US Codex
U.S.C.
Notes

§8008. Definitions — Inbound Citations

22 U.S.C. § 8008

Cited by 86 provisions in release 119-102.

Citations to §8008(1)

Citations to §8008(2)

  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(c)(1)
    Go to provision →
    (1) The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the determination made pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis for the determination.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(3)(B)(iii)
    Go to provision →
    (iii) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian person with respect to such transfer.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(g)(1)
    Go to provision →
    (1) The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India, including—
    (A) any material noncompliance on the part of the Government of India with—
    (i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
    (ii) the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on May 11, 2006;
    (iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA;
    (iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India and the IAEA;
    (v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government of India and the United States Government arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 or any subsequent arrangement under section 2160 of title 42;
    (vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding the export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, equipment, or technology; and
    (vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such licenses;
    (B) any material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness of notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;
    (C) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after December 18, 2006;
    (D) significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced; and
    (E) changes in the purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(g)(2)
    Go to provision →
    (2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 enters into force, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including—
    (A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
    (B) a comprehensive listing of—
    (i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations;
    (ii) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for the export or reexport to India of commodities, related technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulation,1 or any successor regulation;
    (iii) any other United States authorizations for the export or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and
    (iv) with respect to each such license or other form of authorization described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)—
    (I) the number or other identifying information of each license or authorization;
    (II) the name or names of the authorized end user or end users;
    (III) the name of the site, facility, or location in India to which the export or reexport was made;
    (IV) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and authorizations;
    (V) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be applied to such exports or reexports; and
    (VI) the term of validity of each such license or authorization;
    (C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries, including any such trade that—
    (i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the NSG; or
    (ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of United States origin;
    (D) either—
    (i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in the agreements and other documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph (1)(A); or
    (ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance issues arising with regard to the adherence by India to its commitments and obligations, including—
    (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;
    (II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures;
    (III) the measures the United States Government plans to take to this end in the coming year; and
    (IV) an assessment of the implications of any continued noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India remains in the national security interest of the United States;
    (i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in this regard; and
    (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively participating in such efforts, a description of—
    (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to secure India’s full and active participation in such efforts;
    (II) the responses of the Government of India to such measures; and
    (III) the measures the United States Government plans to take in the coming year to secure India’s full and active participation;
    (F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear cooperation with India is in any way assisting India’s nuclear weapons program, including through—
    (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
    (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United States technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
    (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased production by India of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
    (G) a detailed description of—
    (i) United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
    (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and
    (iii) assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote the objectives in clause (i), consistent with its obligations under international law and existing agreements;
    (H) an estimate of—
    (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year;
    (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; and
    (iii) the rate of production in India of—
    (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
    (II) nuclear explosive devices;
    (I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India’s nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the previous year and the proportion of such production that can be attributed to India’s declared civil reactors;
    (J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
    (K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made toward the achievement of India’s—
    (i) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;
    (ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;
    (iii) public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
    (iv) effective implementation of the decision described in clause (iii);
    (L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel; and
    (M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the “Agreement”) approved under section 101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act—
    (i) a listing of—
    (I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and other such information as may be so designated by the United States or India under Article 1(Q); and
    (II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Agreement;
    (ii) a description of—
    (I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for by-product material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 1(A) of the Agreement;
    (II) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the Agreement;
    (III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;
    (IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;
    (V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;
    (VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and
    (VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the receiving country of each such transfer;
    (iii) an analysis of—
    (I) any instances in which the United States or India requested consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations; and
    (II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by the end of the reporting period; and
    (iv) a statement as to whether—
    (I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and
    (II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.

Citations to §8008(3)

Citations to §8008(4)

Citations to §8008(5)

  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(3)(A)
    Go to provision →
    (A) Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 and pursuant to this chapter, and except as provided under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian person of—
    (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or decisions, or
    (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,
    unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(3)(B)(ii)
    Go to provision →
    (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person that made the transfer or the Indian person that made the transfer is a natural person who acted without the knowledge of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 8008(5) of this title; and
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(3)(B)(iii)
    Go to provision →
    (iii) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of India has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions against the Indian person with respect to such transfer.

Citations to §8008(6)

Citations to §8008(7)

Citations to §8008(8)

  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(2)
    Go to provision →
    (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(3)
    Go to provision →
    (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(4)
    Go to provision →
    (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(5)
    Go to provision →
    (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they develop;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(6)
    Go to provision →
    (6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT if—
    (A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
    (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to nonproliferation;
    (C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and implement substantially improved protections against the proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
    (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(11)
    Go to provision →
    (11) such commerce also represents a significant change in United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime;
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(1)
    Go to provision →
    (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(2)
    Go to provision →
    (2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards obligations.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(1)
    Go to provision →
    (1) Pursuant to the obligations of the United States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this chapter constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(5)(A)(ii)
    Go to provision →
    (ii) United States compliance with Article I of the NPT.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8004
    Go to provision →
    Nothing in this chapter constitutes authority for any action in violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8007(d)
    Go to provision →
    (d) All United States activities related to the program shall be consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Citations to §8008(9)

  • 22 U.S.C. § 8001(12)
    Go to provision →
    (12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes India’s adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(3)
    Go to provision →
    (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those1 guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG decisionmaking.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(4)
    Go to provision →
    (4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(5)
    Go to provision →
    (5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(a)(6)
    Go to provision →
    (6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this chapter, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(b)(6)(B)
    Go to provision →
    (B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the guidelines and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(b)(6)(C)
    Go to provision →
    (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(b)(7)
    Go to provision →
    (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(c)(2)(F)
    Go to provision →
    (F) A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(c)(2)(H)
    Go to provision →
    (H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(2)
    Go to provision →
    (2) Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 2153 of title 42 and pursuant to this chapter, no item subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions related thereto, may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of the transfer.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(d)(3)(A)(i)
    Go to provision →
    (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or decisions, or
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(g)(2)(C)(i)
    Go to provision →
    (i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or decisions of the NSG; or

Citations to §8008(10)

Citations to §8008(11)

  • 22 U.S.C. § 8002(b)(4)
    Go to provision →
    (4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(c)(2)(G)
    Go to provision →
    (G) A description and assessment of the specific measures that India has taken to fully and actively participate in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
  • 22 U.S.C. § 8003(g)(2)(E)(i)
    Go to provision →
    (i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in this regard; and

Citations to §8008(12)

Citations to §8008(13)