§10703. Definitions — Inbound Citations
22 U.S.C. § 10703
Cited by 150 provisions in release 119-102.
Citations to §10703(1)
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(1) Not later than 180 days after December 27, 2021, and biannually thereafter for a period of 4 years, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant United States Government departments or agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an assessment of how INTERPOL member countries abuse INTERPOL Red Notices, Diffusions, and other INTERPOL communications for political motives and other unlawful purposes within the past three years.
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(4) Not later than 30 days after the submission of each report under paragraph (1), the Department of Justice and the Department of State, in coordination with other relevant United States Government departments and agencies, shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the content of the reports and recent instances of INTERPOL abuse by member countries and United States efforts to identify and challenge such abuse, including efforts to promote reform and good governance within INTERPOL.
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(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
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(A) Prior to the designation under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult the appropriate committees of Congress.
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(B) Not later than 7 days after making a designation of a foreign country as a State Sponsor of Unlawful or Wrongful Detention under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report notifying the committees of the designation, including a certification of which criteria in subsection (a) are the basis for the designation.
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(A) Not later than one year after December 18, 2025, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress with respect to unlawful or wrongful detentions taking place in the countries listed under paragraph (2)(A) and actions taken by the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies to deter the wrongful detention of United States nationals, including any steps taken in accordance with paragraph (2)(B).
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(B) Any briefings pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be in addition to any briefings requested by the appropriate congressional committees. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to limit the provision of any other briefings to the appropriate committees of Congress.
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(e) In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
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(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;(B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;(F) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;(G) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives;(H) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;(I) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and(J) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
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(B) The Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, may add or remove one or more countries from the list of beneficiary countries under subparagraph (A) after providing written notification of such changes to the appropriate committees of Congress.
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(d) Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2024, the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit an implementation plan to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes a timeline and stated objectives for actions to be taken in beneficiary countries in support of the Precursor Chemical Destruction Initiative.
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(4) a plan for addressing security and government corruption and providing updates to the appropriate committees of Congress on the results of such efforts.
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(f) Not later than one year after the submission of the implementation plan pursuant to subsection (d), and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written description of the results achieved by the Precursor Chemical Destruction Initiative, including—(2) compliance with, and progress related to, meeting the benchmarks referred to in subsection (e)(2); and(3) the type and quantity of listed chemicals destroyed by each beneficiary country.
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(a) Not later than 180 days after October 6, 2000, and annually thereafter at the time of submission of the congressional presentation materials of the foreign operations appropriations budget request, the Secretary of State should submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan setting forth a National Security Assistance Strategy for the United States.
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(2) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not later than 15 days prior to the provision of such assistance.
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(b) Assistance prohibited by this section may be furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of the United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress including—(1) a statement of the determination;(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided;(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national interests.
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(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, assistance may be furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of the United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress including—(1) a statement of the determination;(2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided;(3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and(4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national interests.
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(c) The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, may waive the limitation in subsection (a) in order to initiate a capital project if such Secretary or the Administrator, as the case may be, determines that the project is in the national security, diplomatic, or humanitarian interests of the United States. In the first report submitted under subsection (d) after any waiver under this subsection, such Secretary or the Administrator shall include a detailed justification of such waiver. Not later than 90 days after issuing a waiver under this subsection, such Secretary or the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the assessment described in subsection (a) with respect to the capital project concerned.
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(1) Not later than 30 days after the end of any fiscal-year half-year in which the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development conducts an assessment under subsection (a), such Secretary or the Administrator, as the case may be, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth each assessment so conducted during such fiscal-year half-year, including the elements of each capital project so assessed specified in subsection (a)(2).
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(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
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(d) Each report required by this section shall include a discussion of each significant issue described in subsection (a)(6) that was contained in a previous report issued under this section during 1995, or after December 31, 1995, until the question or concern has been resolved and such resolution has been reported in detail to the appropriate committees of Congress (as defined in section 1102(1) of the Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Security Assistance Act of 1999).
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(d) The President shall keep the appropriate committees of Congress currently informed of the use of funds and the exercise of functions authorized in this chapter.
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(iii) Any waiver of participation under clause (i) or (ii) shall be transmitted in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress.
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(b) In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
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(2) Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes—(A) the training and professional development opportunities at the Foreign Service Institute and other Department facilities available to congressional staff;(B) the budget impacts of offering such opportunities to congressional staff; and(C) potential course offerings.
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(1) Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Secretary shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for adapting and evolving training requirements to better meet the Department’s current and future needs for 21st century diplomacy.
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(1) Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes—(A) a strategy for broadening and deepening professional development and training at the Department, including assessing current and future needs for 21st century diplomacy;(B) the process used and resources needed to implement the strategy referred to in subparagraph (A) throughout the Department; and(C) the results and impact of the strategy on the workforce of the Department, particularly the relationship between professional development and training and promotions for Department personnel, and the measurement and evaluation methods used to evaluate such results.
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(2) Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Secretary submits the report required under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 2 years, the Secretary shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the information required to be included in the report.
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(2) Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes a detailed plan for implementing the program authorized under paragraph (1), including anticipated resource requirements to carry out such program.
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(A) Amounts authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) are authorized to be made available after the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not later than 1 year after December 22, 2023, and not less than annually to the appropriate committees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan’s defense spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting accounts in Taiwan’s defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency).
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(3) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection may not be expended without prior notification of the appropriate committees of Congress.
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(1) Not later than 1 year after August 19, 2000, and annually thereafter for the duration of the Trust Fund, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the Trust Fund.
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(1) Not later than 180 days after December 22, 2023, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report regarding the provision of cyber protection support pursuant to subsection (b), which shall include—(A) a description of the methodology used to make the determination under subsection (a)(1); and(B) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber protection support pursuant to subsection (b).
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(2) In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(A) the appropriate congressional committees;(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and(C) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives.
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(1) Not later than 90 days after December 22, 2023, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Administrator for Nuclear Security and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an implementation plan outlining Department of Defense efforts relating to the AUKUS partnership.
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(f) The President may terminate the application of a sanction imposed pursuant to this section with respect to a person if the President certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that—(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for such sanction or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping such activity; and(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to such sanction in the future.
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(B) not less than 15 days before the granting of the waiver, submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notice of and justification for the waiver.
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(2) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a regional economic development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western Balkans that—(A) takes into account the efforts of the European Union, European nations, and other multilateral financing institutions;(B) considers the full set of tools and resources available from the relevant agencies;(C) includes efforts to ensure coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance frameworks;(D) includes an initial assessment of—(i) economic opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries, would be competitive;(ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans;(iii) the effectiveness of all existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and(iv) ways to increase United States economic activity and investment within the Western Balkans;(E) considers ways to develop human and institutional capacity and infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber-security;(F) considers ways to assist with the development and implementation of programs or initiatives to increase economic development and prosperity in the region;(G) considers ways to support small- and medium-sized businesses, including youth-owned and women-owned enterprises;(H) considers ways to promote government and civil society policies and programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency (including by supporting independent media by promoting the safety and security of journalists), free and fair competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, and business environments conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and(I) includes a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to increase support for the United States relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.
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(3) Not later than 90 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the progress made towards developing the strategy required under paragraph (2).
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(2) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Secretary of State should submit a joint report to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes—(A) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure and energy diversification projects;(B) an outline of additional resources, such as tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; and(C) an assessment of how the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the United States Trade and Development Agency and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, can deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to raise capital through United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.
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(e) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region.
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(b) Not later than 1 year after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that contains—(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries;(2) a review of the information environment in each Western Balkans country;(3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and digital initiatives that—(A) counter influence operations and safeguard elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries;(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure, digital accessibility, and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans;(C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; and(D) build cyber capacity of governments who are allies or partners of the United States;(4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries;(5) an assessment of—(A) options for the United States to better support cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries through changes to current assistance authorities; and(B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or office space, of posting cyber professionals from other Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training to Foreign Service Officers; and(6) any additional support needed from the United States for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
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(a) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, and every two years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Balkan countries that seek—(1) to undermine democratic institutions;(2) to promote political instability; and(3) to harm the interests of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the Western Balkans.
Citations to §10703(2)
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(1) to clarify the applicability of international laws and norms to the use of information and communications technology (referred to in this subsection as “ICT”);
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(4) to encourage the responsible development of new, innovative technologies and ICT products that strengthen a secure internet architecture that is accessible to all;
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(B) to take all appropriate and reasonable efforts to keep their territories clear of intentionally wrongful acts using ICT in violation of international commitments;
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(D) to take appropriate measures to protect the country’s critical infrastructure from ICT threats;
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(F) to respond to appropriate requests for assistance to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory and aimed at the critical infrastructure of another country;
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(1) expand and increase secure internet access and digital infrastructure in emerging markets, including demand for and availability of high-quality information and communications technology (ICT) equipment, software, and services;
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(3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure ICT policies and regulations;
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(4) access United States exports of ICT goods and services;
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(5) expand interoperability and promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from the People’s Republic of China;
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(14) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security, hybrid warfare, and ICT infrastructure;
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(B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom of information and public procurement, including by strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure networks;
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(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, that seek to influence the region;
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(2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to manipulation can increase opportunities for—(A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and software systems; and(B) the use of online information operations by adversaries and malign actors to undermine United States allies and interests;
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(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure, digital accessibility, and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans;
Citations to §10703(3)
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(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens and residents of those six countries.
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(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.
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(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to significant democratic and economic progress in the region.
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(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in neighboring European Union countries.
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(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms could help enable investment and employment opportunities in the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process that increases prosperity for all.
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(8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency.
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(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of the greatest impediments to further economic and political development in the region.
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(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, including the integrity of its elections.
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(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits their aspirations for European integration.
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(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the national interest of the United States.
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(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe.
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(2) support regional integration efforts in the Western Balkans;
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(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, with consideration for enterprises owned by and employing women and youth;
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(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the Western Balkans;
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(5) increase United States business links and investment with the Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries’ efforts—(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and fossil fuels;(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, and conservation; and(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, as appropriate;
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(6) continue to assist in the development, within the Western Balkans, of—(A) strong civil societies;(B) public-private partnerships;(C) independent media;(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive governance that ensure equal representation of all ethnic groups and respect for religious freedom;(E) political stability; and(F) modern, free-market based economies.
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(10) continue to support the cultural heritage, and recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;
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(13) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, civil society organizations, and industry leaders;
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(14) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security, hybrid warfare, and ICT infrastructure;
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(15) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for international law as the sole path forward for the countries of the Western Balkans;
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(18) support the implementation of the Export Control and Related Border Security programs in the Western Balkans; and
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(1) undertaken actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area or state in the Western Balkans;
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(2) engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans;
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(3) engaged or attempted to engage in corruption related to the Western Balkans, including corruption by or on behalf of, a government in the Western Balkans, or a current or former government official in the Western Balkans;
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(4) engaged or attempting to engage in serious human rights abuses in the Western Balkans; or
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(5) engaged or attempted to engage in, acts that obstruct or threaten the implementation of any regional security, peace, cooperation, or mutual recognition agreement or framework or accountability mechanism related to the Western Balkans, including the Prespa Agreement of 2018; the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244; the Dayton Accords; or the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Council held in London in December 1995, including the decisions or conclusions of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council, or its Steering Board; or the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or, with respect to the former Yugoslavia, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.
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(4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such initiative; and
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(2) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a regional economic development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western Balkans that—(A) takes into account the efforts of the European Union, European nations, and other multilateral financing institutions;(B) considers the full set of tools and resources available from the relevant agencies;(C) includes efforts to ensure coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance frameworks;(D) includes an initial assessment of—(i) economic opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries, would be competitive;(ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans;(iii) the effectiveness of all existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and(iv) ways to increase United States economic activity and investment within the Western Balkans;(E) considers ways to develop human and institutional capacity and infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber-security;(F) considers ways to assist with the development and implementation of programs or initiatives to increase economic development and prosperity in the region;(G) considers ways to support small- and medium-sized businesses, including youth-owned and women-owned enterprises;(H) considers ways to promote government and civil society policies and programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency (including by supporting independent media by promoting the safety and security of journalists), free and fair competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, and business environments conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and(I) includes a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to increase support for the United States relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.
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(ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans;
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(iii) the effectiveness of all existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and
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(iv) ways to increase United States economic activity and investment within the Western Balkans;
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(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional economic connectivity and development initiative for the region comprised of each Western Balkans country and any European Union member country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country (referred to in this subsection as the “Western Balkans region”) in accordance with this subsection.
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(A) promote private sector growth and competitiveness and increase the capacity of businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, in the Western Balkans region;
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(C) aim to increase United States economic activity and investments in countries in the Western Balkans;
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(D) support startup companies, including companies led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region by—(i) providing training in business skills and leadership; and(ii) providing opportunities to connect to sources of capital;
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(E) encourage and promote increased economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans through engagement with the Western Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and abroad;
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(G) identify areas where application of additional resources and workforce retraining could expand successful programs to 1 or more countries in the Western Balkans region by building on the existing experience and program architecture;
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(H) compare existing single-country sector analyses to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans region; and
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(I) promote intraregional economic connectivity throughout the Western Balkans region through—(i) programming, including grants, cooperative agreements, and other forms of assistance;(ii) expanding awareness of the availability of loans and other financial instruments from the United States Government; and(iii) coordinating access to existing instruments to promote economic activity and investment that are available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans region, including the European Union and international financial institutions.
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(iii) coordinating access to existing instruments to promote economic activity and investment that are available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans region, including the European Union and international financial institutions.
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(A) transportation projects that build roads, bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the Western Balkans region;
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(F) investment transparency programs that will help countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and establish institutional and regulatory reforms necessary—(i) to create an enabling environment for economic activities and investment; and(ii) to strengthen protections against high-risk investments;
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(I) technical assistance and generating private investment in projects that promote connectivity and energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region;
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(C) be focused on retaining talent within the Western Balkans;
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(E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans region about the initiative, including specific programs and projects.
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(1) Not later than 1 year after December 18, 2025, subject to the availability of appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider including a regional office with responsibilities for the Western Balkans within the Corporation’s plans to open new regional offices.
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(A) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure and energy diversification projects;
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(B) an outline of additional resources, such as tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; and
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(C) an assessment of how the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the United States Trade and Development Agency and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, can deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to raise capital through United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.
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(1) promoting partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans advances United States foreign policy goals and requires a whole-of-government approach, including the utilization of public-private partnerships; and
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(b) The President, working through the Secretary of State, is authorized to promote partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, including—(1) supporting research and analysis on cyber resilience;(2) working with partner governments to reform policies, improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and students, including English language teaching, and to provide quality, inclusive learning materials;(3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide individuals, especially those who historically have had reduced access to relevant education, training, and skills for meaningful employment;(4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and(5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent.
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(4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and
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(5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent.
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(1) regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in the Western Balkans region; and
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(b) The Secretary of State should continue the BOLD Leadership Program, which shall hereafter be known as the “Young Balkan Leaders Initiative”, to promote educational and professional development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued development of the Western Balkans region.
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(1) building the capacity of young Balkan leaders in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration;
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(d) Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State is authorized to award fellowships to young leaders from the Western Balkans who—(1) are between 18 and 35 years of age;(2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;(3) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-regional and multiethnic cooperation; and(4) represent a cross-section of the country’s demographics.
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(e) Not later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region.
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(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure, digital accessibility, and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans;
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(1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to settle disputes between nation states in the region; and
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(2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the ethnic strife that once characterized the region.
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(3) to harm the interests of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the Western Balkans.
Citations to §10703(4)
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(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, and prosperity of that continent.
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(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in population decline in all six countries.
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(7) support the accession of those Western Balkans countries that are not already members to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as “NATO”) for countries that—(A) desire membership;(B) are eligible for membership,(C) are supported by all allies to proceed with an invitation for such membership; and(D) are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and meaningfully contribute to the collective security of NATO;
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(11) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding democratic values;
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(12) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused on regional integration and cooperation, including through the Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;
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(1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and contingent on the agreement of the host country government to develop new national anti-corruption strategies;
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(2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide training, including through the use of embedded advisors, to civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of such agencies and institutions;
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(4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such initiative; and
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(A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and political relationships among Western Balkans countries will enable countries to better utilize existing resources and maximize their economic security and democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and increasing economic activity among other countries in the region; and
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(I) includes a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to increase support for the United States relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.
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(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional economic connectivity and development initiative for the region comprised of each Western Balkans country and any European Union member country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country (referred to in this subsection as the “Western Balkans region”) in accordance with this subsection.
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(F) provide assistance to the governments and civil society organizations of Western Balkans countries to develop—(i) regulations to ensure fair and effective investment; and(ii) screening tools to identify and deter malign foreign investments and other coercive economic practices;
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(D) infrastructure projects that connect Western Balkans countries to each other and to countries with which they share a border;
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(D) promote government policies in Western Balkans countries that encourage free and fair competition, sound governance, environmental protection, and business environments that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and
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(2) the Department of State, through BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.
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(4) providing increased economic and technical assistance to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans countries.
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(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, that seek to influence the region;
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(3) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of Western Balkans countries; and
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(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries;
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(2) a review of the information environment in each Western Balkans country;
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(A) counter influence operations and safeguard elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries;
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(C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; and
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(4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries;
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(A) options for the United States to better support cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries through changes to current assistance authorities; and
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(B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or office space, of posting cyber professionals from other Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training to Foreign Service Officers; and
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(1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China regarding malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries—(A) to undermine democratic institutions, including the planning and execution of democratic elections;(B) to promote political instability; and(C) to manipulate the information environment;
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(A) each network, entity and individual, to the extent such information is available, of Russia, China, or any other country with which Russia or China may cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese malign influence operations or campaigns, including the provision of financial or operational support to activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit freedom of speech or create barriers of access to democratic processes, including exercising the right to vote in a free and fair election; and