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Title VII — Other matters relating to the Russian Federation

S. 482 · 116th Congress · Feb 13, 2019 · Lineage

VII Other matters relating to the Russian Federation

Sec. 701 Determination on designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism

(a)
Determination—
(1)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination of whether the Russian Federation meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
(2)
Form— The determination required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, if appropriate.
(b)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2)
State sponsor of terrorism— The term state sponsor of terrorism means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes of—
(A)
section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));
(B)
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(C)
section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or
(D)
any other provision of law.

Sec. 702 Expansion of geographic targeting orders of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

(a)
In general— Section 5326 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) Reporting by title insurance companies

“(1) In general—The Secretary shall issue an order under subsection (a) requiring a domestic title insurance company to obtain, maintain, and report to the Secretary information on the beneficial owners of entities that purchase residential real estate in high-value transactions in which the domestic title insurance company is involved.

“(2) Definitions—In this subsection:

“(A) Beneficial owner—The term beneficial owner, with respect to an entity, means an individual who, directly or indirectly, owns 25 percent or more of the equity interests in the entity.

“(B) Domestic title insurance company—The term domestic title insurance company has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

“(C) High-value transaction—The term high-value, with respect to a real estate transaction, has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary based on the real estate market in which the transaction takes place.”

(b)
Regulations— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).
(c)
Authorization of appropriations— There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as may be necessary to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).

Sec. 703 Extension of limitations on importation of uranium from Russian Federation

Section 3112A(c) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h–10a(c)) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (2)(A)—
(A)
in clause (vi), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;
(B)
in clause (vii), by striking the period and inserting “; and”; and
(C)
by adding at the end the following:

“(viii) in calendar year 2021, 463,620 kilograms;

“(ix) in calendar year 2022, 456,930 kilograms;

“(x) in calendar year 2023, 449,810 kilograms;

“(xi) in calendar year 2024, 435,933 kilograms;

“(xii) in calendar year 2025, 421,659 kilograms;

“(xiii) in calendar year 2026, 421,659 kilograms;

“(xiv) in calendar year 2027, 394,072 kilograms;

“(xv) in calendar year 2028, 386,951 kilograms;

“(xvi) in calendar year 2029, 386,951 kilograms; and

“(xvii) in calendar year 2030, 375,791 kilograms.”

(2)
in paragraph (3)—
(A)
in subparagraph (A), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; or”;
(B)
in subparagraph (B), by striking “; or” and inserting a period; and
(C)
by striking subparagraph (C);
(3)
in paragraph (5)(A), by striking “reference data” and all that follows through “2019” and inserting the following: “lower scenario data in the document of the World Nuclear Association entitled “Nuclear Fuel Report: Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply Availability 2017–2035”. In each of calendar years 2022, 2025, and 2028”; and
(4)
in paragraph (9), by striking “December 31, 2020” and inserting “December 31, 2030”.

Sec. 704 Establishment of a National Fusion Center to respond to threats from the Government of the Russian Federation

(a)
Establishment— There is established a National Fusion Center to Respond to Hybrid Threats, which shall focus primarily on such threats from the Government of the Russian Federation, and shall be chaired by senior United States Government officials from participating agencies (in this section referred to as the “Center”).
(b)
Mission— The primary missions of the Center are as follows:
(1)
To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government to coordinate analysis and policy implementation across the United States Government in responding to hybrid threats posed by the Government of the Russian Federation to the national security, sovereignty, democracy, and economic activity of the United States and United States allies, including the following activities:
(A)
Execution of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda campaigns through traditional and social media platforms.
(B)
Formation, infiltration, or manipulation of cultural, religious, educational, and political organizations or parties.
(C)
Covert transfer of illicit money through shell corporations and financial institutions to facilitate corruption, crime, and malign influence activities, including through political parties and interest groups.
(D)
Coercive tactics and gray zone activities, including through para-military and para-police and security services and militias.
(E)
Cyber and other non-traditional threats, including against public infrastructure, government institutions, or political organizations or actors.
(F)
Use of energy resources or infrastructure to influence or constrain sovereign states and political actors.
(2)
To synchronize the efforts of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, other relevant civilian United States Government agencies, and United States military combatant commands with respect to countering efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation to undermine the national security, political sovereignty, democratic institutions, and economic activity of the United States and its United States allies, including by—
(A)
ensuring that each such element is aware of and coordinating on such efforts; and
(B)
overseeing the development and implementation of comprehensive and integrated policy responses to such efforts.
(3)
In coordination with the head of the Global Engagement Center established by section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), to examine current and emerging efforts by malign state actors to use propaganda and disinformation operations, including—
(A)
traditional media platforms such as television, radio, and print; and
(B)
social media platforms and other Internet communication tools.
(4)
To identify and close gaps across the departments and agencies of the Federal Government with respect to expertise, readiness, and planning to address the threats posed by the Government of the Russian Federation.
(c)
Reporting requirement—
(1)
In general— The Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees every 180 days a report on threats posed by the Russian Federation to the national security, sovereignty, and economic activity of the United States and its allies.
(2)
Matters included— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a discussion of the following:
(A)
The nature, extent, and execution of the threats described in such paragraph.
(B)
The ability of the United States Government to identify and defend against such threats.
(C)
The progress of the Center in achieving its missions, including through coordination with other governments and multilateral organizations.
(D)
Recommendations the Director determines necessary for legislative actions to improve the ability of the Center to achieve its missions.
(3)
Form— Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Intelligence community— The term intelligence community means an element of the intelligence community specified or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947.
(e)
Authorization of appropriations— There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

Sec. 705 Countering Russian Influence Fund

(a)
Authorization of appropriations— There is authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund described in section 7070(d) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (division J of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 706), $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2020 and 2021.
(b)
Use of funds— Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used in countries of Europe and Eurasia the Secretary of State has determined are vulnerable to malign influence by the Russian Federation to effectively implement, subject to the availability of funds, the following goals:
(1)
To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks.
(2)
To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices.
(3)
To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(4)
To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations.
(5)
To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and operate freely in all regions.
(6)
To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1239(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.
(c)
Revision of activities for which amounts may be used— The Secretary of State may modify a goal described in subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising such goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the revision.
(d)
Implementation—
(1)
In general— The Secretary of State shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, EUCOM, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b).
(2)
Method— Activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) shall be carried out through—
(A)
initiatives of the United States Government;
(B)
Federal grant programs such as the Information Access Fund;
(C)
nongovernmental or international organizations; or
(D)
support exchanges with countries facing state-sponsored disinformation and pressure campaigns, particularly in Europe and Eurasia, provided that a portion of the funds are made available through a process whereby the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State solicits proposals from posts located in affected countries to counter state-sponsored disinformation and hybrid threats, promote democracy, and support exchanges with countries facing state-sponsored disinformation and pressure campaigns.
(3)
Report on implementation—
(A)
In general— Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.
(B)
Elements— Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to each program or activity described in that subparagraph—
(i)
the amount of funding for the program or activity;
(ii)
the goal described in subsection (b) to which the program or activity relates; and
(iii)
an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.
(e)
Coordination with global partners—
(1)
In general— In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with—
(A)
the European Union and its institutions;
(B)
the governments of countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and
(C)
international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).
(f)
Rule of construction— Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.
(g)
Expansion of pilot program—
(1)
In general— The Secretary of State shall expand the pilot program required under section 254(g) of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9543(g)) to hire additional personnel within the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to develop and implement programs focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building capacity of civil society, political parties, and independent media.
(2)
Report on ensuring adequate staffing for governance activities— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on implementation of the pilot program required under section 254(g) of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9543(g)).
(h)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 706 Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia

It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, and continues to apply traditional uses of force, intelligence operations, cyber attacks, and influence campaigns, including through the use of corruption, disinformation, and cultural and social influence, which represent clear and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;
(2)
in response, governments in Europe and Eurasia should redouble efforts to build resilience within their institutions, political systems, and civil societies;
(3)
the United States Government supports the democratic and rule of law-based institutions that the Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union;
(4)
the United States Government should continue to work with and strengthen such institutions, including the European Union, as a partner against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation through the coordination of aid programs, development assistance, and other efforts to counter malign Russian influence;
(5)
the United States Government should continue to work with the individual countries of Europe and Eurasia to bolster efforts to counter malign Russian influence in all its forms; and
(6)
the United States Government should increase assistance and diplomatic efforts in Europe, including in European Union and NATO countries, to address threats to fundamental human rights and backsliding in rule of law protections, operating space for independent media and civil society, and other democratic institutions, whose strength is critical to defending against malign Russian influence over the long term.

Sec. 707 Addressing abuse and misuse by the Russian Federation of INTERPOL red notices and red diffusions

(a)
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The International Criminal Police Organization (commonly known as “INTERPOL”) works to prevent and fight crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters, including counterterrorism, cybercrime, counternarcotics, and transnational organized crime.
(2)
United States membership and participation in INTERPOL advances the national security and law enforcement interests of the United States related to combating counterterrorism, cybercrime, counternarcotics, and combating transnational organized crime.
(3)
Article 2 of INTERPOL’s Constitution states that the organization aims “[t]o ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities […] in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights””.
(4)
Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution states that, “[i]t is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”.
(5)
Independent international nongovernmental organizations have documented how several INTERPOL member countries, including the Government of the Russian Federation and others, have used INTERPOL's processes, including the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms, for activities of a political character.
(b)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation and the governments of certain other countries have repeatedly abused and misused INTERPOL’s red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overtly political purposes and activities such as harassing or persecuting political opponents, human rights defenders, or journalists.
(c)
Censure of abusive activity and institutional reforms— The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at INTERPOL—
(1)
to inform the General Secretariat about cases in which countries are misusing its systems for activities of a political character or other purposes contrary to INTERPOL's Constitution, so that appropriate measures may be taken by INTERPOL;
(2)
to advance institutional reforms at INTERPOL, including in the General Secretariat, the Commission for the Control of Files, and the Notices and Diffusions Task Force within the General Secretariat, to prevent member countries from abusing and misusing INTERPOL’s red notice and diffusion mechanisms;
(3)
to increase, to the extent practicable, dedicated funding to the Commission for the Control of Files and the Notices and Diffusions Task Force in order to further expand operations related to the review of requests for red notices and red diffusions; and
(4)
to censure member countries that repeatedly abuse and misuse INTERPOL's red notice and red diffusion mechanisms, including restricting the access of those countries to INTERPOL's data systems.
(d)
Report on United States support for INTERPOL reforms—
(1)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on United States support for institutional reforms at INTERPOL that are necessary to address abuse and misuse of INTERPOL's red notice and red diffusion mechanisms.
(2)
Elements— The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—
(A)
to the extent feasible, a description of United States support for reforms that increase INTERPOL's transparency with respect to—
(i)
the number of red notices and red diffusions requested by each member country;
(ii)
the number or proportion of requests for red notice or red diffusions rejected by INTERPOL, following internal review, for each member country;
(iii)
how INTERPOL’s General Secretariat identifies requests for red notice or red diffusions that are politically motivated or are otherwise in violation of INTERPOL’s rules; and
(iv)
how INTERPOL reviews and addresses cases in which a member country has abused or misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overtly political purposes; and
(B)
a list of countries that the Secretary determines have repeatedly abused and misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for political purposes.
(3)
Public availability— The report required by paragraph (1) shall be posted on a publicly available interest website of the Department of State and of the Department of Justice.
(e)
Prohibition against action on abusive red notices and red diffusions— An official of the United States may not take any action against a person based solely on the issuance of an INTERPOL red notice or red diffusion issued by a country identified on the list required by paragraph (2)(B) unless the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the red notice or red diffusion was not issued for political purposes.
(f)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 708 Report on accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Russian Federation in Syria

(a)
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
In March 2016, Amnesty International issued a report stating, “Syrian and Russian forces have been deliberately attacking health facilities in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. But what is truly egregious is that wiping out hospitals appears to have become part of their military strategy.”.
(2)
On September 21, 2017, Department of State Spokesperson Heather Nauert said, “The United States is concerned by reports of airstrikes in Idlib province and northern Hama province on September 19 and 20 that killed at least three medical personnel and damaged a number of medical facilities, emergency equipment, and civil defense centers. These attacks fit an all-too-familiar pattern in which medical facilities and personnel—and the civilians they serve—are victims of strikes by the Syrian regime and its Russian allies.”.
(3)
In February 2018, Syrian and Russian airstrikes in rebel-held areas killed 230 civilians and hit at least 9 medical facilities. In a statement on February 10, 2018, the office of Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the airstrikes “may, depending on the circumstances, all constitute war crimes”.
(4)
On March 6, 2018, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic noted, “[I]n one particularly harmful attack on 13 November, the Russian Air Force carried out airstrikes on a densely populated civilian area in Atareb (Aleppo), killing at least 84 people and injuring another 150. Using unguided weapons, the attack struck a market, police station, shops, and a restaurant, and may amount to a war crime.”.
(b)
Report required— The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation or paramilitary forces or contractors responsive to the direction of that Government during the operations of that Government in Syria—
(1)
not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2)
not later than 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of State determines that the violence in Syria has ceased.
(c)
Elements— Each report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
A description of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity described in subsection (b), including—
(A)
any such alleged crimes that may violate the principle of medical neutrality and, if possible, an identification of the individual or individuals who engaged in or organized such crimes; and
(B)
if possible, a description of the conventional and unconventional weapons used for such alleged crimes and the origins of such weapons.
(2)
An assessment of whether such alleged crimes constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, including genocide.
(3)
A description and assessment by the Office of Global Criminal Justice of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and other appropriate Federal agencies, of programs that the United States Government has undertaken to ensure accountability for such alleged crimes, including programs—
(A)
to train investigators within and outside of Syria on how to document, investigate, develop findings with respect to, and identify and locate alleged perpetrators of, such alleged crimes, including—
(i)
the number of United States Government or contractor personnel currently designated to work full-time on such training; and
(ii)
an identification of the authorities and appropriations being used to support such training; and
(B)
to document, collect, preserve, and protect evidence of such alleged crimes, including support for Syrian, foreign, and international nongovernmental organizations, and other entities, including the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic of the United Nations.
(d)
Protection of witnesses and evidence— In preparing the report required by subsection (b), the Secretary shall take due care to ensure that the identities of witnesses and physical evidence are not publicly disclosed in a manner that might place such witnesses at risk of harm or encourage the destruction of such evidence by the Government of the Russian Federation or the Government of Syria, violent extremist groups, anti-government forces, or any other combatants or participants in the conflict in Syria.
(e)
Form— Each report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in unclassified or classified form, but shall include a publicly available annex.
(f)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 709 Report on activities of the Russian Federation in Syria

(a)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that includes—
(1)
an assessment of the willingness and capacity of the Government of the Russian Federation to ensure the removal of Iranian forces, Iran-aligned and Iran-directed militias and paramilitaries, and other armed group responsive to the direction of Iran, from the territory of Syria;
(2)
a list of policies, actions, or activities that the Government of the Russian Federation would take if that Government were willing to ensure the removal of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) from the territory of Syria;
(3)
a list of policies, actions, or activities that the Government of the Russian Federation would take to ensure the removal of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) from the territory of Syria if that Government were capable of doing so;
(4)
an assessment of whether any of the policies, actions, or activities described in paragraph (2) or (3) are being taken by the Government of the Russian Federation;
(5)
an assessment of the specific commitments made by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation to officials of the Government of Israel with respect to the Golan Heights and the presence of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) in the territory of Syria;
(6)
an assessment of weapons, technologies, and knowledge directly or indirectly transferred by the Government of the Russian Federation to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, or Iran-aligned forces in Syria that threaten the security and qualitative military edge of Israel; and
(7)
an assessment of whether the presence of Russian forces and Russian contractors in Syria limits the options of the Government of Israel in taking steps to ensure its security from threats emanating from the territory of Syria.
(b)
Form— The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(c)
Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees and leadership means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 710 Report on the assassination of Boris Nemtsov

(a)
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report detailing the circumstances of the assassination on February 27, 2015, of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, including—
(1)
a list of the individuals the Secretary determines to have been involved in the assassination as perpetrators or as having organized or directed the assassination;
(2)
a description of what measures, if any, have been taken by the Government of the Russian Federation to investigate the assassination and bring the individuals described in paragraph (1) to justice; and
(3)
an assessment of the effectiveness of those measures.
(b)
Form— The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(c)
Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees and leadership means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 711 Report on the personal net worth and assets of Vladimir Putin

(a)
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the personal net worth and assets of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, including—
(1)
the estimated net worth and known sources of income of Vladimir Putin and his family members, including assets, investments, bank accounts, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information; and
(2)
an identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to Vladimir Putin.
(b)
Form of report— The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(c)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 712 Sense of Congress on responsibility of technology companies for state-sponsored disinformation

It is the sense of Congress that technology companies, particularly social media companies, share responsibility for ensuring that their platforms are free of disinformation sponsored by the Government of the Russian Federation and other foreign governments.