Section 1 Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013”.
Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013
A BILL
To provide for a Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategy, and for other purposes.
Sec. 2 Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
The United States nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance program known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is one of the most successful congressionally led United States foreign policy initiatives in the post-Cold War era.
The CTR Program was initiated by the United States Congress in legislation introduced by Senators Sam Nunn (D–GA) and Dick Lugar (R–IN) in 1991.
The initial purpose of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was to dismantle and prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated infrastructure in the independent states of the former Soviet Union and to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction knowledge to other countries.
As of February 28, 2013, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program has—
deactivated 13,300 nuclear warheads;
destroyed 1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);
eliminated 831 ICBM silos;
destroyed 442 ICBM mobile launchers;
eliminated 233 bombers;
eliminated 906 nuclear capable air-to-surface missiles;
destroyed 728 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers;
eliminated 936 SLBMs;
destroyed 48 ballistic missile submarines;
sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and holes; and
destroyed 39,986 metric tons of chemical weapon agent.
Due to the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free and Albania is chemical weapons free.
The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is based on the premise that governments have a responsibility and a mutual interest in working together to reduce the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their associated infrastructure and know-how.
Though the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was initially focused on the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the threat represented by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological WMD-related materials, infrastructure, and know-how extends well beyond the borders of these states.
The threat posed by WMD-related proliferation is increasingly prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where political instability and deeply rooted violent extremism contribute to an already dangerous threat to the United States and some of its strongest allies.
Terrorist organizations, including core al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Hezbollah, Hamas, and their extremist supporters continue to operate in the MENA region and have sought or may seek to attempt to secure WMD materials or know-how.
The Government of Iran’s continued illicit development of its nuclear program and its movement towards an advanced nuclear weapons capability could lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.
The Iranian regime’s continued support for and association with terrorist organizations in the region, including Hamas and Hezbollah, pose a significant and growing proliferation challenge for the entire global community.
Continued upheaval and violence in Syria and the threat of the Assad regime’s substantial chemical weapons stockpile being used or falling into the wrong hands also pose a significant and immediate WMD-related proliferation challenge to the entire global community.
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) binds all United Nations members to adopt and enforce effective controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related materials; yet countries in the Middle East and North Africa have a relatively weak record of implementation of UNSCR 1540.
The MENA region continues to experience significant political instability and sits atop a complex web of ethnic differences, a history of violence and extremism, robust military capabilities, a growing collection of unsecured weapons, and a variety of unstable governments.
The Arab Spring and the continued revolutions across the MENA region represent significant opportunities but also difficult challenges as the United States attempts to create new relationships with popularly elected governments that can be inexperienced in nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, or related security efforts.
A number of governments in this unstable region are considering the development of civilian nuclear power programs, including the Governments of the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.
As a result of these difficult challenges, the United States has a clear interest in preventing or minimizing the potential proliferation of WMD-related weapons, technologies, materials, and know-how in the MENA region.
Despite the threat of proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa, only a small percentage of United States CTR and nonproliferation-related assistance programs have been focused on the countries of this region.
Until 2003, Congress limited the use of Department of Defense (DOD) CTR funding to programs in the former Soviet Union.
Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (22 U.S.C. 5963) authorized the utilization of limited Department of Defense CTR funding outside the independent states of the former Soviet Union for short-term projects and emergency funding.
In section 1306 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181; 122 Stat. 413), Congress, for the first time, specifically authorized funding for longer-term CTR initiatives to address emerging security challenges and urgent threats in regions of the world beyond the independent states of the former Soviet Union, stipulating that CTR should be “strengthened and expanded” for “broader international cooperation and partnerships,” including “programs and projects in … the Middle East”.
Section 1306 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 also mandated that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a study “to analyze options for strengthening and expanding the CTR program”.
The congressionally mandated report from the National Academy of Sciences, “Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,” published in 2009, recommended expanding CTR activities into the Middle East, to include—
encouraging and assisting with security and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles;
providing chemical weapons detection and interdiction equipment and training;
providing training for parliamentarians and national technical advisors;
promoting chemical safety and security in the region;
promoting biological safety, security, and disease surveillance programs;
promoting implementation of UNSCR 1540;
promoting counter-trafficking obligations under UNSCR 1540;
strengthening export controls and border security, including maritime security; and
other cooperative programs aimed at stemming the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction technologies, materials, and know-how.
The Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Security support nonproliferation projects aimed at cooperatively preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and North Africa, including through—
the Department of State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund;
the Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Program;
the Department of State Global Threat Reduction program;
the Department of Energy Second Line of Defense program;
the Department of Energy Global Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation program;
the Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative;
the Department of Homeland Security Container Security Initiative; and
the Department of Homeland Security Secure Freight Initiative.
These programs provide critical but small-scale support in combating proliferation challenges in the region, and they do not by themselves represent a robust, comprehensive, or whole-of-government approach to nonproliferation in the MENA region.
After extensive delays, near the end of 2012, the Executive Branch finally completed internal bureaucratic processes necessary to expand the Department of Defense CTR Program more extensively into the Middle East and the Department of Defense recently publicly announced its intention to apply fiscal year 2013 funds to help Syria’s neighbors counter the immediate threat posed by Syria’s chemical weapons.
The Department of Defense has also initiated a program with fiscal year 2013 funds to work with the Government of Libya to help the country meet its commitment to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by destroying its chemical weapons stockpile.
In addition to preventing proliferation of WMD across borders shared with Syria and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya, the Department of Defense has requested new funding to initiate bio-engagement programs in the Middle East in its fiscal year 2014 budget request.
There is an urgent need today to more sharply focus United States Government efforts and resources on WMD proliferation in the MENA region.
The United States Government needs a comprehensive regional strategy for nonproliferation activities in the Middle East and North Africa, which includes additional, targeted resources for cooperative threat reduction work in the region, and one that utilizes all of our diplomatic, intelligence, military, and public affairs tools in a coordinated and creative whole-of-government approach and leverages support from a wide variety of partners and donors, including foreign countries, nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, United States and foreign businesses, academic institutions, and other sectors.
Sec. 3 Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
countries around the world have a continued interest in working together to reduce the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, related technologies, materials, associated infrastructure, and know-how;
the United States Government, as a leader in the international community in curbing the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD-related weapons, technologies, materials, infrastructure, and know-how, has a national security interest in working with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa on establishing and developing robust nonproliferation capabilities in the region to effectively detect, interdict, deter, and defend against proliferation of WMD in the region;
the United States Government should continue to expand the Department of Defense CTR Program beyond the independent states of the former Soviet Union, to include the countries of the MENA region, provided that these programs complement already existing United States nonproliferation programs in this region and provided that Congress is properly informed of the long-term cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance strategy to be implemented;
Congress supports the initiation of CTR programs aimed at addressing the immediate threat of Syrian WMD-related proliferation in the region and the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile in Libya and urges the United States Government to ensure sufficient funding for the continuation and expansion, if necessary, of these critical programs;
the United States Government should continue to strongly press all members of the United Nations, including the countries of the MENA region, to fully implement UNSCR1540, which imposes binding obligations on all United Nations member states to adopt and enforce effective controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related materials, and the United States Government should provide for and develop cooperative assistance programs aimed at more expeditiously implementing those responsibilities and controls;
at a time of strained resources, the United States needs a comprehensive and effective, whole-of-government approach to global cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs that maintains the ability to provide assistance through both military and civilian channels, seeks to cancel unnecessary or ineffective programs, reduce and eliminate duplication or overlap, and that maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of United States assistance;
the United States Government should seek increased and sustained financial and other support from Russia, the European Union and its member states, China, Japan, and other countries for stronger, standardized, and worldwide physical security for WMD-related weapons and materials as well as for other international nonproliferation efforts, particularly in the MENA region;
the United States Government should make clear that any states that provide WMD to terrorist groups or individuals will face severe and grave retaliation involving all elements of United States power; and
the United States Government should reassert and reinforce United States security commitments around the MENA region in order to assure allies that the pursuit of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or capabilities is not necessary or conducive to stability in this dangerous region.
Sec. 4 Strategy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and North Africa
In general— The President shall establish a multi-year comprehensive regional assistance strategy to coordinate and advance CTR and related nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East and North Africa (in this section referred to as the “MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy”).
Consultation— In establishing the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy, the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees; relevant Federal departments and agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security; multilateral organizations; international institutions; representatives of civil society, including leading nongovernmental and other experts; and other entities that could assist in curbing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, weapons components, weapons-related materials, their associated delivery vehicles, and know-how.
Elements— The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
A commitment to utilizing and building upon the cooperative model of success demonstrated by the last two decades of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.
A commitment to approach Middle East and North Africa nonproliferation issues on a regional basis as well as on a country-by-country basis.
The expansion of current CTR and other nonproliferation assistance programs in the MENA region and the initiation of new programs with new partner countries in the region as appropriate.
Planning to ensure that countries receiving such assistance in the Middle East and North Africa countries have an appropriate stake in the development of each country-specific strategy and are also contributing financially to the effort with an appropriate level of burden-sharing.
A plan to more fully engage, leverage, and increase assistance, financing, and other support from partners in the international community for CTR and nonproliferation assistance programs in the Middle East and North Africa, which may include—
governments of other countries, including Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and others with an interest in a safe, secure, and stable MENA region;
the European Union, including the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the associated member states of the European Union;
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states;
international institutions, including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and others;
international donors, including philanthropists, foundations, and businesses interested in international nonproliferation efforts;
multilateral partnerships, like the Group of Eight or the Group of Twenty;
Middle East and North African regional institutions, including the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency; or
well-respected and prominent international nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Activities supported— Assistance authorized under subsection (g) in support of the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy may be made available for programs and activities to address the challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, weapons components, weapons-related materials, and their delivery vehicles, in the MENA region, including innovative new assistance programs with new partner countries in the region.
Coordination—
In general— Assistance authorized under subsection (g) in support of the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy shall be integrated with pre-existing CTR and nonproliferation programs, and such assistance shall be coordinated between the relevant United States Government agencies involved with CTR or nonproliferation programming in the Middle East and North Africa.
Scope— Integration and coordination of the Middle East and North Africa CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy required under subsection (a) should be the responsibility of the President and shall include—
an assessment to address where potential gaps in assistance may exist while also ensuring the elimination or reduction of any potential overlap or duplication in efforts;
the establishment of appropriate metrics for determining success in the MENA region, as well as metrics for prioritizing potential partner countries under consideration for Middle East and North Africa CTR and nonproliferation programs;
an effort to ensure that the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy fits in the broader United States Government-wide global WMD threat reduction strategy and that assistance is properly aligned with United States policy goals in the MENA region;
a formal plan to ensure the sustainability of coordination in the long term, irrespective of the President and other officials in office or personalities in place, including clear designations of agency and departmental responsibilities, accountability, and lines of communication and authorities;
a description of ways to reduce the potential for stove-piping of information, intelligence, and activities between counterterrorism and counterproliferation programming; and
a plan to ensure the proper tracking and reporting of United States Government-wide assistance in the MENA region.
Reports—
Initial report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress the strategy outlined in subsection (a).
Annual report— Annually thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified form, that describes the progress made by the President in implementing the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy, which should include a list of the activities and countries supported by the MENA CTR and Nonproliferation Strategy, the agencies and assistance levels utilized to implement the strategy, and the extent to which specific program goals, progress, and milestones have been achieved over the course of the prior year.
Assistance authorized— There is authorized to be appropriated not less than $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2019 to be utilized by the relevant executive agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy, to implement the strategy outlined in subsection (a).
Sec. 5 Report on CTR and nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East and North Africa
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing all current CTR and related non-proliferation activities in the MENA region over the previous five years and all United States Government funding contributed across each of the Federal agencies in support of CTR and related nonproliferation activities in the MENA region during that time period, including the amount contributed, the identity of the entity receiving such contribution and undertaking each funded activity, the agency providing the contribution, a brief summary of each specific project undertaken, the specific nonproliferation objectives sought to be achieved by each project, and the extent to which the objectives have been achieved.
Sec. 6 Reports on 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands
Report on comprehensive objectives, strategies, and policies in the lead-Up to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands— The President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, that details the comprehensive objectives, strategy, and policies of the United States with respect to the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, not later than 30 days prior to the Summit.
Follow-Up report on outcomes from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands— Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, detailing the outcomes of the Summit and the extent to which the United States Government was able to accomplish the objectives, strategies and policies detailed pursuant to subsection (a).
Sec. 7 Definitions
In this Act:
Middle East and North Africa— The term Middle East and North Africa includes the countries or areas of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees includes—
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.