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Title V — Election matters

S. 245 · 116th Congress · Jan 28, 2019 · Lineage

V Election matters

Sec. 501 Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against United States election infrastructure

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(C)
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;
(D)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(E)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Congressional leadership— The term congressional leadership includes the following:
(A)
The majority leader of the Senate.
(B)
The minority leader of the Senate.
(C)
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D)
The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3)
State— The term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b)
Report required— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to congressional leadership and the appropriate congressional committees a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United States election infrastructure in States and localities in connection with the 2016 Presidential election in the United States and such cyber attacks or attempted cyber attacks as the Under Secretary anticipates against such infrastructure. Such report shall identify the States and localities affected and shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-related computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and other election officials of the various States.
(c)
Form— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Sec. 502 Review of intelligence community's posture to collect against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential election

(a)
Review required— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1)
complete an after action review of the posture of the intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election in the United States; and
(2)
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the Director with respect to such review.
(b)
Elements— The review required by subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the posture and efforts described in paragraph (1) of such subsection, the following:
(1)
An assessment of whether the resources of the intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
(2)
An assessment of the information sharing that occurred within elements of the intelligence community.
(3)
An assessment of the information sharing that occurred between elements of the intelligence community.
(4)
An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those authorities.
(5)
A review of the use of open source material to inform analysis and warning of such efforts.
(6)
A review of the use of alternative and predictive analysis.
(c)
Form of report— The report required by subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in a classified form.

Sec. 503 Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal elections

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Congressional leadership— The term congressional leadership includes the following:
(A)
The majority leader of the Senate.
(B)
The minority leader of the Senate.
(C)
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D)
The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3)
Security vulnerability— The term security vulnerability has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).
(b)
In general— The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall—
(1)
commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and
(2)
not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—
(A)
congressional leadership; and
(B)
the appropriate congressional committees.
(c)
Update— Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1)
update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and
(2)
submit the updated assessment to—
(A)
congressional leadership; and
(B)
the appropriate congressional committees.

Sec. 504 Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United States elections

(a)
Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means the following:
(1)
The congressional intelligence committees.
(2)
The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3)
The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(4)
The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(5)
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Requirement for a strategy— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral systems and processes in the United States, including Federal, State, and local election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation equipment, and equipment and processes for the secure transmission of election results.
(c)
Elements of the strategy— The strategy required by subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
(1)
A whole-of-government approach to protecting United States electoral systems and processes that includes the agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well as any other agencies and departments of the United States, as determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2)
Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various States and the chief election officials of the States.
(3)
Technical security measures, including auditable paper trails for voting machines, securing wireless and internet connections, and other technical safeguards.
(4)
Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(5)
Improvements in the identification and attribution of Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(6)
Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government of Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or interference with, United States election systems and processes.
(7)
Improvements in Federal Government communications with State and local election officials.
(8)
Public education and communication efforts.
(9)
Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of the strategy.
(d)
Congressional briefing— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection (b).

Sec. 505 Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda

(a)
Russian influence campaign defined— In this section, the term Russian influence campaign means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States.
(b)
Assessment required— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include—
(1)
a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;
(2)
a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referenda;
(3)
a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and
(4)
an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(c)
Form— The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

Sec. 506 Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns

(a)
Reports required—
(1)
In general— As provided in paragraph (2), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following:
(A)
A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices.
(B)
A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats.
(C)
An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.
(2)
Schedule for submittal— A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows:
(A)
In the case of a report regarding an election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B)
In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is 1 year before the date of the election.
(3)
Information to be included— A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(b)
Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats— If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

Sec. 507 Information sharing with State election officials

(a)
State defined— In this section, the term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b)
Security clearances—
(1)
In general— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes such position.
(2)
Interim clearances— Consistent with applicable policies and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director, to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such official under such paragraph.
(c)
Information sharing—
(1)
In general— The Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing any appropriate classified information related to threats to election systems and to the integrity of the election process with chief election officials and such designees who have received a security clearance under subsection (b).
(2)
Coordination— The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to facilitate the sharing of information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.

Sec. 508 Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices

(a)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Active measures campaign— The term active measures campaign means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.
(2)
Candidate, election, and political party— The terms candidate, election, and political party have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(3)
Congressional leadership— The term congressional leadership includes the following:
(A)
The majority leader of the Senate.
(B)
The minority leader of the Senate.
(C)
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D)
The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4)
Cyber intrusion— The term cyber intrusion means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.
(5)
Electronic election infrastructure— The term electronic election infrastructure means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:
(A)
The Federal Government.
(B)
A State or local government.
(C)
A political party.
(D)
The election campaign of a candidate.
(6)
Federal office— The term Federal office has the meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(7)
High confidence— The term high confidence, with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8)
Moderate confidence— The term moderate confidence, with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
(9)
Other appropriate congressional committees— The term other appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Determinations of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns— The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—
(1)
that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
(2)
with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c)
Briefing—
(1)
In general— Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
(A)
A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.
(B)
An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C)
The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.
(D)
Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.
(2)
Electronic election infrastructure briefings— With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.
(3)
Protection of sources and methods— This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

Sec. 509 Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election security matters

(a)
In general— The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to election security.
(b)
Additional responsibilities— The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the following:
(1)
The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2)
Election voting systems and software.
(3)
Voter registration databases.
(4)
Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5)
Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.