Advancing Competitiveness, Transparency, and Security in the Americas Act of 2020
A BILL
To strengthen the United States ties with Latin American and Caribbean countries through diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, to counter efforts by the People’s Republic of China to undermine United States interests and values in the Americas, and to promote economic development and competitiveness in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
2. Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
The People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean since 2004. Latin America is the second largest destination for Chinese foreign direct investment. China has become the top trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. China’s trade with Latin America has grown from $17,000,000,000 in 2002 to $306,000,000,000 in 2018.
Between 2005 and 2018, the People’s Republic of China provided Latin America with an estimated $141,000,000,000 in development loans and other assistance. The annual amount of such loans and assistance consistently surpasses the annual sovereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean from either the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank.
The People’s Republic of China—
is investing extensively across the region’s extractive sector and agricultural supply chains to more effectively control raw materials supply and pricing;
has acquired and built new port facilities and other transport and energy infrastructure in Brazil, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and elsewhere in the region to expand its footprint in Latin America; and
has developed strong partnerships and engaged in extensive deal-making in telecommunications and other technology-intensive sectors in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
In 2015, the People’s Republic of China and countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held the first meeting of the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum, at which they agreed to a 5-year cooperation plan regarding politics, security, trade, investment, finance, infrastructure, energy, resources, industry, agriculture, science, and people-to-people exchanges. China is also active in other regional institutions, including multilateral development banks.
The United States Southern Command has warned that China’s space and telecommunications ventures in Latin America and the Caribbean have created United States commercial and security vulnerabilities.
China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
China promotes the repressive use of technology—
by selling crowd control weapons and riot gear used against demonstrators; and
by developing tracking systems that can be used by governments to surveil and monitor their citizens.
Although China did not originally include the Latin American and Caribbean region in its Belt and Road Initiative—
at a meeting with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in January 2018, China invited Latin America and the Caribbean to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative, referring to the region as a natural fit for a program that aims to improve connectivity between land and sea through jointly built logistic, electricity, and information pathways; and
19 Latin American and Caribbean countries have signed bilateral Belt and Road Cooperation Agreements since 2017.
The People’s Republic of China offers to finance projects in Latin America and the Caribbean on deceptively easy terms that frequently lead recipient countries to become dependent on, and deeply indebted to, China. Chinese companies frequently engage in exploitative practices, including predatory lending, and project requirements that—
provide little or no benefit to the host country; and
facilitate corrupt practices.
The Government of China expects that Chinese companies will invest the equivalent of $250,000,000,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2025.
Since 2017, China has used its increasing economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean to encourage countries, including El Salvador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Of the 15 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 9 are in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
3. Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States shares extensive economic and commercial relations, democratic values, cultural ties, and geographic proximity with the nations of the Western Hemisphere;
increased United States engagement with countries in the Western Hemisphere is essential to addressing initiatives by rival powers, such as China, to increase their presence and influence over governments in Latin American and the Caribbean at the expense of strategic economic and security interests of the United States;
the United States is uniquely positioned to promote the rule of law and support the strengthening of democratic institutions and individual freedoms in Latin America and the Caribbean, while improving the quality of life of citizens throughout the Western Hemisphere;
China’s growing presence in the Western Hemisphere—
has contributed to the survival of autocratic and anti-democratic regimes, such as the Maduro regime and the Government of Cuba, by acting as a lender of last resort and providing other forms of economic support;
has assisted such regimes in undermining democratic norms through weapons sales and the proliferation of surveillance technology; and
has provided governments with the resources to implement irresponsible economic policies to the detriment of its citizens.
the United States Government should continue to assert a positive presence in the Western Hemisphere based upon—
supporting the rule of law, combating corruption, and advancing digital security as a means to improve prospects for regional growth and development and mitigate the unfair advantage accrued to those that engage in unfair and illegal practices;
facilitating technical assistance and knowledge-sharing programs that strengthen regional governments’ and businesses’ capacity for engaging in sound negotiations and contracts, protect their economic interests, and protect the economic interests of their citizens;
engaging in development investments that strengthen United States public and private sector ties to Western Hemisphere governments and businesses, promote shared conviction that open markets and fair competition are critical to sustained economic growth, enhance regional businesses’ ability to move up the value chain, and are environmentally sustainable;
raising awareness regarding how the proliferation of Chinese economic largesse and the increased adoption of Chinese surveillance technology can harm Western Hemisphere economies and undermine democratic institutions;
empowering local and international media and civil society to carefully monitor investment activity in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure accountability and uncover the malign effects of greater Chinese engagement, including a lack of transparency, facilitation of corruption, unsustainable debt, environmental damage, opaque labor and business practices of Chinese firms, and the increased likelihood of projects that leave host countries in unsustainable debt; and
promoting greater economic engagement between the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere to spur economic development in the region and increase economic opportunities for the United States private sector.
4. Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
to expand United States engagement in the Western Hemisphere through economic and public diplomacy that strengthens political and economic relations, reinforces shared democratic values, and facilitates economic development in the Western Hemisphere; and
to promote United States economic prosperity through increased engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.
5. Definitions
In this Act:
Caribbean— The term Caribbean does not include Cuba, unless it is specifically named.
Latin america and the caribbean— The term Latin America and the Caribbean does not include Cuba, unless Cuba is specifically named.
Rule of law— The term rule of law refers to a durable system of institutions and processes founded on the universal principles of—
accountability;
just laws that protect fundamental freedoms;
open and transparent government processes; and
accessible and impartial dispute resolution.
6. Assessing the intentions of the People’s Republic of China in the Western Hemisphere
Defined term— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
Reporting requirement— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of—
Chinese economic activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as foreign direct investment, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, other preferential trading arrangements, and projects related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative;
the involvement of Chinese government entities and state-owned enterprises in infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as—
the building, renovating, and operating of port facilities, including the Margarita Port of Panama, Posorja Deepwater Port in Ecuador, and the Port of Paranaguá in Brazil;
the building and maintenance of the region’s telecom infrastructure, including the bidding and construction of fiber optic submarine cables and the installation of 5G technologies, by Chinese companies, including Huawei, ZTE, and possibly others, and the likelihood that these companies will be the dominant providers of telecommunications infrastructure and associated products and services in the region, with great influence over Latin American government telecom entities;
the building of government facilities in the region; and
the building of Ecuador’s Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and other energy infrastructure projects in the region;
Chinese military activity in the region, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as the major satellite and space control station China recently constructed in Argentina;
Chinese security activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to regional governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Ecuador, and the potential use of such technology as tools of Chinese intelligence;
Chinese intelligence engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the development of dual-use platforms;
the nature of the People’s Republic of China’s presence in the region, and whether it is competitive, threatening, or benign to the United States national interests; and
Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as well the work in Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Coordination— In preparing the report required under subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, as feasible.
Form— The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified annexes.