Congress finds the following:
(1)
The Government of Iraq responded to the protests in Baghdad, Babil, Basra, Maysan, Nasiriya, Karbala, and Najaf from October 1 through November 2019, by using unprecedented repressive measures against protestors that included shootings, sniper fire, illegal and unlawful detention, mass arrests, and weaponizing public services such as electricity and the internet.
(2)
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2470 (2019), states that 149 people were killed in early October and another 97 between October 25 and November 6, 2019, while over 6,100 civilians have been wounded during the suppression of these protests. These human rights violations and abuses resulted due to excessive force against protestors by Iraqi Security Forces.
(3)
Since 2017, Iraqi Security Forces aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), predominantly Shi’ite militias frequently backed by Iran, have committed unlawful and arbitrary killings according to the United States Department of State. Some reports indicate that PMF-aligned fighters were behind the roof-top sniper attacks in Baghdad in early October 2019 targeting protestors. Iraqi police also fired military grade tear gas grenades which lodged in protestors bodies. On October 8, 2019, the Iraqi military acknowledged the excessive use of force.
(4)
The Iraqi government also suppressed freedom of expression during the protests through the detention of journalists, blocking internet access from October 3 through 9, 2019, and again since late October, and attacking media outlets. These attacks included intimidation, harassment, and preparing journalist watchlists while also raiding satellite television stations in Baghdad.
(5)
The Commander of the Iranian Quds Force traveled to Iraq in October 2019 and met with militia leaders from the PMF. The PMF report to the Iraqi Prime Minister but many units maintain a command structure outside the formal military chain of command linked directly to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The PMF and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps established a joint operational cell in Baghdad on October 3, 2019, that may have directly contributed to the use of excessive force and snipers.
(6)
The 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the Department of State found that “civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain units of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were aligned with Iran”.
(7)
The Government of Iran continues to intervene and maintain influence with the militia leaders and Commanders of the PMF. This undermines the formal Iraqi chain of command and contributes to actions by the PMF that use repressive actions against Iraqi protestors to maintain Iranian proxy power.