Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019
Sec. 1501
Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service officers
(a)
Length of period of assignment— Subsection (a) of section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive years.”
(b)
Foreign language deployment requirements— Section 702 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is amended by—
(1)
redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2)
by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) Foreign language deployment requirements
changed
“(1) In general—The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all members of the Service who receive foreign language training in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, Korean, Russian, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive tours in positions in which the acquired language is both relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
“(2) Overseas deployments—In carrying out paragraph (1), at least one of the three successive tours referred to in such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
“(3) Waiver—The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship or in the interest of national security.
“(4) Congressional notification—The Secretary of State shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph (3) was invoked.”
Sec. 1504
Intelligence community reports on security clearances
(a)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating security clearances persists, both within elements of the intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even more;
(2)
the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions of such elements;
(3)
the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different opportunities;
(4)
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now more than ever, therefore, the broken security clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; andreform;
(5)
changed
in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and consistent with national security, permitting new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security clearances, work that either does not require a security clearance or requires only a low-level interim clearance.clearance; and
(6)
added
an immediate review of a clearance may be triggered when a security clearance holder is reported to have engaged in violent acts against individuals, property, or public spaces based on the security clearance holder’s association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, based on factors including, at a minimum, race, religion, national origin, or disability.
(b)
In general— Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a)(1)—
(A)
in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting “and” after the semicolon;
(B)
in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and
(C)
by striking subparagraph (C);
(2)
by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3)
by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):
“(b) Intelligence community reports
“(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
“(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the report:
“(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
“(B) The total number of security clearance periodic reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
“(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—
“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and
“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
“(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—
“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
“(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows:
“(i) For 180 days or less.
“(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
“(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
“(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
“(v) For 24 months or longer.
“(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—
“(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred during the period covered by the report; and
“(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph requirement.
“(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
“(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.
“(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.
“(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”
(4)
in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (a)(1)” and inserting “subsections (a)(1) and (b)”.
Sec. 1505
Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia
(a)
Report required— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury.
(b)
Elements— The report required by subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1)
A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of—
(A)
officials of the Government of Russia;
(B)
persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
(C)
Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law; or
(D)
Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
(2)
An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph (1) and associated entities.
(3)
An assessment of any connections between Russian individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of Russia.
(4)
A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.
(5)
An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(6)
An identification of—
(A)
entry points of money laundering by Russian and associated entities into the United States;
(B)
any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and financial system, including specific sectors, which have been or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat finance activities; and
(C)
the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the threat to the United States financial system and United States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized crime.
(7)
Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(c)
Form of report— The report required under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(d)
Threat finance defined— In this section, the term threat finance means—
(1)
the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2)
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the methods methods, including the use of virtual currencies, and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat actors;
(3)
sanctions evasion; and
(4)
other forms of threat finance activity domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.
Sec. 2509
North Korea follow the money act
added
(a)
added
Assessment required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include revenue from the following sources:
(1)
added
Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
(2)
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The provision of fishing rights to North Korean territorial waters.
(3)
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Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores of value.
(4)
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Trade in textiles.
(5)
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Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
(6)
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Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other associated purposes.
(7)
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Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(8)
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The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner intended to generate significant revenue, directly or indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
(9)
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The provision of non-humanitarian goods (such as food, medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.
(10)
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The provision of services, including banking and other support, including by entities located in the Russian Federation, China, and Iran.
(11)
added
Online commercial activities of the Government of North Korea, including online gambling.
(12)
added
Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and counterfeit goods.
(b)
added
Elements— The assessment required under subsection (a) shall include an identification of each of the following:
(1)
added
The sources of North Korea’s funding.
(2)
added
Financial and non-financial networks, including supply chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through which North Korea accesses the United States and international financial systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods, and services; and
(3)
added
the global financial institutions, money services business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with financial transactions.
(c)
added
Submittal to congress— Upon completion of the assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of such assessment.
Sec. 2511
Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon
added
(a)
added
Report required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United States regional allies, and other specified interests of the United States as a result of such support.
(b)
added
Matters for inclusion— The report required under subsection (a) shall include information relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
(1)
added
A description of arms or related material transferred by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number of such arms or related material and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
(2)
added
A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, including the number and geographic distribution of such personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders with Syria and Lebanon.
(3)
added
An assessment of Hizballah’s operational lessons learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
(4)
added
A description of any rocket–producing facilities in Lebanon for non-state actors, including whether such facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
(5)
added
An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid Hizballah’s acquisition or development of missile production facilities, including the geographic distribution of such foreign and domestic supply chains.
(6)
added
An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
(7)
added
An identification of foreign persons that are, based on credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant financial support or arms or related material to Hizballah.
(8)
added
A description of the threat posed to Israel and other United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of arms or related material or other support offered to Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.
(c)
added
Form of report— The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d)
added
Definition— In this section, the term “arms or related material” means—
(1)
added
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
(2)
added
ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
(3)
added
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;
(4)
added
defense articles or defense services, as those terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
(5)
added
defense information, as that term is defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or
(6)
added
items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
Sec. 2512
Briefing on emerging infectious disease and pandemics
added
(a)
added
Briefing— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the national security of the United States.
(b)
added
Content— The briefing under subsection (a) shall assess—
(1)
added
the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the United States and the international political and economic system;
(2)
added
the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the United States and the international political and economic system; and
(3)
added
contributing trends and factor to the matters assessed under paragraphs (1) and (2).
(c)
added
Examination of response capacity— In examining the risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and a possible transnational pandemic under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the briefing under subsection (a) the response capacity within affected countries and the international system. In considering response capacity, the Director shall include—
(1)
added
the ability of affected nations to effectively detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic;
(2)
added
the role and capacity of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
(3)
added
the effectiveness of current international frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
(d)
added
Form— The briefing under subsection (a) may be classified.
(e)
added
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
added
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
added
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(3)
added
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.