Consequences for Russia’s Arms Control Violations Act of 2014

A public report in the New York Times on January 29, 2014, revealed that the Russian Federation is no longer in compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.

On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Anita E. Friedt stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that, “[w]e have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that affect our common security. We have been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our concerns have been addressed.”.

On March 5, 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Ms. Elaine Bunn said to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, “[W]e are concerned about Russian activity that appears to be inconsistent with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We’ve raised the issue with Russia. They provided an answer that was not satisfactory to us, and we will, we told them that the issue is not closed, and we will continue to raise this.”.

On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Breedlove, stated that, “A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with … I would not judge how the alliance will choose to react, but I would say they will have to consider what to do about it … It can’t go unanswered.”.

The Russian Federation succeeded to the INF Treaty obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a declaration issued at Biskek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992.

The flight test or deployment of any INF-banned weapon delivery vehicle by the Russian Federation constitutes a militarily significant violation of the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, but, under the terms of the Treaty, inspections and continuous monitoring of Russian missile production under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 2001, thus the Treaty no longer offers any verification to detect any militarily significant violations.

A major problem exists with respect to the application of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic or cruise missile that is flight tested or otherwise flown once at a range not prohibited by the Treaty (that is a range less than 500 kilometers or more than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at a range that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is between 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon delivery vehicle.

President Obama has not made use of any INF Treaty-provided means to address Russian noncompliance with the Treaty, to include convening a meeting of the Treaty’s Special Verification Commission under Article XIII of the Treaty.

The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate noted in its 1988 report on the INF Treaty that, “In the event Soviet actions appear to contradict their obligations under the treaty, Congress should be kept fully informed. Any questionable activity should be fully discussed in the Special Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has not, after a sufficient period of time, satisfied United States concerns or ceased the activity in question, and if the Soviet activity is deemed to be militarily significant, the President should propose implementation of an appropriate and proportionate response.”.

The Administration has not made any serious or credible effort, over several years, to respond to violations by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty is no longer effectively verifiable.

The Russian Federation’s actions, as detailed in the January 29, 2014, report of the New York Times have defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.

Continued noncompliance by the Russian Federation with its obligations under the INF Treaty and continued United States adherence to the INF Treaty, in light of failure to respond in a timely manner to Russian noncompliance, places the supreme interests of the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in jeopardy.

The Russian Federation has violated its obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and has rendered null the effect and assurances of the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997.

the Russian Federation, through its flight testing of both a ballistic missile intended for intermediate-range targets as well its flight testing of a ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the INF Treaty has acted contrary to the object and purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is therefore in material breach of its obligations under the Treaty; and

the President, after consultation with United States allies directly affected by such Russian Federation ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, should take such actions as the President determines to be necessary to deny the Russian Federation any militarily significant advantage resulting from its noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

Program required— The President shall establish and carry out a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by modification of exiting United States military capabilities, with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Waiver— The President may waive the requirement to establish and carry out the program under subsection (a) if, on or before October 1, 2014, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

Authorization of appropriations— There is authorized to be appropriated to the President $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to carry out the program under subsection (a).

In general— If, on or before the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the President does not certify to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation is not developing or deploying any military system that violates or circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b).

Sanctions described— The sanctions referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

Waiver— The President may waive the requirement to impose sanctions under this section beginning on or after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has provided to the United States the following:

Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—

INF Treaty or Treaty— The term INF Treaty or Treaty means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.