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Title V — Reports and other matters

S. 3905 · 116th Congress · Jun 8, 2020 · Lineage

V Reports and other matters

Sec. 501 Secure and trusted technology

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of Congress— The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(D)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(E)
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(F)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
(G)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(H)
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;
(I)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(J)
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Fifth-generation wireless network— The term fifth-generation wireless network means a radio network as described by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 15 or higher.
(b)
Supporting the development and adoption of secure and trusted technologies among intelligence allies and partners—
(1)
Communications Technology Security and Innovation Fund—
(A)
Establishment of Fund—
(i)
In general— There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the “Communications Technology Security and Innovation Fund” (referred to in this paragraph as the “Security Fund”).
(ii)
Administration— The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall jointly administer the Security Fund.
(iii)
Contents of fund—
(I)
In general— The fund shall consist of—
(aa)
amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (3)(A); and
(bb)
such other amounts as may be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to be deposited in the Security Fund.
(II)
Availability—
(aa)
In general— Amounts deposited in the Security Fund shall remain available through the end of the tenth fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(bb)
Remainder to treasury— Any amounts remaining in the Security Fund after the end of the tenth fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act shall be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury.
(iv)
Use of amounts— Amounts deposited in the Security Fund shall be available to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to award grants under subparagraph (B).
(B)
Grants—
(i)
In general— The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall award grants to support research and the commercial application of such research, including in the following areas:
(I)
Promoting the development of technology, including software, hardware, and microprocessing technology, that will enhance competitiveness in fifth-generation (commonly known as “5G”) and successor wireless technology supply chains.
(II)
Accelerating development and deployment of open interface, standards-based compatible interoperable equipment, such as equipment developed pursuant to the standards set forth by organizations such as the O–RAN Alliance, the Telecom Infra Project, 3GPP, the O–RAN Software Community, or any successor organizations.
(III)
Promoting compatibility of new fifth-generation wireless network equipment with future open standards-based interoperable equipment.
(IV)
Managing integration of multivendor network environments.
(V)
Objective criteria to define equipment as compliant with open standards for multivendor network equipment interoperability.
(VI)
Promoting development and inclusion of security features enhancing the integrity and availability of equipment in multivendor networks.
(VII)
Promoting the application of network function virtualization to facilitate multivendor interoperability and a more diverse vendor market.
(ii)
Amount—
(I)
In general— Subject to subclause (II), a grant awarded under clause (i) shall be in such amount as the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity consider appropriate.
(II)
Limitation on grant amounts— The amount of a grant awarded under this paragraph to a recipient for a specific research focus area may not exceed $100,000,000.
(iii)
Criteria— The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall jointly establish criteria for grants awarded under clause (i).
(iv)
Timing— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall begin awarding grants under clause (i).
(C)
Federal advisory body—
(i)
Establishment— The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall establish a Federal advisory committee, in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.), composed of government and private sector experts, to advise the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity on the administration of the Security Fund.
(ii)
Composition— The advisory committee established under clause (i) shall be composed of—
(I)
representatives from—
(aa)
the Federal Communications Commission;
(bb)
the National Institute of Standards and Technology;
(cc)
the Department of State;
(dd)
the National Science Foundation; and
(ee)
the Department of Homeland Security; and
(II)
other representatives from the private and public sectors, at the discretion of the Security Fund.
(iii)
Duties— The advisory committee established under clause (i) shall advise the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity on technology developments to help inform—
(I)
the strategic direction of the Security Fund; and
(II)
efforts of the Federal Government to promote a more secure, diverse, sustainable, and competitive supply chain.
(D)
Reports to Congress—
(i)
Initial report— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report with—
(I)
additional recommendations on promoting the competitiveness and sustainability of trusted suppliers in the wireless supply chain; and
(II)
any additional authorities needed to facilitate the timely adoption of open standards-based equipment, including authority to provide loans, loan guarantees, and other forms of credit extension that would maximize the use of designated funds.
(ii)
Annual report— For each fiscal year for which amounts in the Security Fund are available under this paragraph, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity shall submit to Congress a report that—
(I)
describes how, and to whom, grants have been awarded under subparagraph (B);
(II)
details the progress of the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity in meeting the objectives described in subparagraph (B)(i); and
(III)
includes such other information as the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity determine appropriate.
(2)
Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund—
(A)
Establishment of Fund—
(i)
In general— There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the “Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund” (in this section referred to as the “Multilateral Fund”).
(ii)
Administration— The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly administer the Multilateral Fund.
(iii)
Use of amounts— Amounts in the Multilateral Fund shall be used to establish the common funding mechanism required by subparagraph (B).
(iv)
Contents of fund—
(I)
In general— The Multilateral Fund shall consist of amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (3)(B) and such other amounts as may be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Director and the Secretary to be deposited in the Multilateral Fund.
(II)
Availability—
(aa)
In general— Amounts deposited in the Multilateral Fund shall remain available through fiscal year 2031.
(bb)
Remainder to Treasury— Any amounts remaining in the Fund after fiscal year 2031 shall be deposited in the General Fund of the Treasury.
(B)
Multilateral common funding mechanism—
(i)
In general— The Director and the Secretary shall jointly, in coordination with foreign partners, establish a common funding mechanism that uses amounts from the Multilateral Fund to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies in key markets globally.
(ii)
Consultation required— The Director and the Secretary shall carry out clause (i) in consultation with the following:
(I)
The Federal Communications Commission.
(II)
The Secretary of State.
(III)
The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.
(IV)
The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
(V)
The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.
(VI)
The Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology.
(C)
Annual report to Congress—
(i)
In general— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each fiscal year thereafter until fiscal year 2031, the Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an annual report on the Multilateral Fund and the use of amounts under subparagraph (B).
(ii)
Contents— Each report submitted under clause (i) shall include, for the fiscal year covered by the report, the following:
(I)
Any funding commitments from foreign partners, including each specific amount committed.
(II)
Governing criteria for use of the amounts in the Multilateral Fund.
(III)
An account of—
(aa)
how, and to whom, funds have been deployed;
(bb)
amounts remaining in the Multilateral Fund; and
(cc)
the progress of the Director and the Secretary in meeting the objective described in subparagraph (B)(i).
(IV)
Such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Director and the Secretary may have to enhance the effectiveness of the Multilateral Fund in achieving the security goals of the United States.
(3)
Authorization of appropriations—
(A)
Communications Technology Security and Innovation Fund— There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out paragraph (1) $750,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2021 through 2031.
(B)
Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund— There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out paragraph (2) $750,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2021 through 2031.
(c)
Exposing political pressure in international standards-setting bodies that set standards for fifth-generation wireless networks—
(1)
Report required—
(A)
In general— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on political pressure within international forums that set standards for fifth-generation wireless networks and for future generations of wireless networks, including—
(i)
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU);
(ii)
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO);
(iii)
the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL); and
(iv)
the voluntary standards organizations that develop protocols for wireless devices and other equipment, such as the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
(B)
Form— The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(2)
Consultation required— The Director and the Secretary shall carry out paragraph (1) in consultation with the following:
(A)
The Federal Communications Commission.
(B)
The Secretary of State.
(C)
The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.
(D)
The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
(E)
The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.
(F)
The Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology.
(d)
Expanding fifth-generation wireless network testbeds to increase supplier diversity and security using open-architecture standards—
(1)
Report required— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on developing fifth-generation wireless network testbeds for development of military and dual-use applications that use open interface, standards-based compatible interoperable equipment, such as equipment developed pursuant to the standards set forth by organizations such as the O–RAN Alliance, the Telecom Infra Project, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the O–RAN Software Community, or any successor organizations.
(2)
Foreign efforts— The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information about ongoing efforts by China and the United Kingdom to build similar testbeds for virtualized telecommunications technologies.

Sec. 502 Report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services for, or to provide such equipment and services to, certain allies of the United States

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of Congress— The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Five Eyes country— The term Five Eyes country means any of the following:
(A)
Australia.
(B)
Canada.
(C)
New Zealand.
(D)
The United Kingdom.
(E)
The United States.
(b)
Report required— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services for, or to provide such equipment and services to, Five Eyes countries.
(c)
Elements— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
An assessment of United States intelligence sharing and intelligence and military force posture in any Five Eyes country that currently uses or intends to use telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment or services provided by a foreign adversary of the United States, including China and Russia.
(2)
A description and assessment of mitigation of any potential compromises or risks for any circumstance described in paragraph (1).
(d)
Form— The report required by subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.

Sec. 503 Report on threats posed by use by foreign governments and entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and surveillance technology

(a)
Report required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the threats posed by the use by foreign governments and entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology.
(b)
Contents— The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Matters relating to threats described in subsection (a) as they pertain to the following:
(A)
The threat posed to United States persons and persons inside the United States.
(B)
The threat posed to United States personnel overseas.
(C)
The threat posed to employees of the Federal Government, including through both official and personal accounts and devices.
(2)
A description of which foreign governments and entities pose the greatest threats from the use of technology described in subsection (a) and the nature of those threats.
(3)
An assessment of the source of the commercially available cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology that poses the threats described in subsection (a), including whether such technology is made by United States companies or companies in the United States or by foreign companies.
(4)
An assessment of actions taken, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, by the Federal Government and foreign governments to limit the export of technology described in subsection (a) from the United States or foreign countries to foreign governments and entities in ways that pose the threats described in such subsection.
(5)
Matters relating to how the Federal Government, Congress, and foreign governments can most effectively mitigate the threats described in subsection (a), including matters relating to the following:
(A)
Working with the technology and telecommunications industry to identify and improve the security of consumer software and hardware used by United States persons and persons inside the United States that is targeted by commercial cyber intrusion and surveillance software.
(B)
Export controls.
(C)
Diplomatic pressure.
(D)
Trade agreements.
(c)
Form— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 504 Reports on recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission

(a)
Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The report issued by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission under section 1652(k) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232) is an important contribution toward better defending the United States against cyber attacks of catastrophic consequence.
(2)
The recommendations in such report provide potentially important opportunities for the private and public sectors to implement critical changes that could harden United States defenses against cyber attacks.
(b)
Reports required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall submit to Congress a report on the recommendations included in the report issued by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission under section 1652(k) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232).
(c)
Agencies described— The agencies described in this subsection are the following:
(1)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2)
The Department of Homeland Security.
(3)
The Department of Energy.
(4)
The Department of Commerce.
(5)
The Department of Defense.
(d)
Contents— Each report submitted under subsection (b) by the head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall include the following:
(1)
An evaluation of the recommendations in the report described in subsection (b) that pertain to the agency.
(2)
A description of the actions taken, or the actions that the head of the agency expects to take, to implement any of the recommendations included in such report.
(e)
Actions through officers—
(1)
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis— In submitting a report under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall do so by acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
(2)
Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department of Energy— In submitting a report under subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy shall do so by acting through the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

Sec. 505 Assessment of critical technology trends relating to artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and related supply chains

(a)
Assessment required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete a detailed assessment of critical technology trends relating to artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and related supply chains.
(b)
Elements— The assessment required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Export controls—
(A)
In general— An assessment of efforts by partner countries to enact and implement export controls and other technology transfer measures with respect to artificial intelligence, microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, and other artificial intelligence enabled technologies critical to United States supply chains.
(B)
Identification of opportunities for cooperation— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall identify opportunities for further cooperation with international partners on a multilateral and bilateral basis to strengthen export control regimes and address technology transfer threats.
(2)
Semiconductor supply chains—
(A)
In general— An assessment of global semiconductor supply chains, including areas to reduce United States vulnerabilities and maximize points of leverage.
(B)
Analysis of potential effects— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the potential effects of significant geopolitical shifts, including those related to Taiwan.
(C)
Identification of opportunities for diversification— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall also identify opportunities for diversification of United States supply chains, including an assessment of cost, challenges, and opportunities to diversify manufacturing capabilities on a multinational basis.
(3)
Computing power— An assessment of trends relating to computing power and the effect of such trends on global artificial intelligence development and implementation, in consultation with the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, including forward-looking assessments of how computing resources may affect United States national security, innovation, and implementation relating to artificial intelligence.
(c)
Report—
(1)
Definition of appropriate committees of Congress— In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2)
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment completed under subsection (a).
(3)
Form— The report submitted under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 506 Duty to report couterintelligence threats to campaigns

(a)
In general— Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30104) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(j) Disclosure of reportable foreign contacts

“(1) Committee obligation—Not later than 1 week after a reportable foreign contact, each authorized committee of a candidate for President shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact.

“(2) Individual obligation—Not later than 1 week after a reportable foreign contact—

“(A) each candidate for the office of President shall notify the treasurer or other designated official of the principal campaign committee of such candidate of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact; and

“(B) each official, employee, or agent of an authorized committee of a candidate for the office of President shall notify the treasurer or other designated official of the authorized committee of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact.

“(3) Reportable foreign contact—In this subsection:

“(A) In general—The term reportable foreign contact means any direct or indirect contact or communication that—

“(i) is between—

“(I) a candidate for the office of President, an authorized committee of such a candidate, or any official, employee, or agent of such authorized committee; and

“(II) an individual that the person described in subclause (I) knows, has reason to know, or reasonably believes is a covered foreign national; and

“(ii) the person described in clause (i)(I) knows, has reason to know, or reasonably believes involves—

“(I) a contribution, donation, expenditure, disbursement, or solicitation described in section 319; or

“(II) coordination or collaboration with an offer or provision of information or services to or from, or persistent and repeated contact with a covered foreign national in connection with an election.

“(B) Exception—Such term shall not include any contact or communication with a covered foreign national by an elected official or an employee of an elected official solely in an official capacity as such an official or employee.

“(C) Covered foreign national defined

“(i) In general—In this paragraph, the term covered foreign national means—

“(I) a foreign principal (as defined in section 1(b) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b)) that is a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party;

“(II) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal described in subclause (I) or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal described in subclause (I); or

“(III) any person included in the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury pursuant to authorities relating to the imposition of sanctions relating to the conduct of a foreign principal described in subclause (I).

“(ii) Clarification regarding application to citizens of the United States—In the case of a citizen of the United States, subclause (II) of clause (i) applies only to the extent that the person involved acts within the scope of that person’s status as the agent of a foreign principal described in subclause (I) of clause (i).

“(4) Clarification regarding volunteers—For purposes of paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(A)(i)(I), an unpaid volunteer shall not be treated as an official, employee, or agent of an authorized committee unless such unpaid volunteer has a significant supervisory role or provides advice or input to the candidate or to senior officials of the authorized committee.”

(b)
Federal campaign foreign contact reporting compliance system— Section 302(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30102(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(6) Reportable foreign contacts compliance policy

“(A) Reporting—Each authorized committee of a candidate for the office of President shall establish a policy that requires all officials, employees, and agents of such committee to notify the treasurer or other appropriate designated official of the committee of any reportable foreign contact (as defined in section 304(j)) not later than 1 week after such contact was made.

“(B) Retention and preservation of records—Each authorized committee of a candidate for the office of President shall establish a policy that provides for the retention and preservation of records and information related to reportable foreign contacts (as so defined) for a period of not less than 3 years.

“(C) Certification—Upon designation of a political committee as an authorized committee by a candidate for the office of President, and with each report filed by such committee under section 304(a), the candidate shall certify that—

“(i) the committee has in place policies that meet the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B);

“(ii) the committee has designated an official to monitor compliance with such policies; and

“(iii) not later than 1 week after the beginning of any formal or informal affiliation with the committee, all officials, employees, and agents of such committee will—

“(I) receive notice of such policies;

“(II) be informed of the prohibitions under section 319; and

“(III) sign a certification affirming their understanding of such policies and prohibitions.”

(c)
Criminal penalties— Section 309(d)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

“(E) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a violation of section 304(j) or section 302(e)(6) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both.

“(F) Any person who knowingly and willfully conceals or destroys any materials relating to a reportable foreign contact (as defined in section 304(j)) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both.”

(d)
Rule of construction— Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed—
(1)
to impede legitimate journalistic activities; or
(2)
to impose any additional limitation on the right of any individual who is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)) to express political views or to participate in public discourse.

Sec. 507 Combating Chinese influence operations in the United States and strengthening civil liberties protections

(a)
Updates to annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party— Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended—
(1)
by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(2)
by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:

“(8) An identification of influence activities and operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United States science and technology sectors, specifically employees of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and students in the science and technology sector in the United States.”

(b)
Plan for Federal Bureau of Investigation to increase public awareness and detection of influence activities by the Government of the People's Republic of China—
(1)
Plan required— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan—
(A)
to increase public awareness of influence activities by the Government of the People's Republic of China; and
(B)
to publicize mechanisms that members of the public can use—
(i)
to detect such activities; and
(ii)
to report such activities to the Bureau.
(2)
Consultation— In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with the following:
(A)
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(B)
Such other stakeholders outside the intelligence community, including professional associations, institutions of higher education, businesses, and civil rights and multicultural organizations, as the Director determines relevant.
(c)
Recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to strengthen relationships and build trust with communities of interest—
(1)
In general— The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Justice, shall develop recommendations to strengthen relationships with communities targeted by influence activities of the Government of the People's Republic of China and build trust with such communities through local and regional grassroots outreach.
(2)
Submittal to Congress— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress the recommendations developed under paragraph (1).
(d)
Technical corrections— The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—
(1)
in section 1107 (50 U.S.C. 3237)—
(A)
in the section heading, by striking “Communist Party of China” and inserting “Chinese Communist Party”; and
(B)
by striking “Communist Party of China” both places it appears and inserting “Chinese Communist Party”; and
(2)
in the table of contents before section 2 (50 U.S.C. 3002), by striking the item relating to section 1107 and inserting the following new item:

Sec. 508 Annual report on corrupt activities of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party

(a)
Definition of appropriate committees of Congress— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Annual report required—
(1)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2025, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2)
Elements—
(A)
In general— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(i)
A description of the wealth of, and corruption and corrupt activities among, senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party.
(ii)
A description of any recent actions of the officials described in clause (i) that could be considered a violation, or potential violation, of United States law.
(iii)
A description and assessment of targeted financial measures, including potential targets for designation of the officials described in clause (i) for the corruption and corrupt activities described in that clause and for the actions described in clause (ii).
(B)
Scope of reports— The first report under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive information on the matters described in subparagraph (A). Any succeeding report under paragraph (1) may consist of an update or supplement to the preceding report under that subsection.
(3)
Coordination— In preparing each report, update, or supplement under this subsection, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(A)
In preparing the description required by clause (i) of paragraph (2)(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B)
In preparing the descriptions required by clauses (ii) and (iii) of such paragraph, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(4)
Form— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.
(c)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the United States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party, including President Xi Jinping.

Sec. 509 Report on corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs

(a)
Definition of appropriate committees of Congress— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report required— Not later than 100 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs.
(c)
Elements—
(1)
In general— Each report under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(A)
A description of corruption and corrupt activities among Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs who support the Government of the Russian Federation, including estimates of the total assets of such oligarchs.
(B)
An assessment of the impact of the corruption and corrupt activities described pursuant to subparagraph (A) on the economy and citizens of Russia.
(C)
A description of any connections to, or support of, organized crime, drug smuggling, or human trafficking by an oligarch covered by subparagraph (A).
(D)
A description of any information that reveals corruption and corrupt activities in Russia among oligarchs covered by subparagraph (A).
(E)
A description and assessment of potential sanctions actions that could be imposed upon oligarchs covered by subparagraph (A) who support the leadership of the Government of Russia, including President Vladimir Putin.
(2)
Scope of reports— The first report under subsection (a) shall include comprehensive information on the matters described in paragraph (1). Any succeeding report under subsection (a) may consist of an update or supplement to the preceding report under that subsection.
(d)
Coordination— In preparing each report, update, or supplement under this section, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(1)
In preparing the assessment and descriptions required by subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (c)(1), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2)
In preparing the description and assessment required by subparagraph (E) of such subsection, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(e)
Form—
(1)
In general— Subject to paragraph (2), each report under subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.
(2)
Unclassified form of certain information— The information described in subsection (c)(1)(D) in each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

Sec. 510 Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of Congress— The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Critical infrastructure— The term critical infrastructure has the meaning given such term in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b)
Report required— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying whether and how officials of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China may have sought—
(1)
to suppress information about—
(A)
the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan;
(B)
the spread of the virus through China; and
(C)
the transmission of the virus to other countries;
(2)
to spread disinformation relating to the pandemic; or
(3)
to exploit the pandemic to advance their national security interests.
(c)
Assessments— The report required by subsection (b) shall include assessments of reported actions and the effect of those actions on efforts to contain the novel coronavirus pandemic, including each of the following:
(1)
The origins of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the time and location of initial infections, and the mode and speed of early viral spread.
(2)
Actions taken by the Government of China to suppress, conceal, or misinform the people of China and those of other countries about the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan.
(3)
The effect of disinformation or the failure of the Government of China to fully disclose details of the outbreak on response efforts of local governments in China and other countries.
(4)
Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, or other pressure on other countries and international organizations to conceal information about the spread of the novel coronavirus and the response of the Government of China to the contagion, as well as to influence or coerce early responses to the pandemic by other countries.
(5)
Efforts by officials of the Government of China to deny access to health experts and international health organizations to afflicted individuals in Wuhan, pertinent areas of the city, or laboratories of interest in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
(6)
Efforts by the Government of China, or those acting at its direction or with its assistance, to conduct cyber operations against international, national, or private health organizations conducting research relating to the novel coronavirus or operating in response to the pandemic.
(7)
Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate relevant segments of global supply chains, particularly in the sale, trade, or provision of relevant medicines, medical supplies, or medical equipment as a result of the pandemic.
(8)
Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, national security, and political objectives of the Government of China by exploiting vulnerabilities of foreign governments, economies, and companies under financial duress as a result of the pandemic or to accelerate economic espionage and intellectual property theft.
(9)
Efforts to exploit the disruption of the pharmaceutical and telecommunications industries as well as other industries tied to critical infrastructure and bilateral trade between China and the United States and between China and allies and partners of the United States in order to advance the economic and political objectives of the Government of China following the pandemic.
(d)
Form— The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 511 Report on effect of lifting of United Nations arms embargo on Islamic Republic of Iran

(a)
Definition of appropriate committees of Congress— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report required— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such heads of other elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on—
(1)
the plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire military arms if the ban on arms transfers to or from such government under United Nations Security Council resolutions are lifted; and
(2)
the effect such arms acquisitions may have on regional security and stability.
(c)
Contents— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall include assessments relating to plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire additional weapons, the intention of other countries to provide such weapons, and the effect such acquisition and provision would have on regional stability, including with respect to each of the following:
(1)
The type and quantity of weapon systems under consideration for acquisition.
(2)
The countries of origin of such systems.
(3)
Likely reactions of other countries in the region to such acquisition, including the potential for proliferation by other countries in response.
(4)
The threat that such acquisition could present to international commerce and energy supplies in the region, and the potential implications for the national security of the United States.
(5)
The threat that such acquisition could present to the Armed Forces of the United States, of countries allied with the United States, and of countries partnered with the United States stationed in or deployed in the region.
(6)
The potential that such acquisition could be used to deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(7)
The potential for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to proliferate weapons acquired in the absence of an arms embargo to regional groups, including Shi'a militia groups backed by such government.
(d)
Form— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 512 Report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear nonproliferation

(a)
Definition of appropriate committees of Congress— In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report required— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report assessing—
(1)
any relevant activities potentially relating to nuclear weapons research and development by the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(2)
any relevant efforts to afford or deny international access in accordance with international nonproliferation agreements.
(c)
Assessments— The report required by subsection (b) shall include assessments, for the period beginning on January 1, 2018, and ending on the date of the submittal of the report, of the following:
(1)
Activities to research, develop, or enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium with the intent or capability of creating weapons-grade nuclear material.
(2)
Research, development, testing, or design activities that could contribute to or inform construction of a device intended to initiate or capable of initiating a nuclear explosion.
(3)
Efforts to receive, transmit, store, destroy, relocate, archive, or otherwise preserve research, processes, products, or enabling materials relevant or relating to any efforts assessed under paragraph (1) or (2).
(4)
Efforts to afford or deny international access, in accordance with international nonproliferation agreements, to locations, individuals, and materials relating to activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(d)
Form— The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 513 Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation

It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1)
the work of the Third Option Foundation to heal, help, and honor members of the special operations community of the Central Intelligence Agency and their families is invaluable; and
(2)
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should work closely with the Third Option Foundation in implementing section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b), as added by section 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92).