H.R. 2722 — what changed

“(B)

added “(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least 1 voting system at each polling place that—

added “(I) is equipped for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual and enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and contains features to support enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired;

added “(II) in the case of any election for Federal office occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act—

added “(aa) marks ballots that are identical in size, ink, and paper stock to those ballots that would be marked by hand or a ballot marking device used by voters who do not have accessibility needs;

added “(bb) marks the ballot in such a way that someone examining the ballot will not be able to readily determine whether the ballot was marked by hand or machine; and

added “(cc) combines ballots produced by the voting system with ballots marked by voters using other types of voting systems used by the State or jurisdiction in a way that prevents identification of which ballots were cast using each voting system; and

added “(III) is made available for use by any voter who requests to use it; and

added “(ii) in the case of any election for Federal office occurring after the date that is 6 years after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act, meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that allows the voter to privately and independently verify the accuracy of the permanent paper ballot through the presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections from the same printed or marked information that would be used for any vote tabulation or auditing; and”

removed “(i) ensure that individuals with disabilities and others are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including with privacy and independence, in a manner that produces a voter-verified paper ballot as for other voters;

removed “(ii) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual and enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, and nonmanual and enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired, at each polling place; and

removed “(iii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that—

removed “(I) allows the voter to privately and independently verify the permanent paper ballot through the presentation, in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections from the same printed or marked information that would be used for any vote counting or auditing; and

removed “(II) allows the voter to privately and independently verify and cast the permanent paper ballot without requiring the voter to manually handle the paper ballot;”

“247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms

“(a) Study and report—The Director of the National Science Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used.

“(b) Eligibility—An entity is eligible to receive a grant under this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form as the Director may require) an application containing—

“(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such ballots;

“(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the activities carried out with the grant not later than December 31, 2020; and

“(3) such other information and certifications as the Director may require.

“(c) Availability of technology—Any technology developed with the grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public, including to manufacturers of voting systems.

“(d) Coordination with grants for technology improvements—The Director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried out with the grants made under subsection (a) are coordinated with the research conducted under the grant program carried out by the Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology.

“(e) Authorization of appropriations—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to remain available until expended.”

“(8) Printing requirements for ballots—All paper ballots used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in the United States on recycled paper manufactured in the United States.”

Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(d)) is amended to read as follows:

“(d) Effective Date

“(1) In general—Except as provided in paragraph (2), each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section on and after January 1, 2006.

“(2) Special rule for certain requirements

“(A) In general—Except as provided in section 105(b) of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this section which are first imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 shall apply with respect to voting systems used for any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year.

changed “(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper record printers or certain systems using or producing voter-verifiable voter-verified paper records in 2018

“(i) Delay—In the case of a jurisdiction described in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to “2020” were a reference to “2022”, but only with respect to the following requirements of this section:

“(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of subsection (a) (relating to the use of voter-verified paper ballots).

“(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) and (II) of subsection (a) (relating to access to verification from and casting of the durable paper ballot).

“(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) (relating to durability and readability requirements for ballots).

“(ii) Jurisdictions described—A jurisdiction described in this clause is a jurisdiction—

changed “(I) which used voter verifiable voter-verified paper record printers attached to direct recording electronic voting machines, or which used other voting systems that used or produced paper records of the vote verifiable by voters but that are not in compliance with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II), and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended or added by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019), for the administration of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2018; and

“(II) which will continue to use such printers or systems for the administration of elections for Federal office held in years before 2022.

“(iii) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at polling places using grandfathered printers and systems

“(I) Requiring ballots to be offered and provided—The appropriate election official at each polling place that uses a printer or system described in clause (ii)(I) for the administration of elections for Federal office shall offer each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which the individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by the direct recording electronic voting machine or other such system. The official shall provide the individual with the ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is the lesser of 30 minutes or the average waiting period for an individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a paper ballot under this clause.

“(II) Treatment of ballot—Any paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this clause shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot for all purposes (including by incorporating it into the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) for the precinct) and not as a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot.

“(III) Posting of notice—The appropriate election official shall ensure there is prominently displayed at each polling place a notice that describes the obligation of the official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes using a pre-printed blank paper ballot.

“(IV) Training of election officials—The chief State election official shall ensure that election officials at polling places in the State are aware of the requirements of this clause, including the requirement to display a notice under subclause (III), and are aware that it is a violation of the requirements of this title for an election official to fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot.

“(V) Period of applicability—The requirements of this clause apply only during the period in which the delay is in effect under clause (i).

changed “(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain nontabulating ballot marking devices—In the case of a jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking device which automatically deposits the ballot into a privacy sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to “any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year” were a reference to “elections for Federal office occurring held in 2022 or each succeeding year”, but only with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of subsection (a) (relating to nonmanual casting of the durable paper ballot).”

“7 Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements

“297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems and carrying out voting system security improvements

“(a) Availability and use of grant—The Commission shall make a grant to each eligible State—

“(1) to replace a voting system—

“(A) which does not meet the requirements which are first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with a voting system which does meet such requirements, for use in the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 2020, or

“(B) which does meet such requirements but which is not in compliance with the most recent voluntary voting system guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 with another system which does meet such requirements and is in compliance with such guidelines;

“(2) to carry out voting system security improvements described in section 297A with respect to the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal office; and

“(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots.

“(b) Amount of grant—The amount of a grant made to a State under this section shall be such amount as the Commission determines to be appropriate, except that such amount may not be less than the product of $1 and the average of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of the two most recent regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in the State.

“(c) Pro rata reductions—If the amount of funds appropriated for grants under this part is insufficient to ensure that each State receives the amount of the grant calculated under subsection (b), the Commission shall make such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may be necessary to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this part is distributed to the States.

“(d) Surplus appropriations—If the amount of funds appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2) exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following in making a determination to award remaining funds to a State:

“(1) The record of the State in carrying out the following with respect to the administration of elections for Federal office:

“(A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10 years old.

“(B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures for the physical security of voting equipment and paper records at all stages of the process.

“(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available wherever electronic machines are used.

“(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter registration lists.

“(E) Providing a secure voter registration database that logs requests submitted to the database.

“(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use limitations and security safeguards to protect the personal information of voters in the voter registration process.

“(G) Providing secure processes and procedures for reporting vote tallies.

“(H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating vote totals.

“(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and reform in providing voting system security and the proposed plan of the State for implementing additional conditions.

“(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant stakeholders, including local election officials, in developing the grant implementation plan described in section 297B.

“(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities carried out with the grant.

changed “(e) Ability of replacement systems To to administer ranked choice elections—To the greatest extent practicable, an eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting system under this section shall ensure that the replacement system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for the office in the order of the voter’s preference.

“297A. Voting system security improvements described

“(a) Permitted uses—A voting system security improvement described in this section is any of the following:

“(1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such other arrangements as may be appropriate.

“(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.

“(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the State’s election infrastructure which is carried out by a provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered into between the chief State election official and the provider.

“(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified under either of the security risk and vulnerability assessments described in paragraph (3), except that none of the funds provided under this part may be used to renovate or replace a building or facility which is used primarily for purposes other than the administration of elections for public office.

“(5) Providing increased technical support for any information technology infrastructure that the chief State election official deems to be part of the State’s election infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of the State’s election infrastructure.

“(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the information technology infrastructure described in paragraph (4).

“(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration systems.

“(b) Qualified election infrastructure vendors described

changed “(1) In general—For purposes of this part, a “qualified election infrastructure vendor” is any person who provides, supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, support, or maintain, election infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit of local government, or election agency (as defined in section 801 of the Election Security Act) agency, who meets the criteria described in paragraph (2).

“(2) Criteria—The criteria described in this paragraph are such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish, and shall include each of the following requirements:

“(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.

“(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and the Secretary, and to the chief State election official of any State to which the vendor provides any goods and services with funds provided under this part, of any sourcing outside the United States for parts of the election infrastructure.

“(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.

“(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information technology infrastructure in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.

“(E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.

“(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent security testing by the Commission (in accordance with section 231(a)) and by the Secretary of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.

“(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements

“(A) In general—A vendor meets the requirements of this paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the possibility that an election cybersecurity incident has occurred involving any of the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part—

“(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or not such an incident occurred, and submits a notification meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the Chairman of the assessment as soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the incident occurred);

“(ii) if the incident involves goods or services provided to an election agency, the vendor submits a notification meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency as soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the incident occurred), and cooperates with the agency in providing any other necessary notifications relating to the incident; and

“(iii) the vendor provides all necessary updates to any notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii).

“(B) Contents of notifications—Each notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall contain the following information with respect to any election cybersecurity incident covered by the notification:

“(i) The date, time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity incident began, if known.

“(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the election cybersecurity incident was detected.

“(iii) The date, time, and duration of the election cybersecurity incident.

“(iv) The circumstances of the election cybersecurity incident, including the specific election infrastructure systems believed to have been accessed and information acquired, if any.

“(v) Any planned and implemented technical measures to respond to and recover from the incident.

“(vi) In the case of any notification which is an update to a prior notification, any additional material information relating to the incident, including technical data, as it becomes available.

“297B. Eligibility of States

“A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing—

“(1) a description of how the State will use the grant to carry out the activities authorized under this part;

changed “(2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5 years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out risk-limiting audits and will carry out voting system security improvements, as described in section 297A; and

“(3) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.

“297C. Reports to Congress

“Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees, including the Committees on Homeland Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules and Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried out with the funds provided under this part.

“297D. Authorization of appropriations

“(a) Authorization—There are authorized to be appropriated for grants under this part—

changed “(1) $1,000,000,000 $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and

“(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022, 2024, and 2026.

“(b) Continuing availability of amounts—Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section shall remain available until expended.”

changed “8 Grants for Conducting Risk-Limiting Audits of Results of Elections“303A. Risk-limiting audits

changed “298. Grants for conducting risk-limiting audits of results of elections“(a) Definitions—In this section:

changed “(a) Availability of grants—The Commission shall make a grant to each eligible State to conduct “(1) Risk-limiting audit—The term risk-limiting audits as described in subsection (b) audit means, with respect to the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding any election for Federal office.contest, a post-election process that—

changed “(b) Risk-Limiting audits described—In this part, “(A) has a “risk-limiting audit” probability of at least 95 percent of correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is a post-election process—not the correct outcome;

changed “(1) which is conducted in accordance with rules and procedures established by “(B) will not change the chief State election official of outcome if the State which meet reported outcome is the requirements of subsection (c); correct outcome; and

changed “(2) under which, if the reported outcome of the election is incorrect, there is at least a predetermined percentage chance that the audit will replace the incorrect outcome with the correct outcome as determined by “(C) involves a full, hand-to-eye tabulation manual adjudication of voter intent from some or all votes of the ballots validly cast in that the election that ascertains voter intent manually and directly from voter-verifiable paper records.contest.

changed “(c) Requirements for rules and procedures—The rules and procedures established for conducting a risk-limiting audit shall include the following elements:“(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome

changed “(1) Rules for ensuring “(A) Reported outcome—The term reported outcome means the security outcome of ballots an election contest which is determined according to the canvass and documenting that prescribed procedures were followed.which will become the official, certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.

changed “(2) Rules and procedures for ensuring “(B) Correct outcome—The term correct outcome means the accuracy of ballot manifests produced outcome that would be determined by a manual adjudication of voter intent for all votes validly cast in the election agencies.contest.

changed “(3) Rules and procedures for governing “(C) Outcome—The term outcome means the format winner or set of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in the audit.winners of an election contest.

changed “(4) Methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in the audit are those used “(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent—The term manual adjudication of voter intent means direct inspection and determination by the voting system to tally the election results sent to humans, without assistance from electronic or mechanical tabulation devices, of the chief State election official and made public.ballot choices marked by voters on each voter-verified paper record.

changed “(5) Procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during “(4) Ballot manifest—The term ballot manifest means a record maintained by each audit.jurisdiction that—

changed “(6) Rules for “(A) is created without reliance on any part of the calculations and other methods to be voting system used in the audit and to determine whether and when the audit of an election is complete.tabulate votes;

changed “(7) Procedures and requirements “(B) functions as a sampling frame for testing any software used to conduct conducting a risk-limiting audits.audit; and

changed “(d) Definitions—In this part, “(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast regardless of how or whether they were tabulated and includes a precise description of the following definitions apply:manner in which the ballots are physically stored, including the total number of physical groups of ballots, the numbering system for each group, a unique label for each group, and the number of ballots in each such group.

changed “(1) The term ballot manifest means a record maintained by each election agency that meets each of the following requirements:“(b) Requirements

changed “(A) The record is created without reliance on any part of the voting system used to tabulate votes.“(1) In general

changed “(B) The record functions as a sampling frame for conducting a risk-limiting audit.“(A) Audits

changed “(C) The record contains “(i) In general—Each State and jurisdiction shall administer risk-limiting audits of the following information with respect to results of all election contests for Federal office held in the ballots cast and counted State in accordance with the election:requirements of paragraph (2).

changed “(i) The total number of ballots cast and counted by “(ii) Exception—Clause (i) shall not apply to any election contest for which the agency (including undervotes, overvotes, and other invalid votes).State or jurisdiction conducts a full recount through a manual adjudication of voter intent.

changed “(ii) The total number “(B) Full manual tabulation—If a risk-limiting audit conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the reported outcome of ballots cast in each an election administered by contest, the agency (including undervotes, overvotes, and other invalid votes).State or jurisdiction shall use the results of the manual adjudication of voter intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting audit as the official results of the election contest.

changed “(iii) A precise description of the manner in which the ballots are physically stored, including the total number of physical groups of ballots, the numbering system for each group, a unique label for each group, and the number of ballots in each such group.“(2) Audit requirements

changed “(2) The term incorrect outcome means an outcome that differs from the outcome that would be determined by a full tabulation of all votes validly cast in the election, determining voter intent manually, directly from voter-verifiable paper records.“(A) Rules and procedures

changed “(3) The term outcome means “(i) In general—Not later than 1 year after the winner date of an election, whether a candidate or a position.the enactment of this section, the chief State election official of the State shall establish rules and procedures for conducting risk-limiting audits.

changed “(4) The term reported outcome means the outcome of an election which is determined according to the canvass “(ii) Matters included—The rules and which will become procedures established under clause (i) shall include the official, certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.following:

changed “298A. Eligibility “(I) Rules and procedures for ensuring the security of Statesballots and documenting that prescribed procedures were followed.

changed “A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if the State submits to the Commission, at such time “(II) Rules and in such form as procedures for ensuring the Commission may require, an application containing—accuracy of ballot manifests produced by jurisdictions.

changed “(1) a certification that, not later than 5 years after receiving the grant, the State will conduct risk-limiting audits of the results of elections “(III) Rules and procedures for Federal office held in governing the State as described format of ballot manifests and other data involved in section 298;risk-limiting audits.

changed “(2) “(IV) Methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in a certification that, not later than one year after risk-limiting audit are those used by the date of voting system to tally the enactment results of this section, the election contest sent to the chief State election official of the State has established or will establish the rules and procedures for conducting the audits which meet the requirements of section 298(c);made public.

changed “(3) a certification that the audit shall be completed not later than the date on which the State certifies “(V) Rules and procedures for the results random selection of the election;ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.

changed “(4) a certification that, after completing the audit, the State shall publish a report on “(VI) Rules and procedures for the results of calculations and other methods to be used in the audit, together with such information as necessary audit and to confirm that determine whether and when the audit was conducted properly;of each election contest is complete.

changed “(5) a certification that, if a risk-limiting audit conducted under this part leads “(VII) Rules and procedures for testing any software used to a full manual tally of an election, State law requires that the State or election agency shall use the results of the full manual tally as the official results of the election; andconduct risk-limiting audits.

changed “(6) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.“(B) Public report

changed “298B. Authorization “(i) In general—After the completion of appropriationsthe risk-limiting audit and at least 5 days before the election contest is certified, the State shall publish a report on the results of the audit, together with such information as necessary to confirm that the audit was conducted properly.

changed “There are authorized to be appropriated for grants “(ii) Format of data—All data published with the report under this part $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2019, to remain available until expended.”clause (i) shall be published in machine-readable, open data formats.

added “(iii) Protection of anonymity of votes—Information and data published by the State under this subparagraph shall not compromise the anonymity of votes.

added “(c) Effective date—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section for the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office held more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act and for each subsequent election for Federal office.”

added “8 Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits

added “298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits

added “(a) In general—The Commission shall pay to States the amount of eligible post-election audit costs.

added “(b) Eligible post-election audit costs—For purposes of this section, the term eligible post-election audit costs means, with respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by the State or local government within the State for—

added “(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and

added “(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.

added “(c) Special rules

added “(1) Rules and procedures—The Commission shall establish rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election audit costs for payments under this section.

added “(2) Insufficient funds—In any case in which the amounts appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs paid under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be paid to such State (determined without regard to this paragraph) as—

added “(A) the number of individuals who voted in such Federal election in such State; bears to

added “(B) the total number of individuals who voted in such Federal election in all States submitting a claim for eligible post-election audit costs.

added “(d) Authorization of appropriations

added “(1) In general—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to carry out this part.

added “(2) Availability—Any amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year limitation until expended.”

added “(9) Ballot tabulating methods

added “(A) In general—The voting system tabulates ballots by hand or through the use of an optical scanning device that meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).

added “(B) Requirements for optical scanning devices—Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the requirements of this subparagraph are as follows:

added “(i) The device is designed and built in a manner in which it is mechanically impossible for the device to add or change the vote selections on a printed or marked ballot.

added “(ii) The device is capable of exporting its data (including vote tally data sets and cast vote records) in a machine-readable, open data standard format required by the Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

added “(iii) The device consists of hardware that—

added “(I) is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act; and

added “(II) demonstrably conforms to a hardware component manifest describing point-of-origin information (including upstream hardware supply chain information for each component) that—

added “(aa) has been provided to the Commission, the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security under section 2215 of the Homeland Security Act, and the chief State election official for each State in which the device is used; and

added “(bb) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been provided under item (aa) with independent experts for cybersecurity analysis.

added “(iv) The device utilizes technology that prevents the operation of the device if any hardware components do not meet the requirements of clause (iii).

added “(v) The device operates using software—

added “(I) for which the source code, system build tools, and compilation parameters—

added “(aa) have been provided to the Commission, the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security under section 2215 of the Homeland Security Act, and the chief State election official for each State in which the device is used; and

added “(bb) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been provided under item (aa) with independent experts for cybersecurity analysis; and

added “(II) that is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act.

added “(vi) The device utilizes technology that prevents the running of software on the device that does not meet the requirements of clause (v).

added “(vii) The device utilizes technology that enables election officials, cybersecurity researchers, and voters to verify that the software running on the device—

added “(I) was built from a specific, untampered version of the code that is described in clause (v); and

added “(II) uses the system build tools and compilation parameters that are described in clause (v).

added “(viii) The device contains such other security requirements as the Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security requires.

added “(C) Waiver

added “(i) In general—The Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may waive one or more of the requirements of subparagraph (B) (other than the requirement of clause (i) thereof) with respect to any device for a period of not to exceed 2 years.

added “(ii) Publication—Information relating to any waiver granted under clause (i) shall be made publicly available on the Internet.

added “(D) Effective date—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2024, and for each subsequent election for Federal office.”

removed “(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines

removed “(A) Testing—Not later than 9 months before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the Commission shall provide for the testing by accredited laboratories under this section of the voting system hardware and software which was certified for use in the most recent such election, on the basis of the most recent voting system guidelines applicable to such hardware or software (including election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this Act.

removed “(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing to meet guidelines—If, on the basis of the testing described in subparagraph (A), the Commission determines that any voting system hardware or software does not meet the most recent guidelines applicable to such hardware or software issued under this Act, the Commission shall decertify such hardware or software.”

changed “(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines—Not later than 6 months after the date “(10) Prohibition of the enactment use of this paragraph, the Development Committee shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, operating, and updating election wireless communications devices in systems to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents.”or devices

added “(A) In general—No system or device upon which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters (except as necessary for individuals with disabilities to use ballot marking devices that meet the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)), or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, or concealed communication device.

added “(B) Effective date—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal office.

added “(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet

added “(A) In general—No system or device upon which ballot marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon which ballots are marked by voters, or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to the Internet or any non-local computer system via telephone or other communication network at any time.

added “(B) Effective date—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal office.”

added “(13) Ballot marking devices

added “(A) In general—In the case of a voting system that uses a ballot marking device, the ballot marking device shall be a device that—

added “(i) is not capable of tabulating votes;

added “(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3), is certified in accordance with section 232 as meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B); and

added “(iii) is certified under section 2216 of the Homeland Security Act as meeting the requirements of clauses (iii) through (viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B).

added “(B) Requirements

added “(i) In general—A ballot marking device meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, during a double-masked test conducted by a qualified independent user experience research laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of a simulated election scenario which meets the requirements of clause (ii), there is less than a 5 percent chance that an ordinary voter using the device would not detect and report any difference between the vote selection printed on the ballot by the ballot marking device and the vote selection indicated by the voter.

added “(ii) Simulated election scenario—A simulated election scenario meets the requirements of this clause if it is conducted with—

added “(I) a pool of subjects that are—

added “(aa) diverse in age, gender, education, and physical limitations; and

added “(bb) representative of the communities in which the voting system will be used; and

added “(II) ballots that are representative of ballots ordinarily used in the communities in which the voting system will be used.

added “(C) Effective date—Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2022, and for each subsequent election for Federal office.”

added “232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices

added “(a) In general—Any State or jurisdiction which intends to use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of section 301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may submit an application to the Commission for testing and certification under this section.

added “(b) Application, assignment, and testing

added “(1) In general—An application under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the date of the election for Federal office in which the ballot marking device is intended to be used and shall contain such information as the Commission requires.

added “(2) Assignment—Upon receipt of an application for testing under this section, the Commission shall contract with a qualified independent user experience research laboratory for the testing of whether the ballot marking device intended to be used by the State or jurisdiction meets the requirements of section 301(a)(10)(B).

added “(3) Requirements for testing—Any contract described in paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user experience research laboratory to—

added “(A) not later than 30 days before testing begins, submit to the Commission for approval the protocol for the simulated election scenario used for testing the ballot marking device;

added “(B) use only protocols approved by the Commission in conducting such testing; and

added “(C) submit to the Commission a report on the results of the testing.

added “(4) Qualified independent user experience research laboratory—For purposes of this section:

added “(A) In general—The term qualified independent user experience research laboratory means a laboratory accredited under this subsection by the Election Assistance Commission in accordance with standards determined by the Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

added “(B) Criteria—A laboratory shall not be accredited under this subsection unless such laboratory demonstrates that—

added “(i) no employee of, or individual with an ownership in, such laboratory has, or has had during the 5 preceding years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting systems; and

added “(ii) any group of individuals conducting tests under this section collectively meet the following qualifications:

added “(I) Experience designing and running user research studies and experiments using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

added “(II) Experience with voting systems.

added “(c) Review by independent board

added “(1) In general—The Commission shall submit for approval to an independent review board established under paragraph (3) the following:

added “(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under subsection (b)(3)(A).

added “(B) Any report submitted to the Commission under subsection (b)(3)(C).

added “(2) Final approval—Not later than the date that is 12 months before the date of the election for Federal office in which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot marking device, the independent review board shall report to the Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted under paragraph (1)(B).

added “(3) Independent review board

added “(A) In general—An independent review board established under this paragraph shall be composed of 5 independent scientists appointed by the Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

added “(B) Qualifications—The members of the independent review board—

added “(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-reviewed publications in the following fields: cognitive psychology, experimental design, statistics, and user experience research and testing; and

added “(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 preceding years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting systems.

added “(4) Publication—The Commission shall make public—

added “(A) any protocol approved under this subsection;

added “(B) any report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C); and

added “(C) any determination made by an independent review board under paragraph (2).

added “(d) Certification—If—

added “(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the qualified independent user experience research laboratory to meet the requirements of section 301(a)(7); and

added “(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is approved by a majority of the members of the independent review board under subsection (d)(2),

added “(e) Prohibition on fees—The Commission may not charge any fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or manufacturer of a ballot marking device, or any other person in connection with testing and certification under this section.”

added “(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines

added “(A) Testing—Not later than 9 months before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the Commission shall provide for the testing by accredited laboratories under this section of the voting system hardware and software which was certified for use in the most recent such election, on the basis of the most recent voting system guidelines applicable to such hardware or software (including election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this Act.

added “(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing to meet guidelines—If, on the basis of the testing described in subparagraph (A), the Commission determines that any voting system hardware or software does not meet the most recent guidelines applicable to such hardware or software issued under this Act, the Commission shall decertify such hardware or software.”

removed “(9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer

removed “(A) Requiring use of software for which source code is disclosed by manufacturer

removed “(i) In general—In the operation of voting systems in an election for Federal office, a State may only use software for which the manufacturer makes the source code (in the form in which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in such source code, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the software from using the software in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.

removed “(ii) Exceptions—Clause (i) does not apply with respect to—

removed “(I) widely-used operating system software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered; or

removed “(II) widely-used cybersecurity software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered.

removed “(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer

removed “(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware—A State may not use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the identification of the hardware used to operate the system.

removed “(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for custom or altered hardware—To the extent that the hardware used to operate a voting system or any component thereof is not widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the State may not use the system in an election for Federal office unless—

removed “(I) the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the components of the hardware, the design of such components, and how such components are connected in the operation of the system; and

removed “(II) the manufacturer makes the design (in the form which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in the design of the hardware or the component, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the design from using the design in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.”

added “(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent and deter cybersecurity incidents.”

added “(9) Requiring use of software and hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer

added “(A) Requiring use of software for which source code is disclosed by manufacturer

added “(i) In general—In the operation of voting systems in an election for Federal office, a State may only use software for which the manufacturer makes the source code (in the form in which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in such source code, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the software from using the software in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.

added “(ii) Exceptions—Clause (i) does not apply with respect to—

added “(I) widely-used operating system software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered; or

added “(II) widely-used cybersecurity software which is not specific to voting systems and for which the source code or baseline functionality is not altered.

added “(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information is disclosed by manufacturer

added “(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware—A State may not use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the identification of the hardware used to operate the system.

added “(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for custom or altered hardware—To the extent that the hardware used to operate a voting system or any component thereof is not widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the State may not use the system in an election for Federal office unless—

added “(I) the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the components of the hardware, the design of such components, and how such components are connected in the operation of the system; and

added “(II) the manufacturer makes the design (in the form which will be used at the time of the election) publicly available online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all intellectual property rights in the design of the hardware or the component, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who obtains the design from using the design in a manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity activity.”

removed “(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the election; and”

removed “(c) Electronic poll book defined—In this Act, the term electronic poll book means the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—

removed “(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling location, or vote center, or other location at which voters cast votes in an election for Federal office; and

removed “(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to vote in an election.”

added “(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the election; and”

removed “301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage

removed “(a) Requiring States To submit reports—Not later than 120 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the chief State election official of a State shall submit a report to the Commission containing a detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction in the State which will administer the election, including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll books and other equipment and components of such system.

removed “(b) Effective date—Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.”

added “(c) Electronic poll book defined—In this Act, the term electronic poll book means the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—

added “(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling location, or vote center, or other location at which voters cast votes in an election for Federal office; and

added “(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to vote in an election.”

added “301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage

added “(a) Requiring States to submit reports—Not later than 120 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the chief State election official of a State shall submit a report to the Commission containing a detailed voting system usage plan for each jurisdiction in the State which will administer the election, including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll books and other equipment and components of such system.

added “(b) Effective date—Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.”

removed Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is amended—

removed “(b) Waiver of certain requirements—Subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the collection of information for purposes of maintaining the clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a).”

added Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and section 203, is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

added “(10) Voting machine requirements—By not later than the date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in any subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in the United States.”

removed “4 Election security grants advisory committee

removed “225. Election security grants advisory committee

removed “(a) Establishment—There is hereby established an advisory committee (hereinafter in this part referred to as the “Committee”) to assist the Commission with respect to the award of grants to States under this Act for the purpose of election security.

removed “(b) Duties

removed “(1) In general—The Committee shall, with respect to an application for a grant received by the Commission—

removed “(A) review such application; and

removed “(B) recommend to the Commission whether to award the grant to the applicant.

removed “(2) Considerations—In reviewing an application pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), the Committee shall consider—

removed “(A) the record of the applicant with respect to—

removed “(i) compliance of the applicant with the requirements under subtitle A of title III; and

removed “(ii) adoption of voluntary guidelines issued by the Commission under subtitle B of title III; and

removed “(B) the goals and requirements of election security as described in the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act.

removed “(c) Membership—The Committee shall be composed of 15 individuals appointed by the Executive Director of the Commission with experience and expertise in election security.

removed “(d) No compensation for service—Members of the Committee shall not receive any compensation for their service, but shall be paid travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Committee.”

changed Section 301(a) If any provision of the Help America Vote this Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended or amendment made by section 104, section 105, and section 202 this Act, or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is amended held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by adding at this Act, and the end application of the following new paragraph:provisions and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.

removed “(10) Voting machine requirements—By not later than the date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in any subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in the United States.”