies and partners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.
The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based international order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.
The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including—
the protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and
that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders in the liberal international order.
The United States counters attempts by the PRC to—
undermine open and democratic societies;
distort global markets;
manipulate the international trade system;
coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and military means; or
use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states’ national security interests.
The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
Policy— It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—
to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests;
to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, security, informational, and technological realms to maximize the United States’ strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harming the interests and values of the United States and its partners and allies;
to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its allies and friends;
to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;
to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, constructive competition in United States-China economic relations by—
advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and
improving United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;
to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that—
support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;
promote open markets;
establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;
improve the management of key economic sectors;
combat corruption;
foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; and
support American workers and create American jobs;
to play a leading role in advancing international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;
to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;
to ensure that the United States is second to none in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—
providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;
modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;
enhancing the role of the United States in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;
reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;
collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—
coordinating and aligning export control measures;
building capacity for defense technology security;
safeguarding chokepoints in strategically critical supply chains; and
ensuring diversification; and
designing major defense capabilities for export to vetted allies and partners;
to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that—
advance a free and open international order;
strengthen democratic institutions;
protect and promote human rights; and
uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating solutions to global challenges;
to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order and address regional and global challenges posed by the Government of the PRC regarding—
violations and abuses of human rights;
restrictions on religious practices; and
the undermining and abrogation of treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights;
to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the United States or its allies and partners;
to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including through necessary investments in United States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with allies and partners;
to deter the PRC from—
initiating armed conflict;
coercing nations; or
using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict;
to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve both military and civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and
to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially in the following areas—
global fight against climate change;
nuclear security; and
global financial stability.
Sec. 5 Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States—
to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives; and
to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of—
the current challenges facing the international rules based order; and
the need for long-term investments and engagement to defend shared interests and values.
The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC behavior.
Effective United States strategy toward China requires—
bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.
The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies to enable such actors—
to collaborate to advance common interests; and
to identify appropriate policies—
to strengthen the United States and its allies; and
to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order.
The United States must ensure that all Federal departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and resourced to effectively defend and advance United States interests, by—
dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, DC;
placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international development professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
ensuring that this workforce has the training, demonstrated proficiency in language and culture, technical skills, and other competencies required to advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
The United States must place renewed priority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.
The United States must sustain military capabilities necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—
promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;
reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion; and
deterring PRC aggression and preventing unwanted conflict.
Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—
promote the value of partnership with the United States; and
counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States interests.
Sec. 6 Rules of construction
Applicability of existing restrictions on assistance to foreign security forces— Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.
No authorization for the use of military force— Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.