Title II — Investing in alliances and partnerships
II Investing in alliances and partnerships
A Strategic and diplomatic matters
202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States benefits greatly from its ties to allies and partners, without which the United States would be less secure and less prosperous;
any fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships only benefit United States adversaries;
the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand are important allies in tackling global challenges and have pledged significant support for efforts of shared interest;
strengthening and deepening partnerships with the nations of Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, as well as with the region’s emerging ASEAN-centered architecture, is essential to further our shared interests;
the United States should make concrete efforts to cultivate and deepen ties with allies and partners through new and ongoing dialogue and exchanges with counterparts; and
the United States will work with allies to prioritize promoting human rights and labor rights throughout the region.
Statement of policy— It shall be the policy of the United States—
to deepen multilateral diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—
defending Japan, including all areas under the administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan;
defending the Republic of Korea under article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea;
defending the Philippines under article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines;
defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and
defending Australia under article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;
to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and regional partnerships, including with ASEAN and New Zealand;
to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts; and
to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.
203. Reviving United States leadership in international organizations and regional institutions
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
The Trump Administration has abdicated historic United States leadership at the United Nations and in other international and regional organizations, creating a vacuum that the Government of China is filling.
The United States, through enforcement of a statutory cap on contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, has accrued $1,000,000,000 in arrears since fiscal year 2017, leading to funding disruptions to United Nations peacekeeping missions.
The Administration withdrew the United States from the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 and is currently withholding assessed funds for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which has authorized and led investigations uncovering grave human rights abuses in Syria, Venezuela, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, among other places.
The United States formally submitted a notice of withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2019, a landmark international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address the impacts of climate change.
In the midst of a deadly global pandemic, President Trump announced on May 29, 2020, that the United States would “terminate” its relationship with the World Health Organization, and on July 6, 2020, the Administration submitted its formal notice of withdrawal from the World Health Organization. The World Health Organization is playing a key role in the global pandemic response, including by developing technical guidance, providing personal protective equipment and testing kits to low-resource countries, and supporting efforts to identify effective treatments and a vaccine.
The Administration has taken these decisions at the same time the Government of China is increasing its activities at the United Nations and in international and regional organizations in order to pursue its national interests and exploit the United States leadership vacuum.
Chinese nationals currently head four of the United Nations specialized agencies, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). A United States national holds the top leadership position in UNICEF and the World Bank.
The Government of China has sought to use its growing influence to promote a view of international human rights contrary to universal values and elevates the power of the Chinese Communist Party and the state over the rights of the individual, gives primacy to economic and social matters over civil and political rights, and seeks to mute criticism of individual countries’ human rights records, particularly its own.
The Government of China, at every opportunity, will fill the leadership void left by the United States if the United States continues to decrease its engagement with and in regional institutions, international organizations, and with the United Nations, by withdrawing from key United Nations bodies, unilaterally cutting funding to core United Nations programs and agencies, or abrogating its obligations under multilateral treaties or agreements.
Statement of policy— It shall be the policy of the United States to take the following actions:
Fully engage with United Nations bodies and agencies to counter efforts by Chinese diplomats to push concepts, proposals, and programs that undermine United States national and allied interests and values.
Pay United States peacekeeping assessments at the assessed rate negotiated by United States diplomats at the United Nations and pay back outstanding arrears.
Reengage with the United Nations Human Rights Council, including by running for a seat on the Council in future elections held by the United Nations General Assembly.
Refrain from withholding budget funds from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Rescind the United States notice of withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement or if this Act is enacted after November 4, 2020, rejoin as a party to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Rescind the United States notice of withdrawal from the World Health Organization, release assessed and voluntary funding withheld from the WHO, and engage with the WHO on efforts to combat COVID–19 and other public health threats.
Seek to support United States candidates for positions in United Nations bodies and to ensure that such efforts are resourced and staffed, as well as to encourage and support like-minded governments to put forth their own nominees for positions in United Nations bodies.
Engage with regional organizations, including NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organization of American States (OAS) to counter efforts by Chinese diplomatic concepts, proposals, and programs that undermine United States national and allied interests and values.
204. Mandate to use sanctions authorities with respect to the People's Republic of China
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
Congress has provided the President with a broad range of tough authorities to impose sanctions to address malign behavior by the Government of China and individuals and entities in the People’s Republic of China, including individuals and entities engaging in—
intellectual property theft;
cyber-related economic espionage;
repression of ethnic minorities;
the use of forced labor and other human rights abuses;
abuses of the international trading system;
illicit assistance to and trade with the Government of North Korea; and
drug trafficking, including trafficking in fentanyl and other opioids.
Congress has in many cases mandated imposition of sanctions and other measures with respect to individuals and entities identified as responsible for such behavior.
Mandate To use authorities—
In general— The President shall use the full range of authorities available to the President, including the authorities described in paragraph (2) to impose sanctions and other measures to combat malign behavior by the Government of China, entities owned or controlled by that Government, and other Chinese individuals and entities responsible for such behavior.
Authorities described— The authorities described in this paragraph include the following:
The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708) (relating to addressing economic and industrial espionage in cyberspace).
The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).
The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note) (relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to the erosion of certain obligations of the People's Republic of China with respect to Hong Kong).
Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note) (relating to the imposition of sanctions relating to undermining fundamental freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong).
Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) (relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to violations of human rights of minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region).
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) (relating to the imposition of new export controls).
Export control measures required to be maintained with respect to entities in the telecommunications sector of the People’s Republic of China, including under section 1260I of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) (relating to limiting the removal of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. from the entity list of the Bureau of Industry and Security).
Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.) (relating to a prohibition on Federal Government contracts with entities that use telecommunications equipment or services produced by certain Chinese entities).
205. Negotiations with G7 countries on the People’s Republic of China
In general— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of State, shall initiate a China-focused agenda at the G7, with respect to the following issues:
Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
Establishing and promulgating international infrastructure standards.
The erosion of democracy in Hong Kong.
Human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other areas in the People's Republic of China.
The security of 5G telecommunications.
Anti-competitive behavior.
Coercive and indentured international finance and conditional provision of foreign assistance.
International influence campaigns.
Environmental standards.
Coordination with like-minded regional partners, including the Republic of Korea and Australia.
Briefing on progress of negotiations— Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the progress of any negotiations described in subsection (a).
206. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
April 10, 2019, marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8).
Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both parties and to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.
The military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of the People’s Republic of China, which is currently engaged in a comprehensive military modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army and its ability to conduct joint operations.
Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue to face sustained pressure and coercion from the Government of China to isolate Taiwan from the international community, including the World Health Organization.
In the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), which became law on March 16, 2018, Congress observed that the “self-imposed restrictions that the United States maintains” on relations with Taiwan have negative consequences for the United States-Taiwan relationship.
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
Taiwan is a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy;
the security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements for the continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United States;
the United States Government—
supports Taiwan’s efforts to seek appropriate international space and meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations; and
should seek to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) in a manner consistent with the “Six Assurances” and in accordance with the United States “One China” policy as both governments work to improve bilateral relations;
Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy is supported by the United States Government;
Taiwan must increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy; and
the United States should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.
Statement of policy— It is the policy of the United States—
to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;
to seek meaningful cooperation between the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners; and
that the United States should actively work with other member countries of international bodies and organizations to advocate for Taiwan’s participation.
207. Global public health risk reduction program
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
recurring outbreaks of emerging and reemerging zoonotic diseases, including Ebola virus disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and avian influenza, pose an increasing threat to lives and livelihood, demonstrating the need to engage in a One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnection between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment; and
transparency, coordination, and collaboration with stakeholders and partners is key to containment of emerging zoonotic diseases.
Risk reduction strategy— The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shall design and implement a program, in collaboration, to the extent possible, with the People’s Republic of China, to reduce the risk of the transmission of dangerous pathogens from animals to people, including strains of coronavirus, Ebola, and influenza, and to foster transparency in reporting the emergence of such zoonotic diseases. The program should focus on—
the investments that reduce most effectively the risk of the transmission of viruses that pose the greatest threat to Americans and United States national security; and
building networks and strengthening capacity in labs, institutions of higher education, and other institutions to identify and publicly report on emerging zoonotic diseases.
208. Enhancement of diplomatic and economic engagement with Pacific island countries
Authority— The Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of promoting increased diplomatic engagement and increased economic and commercial engagement between the United States and Pacific island countries.
Availability of funds—
In general— Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2021, not more than $10,000,000, respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of this section.
Termination— The availability of funds in paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2025.
Report— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the activities of the Department of State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island countries, which shall include an assessment of the additional diplomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed Staff and an assessment of the impact of the activities with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of the United States.
Appropriate committees of congress defined— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
209. Reporting on the Belt and Road Initiative after onset of the COVID–19 pandemic
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the Government of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Elements— The report required by subsection (a) shall assess the following:
The implications of COVID–19 on the Government of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with respect to any agreements made with BRI contracted countries on debt restructuring, debt sustainability, or debt forgiveness.
The failure of the BRI of the People’s Republic of China to meet international standards with respect to the following:
The sovereignty of the countries in which infrastructure investments are made.
Anti-corruption.
Rule of law.
Human rights.
Fiscal and debt sustainability.
Environmental and energy standards.
Labor.
Transparency.
Greenhouse gas emissions reduction and climate change.
The links between the BRI and the following:
The exportation by the Government of China of mass surveillance techniques and technologies.
The attempts of the Government of China to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting of its human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Whether any projects being carried out under the BRI present the potential for United States engagement, with the support of the Asian Development Bank, to leverage existing contracts into sustainable infrastructure investments.
Whether any such projects meet the international standards described in paragraph (2).
In the case of projects described in paragraph (4) that fail to meet the international standards described in paragraph (2), whether such failures could be mitigated through support by the United States.
United States Government website— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a regularly updated website disclosing and assessing the implications of the BRI of the People’s Republic of China as described in subsection (b).
Classified report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a classified report on the BRI, which shall assess the following:
Whether the BRI is achieving the objectives of the Government of China.
How the BRI is managed and controlled.
How the BRI is evolving over time.
210. United States international development and investment agenda
The Department of State, in coordination with relevant agencies and departments, shall launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to—
good governance;
the rule of law;
transparency;
financing; and
the advancement of free markets and competition.
211. Report on Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall—
conduct a rightsizing review of personnel and resources of the Department of State dedicated to the Indo-Pacific; and
submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on—
the findings of the review; and
related analysis and recommendations.
212. United States-China climate cooperation
It is the sense of Congress that—
successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to avoid the worst forecasted effects of climate change requires global cooperation and coordination of efforts;
as both the world’s largest emitters and largest economies, all other nations look towards the United States and the People's Republic of China for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the effects of climate change that are inevitable;
the United States and the People's Republic of China should, to the extent practicable, coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to reduce domestic greenhouse gas ambitions, with aspirations towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
the United States, and its allies, should work together to hold the Government of China accountable to—
meet emissions reductions commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement;
work faithfully to uphold the principles, goals, and rules of the Paris Climate Agreement; and
avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or devolve the Paris Climate Agreement’s rule or underlying framework, particularly within areas of accountability transparency, and shared responsibility among all parties; and
pursuing opportunities for the United States and the People's Republic of China to cooperate on clean energy research, development, finance, and deployment, with clear mutually agreed upon rules and policies to protect intellectual property and ensure equitable non-punitive provision of support, would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a global clean energy transformation that benefits all.
213. Enhancing United States leadership and competitiveness in advancing global clean energy development
United states contributions— The Secretary of the Treasury may contribute annually on behalf of the United States $225,000,000 to the Clean Technology Fund managed by the World Bank (in this section referred to as the “Fund”).
Limits on country access— The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that—
the Fund does not provide more than approximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country; and
each country that receives amounts from the Fund submit to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan that—
will achieve significant reductions in national-level greenhouse gas emissions; and
in the case of a country that is not classified by the World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be contributed from the public funds of the country.
Project and program requirements—
In general— The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that support from the Fund is used exclusively to support the deployment of clean energy technologies in developing countries (including, where appropriate, through the provision of technical support or support for policy or institutional reforms) in a manner that achieves substantial additional reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Definitions— In this subsection:
Additional— The term additional refers to the extent to which a project or program supported under this subsection results in lower greenhouse gas emissions than would have occurred in the absence of the project or program, taking into account, to the extent practicable, effects beyond the physical boundaries of the project or program that result from project or program activities.
Clean energy technology— The term clean energy technology means a technology that, as compared with technologies being deployed at that time for widespread commercial use in the country involved does the following:
Achieves substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Does not result in significant incremental adverse effects on public health or the environment.
Does one or more of the following:
Generates electricity or useful thermal energy from a non-fossil renewable resource.
Substantially increases the energy efficiency of buildings or industrial processes, or of electricity transmission, distribution, or end-use consumption.
Substantially increases the energy efficiency of the transportation system or increases utilization of transportation fuels that have lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that are substantially lower than those attributable to fossil fuel-based alternatives.
Report to Congress— Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report describing—
the purpose of and progress on each project supported by the Fund; and
how each such project furthers the investment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the project is implemented.
214. Authorizing appropriations for United States contributions to the Green Climate Fund
United states contributions— On behalf of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State may contribute annually up to a total of $1,000,000,000 to the Green Climate Fund established by the United Nations (in this section referred to as the “GCF”).
Limits on country access— The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that—
the GCF does not provide more than approximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country;
each country that receives amounts from the GCF submit to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan that—
energy production projects will achieve significant reductions in national-level greenhouse gas emissions; and
adaptation projects provide long-term enhancements to national and food security; protect lives, livelihoods; or ensure lasting access to freshwater resources and public health outcomes; and
in the case of a country that is not classified by the World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be contributed from the public funds of the country.
Project and program requirements— The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that support from the GCF is used exclusively to support the deployment by developing countries of clean energy technologies and development of projects that improve a countries’ resilience capacities and ability to adapt to the effects of climate change (including, where appropriate, through the provision of technical support or support for policy or institutional reforms).
Report to Congress— Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report describing—
the purpose of and progress on each project supported by the Fund; and
how each such project furthers the investment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the project is implemented.
215. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State
In general— Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended—
by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
“(4) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources
“(A) Authorization for assistant secretary—Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized to be established in the Department of State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.
“(B) Responsibilities—The Assistant Secretary authorized to be established by this paragraph shall be responsible for the execution of diplomatic activities related to, and support for the advancement of foreign policy dedicated to, energy matters within the Department of State for—
“(i) formulating and implementing international policies, in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Transportation, as appropriate, aimed at protecting and advancing United States energy security interests and promoting the responsible development of global energy resources by effectively managing United States bilateral and multilateral relations;
“(ii) ensuring that the Department of State’s analyses and decision-making processes related to matters involving global energy development account for the effects the developments have on—
“(I) United States national security;
“(II) quality of life and public health of people, households, and communities, particularly vulnerable and underserved populations who lack access to reliable and low emission transportation systems or are affected by, or proximate to, energy development, transmission, and distribution projects;
“(III) United States economic interests;
“(IV) emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change; and
“(V) local and regional land use, air and water quality, and risks to public health of communities described under subclause (II);
“(iii) incorporating energy security and climate security into the policies, programs, and activities of the Department of State;
“(iv) facilitating the efforts of countries to implement just transitions from carbon intensive power production and carbon intensive industries to low and zero carbon emitting power sources and to lower decarbonized industrial processes;
“(v) coordinating energy activities within the Department of State and with relevant Federal agencies;
“(vi) working internationally—
“(I) to support socially and environmentally responsible development of energy resources that reduce carbon emissions, and the distribution of such resources for the benefit of the United States and United States allies and trading partners for their energy security, climate security, and economic development needs;
“(II) to promote the availability of clean energy technologies, including low and zero emission vehicles and carbon capture and storage, and a well-functioning global market for energy resources, technologies, and expertise for the benefit of the United States and United States allies and trading partners;
“(III) to facilitate the planning, design, engineering, development of livable communities that utilize multimodal transportation to reduce transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions, reduce congestion and improve commerce and quality of life for affected residents;
“(IV) to resolve international disputes regarding the exploration, development, production, or distribution of energy resources;
“(V) to support the economic, security, and commercial interests of United States persons operating in the energy markets of foreign countries; and
“(VI) to support and coordinate international efforts—
“(aa) to alleviate energy poverty;
“(bb) to protect vulnerable, exploited, and underserved populations that are affected or displaced by energy development projects;
“(cc) to account for and reduce greenhouse gas emission from energy development projects; and
“(dd) to increase access to energy for vulnerable and underserved communities;
“(vii) leading the United States commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;
“(viii) representing the United States at the United Nations’ Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles;
“(ix) coordinating within the Department of State and with relevant Federal departments and agencies on developing and implementing international energy-related sanctions; and
“(x) coordinating energy security and climate security and other relevant functions within the Department of State undertaken as of the date of the enactment of this paragraph by—
“(I) the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State;
“(II) the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of State; and
“(III) other offices within the Department of State.”
Conforming amendment— Section 931 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17371) is amended—
by striking subsections (a) and (b); and
by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively.
216. Sense of Congress on the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
hydrofluorocarbons are highly potent greenhouse gases;
the United States must work cooperatively with the international community to significantly reduce hydrofluorocarbons in commerce;
the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, adopted in October 2016 at the 28th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in Kigali, Rwanda, provides the legal framework for global cooperation on reducing hydrofluorocarbons in global commerce;
the United States is a leader in chemical and technological innovation that is at the forefront of developing safer chemical alternatives to hydrofluorocarbons and the technologies to use those new replacement chemicals;
industrial sectors in other countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, are working quickly to catch up to the United States in developing and marketing chemical and technological alternatives that support the phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons in global commerce in accordance with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and
United States chemical and refrigeration industries are disadvantaged in the global marketplace because the United States has not ratified the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
Statement of policy— It should be the policy of the United States—
to ratify the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and
to enact legislation providing sufficient authorities for the United States to comply with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
Definition of montreal protocol— In this section, the term Montreal Protocol means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987.
B International security matters
221. Definitions
In this subtitle:
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Company— The term company means any corporation, company, limited liability company, limited partnership, business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
Foreign ownership, control, or influence; foci— The terms foreign ownership, control, or influence and FOCI have the meanings given those terms in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document.
Incremental expenses— The term incremental expenses—
means the reasonable and proper cost of the goods and services that are consumed by a country as a direct result of the participation of that country in training under the authority of this title, including rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation; and
does not include pay, allowances, or other normal costs of the personnel of a country.
Other security forces— The term other security forces—
includes national security forces that conduct maritime security; and
does not include self-described militias or paramilitary organizations.
222. Statement of policy
It shall be the policy of the United States to—
exercise freedom of operations in the international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific region;
maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient basing and rotational presence (including support for pre-positioning strategies);
strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;
reaffirm the commitment and support of the United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding—
Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953;
Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;
Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; and
ensure the continuity of operations by the United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.
223. Additional funding for the security of the Indo-Pacific region
There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2021 through 2025, $125,000,000 for the Department of Defense for activities in the Indo-Pacific region and to strengthen alliances and partnerships, infrastructure, platforms, and posture to ensure a credible Indo-Pacific-region-wide defense strategy in accordance with the principles set forth in sections 4, 202, and 222.
224. Prohibition on use of funds to withdraw the United States Armed Forces from Japan and the Republic of Korea
In general— Except as provided in subsection (b), notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funds are authorized to be appropriated to take any action to—
withdraw or otherwise reduce the overall presence, including the rotational presence, of United States Armed Forces personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense in Japan and the Republic of Korea;
close or change the status of any base or other facility of the United States Armed Forces located in Japan or the Republic of Korea; or
withdraw or otherwise reduce the overall presence of United States Armed Forces assets in Japan or the Republic of Korea.
Exceptions— The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply if—
the host government transmits to the United States Government a written request for such a withdrawal or other reduction; or
the President declares the intent to take an action described in subsection (a);
not later than 90 days before initiating an action described in subsection (a), the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees notice of such intent that includes—
a justification for the action;
the number of members of the United States Armed Forces or civilian employees of the Department of Defense to be withdrawn or reduced, as applicable;
a description of the United States Armed Forces assets to be withdrawn or reduced, as applicable;
a description of any base or facility of the United States Armed Forces in Japan or the Republic of Korea to be subject to closure or change of status, as applicable;
an explanation of the national security benefit of the action to the United States and regional allies and partners; and
a plan to offset the reduction in United States conventional deterrence against the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea caused by the action; and
the Secretary of Defense certifies that rotational forces, which are globally available, are needed for a contingency in another area of responsibility.
Public testimony— Not later than 14 days after the submittal of the notice required by subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall testify before the appropriate committees of Congress in public session on such withdrawal or reduction.
225. Additional funding for foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific
Foreign military sales funding— In addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated $70,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2021 through fiscal year 2025 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this section.
Maritime law enforcement initiative— There is authorized to be appropriated $7,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2021 through fiscal year 2025 for the Department of State for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
Foreign military financing compact pilot program—
Authorization of appropriations— There is authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2021 and 2022 for the creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing compacts.
Assistance— The Secretary of State is authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to provide assistance under this section for each country that enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States pursuant to paragraph (7) to support policies and programs that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting security and civilian-military governance through respect for human rights, good governance (including transparency and free and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-crime efforts and programs.
Form of assistance— Assistance under this subsection may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an eligible country described in paragraph (5).
Application— The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and recommend procedures for considering solicited and unsolicited proposals for compacts under this pilot program.
Eligible countries— A country shall be a candidate country for purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal year 2021 and 2022 if—
the country is eligible for assistance from the International Development Association, and the per capita income of the country is equal to or less than the historical ceiling of the International Development Association for that year, as defined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; or
is classified as a lower middle income country in the then most recent edition of the World Development Report for Reconstruction and Development published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and has an income greater than the historical ceiling for International Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year involved; and
the Secretary of State determines that the country has demonstrated a commitment to just and democratic governance, including a demonstrated commitment to—
promote political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;
respect for human and civil rights, including the rights of people with disabilities and the rights of persons regardless of sexual orientation or religious practice or absence of same, including by pursuing effective measures against the trafficking of persons;
protect private property rights;
encourage transparency and accountability of government;
combat corruption; and
institute effective civilian control, professionalization, and accountability of the armed forces, and that such forces respect human rights.
Identification of eligible countries— Not later than 90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Secretary—
shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a list of all eligible countries identified that have met the requirements under paragraph (5) for the fiscal year; and
shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which such countries meet the criteria described in paragraph (5).
FMF Challenge Compact—
Compact— The Secretary of State may provide assistance for an eligible country only if the country enters into an agreement with the United States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Compact” (in this paragraph referred to as a “Compact”) that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of this title.
Elements— The elements of the Compact shall be those listed in paragraph (5) for determining eligibility, and be designed to significantly advance the performance of those commitments during the period of the Compact.
In general— The Compact should take into account the national strategy of the eligible country and shall include—
the specific objectives that the country and the United States expect to achieve during the term of the Compact;
the responsibilities of the country and the United States in the achievement of such objectives;
regular benchmarks to measure, where appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives; and
the strategy of the eligible country to sustain progress made toward achieving such objectives after expiration of the Compact.
Congressional consultation prior to compact negotiations— Not later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact.
Assessment of pilot program and recommendations— Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the pilot program, assess the success and utility of the pilot program established under this subsection in meeting objectives, and make a recommendation for continuing on a pilot or permanent basis with a further foreign military financing compact program.
226. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2021 through fiscal year 2025 for the Department of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.
227. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should prioritize the review of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.
Statement of policy— The Secretary of the Navy shall develop a five year plan to prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific.
Transfer authority— Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by striking “and to the Philippines” and inserting “to the Philippines, and to other major non-NATO allies of the United States located in the Indo-Pacific region (including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand) and other maritime Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states”.
Required coordination— The United States Government shall coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity building efforts of regional allies and partners.
228. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific
Authority— The President is authorized to transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under section 227(c) one OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigate on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
Grants not counted in annual total of transferred excess defense articles— The value of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section shall not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
Costs of transfers— Any expense incurred by the United States in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).
Repair and refurbishment in united states shipyards— To the maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipient to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States.
Expiration of authority— The authority to transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
229. Sense of Congress on arms exports and human rights
It is the Sense of Congress that—
one of the primary purposes for controlling the export of defense articles and defense services to foreign countries is to prevent such exports from being used in violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, including requiring accountability for any such violations, and to ensure that the sale, export, or transfer of such articles and services serves to encourage foreign countries to fully comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
provision of security assistance, including the provision of defense articles and defense services, pursuant to the authorities and in conformity with the principles of this Act, should only be done in accordance with and to support and promote this purpose; and
such security assistance, including the provision of defense articles and defense services controlled for export, should not be provided to a unit of the security forces of any country if such unit—
has violated international humanitarian law and has not been credibly investigated and subjected to a credible and transparent judicial process addressing such allegation; or
has committed a gross violation of human rights, and has not been credibly investigated and subjected to a credible and transparent judicial process addressing such allegation, including—
torture or rape;
ethnic cleansing of civilians;
recruitment or use of child soldiers;
falsely imprisoning, or engaging in the targeted killing of, political opponents;
the operation of, or effective control or direction over, secret detention facilities; or
extrajudicial killings, whether by military, security, or police forces.
230. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan defense relationship
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the Department of Defense, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), to support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including the development of the undersea warfare and air defense capabilities of Taiwan.
Required Department of Defense actions— The Secretary of Defense shall make efforts to include the military forces of Taiwan in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as appropriate, to bolster the defense capabilities of Taiwan.
231. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues
Statement of policy— It shall be the policy of the United States that—
an arms control dialogue with the Government of China, coordinated with United States allies and shaped by a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, is in the national security interests of the United States; and
the United States Government should formulate a strategy to engage the Government of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bringing the People’s Republic of China into an arms control framework, including—
fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control leading to the convening of bilateral strategic stability talks;
negotiating norms for outer space;
developing pre-launch notification regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
expanding lines of communication between both governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of conventional war and increasing transparency.
Report on the future of United States-China arms control— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging the Government of China on arms control, including—
areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, including on nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific;
how the United States Government can foster increased interest on the part of the Government of China in arms control;
identifying strategic military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China that the United States Government is most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and allied security interests;
opportunities for multilateral arms control in the Indo-Pacific region;
mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China; and
opportunities and methods to create strategic transparency between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
Report on arms control talks with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes—
a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for ensuring United States security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;
efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis; and
the interest level of the Government of China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
Extension of New START— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report, and a separate classified annex, that includes the following elements:
The strategy behind the decision to extend or not extend New START.
If New START were allowed to expire, an assessment of whether such an expiration is in the national security interests of the United States, including the specific reasons for such conclusion.
An examination of the effects of the expiration of New START on—
strategic stability with the Russian Federation;
the United States nuclear budget;
spending on United States conventional forces as a result of increased nuclear spending; and
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
An assessment of how the Government of the Russian Federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained environment and how the United States Government will respond if the Government of the Russian Federation expands its arsenal.
An assessment of how the United States Government will need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain, if possible, the knowledge of the Russian Federation’s arsenal that is currently provided by the inspection and verification mechanisms inherent to New START.
232. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea
Sense of Congress— Congress—
condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;
urges the Government of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful;
condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
rejects the People’s Republic of China’s unlawful maritime claim within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;
rejects the People’s Republic of China’s claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and
rejects the People’s Republic of China’s unlawful territorial or maritime claim to the James shoal.
Statement of policy— It shall be the policy of the United States to—
reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;
ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;
uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law;
oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;
support efforts by ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the “early harvest” of agreed-upon elements in the Code of Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;
support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a “common operating picture” in the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;
oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and
assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.
233. Statement of policy on becoming a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
It is the sense of Congress that—
becoming a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay on December 10, 1992, would help protect and advance United States national and economic security including by—
ensuring worldwide access to get our troops to the fight, to sustain them during the fight, and to get back home without the permission of other countries;
influencing the resolution of disputes between the People’s Republic of China and our allies in the South China Sea and elsewhere;
ensuring that the United States is able to assert an internationally accepted claim to its share of the Arctic;
providing United States companies with the legal certainty they need to secure rare earth minerals from the deep seabed; and
allowing United States companies the full protection of the treaty’s framework for laying and protecting submarine cables;
becoming a state party to the Convention would give the United States the voice and vote in decisions relating to deliberative matters under the Convention and thereby improve the ability of the United States to—
intervene as a full party to disputes relating to navigational rights, maritime security, energy development, transcontinental commerce, marine conservation, and environmental destruction; and
defend United States interpretations of the Convention’s provisions and United States interests, including those relating to whether coastal States have a right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs;
the People’s Republic of China’s construction of artificial islands, in support of China’s expanding military presence in the Pacific theatre, in the territorial waters of its neighbors along the South China Sea are hostile acts that escalate tensions between the People’s Republic of China and its neighbors, infringe on the sovereignty of China’s neighbors’ EEZs, and have resulted in an arbitration under the UNCLOS in which the arbitral tribunal ruled against the People’s Republic of China;
the United States status as a nonparty to UNCLOS resulted in the United States exclusion from the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 12, 2016, case in the matter of the South China Sea arbitration, wherein the Permanent Court of Arbitration stated that “the Tribunal forwarded to the Parties for their comment a Note Verbale from the Embassy of the United States of America, requesting to send a representative to observe the hearing” and “the Tribunal communicated to the Parties and the U.S. Embassy that it had decided that “only interested States parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea will be admitted as observers” and thus could not accede to the U.S. request”;
relying on customary international norms and on other countries to assert claims on behalf of the United States is insufficient to defend and uphold United States national and economic security and United States sovereign rights and interests;
the Senate should urgently provide advice and consent to ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; and
the United States should urgently become a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
234. Report on roles, missions, and capabilities of Indo-Pacific partners
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall report to the appropriate congressional committees with an assessment of engagement with each major United States treaty or security partner in the Indo-Pacific region in mutual dialogue on any on-going roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC) discussions, and an enumeration of jointly agreed recommendations for acquisition, platform, infrastructure, training, posture, and other measures necessary to assure that capabilities and capacity exist to execute all identified RMC, including to address anti-access and area denial challenges in the region.
235. Indo-Pacific maritime security initiative
Program authorized—
In general— The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—
to provide assistance to national military or other security forces of such countries that have maritime security missions among their functional responsibilities;
to provide training to ministry, agency, and headquarters level organizations for such forces; and
to provide assistance to and training to other relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related ministries, agencies, departments or offices that manage and oversee maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of State may so designate.
Designation of assistance— Assistance provided by the Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).
Authorization of appropriations— There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $25,000,000 in fiscal year 2021 and $50,000,000 in each of fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023, fiscal year 2024, and fiscal year 2025 to be used for purposes of training and assistance under this Initiative.
Eligible countries— In selecting countries in the Indo-Pacific region to which assistance is to be provided under the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall prioritize the provision of assistance to countries that will contribute to the achievement of the following objectives:
Retaining unhindered access to and use of international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and achieving United States national security objectives.
Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region.
Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been determined to be a security threat to the United States.
Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or regional organization to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Priorities for assistance—
In general— In carrying out the purpose of the Initiative—
priority shall be placed on assistance to enhance the maritime security capabilities of the military or security forces of countries in the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime missions and the government agencies responsible for such forces; and
assistance may be provided to a country in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the capabilities of that country, or of a regional organization that includes that country, to conduct—
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
littoral and port security;
Coast Guard operations;
command and control; and
management and oversight of maritime activities.
Types of assistance and training—
Authorized elements of assistance— Assistance provided under subsection (a)(1)(A) may include the provision of equipment, training, and small-scale military construction.
Required elements of assistance and training— Assistance and training provided under subsection (a) shall include elements that promote—
the observance of and respect for human rights; and
respect for legitimate civilian authority within the country to which the assistance is provided.
Joint task force— The Department of Defense shall establish a joint, interagency task force to assess, respond to, and coordinate with allies and partners in response to the use of grey zone tactics by state and non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, including—
conducting domain awareness operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and hand off suspected grey zone activities;
promoting security, cooperation, and capacity building; and
coordinating country team and partner nation initiatives in order to counter the use of grey zone tactics by adversaries.
Annual report— The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress each year a report on the status of the provision of equipment, training, supplies, or other services provided pursuant to the Initiative during the preceding 12 months.
Authority for payment—
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, if the Secretary of State determines that the payment of incremental expenses in connection with training described in subsection (a)(1)(B) will facilitate the participation in such training of organization personnel of foreign countries under subsection (a)(1)(C), the Secretary may use amounts available under subsection (b) for assistance and training under subsection (a) for the payment of such incremental expenses.
Covered countries— The foreign countries specified in this paragraph are the following:
Brunei.
Singapore.
Taiwan.
Notice to Congress on assistance and training— Not later than 15 days before exercising the authority under subsection (a) or (g) with respect to a recipient foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a notification in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress.
236. Reporting on countries purchasing arms from the People's Republic of China
In general—
Annual report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying countries which have in the prior two years acquired defense articles and any defense goods or services provided by grant, loan, or by other means of provision from the People’s Republic of China.
Interim briefing— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall provide an interim briefing on the report required under paragraph (1) to the appropriate congressional committees.
Elements— The report required under subsection (a) shall include—
a determination of countries that have purchased Chinese-origin defense articles and any defense goods or services provided by grant, loan, or by other means of provision, and whether such purchases have increased over the previous year;
a determination of which countries have provided Chinese-origin defense articles and any defense goods or services provided by grant, loan, or by other means of provision to non-state actors;
a determination of whether the use of Chinese defense articles and any defense goods or services provided by other means by purchasing countries or non-state entities have been used in conflict, and if this has resulted in civilian casualties and, if so, an assessment of whether such casualties are the result of deliberate targeting;
the types, quantities, purchase price or grant or leased value, and general capabilities of such defense articles, and when such articles have been or will be delivered to such country, as well as any concessions by the Government of China in terms of permitting in-country manufacturing, concessional financing, or other incentives, concessions, or cooperative measures associated with such sales; and
a technical assessment of such defense articles, including the strengths, weaknesses, and reliability of the defense articles compared to comparable United States defense articles.
Form— The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
Defense articles defined— In this section, the term defense articles means the following items:
Rockets, space launch vehicles, missiles, bombs (including equipment to enable precision guidance), and torpedoes.
Armored combat ground vehicles, including ground vehicles and trailers that are armed or are specially designed to be used as a firing or launch platform to deliver munitions or otherwise destroy or incapacitate targets, excluding any unarmed ground vehicles.
Aircraft, whether manned, unmanned, remotely piloted, or optionally piloted, as follows:
Bombers.
Fighters, fighter/bombers, and fixed-wing attack aircraft.
Turbofan or turbojet powered trainers used to train pilots for fighter, attack, or bomber aircraft.
Attack helicopters.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Aircraft specially designed to incorporate a defense article for the purpose of performing an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance function.
Aircraft specially designed to incorporate a defense article for the purpose of performing an electronic warfare function, airborne warning and control aircraft, or aircraft specially designed to incorporate a defense article for the purpose of performing a command, control, and communication function.
Naval vessels, such as warships and other combatant vessels (battleships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, cruisers, corvettes, littoral combat ships, mine sweepers, mine hunters, mine countermeasure ships, dock landing ships, amphibious assault ships), Coast Guard vessels, or vessels specially designed or easily converted to provide functions equivalent to such vessels.
Submarines, submersibles and semi-submersibles.
C Regional strategies To counter the People's Republic of China
240. Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this subtitle, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
I Western Hemisphere
241. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations
It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States and Canada are close allies, historically sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;
without a common approach by the United States and Canada on climate and environmental issues, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy and human rights, the People's Republic of China will seek to expand its influence over economic, political, and security issues in Canada;
the relationship between the United States and Canada has come under significant strain due to—
tariff restrictions placed on Canada by the Trump Administration; and
personal attacks by President Trump and White House advisors against senior leaders in the Canadian Government;
amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade relations, a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics and climate change;
the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
the People's Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada; and
the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding—
Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and
the Chinese Government’s intentions with respect to 5G expansion.
242. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens
It is the sense of Congress that—
the Government of China’s detention of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig appears to be a politically motivated act of retaliation for the Government of Canada’s detention of Meng Wanzhou, which is deeply troubling;
the Government of China should—
immediately release Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig; and
guarantee due process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg; and
the United States must continue to support efforts by the Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of Canadian citizens in the People's Republic of China.
243. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in managing relations with the Government of China.
Elements— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—
identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and Canada in managing relations with the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices;
include the development of working groups with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect to—
managing economic relations with the People’s Republic of China;
democracy and human rights in the People’s Republic of China;
technology issues involving the People’s Republic of China; and
defense issues involving the People’s Republic of China;
detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world;
detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology;
detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—
to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic Region; and
to counter Chinese efforts to project political, economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and
detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across the multilateral system, including at the World Health Organization.
Form— The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
Consultation— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this section.
244. Enhancing cooperation between the United States and Canada on technology issues with respect to the People's Republic of China
Working group— The President shall work with the Government of Canada to establish a formal United States-Canada-European Union Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to the technology challenges posed by Chinese efforts and influence in the communications, infrastructure, surveillance equipment and cyber sectors.
Goals— The United States participants in the working group established pursuant to subsection (a) shall seek—
to complete a joint analysis on the perils of overreliance on Chinese telecommunications equipment; and
to share intelligence and screen Chinese investments in strategic technology and critical infrastructure.
245. Enhancing United States-Canada-NATO cooperation on defense issues with respect to the People's Republic of China
In carrying out the initiative described in section 256, the President shall work with the Government of Canada to establish the NATO Working Group described in such section to respond to the security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China.
246. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and infrastructure projects, to—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Additional elements— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action for—
assisting Latin American and Caribbean countries with the sustainable development of equitable economies;
promoting judicial reform and the rule of law as a means to ensure fair competition, combat corruption, end impunity, and strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance;
identifying and mitigating obstacles to economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean;
maintaining free and transparent access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere; and
facilitating a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Reporting requirement— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this part, including examples of successes and challenges.
247. Engagement in regional and international organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean
Appropriate committees of Congress defined— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Reporting requirement—
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Form— The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified annexes.
Diplomacy in multilateral fora— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, the United States Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United States Executive Directors at multilateral development banks with programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, shall submit a strategy to Congress that—
addresses the challenges to United States national security identified in the report required under subsection (b); and
advances the objectives established in the strategy required under section 246(a).
248. Response to the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean
Eligibility of Caribbean countries for financing through the United States International Development Finance Corporation— Section 1412(c) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(3) Inclusion of caribbean countries—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), Caribbean countries (excluding Cuba) shall be included among the countries receiving prioritized support under title II during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the America LEADS Act.”
Prioritizing engagement in the Western Hemisphere— Section 1412 of the BUILD Act of 2018, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following:
“(d) Foreign policy guidance—The Secretary of State, in accordance with the priorities identified in subsection (c), shall provide foreign policy guidance to the Corporation to prioritize development financing to Latin American and Caribbean countries (excluding Cuba) by dedicating not less than 35 percent of development financing and equity investments to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the America LEADS Act.”
249. Technological cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean governments
Technical assistance on cybercrime— The Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues of the Department of State, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chief of the International Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission, shall offer to provide technical assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to strengthen their capacity to promote digital security, including—
defending the integrity of digital infrastructure and digital assets, including data storage systems, such as cloud computing, proprietary data, personal information, and proprietary technologies;
detecting, identifying, and investigating cybercrimes, including the collection of digital forensic evidence;
developing appropriate enforcement mechanisms for cybercrimes;
detecting and identifying perpetrators; and
prosecuting cybercrimes and holding perpetrators accountable for such crimes.
Prioritization— In providing the technical assistance described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall prioritize working with national and regional law enforcement entities that respect the due process and privacy rights of their citizens, including—
police forces;
prosecutors;
attorneys general;
courts; and
other law enforcement entities, as appropriate.
Cyber defense assistance— The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and the Director of National Intelligence, shall offer technical assistance—
to strengthen the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean governments to protect the integrity of their telecommunications and data networks and their critical infrastructure; and
to provide technical assistance to Latin American and Caribbean government officials, including with respect to—
building and monitoring secure telecommunications and data networks;
identifying threats and detecting and deterring attacks;
investigating cybercrimes, including the collection of digital forensic evidence;
protecting the integrity of digital infrastructure and digital assets, including data storage systems (including cloud computing), proprietary data, personal information, and proprietary technologies;
planning maintenance, improvements, and modernization in a coordinated and regular fashion to ensure continuity and safety; and
protecting the digital systems that manage roads, bridges, ports, and transportation hubs.
Briefing requirement— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the technical assistance described in subsections (a) and (c) to—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
249A. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean
In general— The Secretary of State should dedicate at least 14 percent of the amounts appropriated to bilateral and multilateral military education programs, such as the International Military Education and Training Program, for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2021 through 2026.
Modernization— The Secretary of State shall take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
Required elements— The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—
provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;
provide practical skills and frameworks for—
improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and
using technology for maximum efficiency and organization; and
promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights.
Limitation— Security assistance under this section is subject to the limitations set forth in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
249B. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
the Government of China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and
the adoption of surveillance systems can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations of civil rights, and harassment of political opponents.
Diplomatic engagement— The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to—
help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by pervasive surveillance and monitoring technologies; and
offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
Internet freedom programs— The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists and citizens in Latin America, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information without fear of repercussions or surveillance.
Support for civil society— The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations to—
support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;
protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;
assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics;
provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;
provide training on investigative reporting relating to media reporting of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and commercial practices, including the role of the Government of China in such practices; and
assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7).
Briefing requirement— Not more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
II Transatlantic alliance
251. Sense of Congress on the transatlantic alliance
It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States, the European Union, and countries of Europe are close partners, historically sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;
without a common United States and European Union approach on connectivity, trade, transnational problems such as climate change and pandemics, and support for democracy and human rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political and security leverage in Europe;
the People's Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to China;
the transatlantic relationship has come under significant strain due to tariff restrictions placed by the Trump Administration and personal attacks by the President against the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and individual leaders across the continent;
as European Union member states seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery and reinforce our collective national security and defend these shared values;
the United States and European Union should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
the United States and European Union should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;
as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;
the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, due to come into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize Chinese investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;
the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and work to align the law’s regulations with European Union priorities;
the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports to the People’s Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate the export of United States and European Union sensitive technologies to the People’s Republic of China.
252. Strategy requirement
Strategy To enhance cooperation with Europe— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will enhance cooperation with Europe on managing relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Elements— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall do the following:
Designate a senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official to lead United States-European Union efforts to manage relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and European Union in managing relations with the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.
Develop working groups with European Union counterparts on enhancing United States-European Union cooperation on—
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China;
democracy and human rights with respect to the People’s Republic of China;
technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China; and
defense issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the European Union on the People’s Republic of China.
Detail diplomatic efforts to date and future plans to work with European partners to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world.
Detail the diplomatic efforts to date and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology.
Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
Describe the current staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to United States-European Union engagement on the People's Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy.
Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the World Health Organization.
Form— The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
Consultation— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.
253. Enhancing United States-European Union cooperation on post-COVID–19 economic relations with the People's Republic of China
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States and European Union should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the People's Republic of China’s centralized economy;
the United States and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union; and
the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges posed by the People's Republic of China.
Working group— The President shall work with counterparts in Europe to establish a United States-European Union COVID–19 economic working group focused on the People's Republic of China. The United States participants in the proposed working group shall seek to—
evaluate United States and European Union overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;
counter Chinese efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering United States and European Union expertise in the form of official advisors within finance ministries and COVID–19 task forces; and
leverage the United States and European Union private sector in the COVID–19 economic recovery.
254. Response to the People's Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
In general— The President shall work with European counterparts to establish a formal United States-European Commission Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of China. The United States participants in the proposed working group shall seek to integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including—
the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;
the Three Seas Initiative;
the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia;
a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards; and
efforts to address the Government of China’s use of the United Nations to advance BRI, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs on BRI implementation.
Co-Financing of projects—
Authorization of appropriations— There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to co-finance infrastructure projects that could otherwise be included within China’s Belt and Road Initiative, provided that—
the United States can leverage existing and future projects that have entered into contracts with the Belt and Road Initiative to further promote transparency and debt sustainability; and
the projects promote the public good.
Leveraging of private sector financing— The United States shall work with the European Union to also leverage financing from the private sector for such projects.
Standards— The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop—
a set of transparency, environmental, and social standards for all infrastructure projects that are executed by foreign firms on United States or European soil; and
a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with developing countries.
255. Enhancing United States-European Union cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People's Republic of China
The President shall work with European counterparts to establish a formal United States-European Union Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to the technology challenges posed by Chinese efforts in the communications, infrastructure, surveillance equipment, and cyber sectors. The United States participants in the proposed working group shall seek to—
complete a joint analysis on the perils of overreliance on Chinese telecommunications equipment;
share intelligence and screen Chinese investments in strategic technology and critical infrastructure;
coordinate on blocking imports of surveillance technologies from the People's Republic of China and on working with European Union aspirant countries to develop similar import restriction regimes, making it a requirement for European Union membership and enhanced relations with the United States; and
urge the European Union to commit to the September 2019 principles signed by 27 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace,” a set of commitments introduced by the United States and signed by 19 European countries that support the “rules-based international order, affirms the applicability of international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”.
256. Enhancing United States-European Union-NATO cooperation on defense issues with respect to the People's Republic of China
The President shall work with European counterparts to establish a formal United States-European Commission-NATO Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China. The United States participants in the proposed working group shall seek to—
engage in a dialogue on perceptions of Chinese military strategy and capabilities, including its interest in the Arctic Region; and
explore the impact of Chinese investments in 5G and critical technologies, including artificial intelligence, on transatlantic security over the next decades.
257. Engaging with civil society and enhancing United States-European Union cooperation on democracy and human rights with respect to the People's Republic of China
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States and European Union share concerns with respect to repression by the Government of China across the country, and have taken measures to address specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang; and
the United States and European Union should be united in their shared values against attempts by the Government of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that only serve to erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the “community of a shared future for mankind” and “democratization of international relations”.
Working group— The President shall work with European counterparts to establish a United States-European Union democracy and human rights working group on the People's Republic of China. The United States participants in the working group shall seek—
to coordinate with respect to sanctions, including asset freezes and visa bans, targeting officials of the Government of China engaged in gross violations of human rights;
to urge the European Union to finalize its human rights sanctions regime, which is under discussion as of the date of the enactment of this Act and would be the European Union equivalent of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note);
to issue joint statements on human rights abuses and government repression by the Government of China; and
to develop plans to counter efforts by the Government of China to export its authoritarian governance model to countries around the world.
Civil society engagement— Congress encourages the National Endowment of Democracy to work with organizations in countries in Europe, and around the world, to address efforts by the Government of China to undermine democratic institutions and values in Europe and around the world, including through international organizations.
III South and Central Asia
260. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will enhance cooperation with the countries of South and Central Asia on managing relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Elements— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
A detailed description of the security and economic challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border China, Chinese investments in ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.
A detailed description of efforts to provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure investment and other investment in South and Central Asia.
A detailed description of efforts to develop working groups through the Central Asia C5+1 construct that would work with countries in Central Asia on strategies to build resilience against Chinese efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.
A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against Chinese efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.
A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by Chinese investment in the Afghan mineral sector.
In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas where the United States Government can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China in the region.
A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on the People's Republic of China.
Form— The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
Consultation— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).
IV Association of Southeast Asian Nations
261. Sense of Congress on cooperation with ASEAN
It is the sense of Congress that the United States—
stands with the nations of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and supports greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
supports high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each November;
reaffirms the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and supports the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest countries;
urges ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;
recognizes the value of strategic economic initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;
supports ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;
urges all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of China—
to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;
to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and
to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;
urges parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment, and supports the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
urges ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;
reaffirms the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons, and urges ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;
supports the Lower Mekong Initiative, which has led to significant progress in promoting sustainable long-term economic development in mainland Southeast Asia and fostering integrated sub-regional cooperation and capacity-building;
encourages the President of the United States to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;
supports efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
supports the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and global challenges of the future;
supports expanding the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative to include people-to-people partnerships from the broader Indo-Pacific region with an emphasis on civil society leaders and re-naming it the “Obama Young Indo-Pacific Leaders Initiative”;
applauds the ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international agreements with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and encourages all other ASEAN governments to do the same; and
should work with ASEAN, through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, to initiate a dialogue regarding perceptions of Chinese military strategy and capabilities, including its interest in the Arctic Region.
262. ASEAN strategy requirement
Strategy To enhance coordination with ASEAN— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will enhance coordination with ASEAN to increase capacity building and autonomy.
Elements— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—
designate a senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official to lead United States-ASEAN efforts to enhance technical assistance and capacity building;
identify key issues and barriers to increased capacity building between the United States and ASEAN;
identify policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and ASEAN in the areas of global governance, technology, and trade and economic practices;
describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative tasked with engaging with ASEAN;
detail the diplomatic efforts to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian governing model in Southeast Asia;
detail the diplomatic efforts to date supporting ASEAN efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology;
detail plans on how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within ASEAN to counter authoritarian propaganda; and
describe the current staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to United States-ASEAN engagement and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy.
Form— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
Consultation— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.
Report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of National Intelligence, and other relevant heads of Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the political, economic, development, health, and national security implications of changing water-flows along the Mekong River and the Tibetan Plateau watershed, including—
a description of the effects of upriver damming of the Mekong River and the increased security and military presence of the People’s Republic of China on the Lower Mekong, on the political and economic stability of the Lower Mekong region and on the countries of the Lower Mekong region; and
an assessment of—
any impact of such efforts on United States political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, human rights, and security interests; and
steps being taken by the United States to address these issues.
263. Enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on economic relations with the People's Republic of China
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the United States and ASEAN—
should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the People's Republic of China’s centralized economy;
shall accelerate efforts to de-escalate trade disputes and strengthen economic and trade ties; and
shall cooperate on a strategy to respond to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and to leverage existing and future projects that have entered into contracts with the Belt and Road Initiative to further promote transparency, debt sustainability, and the public good.
Working Group— The Secretary of State shall establish a United States-ASEAN economic working group focused on the People's Republic of China. The working group shall—
evaluate United States and ASEAN overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains; and
seek to leverage the United States and ASEAN private sector in the COVID–19 economic recovery.
Response to China’s Belt and Road initiative—
Working Group— The President shall establish a formal Department of State-ASEAN working group to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Standards— The United States and ASEAN shall develop a set of transparency, environmental, and social standards for all infrastructure projects that are executed by foreign firms on United States or ASEAN soil.
Funding—
Leveraging of private sector funds— The United States shall work with ASEAN to leverage financing from the private sector.
Use of funds— The President, in cooperation with ASEAN, shall identify at least 5 infrastructure projects to co-finance in order to promote transparency, debt sustainability, and the public good.
264. Enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on democracy and human rights with respect to the People's Republic of China
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the United States and ASEAN should be united against attempts by the Government of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as the “community of a shared future for mankind” and “the democratization of international relations”.
Working group— The Secretary of State shall establish a United States-ASEAN democracy and human rights working group on the People’s Republic of China. The working group shall, among other tasks, coordinate on asset freezes, travel bans, and other sanctions targeting officials of the Government of China engaged in gross violations of human rights.
Civil society engagement— The National Endowment for Democracy shall establish a working group focused on addressing efforts by the Government of China to promote alternative forms of government in Southeast Asia.
265. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People's Republic of China
It is the sense of Congress that—
the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese communication equipment;
the United States and ASEAN should share intelligence and screen Chinese investments in strategic technology and critical infrastructure;
the United States and ASEAN should coordinate on Chinese exports of surveillance technologies and work together on appropriate import restriction regimes;
the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;
the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the September 2019 principles signed by 27 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace,” a set of commitments that support the “rules-based international order, affirms the applicability of international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”; and
the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese investments in critical technology, including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming decades.
V Africa
271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People's Republic of China in Africa
Definition— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
Intelligence assessment— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including—
the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;
the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa; and
the amount of African debt held by the People's Republic of China.
272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa
Definition— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
Strategy requirement— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa including through support for the rule of law and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
Elements— The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—
a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the different barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assessment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;
a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers; and
an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have a comparative advantage in Africa markets.
Assessment of United States Government human resources capacity— The Comptroller General of the United States shall—
conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
develop an assessment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.
273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa
Definition— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
Interagency Working Group To counter Chinese cyber aggression in Africa—
In general— The President shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber aggression with respect to Africa.
Duties— The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection shall develop a set of recommendations for—
bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure where applicable;
providing alternatives to Huawei;
an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance to host-country governments with protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from Chinese espionage; and
helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism.
Report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth the recommendations developed pursuant to this subsection. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa focused on the People’s Republic of China
The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs may station on a permanent basis a China Desk Officer at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Assistant Secretary considers appropriate.
275. Support for civil society in Africa
Young African Leaders Initiative—
Finding— Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
Policy— It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective countries of origin and across Africa.
Young African Leaders Initiative—
In general— There is hereby established the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary of State.
Fellowships— There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary to support the participation in the Initiative established under this paragraph, in the United States, of not fewer than 700 fellows from Africa each year for such education and training in leadership and professional development through the Department of State as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eligibility for participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
Reciprocal exchanges— Under the Initiative, United States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows under subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
Regional centers and networks— The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall establish each of the following:
Not fewer than four regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and online training throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.
An online network that provides information and online courses on, and connections with leaders in, the private and public sectors in Africa.
Africa broadcasting networks— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa, especially in countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.
VI Middle East and North Africa
277. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
the economic influence of the People’s Republic of China through its oil and gas imports from the Middle East provides influence and leverage that runs counter to United States interests in the region; and
the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People’s Republic of China furthers the efforts of the Government of China to promote its digital authoritarianism through surveillance tools and policies.
Strategy required—
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.
Elements— The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—
efforts to improve regional cooperation with United States allies and partners to promote maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
increased support for government-to-government engagement on critical infrastructure development projects including ports and water infrastructure;
efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare technology;
specific steps to counter increased Chinese investment in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open internet;
efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and public-private partnerships on renewable energy development; and
the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation projects.
278. Report on Chinese energy, infrastructure, and economic development in the Middle East and North Africa
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit a report regarding Chinese energy, infrastructure, and economic development efforts across the Middle East and North Africa to—
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Additional elements— The report required under subsection (a) shall include information regarding—
Chinese imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas;
Chinese investment into critical infrastructure projects, including—
infrastructure projects that would increase Chinese maritime access to the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, or the Eastern Mediterranean or would increase rail or road links between the People's Republic of China and the Middle East and North Africa, including—
an investment of more than $5,000,000 in critical infrastructure, especially port facilities and utilities; and
joint ventures outside the Middle East and North Africa between Chinese companies and companies based in the Middle East or North Africa;
infrastructure projects that would benefit Iran’s ability to export crude oil, gas, or refined petrochemicals;
infrastructure projects that would significantly affect United States military basing, diplomatic facilities, or military and diplomatic visits to existing facilities or ports, including an assessment of the security risks posed by such projects to United States military and diplomatic personnel and facilities; and
Chinese investment in alternative and renewable energy projects;
joint nuclear technology and energy projects;
Chinese investment in telecommunications projects, including—
the use of Chinese equipment valued at more than $2,000,000 in communications infrastructure; and
equipment that furthers the ability of governments to exercise surveillance and control over their citizens;
Chinese investment in water and irrigation projects;
Chinese efforts to evade Iran sanctions; and
an assessment of which Belt and Road Initiative projects could negatively impact United States economic or security interests in the region.
279. Middle East Partnership Initiative
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
The United States and the international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
Transparent governance structures and active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign investment efforts.
Statement of policy— It is the policy of the United States that the United States and the international community should, through a Middle East Partnership Initiative, support modernization and reform efforts that—
advance education;
promote economic opportunity;
foster private sector development;
strengthen civil society;
promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law; and
increase access for women to fully participate politically and economically in society.
Authorization of appropriations— There is authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2021 for the purpose of fostering partnerships among citizens, civil society, the private sector, and government institutions in the Middle East and North Africa to generate shared solutions that promote stability, transparency, good governance, and economic development, including a scholarship program.
VII Arctic Region
281. Arctic Region defined
In this part, the term Arctic Region means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.
282. Sense of Congress on Arctic security
It is the sense of Congress that—
the rapidly changing Arctic environment—
creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased activity in the Arctic Region;
heightens the risks of potential conflicts spilling over into the Arctic Region from interventions and theaters of tension in other regions of the world;
threatens maritime safety due to inadequate capacity to patrol increasing vessel traffic across broader expanses of open Arctic water resulting from diminishing annual levels of sea ice;
impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic Region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and
threatens the health of the Arctic Region’s fragile and historically pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic Region’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems;
increased maritime traffic and other economic activity from adversarial nations, such as the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, threaten United States interests and the free movement of vessels in the Arctic Region;
increased military presence in the Arctic Region from countries such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China pose serious security threats to the United States;
diminished sea ice, resulting from the effects of climate change, is—
opening up new maritime routes;
increasing maritime traffic;
extending the times of year in which ships can transit the Arctic Region; and
creating greater risks to the Arctic environment, maritime safety, and naval defense patrols;
the United States should reduce the consequences outlined in preceding paragraphs by—
carefully evaluating the wide variety and extremely dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in the Arctic Region;
developing policies and making preparations for mitigating and responding to threats and risks in the Arctic Region;
adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability Project to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on time scales necessary for ensuring regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security threats in the Arctic Region; and
pursuing diplomatic engagements with all nations in the Arctic Region to reach an agreement for—
maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic Region; and
fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the Arctic Region.
283. Arctic Security Strategy
Purpose— The purpose of this section is to develop a strategy for protecting and advancing national security, economic, transportation, and environmental protection interests in the Arctic Region.
Amendment— Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended—
by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and
by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
“(g) Special Representative for the Arctic
“(1) Definitions—In this subsection:
“(A) Arctic nations—The term Arctic Nations means the 8 nations (Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland) with territory or exclusive economic zones that extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.
“(B) Arctic region—The term Arctic Region means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.
“(2) Appointment—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the America LEADS Act, the President, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Special Representative for the Arctic (referred to in this subsection as the “Arctic Envoy”), who—
“(A) shall serve within the Office of the Secretary of State; and
“(B) shall have the rank and status of Ambassador at Large.
“(3) Duties—The Arctic Envoy shall—
“(A) develop and facilitate the implementation of an Arctic Region Security Policy in accordance with paragraph (4);
“(B) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the effects (both current and projected), of climate change on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
“(C) make available the methods and approaches on the integration of climate science to other regional security planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may more adequately account for the effects of climate change;
“(D) serve as a key point of contact for other Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community, on Arctic Region security issues;
“(E) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to encourage other countries and international multilateral organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy implemented pursuant to paragraph (4); and
“(F) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe.
“(4) Arctic region security policy—The Arctic Region Security Policy shall include requirements for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, regional bureaus, and other offices with a role in conflict avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance to assess, develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and actions—
“(A) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic Nations to the effects of climate change and increased civilian and military activity from Arctic Nations and other nations that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region due to decreased sea ice, warmer ambient air temperatures and other effects of climate change, as a means of reducing the risk of conflict and instability;
“(B) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic Nations that—
“(i) are vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
“(ii) are strategically significant to the United States;
“(C) to account for the impacts on human health, safety, stresses, reliability, food production, fresh water and other critical natural resources, and economic activity;
“(D) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision-making process on foreign assistance awards to Arctic Nations;
“(E) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic Nations on collaborative approaches—
“(i) to sustainably manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;
“(ii) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;
“(iii) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;
“(iv) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic Nations on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic Nations; and
“(v) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion; and
“(F) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.
“(5) Report—The Arctic Envoy shall regularly report to the Secretary of State regarding the activities described in paragraphs (3) and (4) to integrate Arctic Region security concerns into agendas and program budget requests.”
D Intelligence Matters
291. Definitions
In this subtitle:
Congressional intelligence committees— The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
Intelligence community— The term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in such section.
292. Independent review of counterintelligence apparatus and structure of Federal Government
Establishment— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall jointly establish an independent panel to review the current counterintelligence apparatus and structure in the intelligence community to enhance the counterintelligence posture, capabilities, and responsibilities of the Federal Government in response to contemporary threats.
Composition— The panel established under subsection (a) shall be composed of 8 members as follows:
At least 1 shall be a former employee of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center who retired from Federal employment.
At least 1 shall be a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who retired from Federal employment.
At least 1 shall be a former employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who retired from Federal employment.
At least 1 shall be a former employee of the Department of Defense counterintelligence apparatus who retired from Federal employment.
At least 1 shall be a former employee of the Federal Government who has spent the predominant amount of his or her career outside of the intelligence community.
At least 1 of whom shall be an expert on policy relating to the People’s Republic of China.
At least 1 of whom shall be an expert on policy relating to Russia.
At least 1 of whom shall be an academic who is well known in the academic and national security fields.
All of whom shall be recognized in the field of counterintelligence.
Duties—
Review—
In general— The panel established under subsection (a) shall conduct a review as described in such subsection.
Elements— The review conducted under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
Review of the structure and functions of the counterintelligence apparatus, capabilities of the intelligence community and counterintelligence components of the Federal Government, and funding, resourcing, and regulations as they pertain to the following aspects of counterintelligence:
Investigations, counterintelligence, and espionage, including potential legislative action to improve chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, to address contemporary issues.
Operations.
Analysis.
Cyber operations.
Policy.
Strategy.
Foreign influence and counter foreign influence.
Analysis of the counterintelligence structure of the intelligence community and security elements of Federal departments and agencies that are not elements of the intelligence community.
Evaluation of the role of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center in leading the counterintelligence apparatus and Federal counterintelligence capabilities and its relationship with the operational counterintelligence community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.
Review of potential advantages and risks associated with alternative constructs, governance models, restructuring, and reorganization for counterintelligence, including consideration of what an ideal national-level strategic counterintelligence program should look like.
Review of the resources required and feasibility of the constructs, governance models, restructuring, and reorganization reviewed under clause (iv) that could improve United States counterintelligence to work more strategically, including such legislative or administrative action as may be necessary to do so, such as legislative action regarding appropriations and ability to provide funding to programs that organizationally sit outside of the intelligence programs funded as part of the National Intelligence Program and may result in unfunded mandates.
Report—
In general— Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the panel shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the panel with respect to the review conducted under paragraph (1).
Form— The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
293. Review organizational culture of intelligence community with respect to diversity, inclusion, and equity practices
In general— The Comptroller General of the United States shall carry out an independent audit of elements of the intelligence community with respect to diversity, inclusion, and equity practices in employment and community interactions.
Elements— The audit carried out under subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, cover the following:
The hiring, retention, and promotion of women and minorities, particularly Asian Americans, including analysis of both data and business practices and the processes used.
Measures to address issues tagged in annual work climate surveys.
Top management support of diversity officers and initiatives, as well as of women and minority employee affinity groups.
The engagement of community advisory groups to enhance communications and to rebuild trust and cooperation with minority and immigrant communities.