Title III — Chemical weapons nonproliferation

The international norm against the use of chemical weapons has severely eroded since 2012. At least 4 actors between 2012 and the date of the enactment of this Act have used chemical weapons: Syria, North Korea, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Iraq and Syria.

On March 4, 2018, the Government of the Russian Federation knowingly used novichok, a lethal chemical agent, in an attempt to kill former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia, in Salisbury, United Kingdom.

In September 2018, the Government of the United Kingdom charged 2 Russian suspects with the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, further highlighting the culpability of the Government of the Russian Federation in the attack.

On June 27, 2018, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (commonly known as the “OPCW”), during its Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, adopted a decision to “put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW–UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report; and decide[d] also that the Secretariat shall provide regular reports on its investigations to the Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General for their consideration”.

In addition, during the Fourth Special Session, the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention voted to provide new powers to the Director-General of the OPCW to attribute chemical weapons attacks. The decision “affirms that, whenever a chemical weapons use occurs on the territory of a State Party, those who were the perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved should be identified, and underscores the added value of the Secretariat conducting an independent investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons with a view to facilitating universal attribution of all chemical weapons attacks”.

Finally, the decision of the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention allows “the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating a possible chemical weapons use on its territory, [to] provide technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons”.

The Government of the Russian Federation attempted to impede the adoption of the identification mechanism in the Fourth Special Session, and has repeatedly worked to degrade the OPCW’s ability to identify chemical weapons users.

The Government of the Russian Federation has shown itself to be unwilling or incapable of compelling the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, an ally of the Russian Federation, to stop using chemical weapons against the civilian population in Syria.

The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to its key ally the United Kingdom, its commitment to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Thirty-four countries, including the United States, have joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the use of Chemical Weapons, which represents a political commitment by participating countries to hold to account persons responsible for the use of chemical weapons.

The Defense Ministry of the Government of the Netherlands exposed 4 Russians as agents of the GRU intelligence service who had attempted to hack OPCW networks during the OPCW’s investigation of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom.

to protect and defend the interests of the United States, allies of the United States, and the international community at large from the continuing threat of chemical weapons and their proliferation;

to maintain a steadfast commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW;

to promote and strengthen the investigative and identification mechanisms of the OPCW, including the development of a new OPCW laboratory and enhancements to the OPCW network of designated laboratories, through the provision of additional resources and technical equipment to better allow the OPCW to detect, identify, and attribute chemical weapons attacks;

to pressure the Government of the Russian Federation to halt its efforts to degrade the international efforts of the United Nations and the OPCW to investigate chemical weapons attacks and to designate perpetrators of such attacks by—

to examine additional avenues for investigating, identifying, and holding accountable chemical weapons users if the Government of the Russian Federation continues in its attempts to block or hinder investigations of the OPCW; and

to punish the Government of the Russian Federation for, and deter that Government from, any chemical weapons production and use through the imposition of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the use of the mechanisms specified in the Chemical Weapons Convention for violations of the Convention.

In general— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes an assessment of—

Form of report— Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex.

In general— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Government of the Russian Federation that includes an assessment of—

Form of report— Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

In general— There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024, to be provided to the OPCW as a voluntary contribution pursuant to section 301(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(a)) for the purpose of strengthening the OPCW’s investigative and identification mechanisms for chemical weapons attacks.

Availability of funds— Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.