It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Government of the Russian Federation, working through Russian state-owned enterprises, uses energy as a tool of coercion and political leverage;
(2)
the Government of Russia pursues a strategy to make European countries dependent on Russia for energy supplies, so as to increase this political leverage;
(3)
a central aspect to this Russian strategy is the development of export energy pipelines that are driven not by commercial viability but by the foreign policy goals of Russia;
(4)
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the Turk Stream pipeline are two examples of such Russian energy export pipelines;
(5)
the President should take action to halt such Russian energy export pipelines unless the President determines that doing so is not in the national interest of the United States; and
(6)
in making such a determination, the President should consider whether—
(A)
the non-Russian parties involved in the project have put in place safeguards to minimize the ability of Russia to use the pipeline as a tool of coercion and political leverage, including by requiring unbundling of energy production and transmission, transparency in the energy market, and effective regulatory oversight; and
(B)
the non-Russian parties involved in the project have taken concrete steps to ensure that it will not result in a significant decrease in the transit of Russian energy exports through existing pipelines in other countries, particularly Ukraine.