US Codex
Bill
Notes

Title II — Intelligence and Information Sharing

H.R. 8309 · 116th Congress · Sep 17, 2020 · Lineage

II Intelligence and Information Sharing

A DHS Intelligence Enterprise

Sec. 201 Annual homeland threat assessments

(a)
In general— Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“210H. Homeland threat assessments

“(a) In general—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section and for each of the next five fiscal years (beginning in the fiscal year that begins after the date of the enactment of this section) the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and using departmental information, including component information, and information provided through State and major urban area fusion centers, shall conduct an assessment of the terrorist threat to the homeland.

“(b) Contents—Each assessment under subsection (a) shall include the following:

“(1) Empirical data assessing terrorist activities and incidents over time in the United States, including terrorist activities and incidents planned or supported by persons outside of the United States targeting the homeland.

“(2) An evaluation of current terrorist tactics, as well as ongoing and possible future changes in terrorist tactics.

“(3) An assessment of criminal activity encountered or observed by officers or employees of components in the field which is suspected of financing terrorist activity.

“(4) Detailed information on all individuals denied entry to or removed from the United States as a result of material support provided to a foreign terrorist organization (as such term is used in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)).

“(5) The efficacy and spread of foreign terrorist organization propaganda, messaging, or recruitment.

“(6) An assessment of threats, including cyber threats, to the homeland, including to critical infrastructure and Federal civilian networks.

“(7) An assessment of current and potential terrorism and criminal threats posed by individuals and organized groups seeking to unlawfully enter the United States.

“(8) An assessment of threats to the transportation sector, including surface and aviation transportation systems.

“(c) Additional information—The assessments required under subsection (a)—

“(1) shall, to the extent practicable, utilize existing component data collected from the field; and

“(2) may incorporate relevant information and analysis from other agencies of the Federal Government, agencies of State and local governments (including law enforcement agencies), as well as the private sector, disseminated in accordance with standard information sharing procedures and policies.

“(d) Form—The assessments required under subsection (a) shall be shared with the appropriate congressional committees and submitted in classified form, but—

“(1) shall include unclassified summaries; and

“(2) may include unclassified annexes, if appropriate.”

(b)
Conforming amendment— Subsection (d) of section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(24) To carry out section 210H (relating to homeland threat assessments).”

(c)
Clerical amendment— The table of contents of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 210G the following new item:

Sec. 202 Homeland intelligence doctrine

(a)
In general— Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as amended by this title, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“210I. Homeland intelligence doctrine

“(a) In general—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, acting through the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department, in coordination with intelligence components of the Department, the Office of the General Counsel, the Privacy Office, and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, shall develop and disseminate written Department-wide guidance for the processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of homeland security information (as such term is defined in section 892) and terrorism information (as such term is defined in section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485)).

“(b) Contents—The guidance required under subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

“(1) A description of guiding principles and purposes of the Department’s intelligence enterprise.

“(2) A summary of the roles, responsibilities, and programs of each intelligence component of the Department in the processing, analysis, production, or dissemination of homeland security information and terrorism information, including relevant authorities and restrictions applicable to each such intelligence component.

“(3) Guidance for the processing, analysis, and production of such information.

“(4) Guidance for training necessary for appropriate personnel to process, analyze, produce, and disseminate homeland security information and terrorism information.

“(5) Guidance for the dissemination of such information, including within the Department, among and between Federal departments and agencies, among and between State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, including law enforcement, and with foreign partners and the private sector, consistent with the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

“(6) A description of how the dissemination to the intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))) and Federal law enforcement of such information assists such entities in carrying out their respective missions.

“(c) Form—The guidance required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

“(d) Annual review—For each of the 5 fiscal years beginning with the first fiscal year that begins after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall conduct a review of the guidance required under subsection (a) and, as appropriate, revise such guidance.”

(b)
Clerical amendment— The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 210H, as added by title, the following new item:

Sec. 203 Comptroller General assessment

(a)
Annual assessment required— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and again not later than 5 years thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate an assessment of the degree to which guidance established pursuant to section 210I of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as added by section 202) is implemented across the Department of Homeland Security. Such assessment should evaluate the extent to which such guidance is carried out in a manner that protects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
(b)
Elements of assessment— In conducting each assessment under subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall—
(1)
use standard methodology and reporting formats in order to demonstrate and display any changes over time; and
(2)
include any other subject matter the Comptroller General determines appropriate.
(c)
Access to relevant data— To carry out this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that the Comptroller General of the United States has access to all relevant data.

Sec. 204 Analysts for the chief intelligence officer

Paragraph (1) of section 201(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: “The Secretary shall also provide the Chief Intelligence Officer with a staff having appropriate expertise and experience to assist the Chief Intelligence Officer.”.

Sec. 205 Establishment of Insider Threat Program

(a)
In general— Title I of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 111 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“104. Insider Threat Program

“(a) Establishment—The Secretary shall establish an Insider Threat Program within the Department. Such Program shall—

“(1) provide training and education for Department personnel to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to insider threat risks to the Department’s critical assets;

“(2) provide investigative support regarding potential insider threats that may pose a risk to the Department’s critical assets; and

“(3) conduct risk mitigation activities for insider threats.

“(b) Steering Committee

“(1) In general—The Secretary shall establish a Steering Committee within the Department. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall serve as the Chair of the Steering Committee. The Chief Security Officer shall serve as the Vice Chair. The Steering Committee shall be comprised of representatives of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Federal Protective Service, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, the Science and Technology Directorate, and other components or offices of the Department as appropriate. Such representatives shall meet on a regular basis to discuss cases and issues related to insider threats to the Department’s critical assets, in accordance with subsection (a).

“(2) Responsibilities—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief Security Officer, in coordination with the Steering Committee established pursuant to paragraph (1), shall carry out the following:

“(A) Develop a holistic strategy for Department-wide efforts to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to insider threats to the Department’s critical assets.

“(B) Develop a plan to implement the insider threat measures identified in the strategy developed under subparagraph (A) across the components and offices of the Department.

“(C) Document insider threat policies and controls.

“(D) Conduct a baseline risk assessment of insider threats posed to the Department’s critical assets.

“(E) Examine existing programmatic and technology best practices adopted by the Federal Government, industry, and research institutions to implement solutions that are validated and cost-effective.

“(F) Develop a timeline for deploying workplace monitoring technologies, employee awareness campaigns, and education and training programs related to identifying, preventing, mitigating, and responding to potential insider threats to the Department’s critical assets.

“(G) Require the Chair and Vice Chair of the Steering Committee to consult with the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure the Insider Threat Program is informed, on an ongoing basis, by current information regarding threats, beset practices, and available technology.

“(H) Develop, collect, and report metrics on the effectiveness of the Department’s insider threat mitigation efforts.

“(c) Definitions—In this section:

“(1) Critical assets—The term “critical assets” means the people, facilities, information, and technology required for the Department to fulfill its mission.

“(2) Insider—The term “insider” means—

“(A) any person who has access to classified national security information and is employed by, detailed to, or assigned to the Department, including members of the Armed Forces, experts or consultants to the Department, industrial or commercial contractors, licensees, certificate holders, or grantees of the Department, including all subcontractors, personal services contractors, or any other category of person who acts for or on behalf of the Department, as determined by the Secretary; or

“(B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector personnel who possess security clearances granted by the Department.

“(3) Insider threat—The term “insider threat” means the threat that an insider will use his or her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States, including damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.”

(b)
Reporting—
(1)
In general— Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of section 104 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a) of this section) and biennially thereafter for the next four years, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on how the Department of Homeland Security and its components and offices have implemented the strategy developed pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A) of such section 104, the status of the Department’s risk assessment of critical assets, the types of insider threat training conducted, the number of Department employees who have received such training, and information on the effectiveness of the Insider Threat Program (established pursuant to subsection (a) of such section 104), based on metrics developed, collected, and reported pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(H) of such section 104.
(2)
Definitions— In this subsection, the terms “critical assets”, “insider”, and “insider threat” have the meanings given such terms in section 104 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a) of this section).
(c)
Clerical amendment— The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103 the following new item:

Sec. 206 Department of Homeland Security counterintelligence vetting task force

(a)
Establishment— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall assign personnel of the Department of Homeland Security to participate in a counterintelligence vetting task force to make recommendations to improve counterintelligence vetting for appropriate departmental programs.
(b)
Personnel— In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security may assign personnel from any component of the Department of Homeland Security the Secretary determines necessary to participate in the task force established pursuant to such subsection.
(c)
Coordination— In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security may request participation in the task force established pursuant to such subsection from other appropriate Federal agencies.
(d)
Report— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the recommendations made by the task force established pursuant to subsection (a).

Sec. 207 Visa security

(a)
Establishment—
(1)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the interagency working group established under section 1746(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) shall commence a review of the current policies and procedures of the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State for the purpose of identifying, investigating, and preventing the illicit transfer of sensitive technologies and research from United States institutions of higher education and research institutions through more effective visa security operations and improved protections for such sensitive technologies.
(2)
Objectives—
(A)
Analysis of current visa issuance and admission procedures— The interagency working group referred to in paragraph (1) shall—
(i)
analyze the current visa application process, and the role of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State in such process, including the screening of visa applicants against appropriate criminal, intelligence, national security, terrorism, and other databases and information maintained by the Federal Government, and make recommendations to the Secretaries of such Departments to better screen, identify, and refuse entry to individuals who seek to enter the United States to engage in the illicit transfer of sensitive technologies from United States institutions of higher educations or research institutions;
(ii)
evaluate current policies for refusing visas on grounds that an individual is likely to enter the United States to engage in the illicit transfer of sensitive technologies and recommend updates to the Foreign Affairs Manual and other agency guidance to clarify when and how visas can be refused on such grounds; and
(iii)
analyze current screening procedures at United States ports of entry and make recommendations to the Secretaries of such Departments to better identify individuals who seek to enter the United States to engage in such illicit transfer of sensitive technologies.
(B)
National security review of certain nonimmigrant students— The interagency working group shall recommend procedures and standards for the Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with other appropriate Federal agencies, to conduct national security reviews of aliens who—
(i)
are present in the United States—
(I)
in a nonimmigrant classification described in subparagraphs (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) and change from a program of study not related to sensitive technologies to a program of study or significant coursework, research, or laboratory access related to sensitive technologies; or
(II)
as a nonimmigrant and seek to change status, pursuant to section 248 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1258), to that of a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)), for purposes of engaging in a program of study related to sensitive technologies; and
(ii)
as a result of engaging in a program of study related to sensitive technologies, will have access to information related to operating, installing, maintaining, repairing, overhauling, or refurbishing sensitive technologies or development activities related to sensitive technologies.
(C)
Identifying individuals requiring national security review— For purposes of facilitating the identification of individuals described in subparagraph (B)(ii), the interagency working group shall—
(i)
develop a nonpublic list of six-digit Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes for programs of study related to sensitive technologies to be used in reporting required by section 641 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1372(d)) and related regulations;
(ii)
recommend to the Secretary of Homeland Security changes, as appropriate, to the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or other system designated for such purpose by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to ensure that individuals who seek to engage in programs of study but who will not have access to information related to operating, installing, maintaining, repairing, overhauling, or refurbishing sensitive technologies or development activities related to sensitive technologies are not unnecessarily subjected to national security reviews;
(iii)
recommend to the Secretary of Homeland Security changes to relevant regulations to ensure that entities certified by the Student and Exchange Visitor Program routinely and accurately report the program of study and other necessary information in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or other system designated for such purpose by the Secretary of Homeland Security, for each nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) who is enrolled in such entity; and
(iv)
identify mechanisms for the Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with other appropriate Federal agencies, to order the removal of and make ineligible for future nonimmigrant classification described in subparagraphs (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) individuals who may be identified following pursuant to national security reviews conducted in accordance with subparagraph (B).
(D)
Identifying gaps in authority to address national security threats— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the interagency working group shall identify deficiencies in existing legal authorities determined to be an impediment in achieving the recommendations described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (C), and recommend to the appropriate congressional committees legislative solutions to address such deficiencies.
(3)
Composition— In addition to the members specified in section 1746(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), for purposes of carrying out the review required under paragraph (1), the interagency working group consult with the following:
(A)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations.
(B)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Student and Exchange Visitor Program.
(C)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit.
(D)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Visa Security Program.
(E)
The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
(F)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(G)
At least two representatives from the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
(H)
Private sector and higher education personnel, as appropriate and to a degree that would not detrimentally impact any ongoing law enforcement investigation or intelligence operation, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(4)
Consultation— In carrying out the objectives described in paragraph (2), the interagency working group shall coordinate and consult regularly with the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable established under section 1746(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).
(5)
Report— Not later than one year after the commencement of the review required under paragraph (1), the interagency working group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—
(A)
detailing the results of such review and the analyses and evaluation required under paragraph (2)(A); and
(B)
identifying any legislative solutions necessary to improve the ability of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, or both, to identify, investigate, and prevent the illicit transfer of sensitive technologies from United States institutions of higher education and research institutions as a result of programs of study related to sensitive technologies undertaken by aliens described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)).
(6)
Definitions— In this subsection:
(A)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B)
Institution of higher education— The term “institution of higher education” has the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
(C)
Program of study— The term “program of study” means any degree program, field of study, significant coursework, research, or laboratory access related to sensitive technologies, or other academic activity required to be reported pursuant to section 641(a) of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104–208 (8 U.S.C. 1372(a))).
(D)
Sensitive technologies— The term “sensitive technologies” has the meaning given such term in paragraph (8) of section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(e)), as added by subsection (b).
(b)
Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and related visa security matters—
(1)
Program scope— Paragraph (1) of section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(e)) is amended—
(A)
by striking “The Secretary” and inserting the following:

“(A) Authorization—The Secretary”

(B)
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) Risk-based assignments

“(i) In general—Assignments under subparagraph (A) shall be made—

“(I) in a risk-based manner;

“(II) considering the criteria described in clause (ii); and

“(III) in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 38 of June 2, 1982, or any superseding presidential directive concerning staffing at diplomatic and consular posts.

“(ii) Criteria described—The criteria described in this clause are the following:

“(I) The number of nationals of the subject country who were identified in United States Government databases related to the identities of known or suspected terrorists during the previous two years.

“(II) Information on the cooperation of such country with the counterterrorism efforts of the United States.

“(III) Information analyzing the presence, activity, or movement of terrorist organizations (as such term is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi))) within or through such country.

“(IV) The number of formal objections and denials based on derogatory information issued through the interagency Security Advisory Opinion process.

“(V) Countries identified as a strategic competitor in the “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” issued by the Department of Defense pursuant to section 113(g)(1)(A) of title 10, United States Code, or any successor document.

“(VI) The number of cases involving counterintelligence, illicit technology transfer, and counterproliferation related to the identities of nationals of such country.

“(VII) Information on the cooperation of such country with the counterintelligence, countering nontraditional collection, illicit technology transfer, and counterproliferation efforts of the United States, including information on foreign government-owned infrastructure and organizations dedicated to such matters.

“(VIII) The adequacy of the border and immigration control of such country.

“(IX) Any other criteria the Secretary determines appropriate.

“(iii) Prioritization—The Secretary shall, until December 31, 2024, prioritize the establishment of new overseas assignments made under this subsection to diplomatic and consular posts in countries that are strategic competitors with the goal of countering the exploitation or illicit transfer of sensitive technologies by aliens described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)).”

(2)
Screening— Paragraph (2) of section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(e)) is amended—
(A)
by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and
(B)
by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:

“(C) Review visa applications of aliens against appropriate criminal, national security, and terrorism databases or other relevant information maintained by the Federal Government to improve the detection and examination of aliens whose entry into the United States would pose a substantial risk of the illicit transfer of sensitive technologies.”

(3)
Definition— Subsection (e) of section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(e)) is amended by inserting at the end the following new paragraph:

“(8) Definition—In this subsection, the term “sensitive technologies” means—

“(A) areas of research or technology that require additional protection, as established by the interagency working group in accordance with section 1746(a)(3)(E)(i)(III) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92);

“(B) emerging and foundational technologies identified through the interagency process established under section 1758 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232);

“(C) sciences, technologies, and associated programs of study at an institution of higher education, related to energy, nuclear science, nuclear engineering, or a related field for which an alien who is a citizen of Iran would be denied a visa to participate in coursework pursuant to section 501 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8771); and

“(D) technologies and items included on the Commerce Control List, the United States Munitions List, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Controls, or the Technology Alert List.”

(4)
Memorandum of understanding— Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a memorandum of understanding detailing the responsibilities of and procedures used by Department of Homeland Security personnel assigned to diplomatic and consular posts under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this subsection, including visa security vetting and screening activities, the collection and distribution of relevant fees, and the sharing of information on visa refusals based on derogatory information issued through the interagency Security Advisory Opinion process.
(5)
Machine-readable technology pilot program—
(A)
In general— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall jointly commence a pilot program at a United States diplomatic or consular post in a country with a high volume of individuals who are known to have engaged in government-sponsored technology transfer campaigns. The pilot program shall—
(i)
be conducted for not fewer than 365 days; and
(ii)
assess opportunities to enhance security vetting, including the use of machine-readable technology and applicant interviews, to better defend research or sensitive technologies in the United States from foreign government-sponsored technology transfer campaigns.
(B)
Machine-readable technology— The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall jointly, as part of the pilot program under subparagraph (A)—
(i)
deploy and test equipment and technology to ensure that all documents collected in connection with visa applications are stored in a machine-readable and content-searchable format compatible and shareable between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State, and as appropriate, other interagency partners;
(ii)
collect supplemental documents from visa applicants in accordance with the requirements under subparagraph (A), as appropriate, and ensure appropriate personnel from the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State have access to such documents for visa security vetting purposes; and
(iii)
evaluate the use of such technology and supplemental documents in improving the efficacy and efficiency of visa security vetting.
(C)
Applicant interviews— The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall determine whether additional questions or further documentation requests may be appropriate during visa applicant in-person interviews to improve visa security vetting to address evolving threats to the United States.
(D)
Report— Not later than 420 days after the initiation of the pilot program under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and other appropriate Federal partners a report on the following:
(i)
The results of the pilot program.
(ii)
Recommendations for machine-readable and content-searchable equipment and technology and supplemental documents under paragraph (2).
(iii)
Recommendations for additional interview questions and further documentation requests under paragraph (3).
(iv)
A determination as to whether and where to expand the use of technologies evaluated during the pilot program.
(6)
Definitions— In this subsection:
(A)
Appropriate congressional committees— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(i)
the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(ii)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B)
Screening— The term “screening” means the review of public, private, or governmental information to assess the accuracy and authenticity of claims made on a visa application, including information contained in Federal Government records to include derogatory information.
(C)
Sensitive technologies— The term “sensitive technologies” has the meaning given such term in paragraph (8) of section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(e)), as added by subsection (a).
(D)
Strategic competitor— The term “strategic competitor” means a country identified as a strategic competitor to the United States in the “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” issued by the Department of Defense pursuant to section 113(g)(1)(A) of title 10, United States Code, or any successor document.
(E)
Vetting— The term “vetting” with respect to a visa applicant means the review and use of information collected during screening, any additional information obtained through interviews, consultation with other Federal Government officials, derogatory information, and information drawn from other sources to reach a determination regarding a national security concern related to the visa applicant.

Sec. 208 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and information sharing

(a)
In general— Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as amended by this title, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“210J. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and information sharing

“(a) In general—The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, of the Department of Homeland Security shall—

“(1) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials against the United States, including critical infrastructure;

“(2) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of global infectious disease, public health, food, agricultural, and veterinary issues;

“(3) support homeland security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of the homeland security hazards described in paragraphs (1) and (2), including the storage and transportation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological materials, by providing relevant quantitative and nonquantitative threat information;

“(4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security intelligence capabilities and structures to enhance early detection, prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack;

“(5) share information and provide tailored analytical support on such threats to State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, and other Federal agencies, as well as relevant national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, as appropriate; and

“(6) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the Secretary.

“(b) Coordination—Where appropriate, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department components, agencies within the intelligence community, including the National Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, including officials from high-threat urban areas, State and major urban area fusion centers, and local public health departments, as appropriate, and enable such entities to provide recommendations on optimal information sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified information, and on how such entities can provide information to the Department.

“(c) Definitions—In this section:

“(1) Intelligence community—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

“(2) National biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders—The term “national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders” means officials from Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities and individuals from the private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including infectious disease outbreaks.”

(b)
Clerical amendment— The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 201I, as added by this title, the following new item:
(c)
Report—
(1)
In general— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for each of the following four years, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the following:
(A)
The intelligence and information sharing activities under section 210J of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a) of this section) and of all relevant entities within the Department of Homeland Security to counter the threat from attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.
(B)
The Department’s activities in accordance with relevant intelligence strategies.
(2)
Assessment of implementation— The reports required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
An assessment of the progress of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security in implementing such section 210J.
(B)
A description of the methods established to carry out such assessment.
(3)
Definition— In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, respectively, over the matter concerned.

Sec. 209 Inland waters threat analysis

(a)
In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an inland waters threat analysis that includes an identification and description of the following:
(1)
Current and potential terrorism and criminal threats posed by individuals and groups seeking to—
(A)
enter the United States through inland waters; or
(B)
exploit security vulnerabilities on inland waters.
(2)
Security challenges at United States inland waters ports regarding—
(A)
terrorism and instruments of terror entering the United States; and
(B)
criminal activity, as measured by the total flow of illegal goods and illicit drugs, related to the inland waters.
(3)
Security mitigation efforts with respect to the inland waters to—
(A)
prevent terrorists and instruments of terror from entering the United States; and
(B)
reduce criminal activity related to the inland waters.
(4)
Vulnerabilities related to cooperation between State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, or international agreements, that hinder effective security, counterterrorism, anti-trafficking efforts, and the flow of legitimate trade with respect to inland waters.
(5)
Metrics and performance measures used by the Department of Homeland Security to evaluate inland waters security, as appropriate.
(b)
Analysis requirements— In preparing the threat analysis required under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consider and examine the following:
(1)
Technology needs and challenges.
(2)
Personnel needs and challenges.
(3)
The roles of State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, as well as private sector partners and the public, relating to inland waters security.
(4)
The need for cooperation among Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partner law enforcement, as well as private sector partners and the public, relating to inland waters security.
(5)
The challenges posed by geography with respect to inland waters security.
(c)
Classified threat analysis— To the extent possible, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the threat analysis required under subsection (a) in unclassified form. The Secretary may submit a portion of the threat analysis in classified form if the Secretary determines that such is appropriate.
(d)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A)
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;
(B)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
(2)
The term “inland waters” has the meaning given such term in section 83.03 of title 33, Code of Federal Regulations.

Sec. 210 Transnational criminal organizations threat assessment

(a)
In general— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall, in coordination with appropriate Federal partners, develop and disseminate a threat assessment on whether transnational criminal organizations are exploiting United States border security vulnerabilities in border security screening programs to gain access to the United States and threaten the United States or border security.
(b)
Recommendations— Upon completion of the threat assessment required under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall make a determination if any changes are required to address security vulnerabilities identified in such assessment.
(c)
Distribution— Consistent with the protection of classified and confidential unclassified information, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall share the threat assessment developed under this section with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials, including officials that operate within fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers.

Sec. 211 Department of Homeland Security counterterrorism advisory board

(a)
In general— Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as amended by this title, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“210K. Departmental coordination on counterterrorism

“(a) Establishment—There is in the Department a board to be composed of senior representatives of departmental operational components and headquarters elements. The purpose of the board shall be to coordinate and integrate departmental intelligence, activities, and policy related to the counterterrorism mission and functions of the Department.

“(b) Charter—There shall be a charter to govern the structure and mission of the board. Such charter shall direct the board to focus on the current threat environment and the importance of aligning departmental counterterrorism activities under the Secretary’s guidance. The charter shall be reviewed and updated every 4 years, as appropriate.

“(c) Members

“(1) Chair—The Secretary shall appoint a Coordinator for Counterterrorism within the Department who will serve as the chair of the board.

“(2) Additional members—The Secretary shall appoint additional members of the board from among the following:

“(A) The Transportation Security Administration.

“(B) United States Customs and Border Protection.

“(C) United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

“(D) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.

“(E) The Coast Guard.

“(F) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

“(G) The United States Secret Service.

“(H) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

“(I) The Office of Operations Coordination.

“(J) The Office of the General Counsel.

“(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

“(L) The Office of Policy.

“(M) The Science and Technology Directorate.

“(N) Other Departmental offices and programs as determined appropriate by the Secretary.

“(d) Meetings—The board shall meet on a regular basis to discuss intelligence and coordinate ongoing threat mitigation efforts and departmental activities, including coordination with other Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, and shall make recommendations to the Secretary.

“(e) Terrorism alerts—The board shall advise the Secretary on the issuance of terrorism alerts pursuant to section 203 of this Act.

“(f) Prohibition on additional funds—No additional funds are authorized to carry out this section.”

(b)
Clerical amendment— The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 210J, as added by this title, the following new item:
(c)
Report— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting through the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the status and activities of the board established under section 210K of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a).

Sec. 212 National Vetting Center

(a)
Authorization— The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish and operate a National Vetting Center.
(b)
Director— The Secretary of Homeland Security shall appoint a senior departmental employee to be the director of the center.
(c)
Staffing— The Secretary of Homeland Security shall—
(1)
assign or detail appropriate personnel from the department to serve as analysts at the National Vetting Center; and
(2)
coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies to detail appropriate personnel to serve as analysts at the National Vetting Center.
(d)
Purpose— The National Vetting Center shall, consistent with the guidance and oversight from the National Vetting Governance Board established pursuant to section 214 of this Act—
(1)
coordinate the efforts of Federal agencies to improve vetting of individuals seeking to enter or remain within the United States;
(2)
assist the departments and agencies involved with improving their coordination and use of intelligence and other information to identify potential threats to national security, border security, homeland security, and public safety;
(3)
provide a forum for the departments and agencies involved to identify, coordinate, and resolve policy questions and implementation challenges associated with vetting;
(4)
improve the effectiveness of vetting operations by maximizing the Intelligence Community and law enforcement data holdings used to support vetting;
(5)
develop and maintain a process to ensure compliance with legal, privacy, and civil rights and civil liberty requirements; and
(6)
other responsibilities as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Sec. 213 National Vetting Governance Board

(a)
Establishment— The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a National Vetting Governance Board.
(b)
Purpose— The National Vetting Governance Board shall provide guidance and oversight for the National Vetting Center established pursuant to section 213 of this Act, including—
(1)
producing decisions and recommendations for unified approaches to and solutions for vetting;
(2)
recommending a fiscal strategy;
(3)
recommending priorities for National Vetting Center activities;
(4)
reviewing and recommending new vetting programs or changes to existing vetting activities;
(5)
reporting progress and making recommendations to Secretary of Homeland Security or their designee; and
(6)
ensuring National Vetting Governance Board decisions and recommendations are consistent with relevant legal authorities and align with Department of Homeland Security privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and practices.
(c)
Limitations— The National Vetting Governance Board is not intended to supersede or otherwise replace existing statutory or delegated roles and responsibilities concerning Department of Homeland Security vetting activities.
(d)
Operations—
(1)
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence shall develop the structure, staffing, meeting schedule and other operational issues related to the National Vetting Governance Board.
(2)
The National Vetting Governance Board shall have a standing privacy and civil liberty working group and a legal working group to review the activities of the National Vetting Center and provide advice to the Board.

B Information Sharing

Sec. 215 Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative

(a)
In general— Section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h) is amended—
(1)
by amending the section heading to read as follows:

“210A. Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative”

(2)
in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following: “Beginning on the date of enactment of the Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act, such Initiative shall be known as the “Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative”.”;
(3)
by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

“(b) Interagency support and coordination—Through the Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative, in coordination with principal officials of fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers and the officers designated as the Homeland Security Advisors of the States, the Secretary shall—

“(1) coordinate with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies to provide operational, analytic, and reporting intelligence advice and assistance to the National Network of Fusion Centers and to align homeland security intelligence activities with other field-based intelligence activities;

“(2) support the integration of fusion centers into the information sharing environment, including by—

“(A) providing for the effective dissemination of information within the scope of the information sharing environment to the National Network of Fusion Centers;

“(B) conducting outreach to such fusion centers to identify any gaps in information sharing;

“(C) consulting with other Federal agencies to develop methods to—

“(i) address any such gaps identified under subparagraph (B), as appropriate; and

“(ii) deploy or access such databases and datasets, as appropriate; and

“(D) review information that is gathered by the National Network of Fusion Centers to identify that which is within the scope of the information sharing environment, including homeland security information (as defined in section 892), terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information and incorporate such information, as appropriate, into the Department’s own such information;

“(3) facilitate close communication and coordination between the National Network of Fusion Centers and the Department and other Federal departments and agencies;

“(4) facilitate information sharing and expertise from the national cybersecurity and communications integration center under section 2209 to the National Network of Fusion Centers;

“(5) coordinate the provision of training and technical assistance, including training on the use of Federal databases and datasets described in paragraph (2), to the National Network of Fusion Centers and encourage participating fusion centers to take part in terrorism threat-related exercises conducted by the Department;

“(6) ensure the dissemination of cyber threat indicators and information about cybersecurity risks and incidents to the national Network of Fusion Centers;

“(7) ensure that each fusion center in the National Network of Fusion Centers has a privacy policy approved by the Chief Privacy Officer of the Department and a civil rights and civil liberties policy approved by the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department;

“(8) develop and disseminate best practices on the appropriate levels for staffing at fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers of qualified representatives from State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and emergency management services, and public health disciplines, as well as the private sector;

“(9) to the maximum extent practicable, provide guidance, training, and technical assistance to ensure fusion centers operate in accordance with and in a manner that protects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties afforded by the Constitution of the United States;

“(10) to the maximum extent practicable, provide guidance, training, and technical assistance to ensure fusion centers are appropriately aligned with and able to meaningfully support Federal homeland security, national security, and law enforcement efforts, including counterterrorism;

“(11) encourage the full participation of the National Network of Fusion Centers in all assessment and evaluation efforts conducted by the Department;

“(12) track all Federal funding provided to each fusion center on an individualized basis as well as by funding source;

“(13) ensure that none of the departmental information or data provided or otherwise made available to fusion center personnel is improperly disseminated, accessed for unauthorized purposes, or otherwise used in a manner inconsistent with Department guidance; and

“(14) carry out such other duties as the Secretary determines appropriate.”

(4)
in subsection (c)—
(A)
in the heading, by striking “Personnel Assignment” and inserting “Resource Allocation”;
(B)
by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following:

“(1) Information sharing and personnel assignment

“(A) Information sharing—The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that, as appropriate—

“(i) fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers have access to homeland security information sharing systems; and

“(ii) Department personnel are deployed to support fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers in a manner consistent with the mission of the Department.

“(B) Personnel assignment—Department personnel referred to in subparagraph (A)(ii) may include the following:

“(i) Intelligence officers.

“(ii) Intelligence analysts.

“(iii) Other liaisons from components and offices of the Department, as appropriate.

“(2) Sources of support—Information shared and personnel assigned pursuant to paragraph (1) may be shared or provided, as the case may be, by the following Department components and offices, in coordination with the respective component or office head and in consultation with the principal officials of fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers:

“(A) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

“(B) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

“(C) The Transportation Security Administration.

“(D) U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

“(E) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

“(F) The Coast Guard.

“(G) The national cybersecurity and communications integration center under section 2209.

“(H) Other components or offices of the Department, as determined by the Secretary.”

(C)
in paragraph (3)—
(i)
in the heading, by striking “Qualifying criteria” and inserting “Resource allocation criteria”; and
(ii)
by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:

“(A) In general—The Secretary shall make available criteria for sharing information and deploying personnel to support a fusion center in the National Network of Fusion Centers in a manner consistent with the Department’s mission and existing statutory limits.”

(D)
in paragraph (4)(B), in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting “in which such fusion center is located” after “region”;
(5)
in subsection (d)—
(A)
in paragraph (3), by striking “and” at the end;
(B)
by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5);
(C)
by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

“(4) assist, in coordination with the national cybersecurity and communications integration center under section 2209, fusion centers in using information relating to cybersecurity risks to develop a comprehensive and accurate threat picture;”

(D)
in paragraph (5), as so redesignated—
(i)
by striking “government” and inserting “governments”; and
(ii)
by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and
(E)
by adding at the end the following:

“(6) use Department information, including information held by components and offices, to develop analysis focused on the mission of the Department under section 101(b).”

(6)
in subsection (e)—
(A)
by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:

“(1) In general—To the greatest extent practicable, the Secretary shall make it a priority to allocate resources, including departmental component personnel with relevant expertise, to support the efforts of fusion centers along land or maritime borders of the United States to facilitate law enforcement agency identification, investigation, and interdiction of persons, weapons, and related contraband that pose a threat to homeland security.”

(B)
in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “participating State, local, and regional fusion centers” and inserting “fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers”;
(7)
in subsection (j)—
(A)
by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
(B)
by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively;
(C)
by inserting before paragraph (2) the following:

“(1) the term “cybersecurity risk” has the meaning given such term in section 2209;”

(D)
in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking “and” at the end; and
(E)
by inserting after such paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:

“(6) the term “National Network of Fusion Centers” means a decentralized arrangement of fusion centers intended to enhance individual State and urban area fusion centers’ ability to leverage the capabilities and expertise of all fusion centers for the purpose of enhancing analysis and homeland security information sharing nationally; and”

(8)
by striking subsection (k).
(b)
Report— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter through 2024, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the value of fusion center intelligence products and the expenditure of authorized funds for the support and coordination of the National Network of Fusion Centers as specified in section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h), as amended by subsection (a).
(c)
Report on federal databases— Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report to Congress on the Federal databases and datasets that address any gaps identified pursuant to section 210A(b)(2)(B) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by subsection (a), including databases and datasets used, operated, or managed by Department components, the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of the Treasury, that are appropriate, in accordance with Federal laws and policies, for inclusion in the information sharing environment.
(d)
Technical and conforming amendments—
(1)
Section 2103(c)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 623(c)(1)) is amended by striking “210A(j)(1)” and inserting “210A(j)”.
(2)
The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by striking the item relating to section 210A and inserting the following:
(e)
Reference— Any reference in any law, rule, or regulation to the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative shall be deemed to be a reference to the Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative.

Sec. 216 Fusion center personnel needs assessment

(a)
Assessment—
(1)
In general— Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an assessment of Department of Homeland Security personnel assigned to fusion centers pursuant to section 210A(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h(c)), as amended by this title, including an assessment of whether deploying additional Department personnel to such fusion centers would enhance the Department’s mission under section 101(b) of such Act (6 U.S.C. 111(b)) and the National Network of Fusion Centers.
(2)
Contents— The assessment required under this subsection shall include the following:
(A)
Information on the current deployment of the Department’s personnel to each fusion center.
(B)
Information on the roles and responsibilities of the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis intelligence officers, intelligence analysts, senior reports officers, reports officers, and regional directors deployed to fusion centers.
(C)
Information on Federal resources, in addition to personnel, provided to each fusion center.
(D)
An analysis of the optimal number of personnel the Office of Intelligence and Analysis should deploy to fusion centers, including a cost-benefit analysis comparing deployed personnel with technological solutions to support information sharing.
(E)
An assessment of fusion centers located in jurisdictions along land and maritime borders of the United States, and the degree to which deploying personnel, as appropriate, from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Coast Guard to such fusion centers would enhance the integrity and security at such borders by helping Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement authorities to identify, investigate, and interdict persons, weapons, and related contraband that pose a threat to homeland security.
(F)
An assessment of fusion centers located in jurisdictions with large and medium hub airports, and the degree to which deploying, as appropriate, personnel from the Transportation Security Administration to such fusion centers would enhance the integrity and security of aviation security.
(b)
Definitions— In this section, the terms “fusion center” and “National Network of Fusion Centers” have the meanings given those terms in section 210A(j) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h(j)), as amended by this title.

Sec. 217 Program for State and local analyst clearances

(a)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that any program established by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to provide eligibility for access to information classified as Top Secret for State, local, Tribal, and territorial analysts located in fusion centers shall be consistent with the need to know requirements pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note).
(b)
Report— Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the following:
(1)
The process by which the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis determines a need to know pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note) to sponsor Top Secret clearances for appropriate State, local, Tribal, and territorial analysts located in fusion centers.
(2)
The effects of such Top Secret clearances on enhancing information sharing with State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.
(3)
The cost for providing such Top Secret clearances for State, local, Tribal, and territorial analysts located in fusion centers, including training and background investigations.
(4)
The operational security protocols, training, management, and risks associated with providing such Top Secret clearances for State, local, Tribal, and territorial analysts located in fusion centers.
(c)
Definition— In this section, the term “fusion center” has the meaning given the term in section 210A(j) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h(j)), as amended by this title.

Sec. 218 Information technology assessment

(a)
In general— The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Homeland Security and representatives from the National Network of Fusion Centers, shall conduct an assessment of information systems used to share homeland security information between the Department of Homeland Security and fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers and make upgrades to such systems, as appropriate. Such assessment shall include the following:
(1)
An evaluation of the security, accessibility, and ease of use of such systems by fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers.
(2)
A review to determine how to establish improved interoperability of departmental information systems with existing information systems used by fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers.
(3)
An evaluation of participation levels of departmental components and offices of information systems used to share homeland security information with fusion centers in the National Network of Fusion Centers.
(b)
Definitions— In this section—
(1)
the terms “fusion center” and “National Network of Fusion Centers” have the meanings given those terms in section 210A(j) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h(j)), as amended by this title;
(2)
the term “homeland security information” has the meaning given the term in section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482); and
(3)
the term “information systems” has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.

Sec. 219 Department of Homeland Security classified facility inventory and dissemination

(a)
In general— The Secretary of Homeland Security shall, to the extent practicable—
(1)
maintain an inventory of those Department of Homeland Security facilities that the Department certifies to house classified infrastructure or systems at the Secret level and above;
(2)
update such inventory on a regular basis; and
(3)
share part or all of such inventory with appropriate departmental personnel and representatives of other Federal, State, and local agencies as determined appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(b)
Inventory— The inventory of facilities described in subsection (a) may include—
(1)
the location of such facilities;
(2)
the attributes and capabilities of such facilities (including the clearance level of the facility, the square footage of, the total capacity of, the number of workstations in, document storage, and the number of conference rooms in, such facilities);
(3)
the entities that operate such facilities; and
(4)
the date of establishment of such facilities.

Sec. 220 Terror inmate information sharing

(a)
In general— The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and in consultation with other appropriate Federal officials, shall, as appropriate, share with State, local, and regional fusion centers through the Department of Homeland Security Fusion Center Partnership Initiative under section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h), as well as other relevant law enforcement entities, release information from a Federal correctional facility, including the name, charging date, and expected place and date of release, of certain individuals who may pose a terrorist threat.
(b)
Scope— The information shared pursuant to subsection (a) shall be—
(1)
for homeland security purposes; and
(2)
regarding individuals convicted of a Federal crime related to acts of terrorism (as such term is defined in section 3077 of title 18, United States Code).
(c)
Periodic threat assessments— Consistent with the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with appropriate Federal officials to provide State, local, and regional fusion centers described in subsection (a) with periodic assessments regarding the overall threat from known or suspected terrorists currently incarcerated in a Federal correctional facility, including the assessed risks of such populations engaging in terrorist activity upon release.
(d)
Privacy protection— Prior to affecting the information sharing described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall receive input and advice from the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Officer for Privacy, and the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security.
(e)
Rule of construction— Nothing in this section may be construed as requiring the establishment of a list or registry of individuals convicted of terrorism.

Sec. 221 Enhancing Department of Homeland Security suspicious activity reporting operations

(a)
Strategy required— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other appropriate officials, shall develop a strategy to improve the operations and activities of the Department of Homeland Security related to training, outreach, and information sharing for suspicious activity reporting to prevent acts of terrorism and acts of targeted violence.
(b)
Contents of strategy— The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
A plan to maintain and expand activities related to effectively identifying, reporting, and responding to potential acts of terrorism.
(2)
A plan to develop a behavioral threat assessment and management model for use by appropriate National Network of Fusion Centers, emergency response providers, and appropriate private sector personnel involved in reporting or responding suspicious activity related to acts of targeted violence.
(3)
Protocols, developed in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to ensure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation receives all relevant suspicious activity reports.
(4)
A staffing and budget plan to ensure the continued operation and any necessary expansion of Department of Homeland Security information sharing, technical assistance, training, and other activities related to suspicious activity reporting.
(5)
Training for appropriate personnel of the National Network of Fusion Centers, emergency response providers, and appropriate private sector personnel on—
(A)
methods for identifying, analyzing, and disseminating critical information, including the indicators of acts of terrorism and acts of targeted violence;
(B)
methods to protect privacy and civil liberties, including preventing racial, religious, and national origin discrimination;
(C)
implementation of the behavioral threat assessment and management model;
(D)
response protocols for submitting suspicious activity reports; and
(E)
other training determined appropriate by the Secretary.
(6)
A plan to—
(A)
provide technical assistance for appropriate National Network of Fusion Centers, emergency response providers, and appropriate private sector personnel for operations related to suspicious activity reporting activity; and
(B)
assist with questions or concerns related to privacy and civil liberty protections.
(c)
Congressional notification— The Secretary shall provide to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a copy of the strategy required in subsection (a).
(d)
Definitions— In this section:
(1)
Behavioral threat assessment— The term “behavioral threat assessment and management” means the systematic and evidence-based process of—
(A)
identifying individuals who are exhibiting patterns of concerning behavior that indicate an interest, motive, intention, or capability of carrying out an act of violence;
(B)
investigating and gathering information from multiple sources to assess whether an individual described in subparagraph (A) poses a threat, based on articulable facts; and
(C)
the subsequent management of such a threat, if necessary.
(2)
Emergency response providers— The term “emergency response provider” has the meaning given such term in section 2(6) of the Homeland Security Act.
(3)
National network of fusion centers— The term “National Network of Fusion Centers” has the meaning given such term in section 215 of this Act.
(4)
Targeted violence— The term “targeted violence” means any incident of predatory violence with respect to which an identifiable individual or group focuses an attack on a particular target.
(5)
Terrorism— The term “terrorism” has the meaning given such term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.