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Title II — Matters Relating to China’s Role in COVID–19

H.R. 4792 · 117th Congress · Jul 29, 2021 · Lineage

II Matters Relating to China’s Role in COVID–19

201. Declassification of information related to the origin of COVID–19

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1)
declassify any and all information relating to potential links between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19), including—
(A)
activities performed by the Wuhan Institute of Virology with or on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army;
(B)
coronavirus research or other related activities performed at the Wuhan Institute of Virology prior to the outbreak of COVID–19; and
(C)
researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology who fell ill in autumn 2019, including for any such researcher—
(i)
the researcher’s name;
(ii)
the researcher’s symptoms;
(iii)
the date of the onset of the researcher’s symptoms;
(iv)
the researcher’s role at the Wuhan Institute of Virology;
(v)
whether the researcher was involved with or exposed to coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology;
(vi)
whether the researcher visited a hospital while they were ill; and
(vii)
a description of any other actions taken by the researcher that may suggest they were experiencing a serious illness at the time; and
(2)
submit to Congress an unclassified report that contains—
(A)
all of the information described under paragraph (1); and
(B)
only such redactions as the Director determines necessary to protect sources and methods.

202. Amendment to Department of State rewards program

Subsection (b) of section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (12), by striking “or” after the semicolon at the end;
(2)
in paragraph (13), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and
(3)
by adding at the end the following new paragraph.

“(14) the identification of credible information regarding the origins of COVID–19, or any person or entity involved in the coverup of the origins of COVID–19, or the identification of any person or entity that provides nonpublic information related to gain of function research connected to Chinese laboratories, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, with relation to coronaviruses that has been covered up by the Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party.”

203. Executive strategy to seek reimbursement from China of funds made available by the United States Government to address COVID–19

(a)
Executive strategy— The President, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, shall develop and carry out a strategy to seek reimbursement from the People’s Republic of China of funds made available by the United States Government to address COVID–19.
(b)
Report— Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategy required under subsection (a) and its implementation.
(c)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;
(2)
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(3)
the Joint Economic Committee.

204. Prohibition on use of funds to seek membership in the World Health Organization or to provide assessed or voluntary contributions to the World Health Organization

(a)
In general— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds available to any Federal department or agency may be used to seek membership by the United States in the World Health Organization or to provide assessed or voluntary contributions to the World Health Organization until such time as the President certifies to Congress that the World Health Organization meets the conditions described in subsection (b).
(b)
Conditions described— The conditions described in this subsection are the following:
(1)
The World Health Organization has adopted meaningful reforms to ensure that humanitarian assistance is not politicized and is to be provided to those with the most need.
(2)
The World Health Organization is not under the control or significant malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party.
(3)
The World Health Organization is not involved in a coverup of the Chinese Communist Party’s response to the COVID–19 pandemic.
(4)
The World Health Organization grants observer status to Taiwan.
(5)
The World Health Organization does not divert humanitarian or medical supplies to Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
(6)
The World Health Organization has put in place mechanisms to increase transparency and accountability in its operations and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse.

205. Establishment of a joint select committee on the events and activities surrounding China’s handling of the 2019 novel coronavirus

There is hereby established in the Senate and the House of Representatives a joint select committee to be known as the “Joint Select Committee on the Events and Activities Surrounding China’s Handling of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus” (hereafter referred to as the “Joint Select Committee”).

206. Membership

(a)
Selection and appointment—
(1)
In general— The Joint Select Committee shall be composed of 20 Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, of whom—
(A)
10 shall be Members of the House of Representatives, of whom 5 shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 5 shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives; and
(B)
10 shall be Senators, of whom 5 shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate and 5 shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.
(2)
Treatment of delegate and resident commissioner— For purposes of this section, a “Member” of the House of Representatives includes a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress.
(b)
Co-Chairs— Two of the members of the Joint Select Committee shall serve as co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee, and shall be appointed as follows:
(1)
One shall be a Member of the House of Representatives, who shall be appointed as co-chair by the Speaker of the House of Representatives in consultation with the majority leader of the Senate.
(2)
One shall be a Senator, who shall be appointed as co-chair by the minority leader of the Senate in consultation with the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(c)
Vacancies— A vacancy in the membership of the Joint Select Committee (including a vacancy resulting because a member ceases to be a Member of the House of Representatives or a Senator) shall not affect its powers, and shall be filled not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the vacancy occurs in the same manner as the original appointment was made.
(d)
Deadlines— Members of the Joint Select Committee and the co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution.

207. Investigation and report on the events surrounding China’s handling of the 2019 novel coronavirus

(a)
Investigation and report— The Joint Select Committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation of, and to issue a final report to the House of Representatives and Senate regarding, the following:
(1)
The origins and causes of the 2019 novel coronavirus.
(2)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China regarding the origins and causes of such coronavirus.
(3)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China in response to the initial outbreak and spread of such coronavirus.
(4)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China to suppress facts and information regarding the spread, origins, causes, and transmission of such coronavirus, including efforts to silence those making early warnings, punish whistleblowers, and restrict freedom of information about such coronavirus.
(5)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China to spread misinformation regarding the origins and causes of such coronavirus, including accusations and misinformation that the coronavirus was brought to the city of Wuhan by the United States military.
(6)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China to sideline, deny, and suppress charitable service organizations, institutions of civil society, secular and faith-based non-governmental organizations, international humanitarian organizations, and foreign governments offering to provide information, expertise, resources, and assistance to China and the Chinese people to combat such coronavirus.
(7)
Accountability for policies, decisions and activities related to influencing the World Health Organization’s response to the outbreak of such coronavirus, including individuals and entities responsible for those policies, decisions, and activities.
(8)
All policies, decisions, and activities by China to manufacture, produce, procure, possess, or hoard personal protective equipment and critical pharmaceutical components to manipulate or weaponize the supply chain against the international community, including the United States.
(9)
Vulnerabilities in the United States domestic and global supply chain to combat a global pandemic due to reliance on Chinese manufacturing and recommendations for decreasing dependence on Chinese manufacturing by improving and securing a domestic supply chain for antibiotics, viral drugs, critical pharmaceutical components, masks, and other personal protective equipment.
(10)
Information related to lessons learned from China’s handling of such coronavirus.
(11)
Any other relevant issues relating to China’s actions that led to further spread of such coronavirus, China’s response to such coronavirus, or the investigation by the Joint Select Committee into China regarding such coronavirus.
(12)
Any recommendations to Congress and the executive branch regarding actions the United States government should take in response to China’s handling of such coronavirus.
(b)
Transfer of records— At the request of the co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee, any standing committee of the Senate or House of Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the matters described in subsection (a) shall transfer such records to the Joint Select Committee.
(c)
Interim reports— In addition to the final report issued under subsection (a), the Joint Select Committee may issue such interim reports as it considers necessary.
(d)
Classified annex— The Joint Select Committee may include a classified annex in any report issued under this section.
(e)
Definitions—
(1)
China— In this section, the term “China” means the Government of the People’s Republic of China and any of the following:
(A)
An official of the Chinese Communist Party.
(B)
An official of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(C)
An agent or instrumentality of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(D)
Any other person owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of any person described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(2)
2019 novel coronavirus— In this subsection, the term “2019 novel coronavirus” means the coronavirus disease (COVID–19) and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS–CoV–2).

208. Powers

(a)
Hearings and other activities— For the purpose of carrying out its duties, the Joint Select Committee may hold such hearings and undertake such other activities as the Joint Select Committee determines to be necessary to carry out its duties, whether the Congress is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned.
(b)
Authority to use subpoenas— The Joint Select Committee may require by subpoena the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, as it considers appropriate.
(c)
Access to legislative branch services— The Joint Select Committee shall have access to the services of the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service in the same manner and under the same terms and conditions as any standing committee of the House of Representatives or Senate.
(d)
Adoption of rules— Not later than 7 days after all of its members have been appointed, the Joint Select Committee shall adopt rules governing its operations, including rules governing the issuance of subpoenas and rules governing the use of official funds for travel by members and staff, and shall submit such rules to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and Secretary of the Senate for publication in the Congressional Record.

209. Staff; funding

(a)
Staff—
(1)
Use of existing staff— To the greatest extent practicable, the Joint Select Committee shall utilize the services of staff of employing offices of the Senate and House of Representatives.
(2)
Authority to appoint staff—
(A)
In general— Each of the co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee may appoint, prescribe the duties and responsibilities of, and fix the pay of such staff as the co-chair considers appropriate to assist the Joint Select Committee in carrying out its duties, so long as the number of staff appointed by one of the co-chairs does not exceed the number of staff appointed by the other co-chair.
(B)
Detail of congressional employees— Upon the joint request of the co-chairs, the head of an employing office of the House of Representatives or Senate (including a joint committee of the Congress) is authorized to detail, without reimbursement, any of the staff of the office to the Joint Select Committee to assist the Joint Select Committee in carrying out its duties.
(3)
Experts and consultants— Section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the Joint Select Committee in the same manner as such section applies with respect to a standing committee of the Senate, except that any consultant whose services are procured by the Joint Select Committee shall be selected jointly by the co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee.
(b)
Funding—
(1)
Vouchers— Payments for expenses of the Joint Select Committee shall be made using vouchers authorized by the Joint Select Committee, signed by co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee, and approved in a manner directed by the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Source of funds— There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the operation of the Joint Select Committee, of which—
(A)
50 percent shall be derived from the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives; and
(B)
50 percent shall be derived from the contingent fund of the Senate.

210. Termination

(a)
Termination date— The Joint Select Committee shall terminate 30 days after filing the final report required under section 207.
(b)
Transfer of records— Upon termination of the Joint Select Committee, the records of the Joint Select Committee shall be transferred to—
(1)
such committee or committees of the House of Representatives as may be designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
such committee or committees of the Senate as my be designated by the President pro tempore of the Senate.

211. Statement of policy

It shall be the policy of the United States to impose sanctions against governments of foreign states, and take other measures if the governments of such foreign states engage in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to state owned, operated, or directed chemical or biological programs.

212. Amendments to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991

(a)
Purposes and definitions— Section 502 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601) is amended—
(1)
in the section heading, by adding at the end before the period the following: “and definitions”;
(2)
by striking “The purposes” and inserting “(a) Purposes.—The purposes”;
(3)
in paragraph (1)—
(A)
by striking “or use” and insert “use”; and
(B)
by inserting “, or engage in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state” after “nationals”; and
(4)
by adding at the end the following:

“(b) Definitions—In this Act:

“(1) Gross negligence—The term “gross negligence”, with respect to an act or acts of a government of a foreign state, includes the government knew, or should have known, the act or acts would result in injury or damages to another foreign state or other such foreign states.

“(2) Foreign state—The term “foreign state”—

“(A)

“(i) has the meaning given that term in subsection (a) of section 1603 of title 28, United States Code; and

“(ii) includes an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as that term is defined in subsection (b) of such section; and

“(B) includes an entity that is—

“(i)

“(I) directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or beneficially owned by, or in an official or unofficial capacity acting as an agent of or on behalf of, the government of a foreign state; or

“(II) received significant material support from the government of a foreign state; and

“(ii) engaged in providing commercial services, shipping, manufacturing, producing, or exporting.”

(b)
Determinations regarding use of chemical or biological weapons— Section 506 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5604) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a)—
(A)
by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4);
(B)
by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) Additional determination by the president

“(A) When determination required; nature of determination—Whenever credible information becomes available to the executive branch indicating a substantial possibility that, on or after January 1, 2020, the government of a foreign country has engaged in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state, the President shall, within 60 days after the receipt of such information by the executive branch, determine whether that government, on or after such date, has engaged in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state. Section 507 applies if the President determines that that government has so engaged in such act or acts of gross negligence.

“(B) Matters to be considered—In making the determination under subparagraph (A), the President shall consider the following:

“(i) All physical and circumstantial evidence available bearing on the possibility that the government in question engaged in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state.

“(ii) Whether evidence exists that such program or programs have civilian and military purposes or applications.

“(iii) Whether the government in question attempted to conceal or otherwise withhold information from other governments or international organizations regarding an act or acts of gross negligence.

“(iv) Whether, and to what extent, the government in question is compliant with its obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, as applicable.

“(v) Whether, and to what extent, the government in question is providing or otherwise voluntarily disclosing substantive information to relevant international organizations.”

(C)
in paragraph (4) (as redesignated)—
(i)
in the first sentence, by inserting “or (3)” after “paragraph (1)”;
(ii)
in the second sentence, by inserting “under paragraph (1)” after “determination”; and
(iii)
by adding at the end the following: “If the determination under paragraph (3) is that a foreign government had engaged in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state, the report shall specify the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to section 507A.”; and
(2)
in subsection (b)—
(A)
in paragraph (1)—
(i)
by striking “whether a particular foreign government” and inserting the following:

“(A) a particular foreign government”

(ii)
by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and
(iii)
by adding at the end the following:

“(B) a particular foreign government, on or after January 1, 2020, has engaged in an act of acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state.”

(B)
in paragraph (2)—
(i)
in the first sentence—
(I)
by striking “whether the specified government” and inserting the following:

“(A) the specified government”

(II)
by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and
(III)
by adding at the end the following:

“(B) the specified government, on or after January 1, 2020, has engaged in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state.”

(ii)
in the second sentence—
(I)
by inserting “or (3)(B), as applicable” after “subsection (a)(2)”; and
(II)
by moving the margin of the second sentence so it has the same level of indentation as margin of the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of the first sentence.
(c)
Sanctions against foreign states with respect to chemical or biological programs— The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 507 the following:

“507A. Sanctions against foreign states with respect to chemical or biological programs

“(a) Initial sanctions

“(1) In general—If the President makes a determination pursuant to section 506(a)(3) with respect to the government of a foreign state, the President shall, within 30 days of making such determination, impose the sanctions described in paragraph (2) with respect to the foreign state.

“(2) Sanctions described—The sanctions described in this paragraph are the following:

“(A) The United States Government shall suspend all scientific cooperative programs and efforts with the government of the foreign state.

“(B) The President shall prohibit the export to the foreign state of any goods, services or technology under Category 1 and Category 2 of the Commerce Control List.

“(C) The United States Government may not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from any person operating in the chemical or biological sectors of the foreign state.

“(b) Intermediate application of sanctions

“(1) Determination—Not later than 120 days after making a determination pursuant to section 506(a)(3) with respect to a government of a foreign state, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination as to whether—

“(A) such government has adequately addressed an act an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state;

“(B) such government has developed or is developing necessary measures to prevent any future act or acts of gross negligence;

“(C) such government is providing or otherwise voluntarily disclosing substantive information to the United States and relevant international organizations; and

“(D) such government is compliant with its obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, as applicable.

“(2) Effect of determination—If the President is unable to certify that a government of a foreign state has taken the actions described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1), the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to the government of the foreign state.

“(3) Sanctions described—The sanctions described in this paragraph are the following:

“(A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance to the government of the foreign state under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food or other agricultural commodities or products.

“(B) No sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may be made to the government of the foreign state.

“(C) No licenses for export of any item on the United States Munitions List that include the government of the foreign state as a party to the license may be granted.

“(D) No exports of any goods or technologies controlled for national security reasons under the Export Administration Regulations may be made to the government of the foreign state, except that such prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities).

“(E) The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the government of the foreign state under—

“(i) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);

“(ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

“(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or

“(iv) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.

“(c) Final application of sanctions

“(1) Determination—Not later than 210 days after making a determination pursuant to section 506(a)(3) with respect to a government of a foreign state, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination as to whether the government of the foreign state has taken the actions described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of subsection (b)(1).

“(2) Effect of determination—If the President is unable to certify that a government of a foreign state has taken the actions described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of subsection (b)(1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to the government of the foreign state.

“(3) Sanctions—The sanctions described in this paragraph are the following:

“(A) The President shall, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the government of the foreign state has any interest.

“(B) The President shall, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between one or more financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the government of the foreign state.

“(d) Removal of sanctions—The President shall remove the sanctions imposed with respect to the government of a foreign state pursuant to this section if the President determines and so certifies to the Congress, after the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date on which sanctions were initially imposed on that government of a foreign state pursuant to subsection (a), that—

“(1) such government has adequately addressed an act an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state;

“(2) such government has developed or is developing necessary measures to prevent any future act or acts of gross negligence;

“(3) such government is providing or otherwise voluntarily disclosing substantive information to the United States and relevant international organizations;

“(4) such government is compliant with its obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, as applicable; and

“(5) such government is making restitution to those affected by an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the government of a foreign state, including United States persons.

“(e) Waiver

“(1) In general—The President may, for periods not to exceed 180 days, waive the imposition of sanctions under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

“(2) Sunset—The President may not exercise the authority described in paragraph (1) beginning on the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment of this section.

“(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

“(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.”

213. Determination regarding the People’s Republic of China

(a)
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall determine whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that the Government of the People’s Republic of China meets the criteria for engaging in an act or acts of gross negligence with respect to a chemical or biological program owned, controlled, or directed by, or subject to the jurisdiction of that government under section 506(a)(3) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, as amended by section 3 of this Act.
(b)
Report required—
(1)
In general— Not later than 30 days after making a determination under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the reasons for the determination.
(2)
Form— A report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

214. Regulatory authority

(a)
In general— The President shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, prescribe regulations as necessary for the implementation of sections 212 and 213 of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.
(b)
Notification to congress— Not later than 10 days before the prescription of regulations under subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees regarding the proposed regulations and the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the regulations are implementing.

215. Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

216. Limitation on research by the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the activities authorized for the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health may include, conduct, or support any research—
(1)
using fetal tissue obtained from an induced abortion or any derivatives thereof,
(2)
in which a human embryo is created or destroyed, discarded, or put at risk of injury,
(3)
in which an embryo-like entity is created wholly or in part from human cells or components,
(4)
in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification, or
(5)
using any stem cell the derivation of which would be inconsistent with the standards established herein.

217. Prohibition on certain human-animal chimeras

Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 51 the following:

“52 Certain Types of Human-Animal Chimeras Prohibited

“1131. Definitions

“In this chapter the following definitions apply:

“(1) Prohibited human-animal chimera—The term “prohibited human-animal chimera” means—

“(A) a human embryo into which a nonhuman cell or cells (or the component parts thereof) have been introduced to render the embryo’s membership in the species Homo sapiens uncertain;

“(B) a human-animal embryo produced by fertilizing a human egg with nonhuman sperm;

“(C) a human-animal embryo produced by fertilizing a nonhuman egg with human sperm;

“(D) an embryo produced by introducing a nonhuman nucleus into a human egg;

“(E) an embryo produced by introducing a human nucleus into a nonhuman egg;

“(F) an embryo containing at least haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human and a nonhuman life form;

“(G) a nonhuman life form engineered such that human gametes develop within the body of a nonhuman life form;

“(H) a nonhuman life form engineered such that it contains a human brain or a brain derived wholly or predominantly from human neural tissues;

“(I) a nonhuman life form engineered such that it exhibits human facial features or other bodily morphologies to resemble human features; or

“(J) an embryo produced by mixing human and nonhuman cells, such that—

“(i) human gametes develop within the body of the resultant organism;

“(ii) it contains a human brain or a brain derived wholly or predominantly from human neural tissues; or

“(iii) it exhibits human facial features or other bodily morphologies to resemble human features.

“(2) Human embryo—The term “human embryo” means an organism of the species Homo sapiens during the earliest stages of development, from 1 cell up to 8 weeks.

“1132. Prohibition on certain human-animal chimeras

“(a) In general—It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly, in or otherwise affecting interstate commerce—

“(1) create or attempt to create a prohibited human-animal chimera;

“(2) transfer or attempt to transfer a human embryo into a nonhuman womb;

“(3) transfer or attempt to transfer a non­human embryo into a human womb; or

“(4) transport or receive for any purpose a prohibited human-animal chimera.

“(b) Penalties

“(1) In general—Whoever violates subsection (a) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

“(2) Civil penalty—Whoever violates subsection (a) and derives pecuniary gain from such violation shall be subject to a civil fine of the greater of $1,000,000 and an amount equal to the amount of the gross gain multiplied by 2.

“(c) Rule of construction—This section does not prohibit research involving the use of transgenic animal models containing human genes or transplantation of human organs, tissues, or cells into recipient animals, if such activities are not prohibited under subsection (a).”

218. Technical amendment

The table of chapters for part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 51 the following: