§201. Short title — Inbound Citations
29 U.S.C. § 201
Cited by 45 provisions in release 119-102.
Citations to 29 U.S.C. § 201 as a whole
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(1) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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(3) The Board shall issue regulations for covered employees whose work schedules directly depend on the schedule of the House of Representatives or the Senate that shall be comparable to the provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] that apply to employees who have irregular work schedules.
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(5) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and related provisions of sections 5541 through 5550a of title 5.
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(1) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.);
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(5) shall be disregarded in determining the minimum wage and overtime pay to which a covered employee is entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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Eff. July 16, 1946, 11 F.R. 7873, 60 Stat. 1095, by act Dec. 20, 1945, ch. 582, 59 Stat. 613, as amended Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89–554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 662
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(1) In addition to the activities described in subsection (a), a grant under section 604 or 605 of this title may be used to provide a reasonable stipend to paid-on-call or volunteer emergency response providers who are not otherwise compensated for travel to or participation in training or exercises related to the purposes of this part. Any such reimbursement shall not be considered compensation for purposes of rendering an emergency response provider an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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(cc) is in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), if applicable.
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(1) The Secretary shall permit any political subdivision, in any State, that applies and submits a plan to the Secretary in compliance with guidelines promulgated by the Secretary to operate a workfare program pursuant to which every member of a household participating in the supplemental nutrition assistance program who is not exempt by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall accept an offer from such subdivision to perform work on its behalf, or may seek an offer to perform work, in return for compensation consisting of the allotment to which the household is entitled under section 2017(a) of this title, with each hour of such work entitling that household to a portion of its allotment equal in value to 100 per centum of the higher of the applicable State minimum wage or the Federal minimum hourly rate under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.].
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Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to affect in any manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
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(b) Any person employed in any reservoir project enacted and funded pursuant to the implementation of section 3116(c)(1) of this title, or in any other job created pursuant to implementation of this chapter, shall, subject to any limitations on maximum annual compensation as may be provided in the law authorizing such programs, be paid not less than the pay received by others performing the same type of work for the same employer, and in no case less than the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.]. No person employed in any reservoir project enacted and funded pursuant to implementation of section 3116(c)(1) of this title shall perform work of the type to which sections 3141–3144, 3146, and 3147 of title 40 apply, except as otherwise may be specifically authorized by law.
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(3) As used in this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s losses” has the same meaning as provided in section 2259(c)(2) and shall in addition include the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim’s services or labor or the value of the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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(1) Pursuant to its authority under section 994 of title 28 and in accordance with this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall review and, if appropriate, amend the sentencing guidelines and policy statements applicable to persons convicted of offenses involving the trafficking of persons including component or related crimes of peonage, involuntary servitude, slave trade offenses, and possession, transfer or sale of false immigration documents in furtherance of trafficking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act [29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.].
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(4) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] (in any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after January 24, 1950), on account of the failure of said employer to pay an employee compensation for any period of overtime work performed prior to July 20, 1949, if the compensation paid prior to July 20, 1949, for such work was at least equal to the compensation which would have been payable for such work had section 7(d)(6) and (7) and section 7(g) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 207(d)(6), (7), (g)], been in effect at the time of such payment.
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(a) The Congress finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to stand, (1) the payment of such liabilities would bring about financial ruin of many employers and seriously impair the capital resources of many others, thereby resulting in the reduction of industrial operations, halting of expansion and development, curtailing employment, and the earning power of employees; (2) the credit of many employers would be seriously impaired; (3) there would be created both an extended and continuous uncertainty on the part of industry, both employer and employee, as to the financial condition of productive establishments and a gross inequality of competitive conditions between employers and between industries; (4) employees would receive windfall payments, including liquidated damages, of sums for activities performed by them without any expectation of reward beyond that included in their agreed rates of pay; (5) there would occur the promotion of increasing demands for payment to employees for engaging in activities no compensation for which had been contemplated by either the employer or employee at the time they were engaged in; (6) voluntary collective bargaining would be interfered with and industrial disputes between employees and employers and between employees and employees would be created; (7) the courts of the country would be burdened with excessive and needless litigation and champertous practices would be encouraged; (8) the Public Treasury would be deprived of large sums of revenues and public finances would be seriously deranged by claims against the Public Treasury for refunds of taxes already paid; (9) the cost to the Government of goods and services heretofore and hereafter purchased by its various departments and agencies would be unreasonably increased and the Public Treasury would be seriously affected by consequent increased cost of war contracts; and (10) serious and adverse effects upon the revenues of Federal, State, and local governments would occur.The Congress further finds that all of the foregoing constitutes a substantial burden on commerce and a substantial obstruction to the free flow of goods in commerce.The Congress, therefore, further finds and declares that it is in the national public interest and for the general welfare, essential to national defense, and necessary to aid, protect, and foster commerce, that this chapter be enacted.The Congress further finds that the varying and extended periods of time for which, under the laws of the several States, potential retroactive liability may be imposed upon employers, have given and will give rise to great difficulties in the sound and orderly conduct of business and industry.The Congress further finds and declares that all of the results which have arisen or may arise under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, as aforesaid, may (except as to liability for liquidated damages) arise with respect to the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts1 and that it is, therefore, in the national public interest and for the general welfare, essential to national defense, and necessary to aid, protect, and foster commerce, that this chapter shall apply to the Walsh-Healey Act and the Bacon-Davis Act.1
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(a) No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act1 (in any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947), on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any activity of an employee engaged in prior to May 14, 1947, except an activity which was compensable by either—(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer; or(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the establishment or other place where such employee was employed, covering such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer.
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(c) In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], of the Walsh-Healey Act, or of the Bacon-Davis Act,1 in determining the time for which an employer employed an employee there shall be counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engaged in activities which were compensable within the meaning of subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
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(d) No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under the Bacon-Davis Act,1 to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to enforce any liability or impose any punishment with respect to an activity which was not compensable under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
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(e) No cause of action based on unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 which accrued prior to May 14, 1947, or any interest in such cause of action, shall hereafter be assignable, in whole or in part, to the extent that such cause of action is based on an activity which was not compensable within the meaning of subsections (a) and (b).
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(a) Any cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 which accrued prior to May 14, 1947, or any action (whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947) to enforce such a cause of action, may hereafter be compromised in whole or in part, if there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable by the employer to his employee; except that no such action or cause of action may be so compromised to the extent that such compromise is based on an hourly wage rate less than the minimum required under such Act, or on a payment for overtime at a rate less than one and one-half times such minimum hourly wage rate.
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(b) Any employee may hereafter waive his right under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], to liquidated damages, in whole or in part, with respect to activities engaged in prior to May 14, 1947.
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such employee engaged in on or after May 14, 1947—(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.
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(d) In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], of the Walsh-Healey Act, or of the Bacon-Davis Act,1 in determining the time for which an employer employs an employee with respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other preliminary or postliminary activities described in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in any such activity which is compensable within the meaning of subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
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Any action commenced on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act1 —
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In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of section 255 of this title, an action commenced on or after May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or class action instituted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant—
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The statute of limitations prescribed in section 255(b) of this title shall also be applicable (in the case of a collective or representative action commenced prior to May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.]) to an individual claimant who has not been specifically named as a party plaintiff to the action prior to the expiration of one hundred and twenty days after May 14, 1947. In the application of such statute of limitations such action shall be considered to have been commenced as to him when, and only when, his written consent to become a party plaintiff to the action is filed in the court in which the action was brought.
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In any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 based on any act or omission prior to May 14, 1947, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of any agency of the United States, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of any such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.
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(a) In any action or proceeding based on any act or omission on or after May 14, 1947, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.
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(1) in the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.]—the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor;
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In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
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No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of an activity engaged in by such employee prior to December 26, 1946, if such employer—
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(a) When the terms “employer”, “employee”, and “wage” are used in this chapter in relation to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], they shall have the same meaning as when used in such Act of 1938.
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(3) The provisions in this section shall be construed in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), as amended before or after the effective date of this Act.
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(5) The term “employ” has the meaning given such term under section 3(g) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(g)) for the purposes of implementing the requirements of that Act [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.].
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(2) All funds received by the Department under contractual arrangements made under subsection (b) or (d), or by nonprofit entities described in subsection (b)(2), shall be deposited in or credited to the fund, and the Secretary shall distribute out of the fund moneys to participants at rates not less than the wage rates specified in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) and regulations prescribed thereunder for work of similar character.
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(4) A State shall ensure that, regardless of whether the State uses an agency-provider model or other models to provide home and community-based attendant services and supports under a State plan amendment under this subsection, such services and supports are provided in accordance with the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.] and applicable Federal and State laws regarding—(A) withholding and payment of Federal and State income and payroll taxes;(B) the provision of unemployment and workers compensation insurance;(C) maintenance of general liability insurance; and(D) occupational health and safety.
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(i) the minimum wage that would be applicable to such a participant under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), if section 6(a)(1) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)) applied to the participant and if the participant were not exempt under section 13 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 213);
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(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law except as may be provided expressly in limitation of this subsection, payments to volunteers under this chapter shall not in any way reduce or eliminate the level of or eligibility for assistance or services any such volunteers may be receiving under any governmental program, except that this paragraph shall not apply in the case of such payments when the Director determines that the value of all such payments, adjusted to reflect the number of hours such volunteers are serving, is equivalent to or greater than the minimum wage then in effect under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) or the minimum wage, under the laws of the State where such volunteers are serving, whichever is the greater.
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(2) The guidelines for reimbursement for costs under paragraph (1) shall ensure that no State, tribal, or local government is denied reimbursement for overtime payments that are required pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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(g) The guidelines for reimbursement for costs under subsection (e)(2)(D) shall ensure that no State or local government is denied reimbursement for overtime payments that are required pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
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(1) the minimum wage which would be applicable to the employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if section 6(a)(1) of such Act [29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)] applied to the resident and if he or she were not exempt under section 13 [29 U.S.C. 213] thereof;
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(A) the minimum wage that would be applicable to the employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if section 6(a)(1) of such Act [29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)] applied to the resident and if the resident were not exempt under section 13 of such Act [29 U.S.C. 213];
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(2) For purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], residential youth corps programs under this division will be considered an organized camp.
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(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is authorized under title 10 (or any other applicable law in addition to title 5, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and