Securing Our Arctic Interests Act of 2017

The strategic importance of the Arctic continues to increase as the United States and other countries recognize the military significance of the sea lanes and choke points within the region and understand the potential for power projection from the Arctic into multiple regions.

The economic significance of the Arctic continues to grow as nations around the globe begin to understand the potential for maritime transportation through, and economic and trade development in, the region.

Given the potential for maritime accidents, oil spills, and illegal fishing near the exclusive economic zone of the United States, increases in human, maritime, and resource development activity in the Arctic region are expected to create additional mission requirements for the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

The Bering Strait is experiencing significant increases in international traffic from vessels transiting the Northern Sea Route, increases which are projected to continue if decreases in sea ice coverage continue.

Russia has prioritized the development of Arctic capabilities and has made significant investments in military infrastructure in the Arctic, including the creation of a new Arctic Command and the construction or refurbishment of 16 deepwater ports and 14 airfields in the region.

Russia currently has approximately 40 icebreakers, including several nuclear-powered icebreakers, is currently constructing four, and is planing to build an additional eight.

On May 15, 2015, former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated that “[t]he Arctic is going to be a major area of importance to the United States, both strategically and economically in the future—it’s fair to say that we’re late to the recognition of that”.

On July 6, 2015, Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, stated with respect to United States strategic presence and supporting infrastructure of the United States in the Arctic that “[w]e’re not even in the same league as Russia right now. We’re not playing in this game at all”.

On January 12, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that “[t]he Arctic is key strategic terrain … Russia is taking aggressive steps to increase its presence there … I will prioritize the development of an integrated strategy for the Arctic. I believe that our interests and the security of the Arctic would benefit from increasing the focus of the Department of Defense on this region”.

Section 1068 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) requires a new Department of Defense “Strategy to Protect the United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region”.

Section 1095 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) requires the Department of Defense to designate a Department of Defense Strategic Arctic Port.

In January 2017, the Department of Defense released a report entitled “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region” to “update the ways and means the Department of Defense intends to use to achieve its objectives as it implements the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region”, including—

In June 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Coast Guard was experiencing a gap in its heavy icebreaking capability and was without a heavy icebreaker from 2010 to 2013.

Since 2013, the United States Coast Guard has operated just one heavy icebreaker—the Polar Star—and one medium icebreaker—the Healy—which is less capability and capacity than the United States Coast Guard has historically had in its fleet.

The only other heavy icebreaker of the United States Coast Guard—the Polar Sea—has been inactive since experiencing major engine damage in June 2010.

In June 2016, the Government Accountability Office reported on the status of the Arctic strategy of the United States Coast Guard and how it had been unable to fulfill a portion of its polar icebreaking responsibilities due to its aging icebreaker fleet.

Senior Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, and Office of Management and Budget officials have acknowledged that, at historical funding levels, the Coast Guard cannot afford to recapitalize and modernize its assets in accordance with the current plan.

In July 2010, the Coast Guard first identified a need for a new icebreaker fleet of 3 heavy cutters and 3 medium cutters to fulfill its statutory missions.

Preliminary estimates for the acquisition cost for detailed development and construction of the first new heavy icebreaker for the United States have been as high as $1,000,000,000.

The Coast Guard is currently partnering with the Navy, through an Integrated Program Office, in an attempt to leverage the shipbuilding expertise of the Navy.

polar-class heavy icebreakers; and

polar-class medium icebreakers.

In recent years, the retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic, combined with an expected increase in human activity in the region, has heightened the interests of the United States and other nations in the Arctic region.

Diminishing sea ice has made some Arctic waters navigable for longer periods and, as a result, may contribute to new economic opportunities in commercial shipping, resource extraction, tourism, and commercial fishing.

Arctic Region Policy, as outlined in National Security Presidential Directive–66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive–25, states that “[t]he United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region,” including “such matters as … deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight”.

The January 2017 report of the Department of Defense entitled “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region” states that “[i]n support of the U.S. national security interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law, DoD will preserve the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic, as in other regions. This includes conducting Freedom of Navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims when and where necessary”.

In regard to the ability of the United States Navy to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the Arctic region, on June 15, 2017, Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that “[i]t's absolutely true that we don't have the capacity or the capability”.

Current Department of Defense jurisdiction over the Arctic Region is a classic case study in operational seams between three geographic combatant commands—the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the United States European Command (USEUCOM), and the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)—and involving two functional combatant commands—the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Within the Arctic Region, the United States European Command has primary responsibility for the key adversary, the United States Pacific Command has operational control of the United States forces located in Alaska that are best trained for Arctic conditions, and the United States Northern Command has the assigned role as the “Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic Capability”.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there is no single person directly responsible for the coordination of Arctic security issues and, while the United States Northern Command is the “Advocate for Arctic Capabilities”, the January 2017 report of the Department of Defense entitled “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region” was largely written from within the United States European Command.

A review of the operational plan for the protection of United States national security interests in the Arctic region, including strategic national assets, United States citizens, territory, freedom of navigation, and economic and trade interests in the region.

A description of United States military capabilities required to implement the operational plan, including types of forces, major weapon systems, and logistics required for operations in Arctic terrain.

A description of the installations, infrastructure, and deep water ports for deployment of assets required to support the operational plan, including the stationing, deployment, and training of military forces for operations in the Arctic region.

An investment plan to establish the installations and infrastructure required to implement the operational plan.

Current Department of Defense and commercial satellite constellations do not provide sufficient space coverage to offer consistent coverage of the Arctic and Polar regions.

The United States military currently faces significant challenges in its ability to operate in the Arctic region, given these current communications, navigational, and domain awareness shortfalls.

The September 2016 report of the International Security Advisory Board entitled “Report on Arctic Policy” stated that “the Arctic presents some unique problems of domain awareness, given that it is a region with limited telecommunications capability, unique geography, and remote and indigenous populations”.

The January 2017 report of the Department of Defense entitled “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region” concluded that “[c]ommand and control of forces are challenged by limited satellite and terrestrial communications above 65 degrees north” and affirmed that “[a]ddressing gaps in key enablers, particularly C5ISR, domain awareness, remote sensing and observing capabilities, ice prediction, and weather forecasting remains a priority”.