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Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015

S. 792 · 114th Congress · Mar 18, 2015 · Lineage

A BILL

To expand sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.

Section 1 Short title; table of contents

(a)
Short title— This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015”.
(b)
Table of contents— The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 2 Definitions

In this Act:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2)
Joint Plan of Action— The term Joint Plan of Action—
(A)
means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva November 24, 2013, by Iran and the P5-plus-1 countries; and
(B)
includes all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, including the technical understandings reached on January 12, 2014, the extension agreed to on July 19, 2014, the extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and any extension that is agreed to on or after the date of the enactment of this Act and is transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to section 101.
(3)
Long-term comprehensive solution— The term long-term comprehensive solution means any comprehensive agreement, including a framework agreement or political agreement, regarding the nuclear program of Iran as described in the Joint Plan of Action, without regard to whether or not one or more countries other than the United States and Iran are parties to the agreement, and all implementing materials and technical understandings related to that comprehensive agreement.
(4)
P5-plus-1 countries— The term P5-plus-1 countries means the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Sec. 3 Sense of Congress with respect to Iran

It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
it is the policy of the United States that the Government of Iran will not be allowed to develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon capability;
(2)
all instruments of power and influence of the United States should remain on the table to prevent the Government of Iran from developing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon capability;
(3)
a long-term comprehensive solution with Iran will be most sustainable over the long term if the President consults and coordinates closely with Congress to implement a strategy that decisively ends any nuclear threat from Iran;
(4)
the Government of Iran does not have an absolute or inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and technologies under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);
(5)
the goal of international negotiations with Iran, led by the United States, should be to conclude a long-term comprehensive solution with parameters that will—
(A)
reverse the development of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapon components and technology, such that Iran is precluded from a nuclear breakout capability and prevented from pursuing both uranium and plutonium pathways to a nuclear weapon;
(B)
bring Iran into compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program, including Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the Security Council’s consideration of matters relating to the nuclear program of Iran;
(C)
resolve all issues of past and present concern with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including possible military dimensions of the nuclear program of Iran, and give inspectors access to personnel, documents, and facilities involved, at any point, with nuclear or nuclear weapons-related activities of Iran;
(D)
permit on-site and short-notice inspection, verification, and monitoring of all declared and suspect facilities in Iran, including installation and use of any compliance verification equipment requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency, such that any effort by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon will be quickly detected;
(E)
require that Iran fully implement and comply with—
(i)
the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the “Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement”);
(ii)
modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and
(iii)
ratification and implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to as the “Additional Protocol”); and
(F)
require that Iran implement measures in addition to the Additional Protocol that include verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency of Iran’s centrifuge research, development, and manufacturing facilities, including raw materials and components, and Iran’s uranium mines, mills, and processing facilities;
(6)
the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and its proxies for their continuing sponsorship of terrorism;
(7)
the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and Iranian persons for—
(A)
ongoing abuses of human rights; and
(B)
actions in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and
(8)
the United States should continue to impose sanctions on the Government of Iran and other governments and persons for the procurement, sale, or transfer of technology, services, or goods that support the development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or the means of delivery of those weapons.

Sec. 4 Sense of Congress with respect to Israel's right to exist and to defend itself and its people

(a)
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
Consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes the right of a country to self-defense, Israel must be allowed to take any actions necessary to remove threats to its existence.
(2)
Iran, which rejects Israel's right to exist as a country, is a continued threat to the safety and security of Israel and the United States through its support of terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
(3)
Any efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons are a direct threat to Israel's right to exist as a country.
(b)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the United States supports Israel's rights—
(1)
to exist as a democratic, Jewish state;
(2)
to defend itself against threats to its existence; and
(3)
to protect the lives and safety of the people of Israel.