Taiwan Defense Act

the termination of hostilities or, at a minimum, the termination of the attempted fait accompli; or

the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.

a beacon of democracy in Asia; and

a steadfast partner of the United States in the common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific region in which—

the world would lose one of the great champions of freedom and democracy;

the United States and allies and partners of the United States would face severe difficulty in maintaining favorable balances of power relative to the People’s Republic of China in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and

as the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of the People’s Republic of China would possess an increasing ability—

the assessment by the Defense Science Board in 2017 that the Government of the People’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of victory whereby once conflict with the United States appeared inevitable, as might be the case if the Government of the People’s Republic of China attempted to use military force to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, then the Government of the People’s Republic of China “will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, presenting the United States and its allies with a fait accompli” and “then seek to demonstrate that the United States and its allies will incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that outcome”;

the assessment in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that, if the Government of the People’s Republic of China or another competitor in the Indo-Pacific region decides “to advance their interests through force, they are likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, competitors would seek to employ their capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives and forestall a response from the United States and its allies and partners”;

testimony by then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 that—

testimony by then Commanding General of Marine Corps Combat Development Command Lieutenant General David Berger in April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United States seek “to create strategic dilemmas through fait accompli scenarios”.

the unique challenges to the United States Armed Forces posed by the employment of the fait accompli strategy by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or another strategic competitor; and

the consequent urgent need for new thinking and steady focus by the Department of Defense on ensuring the ability of the United States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary from using the fait accompli strategy to advance its interests at the expense of those of the United States.

the incorporation in the National Defense Strategy of the Global Operating Model that includes a “blunt layer” of combat-credible forward forces postured and employed to “delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression”;

the conclusion by the National Defense Strategy Commission that the Department of Defense must position “substantial capability forward” in the form of the “blunt layer” included in the Global Operating Model to “deter and prevent a fait accompli”;

the statement for the record by the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 2018 in which he concludes, “[d]ue to the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot rely solely on surge forces from the continental United States to deter Chinese aggression or prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific”;

the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence Operations, which states that forward-deployed forces, such as those included in the blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and referenced by the National Defense Strategy Commission and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to “denying benefits” and thereby reduce “the likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adversary decisionmakers from concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli that could be extremely costly for the [United States] to reverse by force”;

the United States Army Multi-Domain Operations concept document, which states that the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capability “to immediately deny a fait accompli attack” in order to deter a near-peer adversary; and

the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 report, which states that forward-deployed forces “that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable,” and that such “stand-in” forces possess the capability to “attrite adversary forces, enable joint force access requirements, complicate targeting and consume adversary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] resources, and prevent fait accompli scenarios”.

An explanation of the objectives for the United States Armed Forces that would be necessary to deny the fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan.

An identification of joint warfighting capabilities and current efforts to organize, train, and equip the United States Armed Forces in support of the objectives referred to in paragraph (1), including—

An assessment of the role of the nuclear forces of the United States in deterring or defeating a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, including concepts for—