Congress finds the following:
(1)
It is the policy of the United States to promote competition in the market for drugs and biological products by facilitating the timely entry of low-cost generic and biosimilar versions of those drugs and biological products.
(2)
Since their enactment in 1984 and 2010, respectively, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Public Law 98–417; 98 Stat. 1585) and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (subtitle A of title VII of Public Law 111–148; 124 Stat. 804), have provided pathways for making lower-cost versions of previously approved drugs and previously licensed biological products available to the people of the United States in a timely manner, thereby lowering overall prescription drug costs for patients and taxpayers by billions of dollars each year.
(3)
In order for these pathways to function as intended, developers of generic drugs and biosimilar biological products (referred to in this section as “generic product developers”) must be able to obtain quantities of the reference listed drug or biological product with which the generic drug or biosimilar biological product is intended to compete (referred to in this section as a “covered product”) for purposes of supporting an application for approval by the Food and Drug Administration, including for testing to show that—
(A)
a prospective generic drug is bioequivalent to the covered product in accordance with subsection (j) of section 505 of the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (
21 U.S.C. 355), or meets the requirements for approval of an application submitted under subsection (b)(2) of that section; or
(B)
a prospective biosimilar biological product is biosimilar to or interchangeable with its reference biological product under section 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act (
42 U.S.C. 262(k)), as applicable.
(4)
For drugs and biological products that are subject to a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy, another essential component in the creation of low-cost generic and biosimilar versions of covered products is the ability of generic product developers to join the manufacturer of the covered product (referred to in this section as the “license holder”) in a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use and supporting agreements as required by section
505–1 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (
21 U.S.C. 355–1), or secure a variance therefrom.
(5)
Contrary to the policy of the United States to promote competition in the market for drugs and biological products by facilitating the timely entry of lower-cost generic and biosimilar versions of those drugs and biological products, certain license holders are preventing generic product developers from obtaining quantities of the covered product necessary for the generic product developer to support an application for approval by the Food and Drug Administration, including testing to show bioequivalence, biosimilarity, or interchangeability to the covered product, in some instances based on the justification that the covered product is subject to a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy with elements to assure safe use under section
505–1 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (
21 U.S.C. 355–1).
(6)
The Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research of the Food and Drug Administration has testified that some manufacturers of covered products have used risk evaluation and mitigation strategies and distribution restrictions adopted by the manufacturer on their own behalf as reasons to not sell quantities of a covered product to generic product developers, causing barriers and delays in getting generic products on the market. The Food and Drug Administration has reported receiving significant numbers of inquiries from generic product developers who were unable to obtain samples of covered products to conduct necessary testing and otherwise meet requirements for approval of generic drugs.
(7)
In 2018, the Acting Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission testified that the Federal Trade Commission continues to be very concerned about potential abuses by manufacturers of brand drugs of risk evaluation and mitigation strategies or other closed distribution systems to impede generic competition.
(8)
Also contrary to the policy of the United States to promote competition in the market for drugs and biological products by facilitating the timely entry of lower-cost generic and biosimilar versions of those drugs and biological products, certain license holders are impeding the prompt negotiation and development on commercially reasonable terms of a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use, which may be necessary for the generic product developer to gain approval for its drug or licensing for its biological product.
(9)
While the antitrust laws may address the refusal by some license holders to provide quantities of a covered product to a generic product developer, a more tailored legal pathway would help ensure that generic product developers can obtain necessary quantities of a covered product in a timely way for purposes of developing a generic drug or biosimilar biological product, facilitating competition in the marketplace for drugs and biological products.
(10)
The antitrust laws may address actions by license holders who impede the prompt negotiation and development of a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use, and the Food and Drug Administration has some authority to waive the requirement of a single, shared system. Clearer regulatory authority to approve different systems that meet the statutory requirements to ensure patient safety, however, would limit the effectiveness of bad faith negotiations over single, shared systems to delay generic approval. At the same time, clearer regulatory authority would ensure all systems protect patient safety.