United States Information Abroad for Strategic Competition Act
A BILL
To improve and coordinate United States information statecraft strategy and capabilities for an era of strategic competition, and for other purposes.
2. Findings
3. Information statecraft
“(3) As needed, support the development and dissemination of fact-based narratives and analysis to—
“(A) refute and counter propaganda and disinformation directed at the United States and United States allies and partner nations;
“(B) discredit the actors responsible for such propaganda and disinformation; and
“(C) reduce the ability of such actors to influence global discourse.”
4. Active Measures Working Group for the Chinese Communist Party
5. Special fast-track procedures
6. Research and evaluation
“(B) Effectiveness assessment—In evaluating the public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities described in subparagraph (A), the Commission shall conduct an assessment that considers the relation to the United States national interest, the public diplomacy target impact, the achieved impact, and the cost of public diplomacy activities and international broadcasting. The assessment shall include, if practicable, an appropriate metric such as “cost-per-audience” or “cost-per-student” for each such activity. Upon the completion of the assessment, the Commission shall assign a rating of—
“(i) “effective” for activities that—
“(I) set appropriate goals and achieve all or most of the desired results;
“(II) are well-managed;
“(III) are cost efficient; and
“(IV) quantifiably advance the priorities of the most recent National Security Strategy and related national strategies for defense and foreign policy;
“(ii) “moderately effective” for activities that—
“(I) set appropriate goals and achieve some desired results;
“(II) are generally well-managed;
“(III) may need to improve their cost efficiency, including reducing overhead; and
“(IV) have a substantive rationale for advancing the priorities of the most recent National Security Strategy and related national strategies for defense and foreign policy, but have not demonstrated quantifiable results;
“(iii) “ineffective” for activities that—
“(I) lack appropriate goals or fail to achieve stated goals or desired results;
“(II) are not well-managed;
“(III) are not cost efficient, such as through insufficient use of available resources to achieve stated goals or desired results, or have excessive overhead; or
“(IV) do not have a substantive rationale for advancing the priorities of the most recent National Security Strategy and related national strategies for defense and foreign policy; or
“(iv) “results not demonstrated” for activities that—
“(I) do not have acceptable performance public diplomacy metrics for measuring results; or
“(II) are unable or failed to collect data to determine if such activities are effective.”