Congress finds the following:
(1)
Iran is characterized by high levels of official and institutional corruption, and substantial involvement by Iran’s security forces, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (in this Act referred to as the “IRGC”), in the economy.
(2)
Many members of Iran’s senior political and military leadership have acquired significant personal and institutional wealth by using their positions to secure control of significant portions of Iran’s national economy.
(3)
Sanctions relief provided through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has resulted in the removal of many Iranian entities that are tied to governmental corruption from the list of entities sanctioned by the United States.
(4)
The Department of the Treasury in 2011 designated Iran’s financial sector as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern under
section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, stating “Treasury has for the first time identified the entire Iranian financial sector; including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global financial system.”.
(5)
Iran continues to be listed by the Financial Action Task Force (in this section referred to as “FATF”) among the “high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions”, jurisdictions that FATF perceives to be non-cooperative in the global fight against terrorist finance and money laundering.
(6)
Iran and North Korea are the only countries listed by the FATF as “high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions” against which countries that are members of FATF should take measures.
(7)
The Transparency International index of perceived public corruption ranks Iran 131st out of 176 countries surveyed.
(8)
The Department of State identified Iran as a “major money-laundering country” in its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2016.
(9)
The Department of State currently identifies Iran, along with North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, as a state sponsor of terrorism, for “having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism”.
(10)
The Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014, noted that “Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC–QF). These groups included Lebanese Hizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide support to the Asad regime, dramatically bolstering its capabilities, prolonging the civil war in Syria, and worsening the human rights and refugee crisis there.”.
(11)
The Government of Iran’s tolerance of corruption and nepotism in business limits opportunities for foreign and domestic investment, particularly given the significant involvement of the IRGC in many sectors of Iran’s economy.
(12)
The IRGC and the leadership-controlled bonyads (foundations) control an estimated 1/3 of Iran’s total economy, including large portions of Iran’s telecommunications, construction, and airport and port operations. These operations give the IRGC and bonyads vast funds to support terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
(13)
By gaining control of major economic sectors, the IRGC and bonyads have also served to further disadvantage the average citizen of Iran.