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Bill
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Central America Reform and Enforcement Act

S. 3540 · 115th Congress · Oct 2, 2018 · Lineage

A BILL

To provide a coordinated regional response to manage effectively the endemic violence and humanitarian crisis in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Section 1 Short title; table of contents

(a)
Short title— This Act may be cited as the “Central America Reform and Enforcement Act”.
(b)
Table of contents— The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 2 Findings

Congress finds the following:
(1)
Since 2008, incidents of murder, other violent crime, and corruption perpetrated by criminal networks, armed gangs and groups, and illicit trafficking organizations have remained at alarmingly levels in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
(2)
In 2017, El Salvador and Honduras—
(A)
continued to be among the most violent countries in Latin America and the world, with 60 and 42 murders for every 100,000 people, respectively; and
(B)
were characterized by a high prevalence of gang-related violence and crimes involving sexual and gender-based violence.
(3)
El Salvador and Honduras are both among the top 3 countries in the world with the highest child homicide rates, with more than 22 and 32 deaths per 100,000 children respectively, according to the nongovernmental organization Save the Children.
(4)
A November 2017 report by the United Nations Development Programme and UN Women stated that femicide “is taking on a devastating magnitude and trend in Central America, where 2 in every 3 women murdered, are killed because of their gender.”.
(5)
Since 2014, elevated numbers of unaccompanied minors, women, and other vulnerable individuals have fled violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle and left for the United States in search of protection.
(6)
Unaccompanied minors emigrating from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras cite violence, forced gang recruitment, extortion, poverty, and lack of opportunity as reasons for leaving their home countries.
(7)
Challenges to the rule of law in the Northern Triangle continue to be exacerbated by high levels of impunity related to murders and violent crime. In 2015, approximately 95 percent of murders taking place in Honduras and El Salvador remained unresolved.
(8)
The presence of major drug trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle contributes to violence, corruption, and criminality. According to the Department of State’s 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to be transit countries for illicit drugs originating from countries in South America that are destined for the United States.
(9)
In June 2018, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights found that in El Salvador, a pattern of behavior among security personnel and weak institutional responses may have resulted in extrajudicial executions and excessive use of force, with official figures indicating an alarming increase in the number of persons (alleged gang-members) who have been killed by security personnel.
(10)
Widespread public sector corruption in the Northern Triangle undermines economic and social development and directly affects regional political stability.
(11)
Human rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, social leaders, and LGBT activists in the Northern Triangle face dire conditions, as evidenced by—
(A)
the March 2016 murder of the prominent Honduran environmental activist, Berta Caceres; and
(B)
the ongoing targeted killing of civil society leaders in all 3 countries in the Northern Triangle.
(12)
The Northern Triangle struggles with high levels of economic insecurity. In 2016, 60.9 percent of Hondurans and 38 percent of Salvadorans lived below the poverty line. In 2014, 59.3 percent of Guatemalans lived below the poverty line.
(13)
Weak investment climates, low levels of tax collection, and low levels of educational opportunity are barriers to inclusive economic growth and social development in the Northern Triangle.
(14)
In January 2018 and May 2018, the Trump Administration announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Honduras and El Salvador, respectively, which would affect more than 500,000 individuals and their United States citizen children who may have to return to dangerous conditions in those countries.
(15)
In a November 2017 letter to the Department of Homeland Security, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that as a result of ending Temporary Protected Status, the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras “may take retaliatory actions counter to our long-standing national security and economic interests like withdrawing their counternarcotics and anti-gang cooperation with the United States, reducing their willingness to accept the return of their deported citizens, or refraining from efforts to control illegal migration.”.

Sec. 3 Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
United States support is necessary to address irregular migration by addressing the violence and humanitarian crisis in the Northern Triangle, which has resulted in the elevated numbers of Central American unaccompanied children, women, and other refugees and migrants arriving at the Southwestern border of the United States;
(2)
the violence and humanitarian crisis is linked to the severe challenges posed by—
(A)
high rates of homicide, sexual and gender-based violence, and violent crime perpetrated by armed criminal actors, including drug trafficking organizations and criminal gangs, such as the MS–13 and 18th Street gangs;
(B)
endemic corruption carried out by organized networks and the weak rule of law, including the limited institutional capacity of national police forces, public prosecutors, and court systems; and
(C)
the limited capabilities and lack of political will on the part of Northern Triangle governments to establish the rule of law, guarantee security, and ensure the well-being of their citizens;
(3)
the United States must work with international partners—
(A)
to address the complicated conditions in the Northern Triangle that contribute to the violence and humanitarian crisis; and
(B)
to guarantee protections for vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, fleeing violence in the region;
(4)
the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, which was developed by the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, with the technical assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, represents a comprehensive approach to address the complex situation in the Northern Triangle;
(5)
the United States Strategy for Engagement in Central America, as first developed by President Obama and Vice President Biden, provides important support for the Alliance for Prosperity and other United States national security priorities, including rule of law and anti-corruption initiatives;
(6)
the Trump Administration’s proposed cuts in United States foreign assistance for Central America for fiscal years 2018 and 2019, if implemented, would undermine the United States ability to work with the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to address critical United States national security priorities and the factors driving migration to the United States;
(7)
the Trump Administration must reverse its decision to terminate the Temporary Protected Status designations for El Salvador and Honduras in order to prevent negative consequences to United States foreign policy objectives;
(8)
the United States should partner with the Government of Mexico—
(A)
to strengthen Mexico’s internal asylum system; and
(B)
ensure that Mexico upholds international and humanitarian standards;
(9)
combating corruption in the Northern Triangle must remain a critical priority and the United States must continue its public and financial support for the United Nation’s Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) as part of this effort;
(10)
the Government of Guatemala should reverse its efforts—
(A)
to terminate CICIG’s mandate; and
(B)
to undermine the effectiveness of CICIG’s ongoing operations, including prohibiting the current CICIG Commissioner from entering the country; and
(11)
it is imperative for the United States to implement a multi-year strategy and sustain a long-term commitment to addressing the underlying factors causing Central Americans to flee their countries by strengthening citizen security, the rule of law, democratic governance, the protection of human rights, and inclusive economic growth in the Northern Triangle.

Sec. 4 Definitions

In this Act:
(1)
Intelligence community— The term intelligence community has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
(2)
Northern triangle— The term Northern Triangle means El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
(3)
Placement— The term placement means the placement of an unaccompanied alien child with a sponsor.
(4)
Plan— The term Plan means the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle.
(5)
Sponsor— The term sponsor means a sponsor referred to in section 462(b)(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279(b)(4)).
(6)
Unaccompanied alien child— The term unaccompanied alien child has the meaning given the term in section 462(g) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279(g)).