Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The United States entered into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, without the approval of Congress.
(2)
The JCPOA established the Joint Commission in Annex IV of the agreement.
(3)
The JCPOA placed detailed limitations on components of Iran’s nuclear agreement, and required those limitations to be met by Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016.
(4)
The Joint Commission provided alternate arrangements regarding some Iranian nuclear stocks and facilities prior to January 16, 2016.
(5)
The JCPOA capped Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) at 300 kilograms (kg).
(6)
Iran was granted an exemption to retain more than 300 kg of LEU by the Joint Commission.
(7)
The JCPOA required all Iranian uranium oxide enriched to between 5 percent and 20 percent to be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67 percent or less.
(8)
The Joint Commission found near 20 percent LEU in “lab contaminant” that was judged as unrecoverable.
(9)
Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells, shielded cells, or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters for 15 years.
(10)
Prior to Implementation Day, the Joint Commission agreed to allow Iran to continue operating 19 large hot cells in three Tehran locations and one Karaj location which are in excess of the 6 cubic meter limitation.
(11)
In July 2016, the Joint Commission established a Technical Working Group to evaluate stocks of Iranian 3.67 percent LEU and other stocks.
(12)
Ensuring Iranian compliance with the JCPOA is tantamount to restricting breakout times for the development of a nuclear weapon.
(13)
The current Administration’s policy to maintain secrecy on the decisions of the Joint Commission and its Technical Working Group interferes in the process of establishing adequate congressional and public oversight of the JCPOA.