901. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
Planning and management—
Global audit— As the size, cost, and number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade, independent audits of each such operation should be conducted annually, with a view toward “right-sizing” operations and ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost effective.
Procurement and transparency— The logistics established within the United Nations Department of Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion while individual accountability for waste, fraud, and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is uniformly enforced.
Review of mandates and closing operations— In conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the following:
Except in extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked with activities that are impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto trusteeship outside of the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves for creating and maintaining conditions for peace.
Long-standing operations that are static and cannot fulfill their mandate should be downsized or closed.
Where there is legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping operation would result in the resumption of major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed contributions, similar to that currently supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be explored and instituted.
Leadership— As peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on specific skills and experience, and current senior leaders and managers who do not meet those standards should be removed.
Pre-deployment training— Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has received and understands such training as a condition of participation in the operation.
Gratis military personnel— The General Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel by the Department so that the Department may accept secondments from Member States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties.
Conduct and discipline—
Adoption of a uniform code of conduct— A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal documents governing participation in such an operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
Understanding the code of conduct— All personnel, regardless of category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on training. In particular—
all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether such language is an official language of the United Nations;
all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code of Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability and victims compensation, where appropriate, as a condition of appointment to any such operation; and
peacekeeping operations should continue and enhance educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based, including explaining prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
Monitoring mechanisms— Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams already deployed to support most United Nations peacekeeping operations, should be present in each operation to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the United Nations Department of Field Support, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations.
Investigations— A permanent, professional, and independent investigative body should be established and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping operations. In particular:
The investigative body should include professionals with experience in investigating sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of resources, as appropriate, as well as experts who can provide guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements necessary for any subsequent legal action.
Provisions should be included in all Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate Member States that contribute troops to a peacekeeping operation to designate a military prosecutor who will participate in any investigation into credible allegations of misconduct brought against an individual of such Member State, so that evidence is collected and preserved in a manner consistent with the military law of such Member State.
The investigative body should be regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and should be equipped with modern forensics equipment for the purpose of positively identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, for determining paternity.
The investigative body should report directly to the Associate Director of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies of any reports to the Department of Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member State concerned.
Follow-up— The Conduct and Discipline Unit in the headquarters of the United Nations Department of Field Support should be appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked with—
promulgating measures to prevent misconduct;
receiving reports by field personnel and coordinating the Department’s response to allegations of misconduct;
gathering follow-up information on completed investigations, particularly by focusing on disciplinary actions against the individual concerned that have been taken by the United Nations or by the individual's Member State, and sharing such information with the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, and the community hosting the peacekeeping operation; and
contributing pertinent data on conduct and discipline to the database required pursuant to subparagraph (H).
Financial liability and victims assistance— Although peacekeeping operations should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In particular:
The United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing long-term treatment or compensation under the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity.
If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that contributed the contingent to which such individual belonged or to the manager concerned.
In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing country concerned.
In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent with existing United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall not be shielded from liability.
Managers and commanders— The manner in which managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
Database— A centralized database, including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and other relevant United Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.
Cooperation of member states— If a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from personal liability, that Member State should be barred from contributing troops or personnel to future peacekeeping operations.
Welfare— Peacekeeping operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities, as necessary and appropriate.