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Title II — Matters relating to the Department of Defense

H.R. 2621 · 115th Congress · May 24, 2017 · Lineage

II Matters relating to the Department of Defense

201. Authorization of funds for critical munitions

(a)
Findings— Congress finds the following:
(1)
Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United States Pacific Command, testified in February 2016 “critical munitions shortfalls are a top priority and concern … munitions are a major component of combat pre-positioning, but fiscal pressure places this at risk”.
(2)
Admiral Harris stated that “Weapons improvement priorities include long-range and stand-off strike weapons, longer-range anti-ship weapons, advanced air-to-air munitions, theater ballistic/cruise missile defense, torpedoes, naval mines, and a cluster munitions replacement.”.
(3)
Admiral Harris further indicated that “if additional resources were to become available, I would prioritize investment in the following areas … procure additional critical munitions (AIX–9X, AIM–120D, SM–6, MK–48)”.
(b)
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Department of Defense should address shortfalls in critical munitions inventories and make improvements in critical munitions capabilities;
(2)
insufficient critical munition investments will limit the ability of the Armed Forces to perform required missions; and
(3)
improvements to critical munition capabilities should include pre-positioning arrangements, infrastructure for munition storage and security, and logistical requirements for critical munitions.
(c)
Availability of funds—
(1)
Authorization— There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $1,000,000,000 to address shortfalls in critical munition inventories and to improve critical munition capabilities.
(2)
Capability and capacity areas— Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to the following:
(A)
AIM–120.
(B)
AIM–9X.
(C)
Precision-Guided Anti-Ship Missiles.
(D)
Standard missile-2.
(E)
Standard missile-6.
(F)
Evolved sea sparrow missiles.
(G)
Laser direct attack munition.
(H)
Miniature air launched decoy jammers.
(I)
Fuzes for hard target penetrators.
(J)
Massive ordnance penetrators.
(K)
Army tactical missile system.
(L)
Guided multiple launch rocket system.
(M)
Tomahawk land attack missiles.
(N)
Joint standoff weapon.
(O)
Joint air-to-surface standoff missile extended range.
(P)
Sonobuoys.
(Q)
MK48 heavy weight torpedos.
(R)
MK48 torpedo modifications.
(S)
MK54 light weight torpedos.
(T)
Any other weapon system determined appropriate by the Secretary of Defense.
(d)
Notification— Not later than 30 days before taking any action to obligate funds authorized by subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any proposed obligation and provide a detailed justification for such proposed obligations.

202. Procurement of ballistic missile interceptors and missile defense exercises

(a)
Findings— Congress finds the following:
(1)
In April 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United States Pacific Command, testified that “Pacific Commands Integrated Air and Missile Defense priority is to establish a persistent, credible, and sustainable ballistic missile defense presence by forward deploying the latest advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, TPY–2 radars in Japan, the THAAD system on Guam, and the Sea-Based X-band radar based in Hawaii defend the U.S. homeland and our allies.”.
(2)
In February 2016, General Curtis Scaparrotti, former Commander of the United States Forces, Korea, testified that “North Korea’s missile program continues to develop, so it is critical for the Alliance to continue to build a layered and interoperable BMD capability … and consider a high-altitude missile defense capability.”.
(b)
Procurement— There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $1,000,000,000 to procure terminal high altitude area defense interceptors or lower-tier air and missile defense interceptors, including standard missile-3, Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) missile segment enhancement, and Patriot guidance enhanced missile TBM.
(c)
Exercises— There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $15,000,000 for exercises to be conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of the United States Pacific Command, and the Commander of the United States Northern Command for joint and other exercises with the armed forces of the Governments of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the United States for the defense against and defeat of ballistic missile forces of North Korea.
(d)
Notification— Not later than 30 days before taking any action to obligate funds authorized by subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any proposed obligation and provide a detailed justification for such proposed obligations.

203. Plan to maintain a forward-stationed combat aviation brigade in South Korea

(a)
Findings— Congress finds the following:
(1)
The National Commission on the Future of the Army established by the National Commission on the Future of the Army Act of 2014 (title XVII of Public Law 113–291) found that the Army is incurring unacceptable risk in capabilities that would be required early for major contingencies, and that retaining an eleventh combat aviation brigade in the regular Army would help meet these demands.
(2)
The Commission also found that with an eleventh combat aviation brigade, the Army would be better postured to retain a forward stationed aviation brigade in South Korea, a major advantage over rotating forces as currently planned, and shortfalls in capabilities would decline significantly.
(3)
The Army of the United States currently plans to begin rotational sourcing in 2019 to meet the Combat Aviation Brigade requirement in South Korea.
(4)
The Commission expressed concern that this rotational approach may present unacceptable risk, given terrain and aviation mission complexities in South Korea.
(5)
The Commission found that “forward stationing of the combat aviation brigade in South Korea would provide air crews greater familiarity with the demanding environment and enable greater interoperability with U.S. allies and partners for “fight-tonight” readiness”.
(b)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, should retain an eleventh combat aviation brigade of the regular Army in South Korea.
(c)
Plan— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan that includes an assessment of the actions necessary, and additional resources required, to retain an eleventh combat aviation brigade in South Korea.
(d)
Form— The plan required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

204. Extended deterrence commitment to the Asia-Pacific region

(a)
Findings— Congress finds the following:
(1)
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to extended deterrence and continued protection of the treaty allies of the United States under the United States nuclear umbrella.
(2)
The United States-Republic of Korea Deterrence Strategy Committee and the United States-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue provide valuable communication channels for ensuring the commitment of the United States to the policy of extended nuclear deterrence and allow for bilateral discussions on how the range of United States capabilities—including the United States nuclear umbrella—can be leveraged to credibly deter, and if necessary, defeat, North Korean nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and missile threats and aggression.
(3)
Statements by officials of the United States have consistently emphasized the United States commitment to providing extended deterrence and defense across the full spectrum of military capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.
(4)
On September 9, 2016, President Obama responded to a North Korean nuclear test by issuing the following statement, “I restated to President Park and Prime Minister Abe the unshakable U.S. commitment to take necessary steps to defend our allies in the region, including through our deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the ROK, and the commitment to extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities.”.
(5)
On October 14, 2016, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, “reaffirmed the ironclad commitment of the U.S. to defend both the ROK and Japan and provide extended deterrence guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities”.
(6)
On October 19, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, stated, “the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea is unwavering. This includes our commitment to provide extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities. Make no mistake: Any attack on America or our allies will not only be defeated, but any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an overwhelming and effective response.”.
(7)
On October 19, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry, during a joint press conference with the South Korean Foreign Minister, confirmed the United States would “defend South Korea through a robust, combined defense posture and through extended deterrence including the U.S. nuclear umbrella conventional strike and missile defense capabilities.”.
(8)
On February 3, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, during a visit to South Korea, stated, “America’s commitments to defending our allies and to upholding our extended deterrence guarantees remain ironclad: Any attack on the United States, or our allies, will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming.”.
(9)
In conjunction with the sea- and land-based legs of the triad, nuclear-capable B–2, B–21, and B–52 bombers and dual-capable aircraft, including F–35 Block 4 aircraft, are vital to ensuring the credibility and flexibility of United States extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea.
(b)
Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the defense of South Korea and Japan must remain a top priority for the administration;
(2)
the United States maintains an unwavering and steadfast commitment to the policy of extended deterrence, especially with respect to South Korea and Japan;
(3)
bilateral extended deterrence dialogues and discussions with South Korea and Japan are of great value to the United States and its partners and must remain a central component of these relationships;
(4)
the United States must maintain a robust nuclear triad, including nuclear-capable bombers, consisting of the current and planned Air Force fleet of nuclear-capable B–2, B–21, and B–52 bombers and dual-capable aircraft including F–35 Block 4 aircraft, to ensure that the full spectrum of military options associated with the extended deterrence commitments of the United States remains credible and executable;
(5)
the fielding of long-range stand-off weapons in order to replace the current fleet of air-launched cruise missiles before such cruise missiles are retired at the end of the service life of the missiles is absolutely vital to ensuring the United States remains capable of meeting extended deterrence commitments in the Asia-Pacific region in the years to come; and
(6)
the timely development, production, and deployment of the B–21 bomber and F–35 Block 4 dual-capable aircraft are fundamental to ensure that the United States remains able to meet extended deterrence requirements in the Asia-Pacific region far into the future.

205. Assessment of ability of the Air Force to employ bombers and associated weapons while forward deployed

(a)
Assessment required— The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an assessment of the ability of the Air Force to employ the full range of bombers of the Air Force and the associated weapons of such bombers while forward deployed in support of operational plans, contingency plans, and warfighting scenarios throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific area of operations.
(b)
Elements— The assessment under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
An assessment of the capabilities and limitations of infrastructure and weapons loading equipment required to support weapons ground transportation and activities for B–1 and B–52 bombers of the Air Force, when forward deployed to airfields controlled by the United States allies of the United States in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(2)
An identification and assessment of any such assessed limitation that would materially affect operational and contingency plans and warfighting scenarios in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(3)
Recommendations to mitigate any such infrastructure and weapon loading equipment support limitations needed to ensure full employment of bombers and associated weapons in support of operational plans, contingency plans, and warfighting scenarios in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(c)
Report required— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that contains a report that includes the assessment required under subsection (a).
(d)
Form— The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

206. Plan to enhance imagery sharing with allies in the Asia-Pacific region

(a)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Department of Defense should enhance critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities because such capabilities are a top readiness challenge and resourcing priority; and
(2)
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities with enhanced detection and indications and warning are necessary to maintain situational awareness and provide adequate decisions space for the United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea.
(b)
Plan—
(1)
In general— The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a plan for enhancing the sharing of commercial imagery and national technical means with the Governments of South Korea and Japan, consistent with the national security of the United States and with the protection of sources and methods. The Secretary shall implement such plan with the goal of enhancing detection, indications, and warning, in order to improve joint non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and ballistic missile detection and defense capabilities.
(2)
Briefing— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan under paragraph (1).
(3)
Appropriate congressional committees— In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(B)
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

207. Plan to increase cyber and information operations, deterrence, and defense

(a)
Findings— Congress finds the following:
(1)
Cyber threats originating from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region targeting the United States and the allies of the United States have increased, including the use of cyber intrusions, the exfiltration of data in the national interest of the United States, and espionage.
(2)
In February 2016, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United States Pacific Command, in his testimony noted “increased cyber capacity and nefarious activity, especially by China, North Korea, and Russia underscore the growing requirement to evolve command, control, and operational authorities”.
(3)
Admiral Harris stated “that in order to fully leverage the cyber domain, PACOM requires an enduring theater cyber capability able to provide cyber planning, integration, synchronization, and direction of cyber forces.”.
(b)
Plan— The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan to—
(1)
incorporate cyber planning within joint planning exercises pertaining to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region;
(2)
enhance joint, regional, and combined information operations and strategic communication strategies to counter Chinese, North Korean, and Russian information warfare, malign influence, and propaganda activities; and
(3)
identify potential areas of cybersecurity collaboration and partnership capabilities with Asian allies and partners of the United States.
(c)
Briefing— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the plan required under subsection (b).

208. Establishment of joint training exercises and improving response capabilities for contingency scenarios

(a)
Sense of Congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should conduct enhanced joint force training and exercises that specifically address full-spectrum threats across combatant commands; and
(2)
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also consider training and exercises that enhance the effectiveness of the joint force, and partnered forces, to deter and respond to operational activities conducted below the threshold of conventional war.
(b)
Availability of funds— There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $100,000,000 for the enhancement of joint training and exercises through the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation Program.