---
kind: "diff"
citation: "H.R. 4644"
bill: "116-hr-4644"
heading: "Libya Stabilization Act"
from: "ih"
from_label: "Introduced in House"
to: "rh"
to_label: "Reported in House"
sections_amended: 17
sections_added: 1
sections_removed: 0
url: "https://uscodex.org/bills/116/hr/4644/changes/rh"
---

# H.R. 4644 — what changed

H.R. 4644, Libya Stabilization Act — 17 sections amended and 1 added between Introduced in House and Reported in House.

Edits are marked `<del>struck</del>` and `<ins>inserted</ins>`.

## Sec. 2 Findings; statement of policy

- (a) Findings— Congress makes the following findings:
  - (1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya is critical to the security of the United States, Europe, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as maritime routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea.
  - (2) <del>General Thomas Waldhauser, former Commander of </del>United States Africa Command <del>(AFRICOM), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2017, “instability </del><ins>(AFRICOM) identifies containing instability </ins>in Libya <del>and North </del><ins>as one of its six main lines of effort in </ins>Africa <del>may be the most significant, near-term threat to U.S. </del>and <del>allies’ interests on </del><ins>works to support diplomatic efforts to reconstitute </ins>the <del>continent”.</del><ins>Libyan State and to disrupt terrorist organizations that impede that process or threaten United States interests.</ins>
  - (3) <del>AFRICOM identifies containing instability </del><ins>According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Islamic State </ins>in Libya <del>as one of its six main lines </del><ins>(ISIS-Libya) is “degraded”. However, Secretary </ins>of <del>effort </del><ins>Defense Mark Esper said </ins>in <del>Africa and works to support diplomatic efforts to reconstitute the Libyan state and to disrupt terrorist organizations that impede </del><ins>November 2019 </ins>that <del>process or threaten United States interests.</del><ins>there is a continued need for lethal operations to keep ISIS-Libya in a degraded state.</ins>
  - (4) <del>According to </del><ins>On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, </ins>the <del>Director </del><ins>commander </ins>of <ins>the Libyan </ins>National <del>Intelligence, as </del><ins>Army (LNA) ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilateral military operation to take control </ins>of <del>2019, </del><ins>Tripoli, </ins>the <del>capabilities </del><ins>capital </ins>of <ins>Libya and seat of </ins>the <del>Libya-based Islamic State (ISIS) affiliate “have been degraded, but it is still capable </del><ins>Government </ins>of <del>conducting attacks on local and Western targets in Libya </del><ins>National Accord (GNA), an interim body that emerged from previous United Nations-backed negotiations which the United States Government </ins>and <del>possibly elsewhere in </del>the <del>region”. According to </del>United Nations <del>Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ghassan Salamé, ISIS has conducted six attacks </del><ins>Security Council have recognized </ins>since <del>April 4, 2019.</del><ins>2015.</ins>
  - (5) <del>On September 22, 2016, a Joint Communique on Libya, signed by Egypt, Italy, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, </del><ins>Both </ins>the <del>United Arab Emirates, </del><ins>LNA, the GNA, </ins>and <del>others, reaffirmed a joint “commitment </del><ins>their associated forces have failed </ins>to <del>the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s [UNSMIL] efforts </del><ins>observe their obligations </ins>under <del>the leadership of </del><ins>international humanitarian law, increased </ins>the <del>UN Special Representative </del><ins>geographic scope </ins>of the <del>Secretary General”.</del><ins>conflict, ignored calls for de-escalation and a ceasefire, recruited foreign mercenaries, and intensified ground and air campaigns using heavy weapons, aircraft, and reportedly using armed drones provided by foreign powers.</ins>
  - (6) <del>On March 1, 2019, </del><ins>According to then-United Nations Special Representative and Head of </ins>the United <del>States Government, along with </del><ins>Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé, weapons provided by foreign powers to </ins>the <del>governments </del><ins>warring parties in violation </ins>of <del>France, Italy, and </del>the United <del>Kingdom, reiterated its strong support </del><ins>Nations arms embargo are being sold </ins>to <del>the diplomatic efforts of SRSG Ghassan Salamé and UNSMIL, rejected a military solution </del><ins>or captured by terrorist groups active </ins>in <del>Libya, and called on all Libyans to work constructively with SRSG Salamé to realize a stable and unified government that can deliver security and prosperity for all Libyans.</del><ins>Libya.</ins>
  - (7) <del>UNSMIL planned </del><ins>According </ins>to <del>host a long-awaited National Conference </del><ins>the United Nations, since the LNA offensive began </ins>in <del>Ghadames, Libya to begin on </del>April <del>12, </del>2019, <ins>the conflict in Libya has led </ins>to <del>help </del>the <del>Libyan </del><ins>deaths of more than 2,200 </ins>people <del>negotiate a path toward interim governance structures </del>and <del>credible and secure elections.</del><ins>the displacement of more than 150,000 people.</ins>
  - (8) <del>On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the commander </del><ins>All sides </ins>of the <del>Libyan National Army (LNA) movement ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilateral military operation to take control of Tripoli, </del><ins>conflict have requisitioned </ins>the <del>capital </del><ins>houses </ins>of <del>Libya.</del><ins>civilians, targeted medical facilities, and inhibited humanitarian access to food, health, and other life-saving services, worsening humanitarian conditions.</ins>
  - (9) <del>Tripoli is the seat of the Government </del><ins>More than 2,200 refugees and migrants are detained in detention facilities in Libya with serious risks </ins>of <del>National Accord (GNA), an interim body that emerged from previous United Nations-backed negotiations </del><ins>torture, starvation, sexual abuse, </ins>and <del>that </del><ins>death. On July 2, 2019, an airstrike against </ins>the <del>United States Government </del><ins>Tajura Detention Center killed 53 </ins>and <ins>wounded 130 people trapped in </ins>the <ins>center. The </ins>United Nations <del>Security Council have recognized since 2015.</del><ins>has called for the immediate release, evacuation, and protection of refugees and migrants detained in conflict zones.</ins>
  - (10) <del>Both the LNA movement, the GNA, </del><ins>The Department of State’s 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report states with regard to Libya, “Trafficking victims—including men, women, </ins>and <del>their associated forces have failed </del><ins>children—are highly vulnerable </ins>to <del>observe their obligations under international humanitarian law, increased the geographic scope of the conflict, ignored calls for de-escalation </del><ins>extreme violence </ins>and <del>a ceasefire, recruited foreign mercenaries, </del><ins>other human rights violations in Libya by governmental </ins>and <del>intensified ground </del><ins>non-state armed groups, including: physical, sexual, </ins>and <del>air campaigns using heavy weapons, aircraft, </del><ins>verbal assault; abduction for ransom; extortion; arbitrary killings; inhumane detention; </ins>and <del>reportedly using armed drones provided </del><ins>child soldiering…Migrants in Libya are extremely vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking [and …] are vulnerable to exploitation </ins>by <del>foreign powers.</del><ins>state and non-state actors, including employers who refuse to pay laborers’ wages.”.</ins>
  - (11) <del>Without the full cooperation of all United Nations Member States in implementing </del><ins>In November 2019, </ins>the <del>arms embargo in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2473 (2019), </del><ins>GNA </ins>and <del>all relevant predecessor resolutions, </del>the <del>flow </del><ins>Government </ins>of <del>weapons to Libya will continue to fuel </del><ins>Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding on maritime boundaries in </ins>the <del>conflict.</del><ins>Mediterranean Sea.</ins>
  - (12) According to <del>SRSG Salamé, weapons provided by foreign powers to </del><ins>a July 2020 Department of Defense Inspector General report, </ins>the <del>warring parties are being sold </del><ins>Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has deployed as many as 2,500 mercenary forces, including some Syrian fighters, advanced equipment, and advanced capabilities </ins>to <del>or captured by terrorist groups active </del><ins>support the LNA and Russian objectives </ins>in <del>Libya.</del><ins>North Africa.</ins>
  - (13) According to <del>the United Nations, since the LNA movement offensive began in April 2019, </del><ins>a July 2020 Department of Defense Inspector General report, “Turkey’s president acknowledged that his country sent many Syrian militants to Libya to support </ins>the <del>conflict </del><ins>Government of National Accord (GNA)….USAFRICOM estimated that 3,500 Syrian mercenaries were </ins>in Libya <del>has led to </del><ins>supporting </ins>the <del>deaths </del><ins>GNA as </ins>of <del>more than 1,100 people and </del>the <del>displacement </del><ins>end </ins>of <del>more than 120,000 people.</del><ins>March. Citing press reports, USAFRICOM stated that an additional 300 Turkish-supported “Syrian opposition” fighters arrived in Libya in early April.”.</ins>
  - (14) <del>Both the LNA movement and opposing </del><ins>In January 2020, LNA-aligned </ins>forces <del>have requisitioned </del><ins>shut down oil production in eastern Libya, which according to </ins>the <del>houses of civilians, targeted medical facilities, </del><ins>United Nations threatens devastating consequences for the Libyan people </ins>and <del>inhibited humanitarian access to food, health, </del><ins>for the country’s economic </ins>and <del>other life-saving services, worsening humanitarian conditions.</del><ins>financial situation.</ins>
  - (15) <del>More than 5,100 refugees and migrants are detained in detention facilities in Libya, including more than 3,000 </del><ins>On January 19, 2020, at a peace conference </ins>in <del>and around </del><ins>Berlin, representatives of </ins>the <del>conflict zones in Tripoli, with serious risks </del><ins>Governments </ins>of <del>torture, starvation, sexual abuse, </del><ins>Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of Congo, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, </ins>and <del>death. On July 2, 2019, an airstrike against </del>the <del>Tajura Detention Center killed 53 </del><ins>United States, as well as regional </ins>and <del>wounded 130 people trapped </del><ins>multilateral organizations, agreed to refrain from interference </ins>in <ins>Libya’s internal affairs, abide by </ins>the <del>center. The </del>United Nations <del>has called for the immediate release, evacuation, and protection of refugees </del><ins>arms embargo, </ins>and <del>migrants detained in </del><ins>advance a 55-point communique to resolve the </ins>conflict <del>zones.</del><ins>in Libya.</ins>
  - (16) <ins>On January 30, 2020, then-United Nations Special Representative Salamé asserted, “the warring parties have continued to receive advanced equipment, fighters, and advisors from foreign states, in violation of the UN arms embargo and pledges made by representatives of these countries in Berlin”.</ins>
  - (17) <ins>On February 12, 2020, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The task of bringing the Libyans back to the negotiating table has been complicated by the involvement of external actors. Libya is not the place for Russian mercenaries, or fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan. It is not the place for the Emiratis, Russians, or Turks to be fighting battles on the ground through intermediaries they sponsor or support with sophisticated and deadly equipment in pursuit of their own agendas.”.</ins>
  - (18) <ins>On February 13, 2020, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2510, which endorses the Conclusions of the International Conference on Libya held in Berlin, affirms the need for a lasting ceasefire, demands full compliance by all member states with the United Nations arms embargo, and expresses unequivocal support for the United Nations Special Representative and the ongoing UNSMIL-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue.</ins>
- (b) Statement of policy— It is the policy of the United States—
  - (1) to <del>assert there is no military solution </del><ins>advance a peaceful resolution </ins>to the conflict in Libya <del>and that only </del><ins>through </ins>a political process <del>can </del><ins>as the best way to </ins>secure United States interests, ensure a stable and unified Libya, reduce the threat of terrorism, and provide peace and opportunity to the Libyan people;
  - (2) to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embargo on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying and extending the embargo;
  - (3) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of persons contributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)), designed to target individuals or entities who “threaten the peace, security, and stability of Libya”;
  - (4) to <del>employ sanctions and war-crimes prosecution, against any and all parties engaging in </del><ins>oppose </ins>attacks on civilians, medical workers, and critical infrastructure, including water supplies, in <del>Libya;</del><ins>Libya, and to support accountability for those engaged in such heinous actions;</ins>
  - (5) to <del>contribute to Libya’s peace and stability, prevent destabilizing arms shipments, and </del>support <del>efforts to safeguard </del>Libya’s <del>oil resources in accordance </del><ins>sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity consistent </ins>with United Nations Security Council <del>Resolutions 2259 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2362 (2017), </del><ins>Resolution 2510 (2020) </ins>and <del>2473 (2019);</del><ins>all predecessor resolutions with respect to Libya, including by—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>taking action to end the violence and flow of arms;</ins>
    - (B) <ins>rejecting attempts by any party to illicitly export Libya’s oil; and</ins>
    - (C) <ins>urging Libyan parties to eject foreign military and mercenary forces;</ins>
  - (6) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince the parties to the conflict in Libya to immediately de-escalate and halt their current fighting and persuade foreign powers to stop providing <del>weapons </del><ins>personnel, including mercenaries, weapons, </ins>and financing that exacerbate the conflict;
  - (7) to <del>encourage </del><ins>support building on </ins>the <del>parties </del><ins>Libyan Political Agreement as a viable framework for the political solution in Libya and </ins>to <del>promptly return </del><ins>urge all Libyan parties </ins>to <del>a </del><ins>resume the inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned </ins>political process <del>led by the United Nations Special Representative of </del><ins>under </ins>the <del>Secretary General (SRSG) and head </del><ins>auspices </ins>of <del>the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL);</del><ins>UNSMIL;</ins>
  - (8) to support <del>the United Nations-mediated political process that seeks </del>a negotiated and peaceful <ins>political </ins>solution <del>to </del><ins>that includes a single, unified, inclusive, and effective Libyan Government approved by </ins>the Libyan <del>crisis;</del><ins>House of Representatives, the end of a transitional period achieved through free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections, a fair and transparent allocation of resources, interim security arrangements, and a process for the reunification of Libyan government ministries and Libyan sovereign institutions, including the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation, and the Libyan Investment Authority;</ins>
  - (9) <del>that a negotiated and peaceful political solution should include a transitional, civilian-led government representing all Libyans, preparations for credible elections, a fair and transparent allocation of resources, interim security arrangements, and a process for the reunification of Libyan government ministries and Libyan sovereign institutions, including the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation, and the Libyan Investment Authority;</del>
  - (9) [was (3)(12)] to support constant, unimpeded, and reliable humanitarian access to those in need and to hold accountable those who impede or threaten the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
  - (10) <ins>to seek to bring an end to trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor, and sexual exploitation, including with respect to migrants;</ins>
  - (11) to advocate for the immediate release and safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants trapped by the fighting in Libya;
  - (12) to <del>assist </del><ins>encourage </ins>implementation of UNSMIL’s plan for the organized and gradual closure of migrant detention centers in <del>Libya; and</del><ins>Libya;</ins>
  - (13) to support <ins>current and </ins>future democratic <del>development </del>and <del>the </del>economic <del>recovery of Libya both during and after a negotiated and peaceful political solution.</del><ins>development; and</ins>
  - (14) <ins>to discourage all parties from heightening tensions in the region, through unhelpful and provocative actions.</ins>

## Sec. 101 Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Libya

- (a) <ins>In general—</ins> <ins>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—</ins>
  - (1) <ins>a description of the full extent of involvement in Libya by foreign governments, including the Governments of Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, China, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, including—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>a description of which governments are linked to drone and aircraft strikes;</ins>
    - (B) <ins>a list of the types and estimated amounts of equipment transferred by each government described in this paragraph to the parties to the conflict, including foreign military contractors, mercenaries, or paramilitary forces operating in Libya; and</ins>
    - (C) <ins>an estimate of the financial support provided by each government described in this paragraph to the parties to the conflict, including foreign military contractors, mercenaries, or paramilitary forces operating in Libya;</ins>
  - (2) <ins>an analysis and determination of whether the actions by the governments described in paragraph (1) violate the arms embargo with respect to Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Security Council resolutions;</ins>
  - (3) <ins>a list of the specific offending materiel or financial support transfers provided by a government described in paragraph (1) that violate the arms embargo with respect to Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Security Council resolutions;</ins>
  - (4) <ins>a description of the activities of each foreign armed group, including the Russian Wagner Group, Turkish military contractors and mercenaries, affiliates of ISIS, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya;</ins>
  - (5) <ins>a description of European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts to enforce the United Nations arms embargo and facilitate a ceasefire;</ins>
  - (6) <ins>a description of any violations of the arms embargo by European Union member states; and</ins>
  - (7) <ins>a description of United States diplomatic engagement with the European Union and NATO regarding enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo.</ins>
- (b) <ins>Form—</ins> <ins>The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.</ins>
- (c) <ins>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</ins> <ins>In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—</ins>
  - (1) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and</ins>
  - (2) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.</ins>
- <del>Notwithstanding any other provision of law or Executive order, Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559), signed on April 19, 2016, and entitled “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Persons Contributing to the Situation in Libya” shall have the force and effect of law.</del>

## Sec. 102 Report of Russian activities and objectives in Libya

- (a) <del>In general—</del><ins>Findings—</ins> <del>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to </del><ins>Congress makes </ins>the <del>appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—</del><ins>following findings:</ins>
  - (1) <del>a description of the full extent </del><ins>General Stephen Townsend, Commander </ins>of <del>involvement </del><ins>United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), warned </ins>in <del>Libya by the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, </del><ins>January 2020 that in Libya, Russia seeks to “demonstrate itself as an alternative partner to </ins>the <del>United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey, Sudan, Russia, </del><ins>West” and seeks to position itself alongside </ins>the <del>People’s Republic </del><ins>southern flank </ins>of <del>China, France, and Italy, including—</del><ins>the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).</ins>
    - (A) <del>a description of which governments are linked to drone and aircraft strikes;</del>
    - (B) <del>the estimated dollar value and the amounts of various types of equipment transferred to the warring parties; and</del>
    - (C) <del>an attribution of outside financial support provided to each reported presence of foreign mercenaries in Libya;</del>
  - (2) <del>a determination and analysis of whether the actions by </del><ins>AFRICOM has also stated that </ins>the <del>governments identified </del><ins>Russian military presence </ins>in <del>paragraph (1) violate the arms embargo with respect to </del>Libya <del>in accordance with </del><ins>threatens future </ins>United <del>Nations Security Council Resolution 2473 (2019) </del><ins>States military partnerships </ins>and <del>predecessor Security Council resolutions;</del><ins>counterterrorism cooperation by impeding United States access to Libya.</ins>
  - (3) <del>a list of the specific offending materiel or financial support transfers </del><ins>In May 2020, AFRICOM reported </ins>that <del>would be in violation of </del>the <del>arms embargo with respect </del><ins>Government of Russia deployed 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft </ins>to Libya <del>in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and predecessor Security Council resolutions; and</del><ins>to support Russian state-sponsored private military contractors, including the Wagner Group.</ins>
- (b) <ins>Report—</ins> <ins></ins>
  - (1) <ins>Report—</ins> <ins>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains an assessment of Russian activities and objectives in Libya, including—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>the potential threat such activities pose to the United States, southern Europe, NATO, and partners in the Mediterranean Sea and North African region;</ins>
    - (B) <ins>the direct role of Russia in Libyan financial affairs, to include issuing and printing currency; and</ins>
    - (C) <ins>Russia’s use of mercenaries, military contractors, equipment, and paramilitary forces in Libya.</ins>
  - (2) <ins>Form—</ins> <ins>The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.</ins>
  - (3) <ins>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</ins> <ins>In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and</ins>
    - (B) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.</ins>
  - (4) <del>a determination and analysis of the activities of foreign armed groups, including affiliates of the Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya.</del>
- (b) <del>Form—</del> <del>The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.</del>
- (c) <del>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</del> <del>In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—</del>
  - (1) <del>the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and</del>
  - (2) <del>the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.</del>

## Sec. 103 Determination of sanctionable activities of the Libyan National Army with respect to Syria

- <ins>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a list of members of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and details of their activities, that the President determines are knowingly responsible for sanctionable offenses pursuant to—</ins>
- (1) <ins>section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note; 133 Stat. 2292); or</ins>
- (2) <ins>Executive Order 13582 (76 Fed. Reg. 52209; relating to blocking property of the Government of Syria and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Syria (August 17, 2011)).</ins>
- (a) <del>Findings—</del> <del>Congress makes the following findings:</del>
  - (1) <del>In the 2019 “posture statement” to Congress provided by General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), asserted that Russia was “invok[ing] Qaddafi-era relationships and debts to obtain economic and military contracts … aimed at accessing Libya’s vast oil market, reviving arms sales, and gaining access to coastal territories”.</del>
  - (2) <del>Russia’s involvement in Libya and neighboring countries is part of a larger regional strategy to monitor the southern coastline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), isolate Europe from Africa, and exert control over the southern Mediterranean Sea region.</del>
- (b) <del>Report and strategy—</del> <del></del>
  - (1) <del>Report—</del> <del>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—</del>
    - (A) <del>an assessment of Russian influence and objectives in Libya;</del>
    - (B) <del>the potential threat such influence poses to the United States, southern Europe, and NATO operations in the Mediterranean Sea;</del>
    - (C) <del>Russia’s use of currency issuing and printing; and</del>
    - (D) <del>Russia’s use of mercenaries, military contractors, and paramilitary forces in Libya.</del>
  - (2) <del>Strategy—</del> <del>Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding a strategy to counter threats identified in the report.</del>
  - (3) <del>Form—</del> <del>The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.</del>
  - (4) <del>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</del> <del>In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—</del>
    - (A) <del>the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and</del>
    - (B) <del>the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.</del>

## Sec. 201 Sanctions with respect to foreign persons leading, directing, or supporting certain foreign government involvement in Libya

- (a) In general— <del>On and after the date that is </del><ins>Not later than </ins>180 days after the date <del>on which the report required by section 102 is submitted to </del><ins>of </ins>the <del>appropriate congressional committees, </del><ins>enactment of this Act, </ins>the President shall impose <ins>each of </ins>the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to <del>a </del><ins>each </ins>foreign person <del>if </del><ins>that </ins>the President determines <del>that the foreign person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, </del>knowingly engages in an activity described in subsection (b).
- (b) Activities described— A foreign person engages in an activity described in this subsection if the person <del>knowingly </del><ins>leads, directs, or </ins>provides significant financial, material, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in a significant transaction <del>with—</del><ins>with, a non-Libyan foreign person that is—</ins>
  - (1) <del>a foreign person that is knowingly operating </del>in <ins>Libya in </ins>a military <ins>or commercial </ins>capacity <del>in Libya for </del><ins>as a military contractor, mercenary, </ins>or <del>on behalf of the Government </del><ins>part </ins>of <del>Russia; or</del><ins>a paramilitary force; and</ins>
  - (2) <del>a foreign person that is a military contractor, mercenary, or a paramilitary force knowingly operating in a military capacity </del><ins>engaged </ins>in <del>Libya for or on behalf of </del><ins>significant actions that threaten </ins>the <del>Government </del><ins>peace, security, or stability </ins>of <del>Russia.</del><ins>Libya.</ins>

## Sec. 202 Sanctions with respect to foreign persons threatening the peace or stability of Libya

- (a) Imposition of sanctions— <del>On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the </del><ins>The </ins>President shall impose <ins>each of </ins>the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to <del>a </del><ins>each </ins>foreign person <del>if the President determines that the person, </del>on <del>or after </del>the <del>date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly engages in an activity described in </del><ins>list required by </ins>subsection (b).
- (b) <del>Activities described—</del><ins>List—</ins> <del>A foreign person engages in an activity described in </del><ins>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of </ins>this <del>subsection if </del><ins>Act, </ins>the <del>person knowingly—</del><ins>President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of—</ins>
  - (1) <del>is engaged in </del><ins>foreign persons, including senior government officials, militia leaders, paramilitary leaders, and other persons who provide </ins>significant <del>actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, </del><ins>support to militia </ins>or <del>stability of </del><ins>paramilitary groups in </ins>Libya, <del>including through </del><ins>that </ins>the <del>supply of arms or related materiel;</del><ins>President determines are knowingly—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>engaged in significant actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, including any supply of arms or related materiel in violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution with respect to Libya;</ins>
    - (B) <ins>engaged in significant actions or policies that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delaying, or impeding the United Nations-mediated political process that seeks a negotiated and peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis;</ins>
    - (C) <ins>engaged in significant actions that may lead to or result in the misappropriation of significant state assets of Libya;</ins>
    - (D) <ins>involved in, or has been involved in, the significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya, including the significant illicit production, refining, brokering, sale, purchase, or export of Libyan oil;</ins>
    - (E) <ins>significantly threatening or coercing Libyan state financial institutions or the Libyan National Oil Company; or</ins>
    - (F) <ins>significantly responsible for actions or policies that are intended to undermine efforts to promote stabilization and economic recovery in Libya;</ins>
  - (2) <del>is engaged in significant actions or policies </del><ins>foreign persons </ins>that <del>obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delaying, or impeding </del>the <del>United Nations-mediated political process that seeks a negotiated and peaceful solution </del><ins>President determines are successor entities </ins>to <del>the Libyan crisis;</del><ins>persons referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1); and</ins>
  - (3) <del>is engaged in significant actions or policies </del><ins>foreign persons </ins>that <del>may lead to or result in </del>the <del>misappropriation of significant state assets of Libya;</del><ins>President determines—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>own or control, or are owned or controlled by, a person referred to in any of subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2); and</ins>
    - (B) <ins>have provided, or attempted to provide, significant financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, a person referred to in any of subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) for purposes of engaging in any activity listed in such subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1).</ins>
- (c) <ins>Updates of list—</ins> <ins>The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under subsection (b)—</ins>
  - (1) <ins>not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years; or</ins>
  - (2) <ins>as new information becomes available.</ins>
- (d) <ins>Form—</ins> <ins>The list required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.</ins>
  - (4) <del>is involved in, or has been involved in, the significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya, including the significant illicit production, refining, brokering, sale, purchase, or export of Libyan oil;</del>
  - (5) <del>is significantly threatening or coercing Libyan state financial institutions or the Libyan National Oil Company;</del>
  - (6) <del>is significantly responsible for actions or policies that are intended to undermine—</del>
    - (A) <del>the United Nations-led political process to end the conflict in Libya; or</del>
    - (B) <del>efforts to promote stabilization and economic recovery in Libya;</del>
  - (7) <del>is a successor entity to a person referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6);</del>
  - (8) <del>owns or controls, or is owned or controlled by, a person referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6);</del>
  - (9) <del>is acting for or, on behalf of, a person referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6); or</del>
  - (10) <del>has provided, or attempted to provide, significant financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, a person referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6).</del>

## Sec. 203 Sanctions with respect to foreign persons who are responsible for or complicit in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed in Libya

- (a) Imposition of sanctions— The President shall impose <ins>each of </ins>the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).
- (b) List of <del>Persons—</del><ins>persons—</ins>
  - (1) In general— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of foreign <ins>persons, including senior government officials, militia leaders, paramilitary leaders, and other </ins>persons <ins>who provide significant support to militia or paramilitary groups in Libya, </ins>that the President determines are knowingly responsible for or complicit in, or <del>to </del>have directly or indirectly engaged in, <del>serious </del><ins>gross violations of internationally recognized </ins>human rights <del>abuses </del>committed in Libya.
  - (2) Updates of list— The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—
    - (A) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years; or
    - (B) as new information becomes available.
  - (3) Form— The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

## Sec. 204 Sanctions described

- (a) Sanctions described— The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a foreign person under section 201, 202, or 203 are the following:
  - (1) Blocking of property— The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
  - (2) Inadmissibility of certain individuals—
    - (A) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole— A foreign person who meets any of the criteria described <del>in </del>section 201, 202, or 203 is—
      - (i) inadmissible to the United States;
      - (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
      - (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
    - (B) Current visas revoked— A foreign person subject to section 201, 202, or 203 is subject to the following:
      - (i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
      - (ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall—
        - (I) take effect immediately; and
        - (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person’s possession.
- (b) Penalties— The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations promulgated under section 306(2) to carry out subsection (a)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.
- (c) Exception— Sanctions under subsection (a)(2) shall not apply to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States.
- (d) <ins>Exception to comply with national security—</ins> <ins>The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under this section:</ins>
  - (1) <ins>Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).</ins>
  - (2) <ins>Any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities of the United States.</ins>

## Sec. 205 Waiver

- <ins>The President may waive the application of sanctions imposed on a foreign person under this title if the President—</ins>
- (a) <del>In general—</del> <del>The President may waive the application of sanctions imposed on a foreign person under this title if the President—</del>
- (1) [was (2)(3)] determines that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and
- (2) [was (2)(4)] not later than the date on which such waiver will take effect, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of and justification for such waiver.
- (b) <del>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</del> <del>In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—</del>
  - (1) <del>the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and</del>
  - (2) <del>the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.</del>

## Sec. 206 Implementation and regulatory authority

- The President—
- (1) <del>may </del><ins>is authorized to </ins>exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title; and
- (2) shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this title.

## Sec. 207 Exception relating to importation of goods

- (a) In general— The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this title shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
- (b) Good defined— In this section, the term <del>good </del><ins>“good” </ins>means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and excluding technical data.

## Sec. 208 Definitions

- In this title:
- (1) <del>Admission; admitted, alien—</del><ins>Appropriate congressional committees—</ins> The <del>terms admission, admitted, and alien have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).</del><ins>term “appropriate congressional committees” means—</ins>
  - (A) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and</ins>
  - (B) <ins>the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.</ins>
- (2) <del>Foreign person—</del><ins>Admitted; alien—</ins> The <del>term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.</del><ins>terms admitted and alien have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).</ins>
- (3) <del>Knowingly—</del><ins>Foreign person—</ins> The term <del>knowingly with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, </del><ins>“foreign person” </ins>means <ins>an individual or entity </ins>that <ins>is not </ins>a <del>person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.</del><ins>United States person.</ins>
- (4) <del>United States person—</del><ins>Foreign government—</ins> The term <ins>“foreign government” means any government of a country other than the </ins>United <del>States person means—</del><ins>States.</ins>
- (5) <ins>Knowingly—</ins> <ins>The term “knowingly” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.</ins>
- (6) <ins>United states person—</ins> <ins>The term “United States person” means—</ins>
  - (A) <ins>an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or</ins>
  - (B) <ins>an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or</ins>
  - (C) <ins>any person in the United States.</ins>
- (7) <ins>Gross violations of internationally recognized human rights—</ins> <ins>The term “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” has the meaning given such term in section 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)).</ins>
  - (A) <del>a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or</del>
  - (B) <del>an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.</del>

## Sec. 209 Suspension of sanctions

- (a) <ins>In general—</ins> <ins>The President may suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under this title for periods not to exceed 90 days if the President determines that the parties to the conflict in Libya have agreed to and are upholding a sustainable, good-faith ceasefire in support of a lasting political solution in Libya.</ins>
- (b) <ins>Notification required—</ins> <ins>Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President makes a determination to suspend the imposition of sanctions as described in subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the determination.</ins>
- (c) <ins>Reimposition of sanctions—</ins> <ins>Any sanctions suspended under subsection (a) shall be reimposed if the President determines that the criteria described in that subsection are no longer being met.</ins>
- <del>The requirement to impose sanctions under this title shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2024.</del>

## Sec. 210 Sunset — added

- <ins>The requirement to impose sanctions under this title shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2024.</ins>

## Sec. 301 Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international refugees and migrants in Libya

- (a) Sense of congress— It is the sense of Congress that—
  - (1) the United States Government should—
    - (A) <del>expand </del><ins>continue </ins>efforts to address Libya’s humanitarian crisis;
    - (B) leverage diplomatic relations with the warring parties to guarantee constant, reliable humanitarian access by frontline providers in Libya;
    - (C) leverage diplomatic relations with the warring parties, the United Nations, and the European Union to <del>ensure </del><ins>encourage </ins>the <del>release </del><ins>voluntary safe passage </ins>of <ins>detained </ins>vulnerable migrants and refugees <del>from detention centers and their voluntary safe passage </del>from the conflict zones in Libya; and
    - (D) <del>expand </del><ins>support </ins>efforts to document and publicize <ins>gross </ins>violations of <ins>internationally recognized </ins>human rights and international humanitarian <del>law </del><ins>law, including efforts related to trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor, and sexual exploitation, </ins>and hold perpetrators accountable; and
  - (2) humanitarian assistance to address the crisis in Libya should be targeted toward those most in need and delivered through partners that uphold internationally recognized humanitarian <del>principles.</del><ins>principles, with robust monitoring to ensure assistance is reaching intended beneficiaries.</ins>
- (b) <ins>Assistance authorized—</ins> <ins>The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Secretary of State, should continue to support humanitarian assistance to individuals and communities in Libya, including—</ins>
- (b) <del>Assistance authorized—</del> <del></del>
  - (1) <del>In general—</del> <del>The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals and communities in Libya.</del>
  - (1) <del>Included assistance—</del> <del>Assistance authorized by paragraph (1) shall include the following:</del><ins>health assistance, including logistical and technical assistance to hospitals, ambulances, and health clinics in affected communities, including migrant communities, and provision of basic public health commodities;</ins>
  - (2) <ins>services, such as medicines and medical supplies and equipment;</ins>
  - (3) <ins>assistance to provide—</ins>
    - (A) <ins>protection, food, and shelter, including to migrant communities; and</ins>
    - (B) <ins>water, sanitation, and hygiene (commonly referred to as “WASH”); and</ins>
  - (4) <ins>technical assistance to ensure health, food, and commodities are appropriately selected, procured, targeted, monitored, and distributed.</ins>
    - (A) <del>Urgently needed health assistance, including logistical and technical assistance to hospitals, ambulances, and health clinics in affected communities.</del>
    - (B) <del>Public health commodities and services, including medicines and basic medical supplies and equipment.</del>
    - (C) <del>Protection, food, shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and other assistance.</del>
    - (D) <del>Technical assistance to ensure health, food, and commodities are appropriately selected, procured, targeted, and distributed.</del>
- (c) Strategy— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on the following:
  - (1) How the United States, working with relevant foreign governments and multilateral organizations, plans to address the humanitarian situation in Libya.
  - (2) <del>How </del><ins>Diplomatic efforts by the United States </ins>to <del>leverage diplomatic and assistance tools as well as </del><ins>encourage </ins>strategic burden-sharing with international <del>partners </del><ins>donors, including foreign governments and multilateral organizations on efforts </ins>to improve the humanitarian situation in Libya.
  - (3) How to <del>confront </del><ins>address </ins>humanitarian access challenges and ensure protection for vulnerable refugees and <del>migrants.</del><ins>migrants, including protection from trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor, and sexual exploitation.</ins>
  - (4) How the United States <del>will engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure support from international donors, including foreign governments </del><ins>is mitigating risk, utilizing third party monitors, </ins>and <del>multilateral organizations.</del><ins>ensuring effective delivery of assistance.</ins>
- (d) Diplomatic engagement— The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, <del>shall </del><ins>should </ins>work with relevant foreign governments and multilateral organizations to coordinate a high-level <del>donor </del>summit <del>and carry out diplomatic engagement to advance the provision of humanitarian assistance </del><ins>with respect </ins>to <del>the people of </del>Libya <del>and international migrants and refugees </del>in <del>Libya and carry out the strategy required by subsection (c).</del><ins>order to—</ins>
  - (1) <ins>advance a ceasefire;</ins>
  - (2) <ins>facilitate a political process to achieve such a ceasefire; and</ins>
  - (3) <ins>coordinate donations to advance the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Libya and international migrants and refugees in Libya in order to carry out the strategy required by subsection (c).</ins>
- (e) Appropriate congressional committees defined— In this section, the term <del>appropriate </del><ins>“appropriate </ins>congressional <del>committees </del><ins>committees” </ins>means—
  - (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
  - (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

## Sec. 302 Support for democratic governance, elections, and civil society

- (a) In general— The Secretary of <del>State, in coordination with the Administrator of the </del><ins>State shall coordinate </ins>United States <del>Agency for International Development, shall—</del><ins>Government efforts to—</ins>
  - (1) <del>work to help the people of Libya and a future Libyan government unify Libyan financial and governing institutions </del><ins>support efforts </ins>to <del>deliver progress for </del><ins>resolve </ins>the <del>Libyan people;</del><ins>current civil conflict in Libya;</ins>
  - (2) work to <del>ensure transparent, credible, </del><ins>help the people of Libya </ins>and <del>inclusive </del><ins>a </ins>future <del>elections in Libya, including through supporting electoral security and international election observation and by providing training </del><ins>Libyan government develop functioning, unified Libyan economic, security, </ins>and <del>technical assistance to institutions with election-related responsibilities; and</del><ins>governing institutions;</ins>
  - (3) work <ins>to ensure free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections organized by an independent and effective High National Elections Commission in Libya, including through supporting electoral security and international election observation and by providing training and technical assistance to institutions </ins>with <del>nongovernmental organizations—</del><ins>election-related responsibilities, as appropriate;</ins>
  - (4) <ins>work with the people of Libya, nongovernmental organizations, and Libyan institutions to strengthen democratic governance, reinforce civilian institutions and support decentralization in order to address community grievances, promote social cohesion, mitigate drivers of violent extremism, and help communities recover from Islamic State occupation;</ins>
  - (5) <ins>defend against gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Libya, including by supporting efforts to document such violations;</ins>
  - (6) <ins>to combat corruption and improve the transparency and accountability of Libyan government institutions; and</ins>
    - (A) <del>to strengthen democratic governance and institutions and support decentralization;</del>
    - (B) <del>to increase public and stakeholder confidence in Libya’s electoral system;</del>
    - (C) <del>to defend internationally recognized human rights for people in Libya, including support for efforts to document crimes against humanity and violations of human rights;</del>
    - (D) <del>to combat corruption and improve the transparency and accountability of government institutions; and</del>
  - (7) [was (2)(5)(6)] to support the efforts of independent media outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share information with the Libyan people.
- (b) <ins>Risk mitigation and assistance monitoring—</ins> <ins>The Secretary of State and Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall ensure that appropriate steps are taken to mitigate risk of diversion of assistance for Libya and ensure reliable third-party monitoring is utilized for projects in Libya that United States Government personnel are unable to access and monitor.</ins>
- (c) <ins>Report—</ins> <ins></ins>
  - (1) <ins>In general—</ins> <ins>Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities carried out under subsection (a).</ins>
  - (2) <ins>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</ins> <ins>In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—</ins>
- (b) <del>Briefing requirement—</del> <del></del>
  - (1) <del>In general—</del> <del>Not later than 45 days after the scheduling of credible presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategy to carry out the activities described in subsection (a).</del>
  - (2) <del>Appropriate congressional committees defined—</del> <del>In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—</del>
    - (A) [was (3)(3)(3)] the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
    - (B) [was (3)(3)(4)] the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
- (d) <ins>Authorization of appropriations—</ins> <ins></ins>
  - (1) <ins>In general—</ins> <ins>There are authorized to be appropriated $23,000,000 for fiscal year 2021 to carry out subsection (a).</ins>
- (c) <del>Authorization of appropriations—</del> <del></del>
  - (1) <del>In general—</del> <del>There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2020, $23,000,000 to carry out subsection (a).</del>
  - (2) [was (4)(3)] Notification requirements— Any expenditure of amounts made available to carry out subsection (a) shall be subject to the notification requirements applicable to—
    - (A) [was (4)(3)(3)] expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)); and
    - (B) [was (4)(3)(4)] expenditures from the Development Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2413(a)).

## Sec. 303 Engaging international financial institutions to advance Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial management

- (a) In general— The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to <del>support </del><ins>support, in </ins>a <ins>way that is consistent with broader United States national interests, a </ins>Libyan-led process to develop a framework for the economic recovery of Libya and improved public sector financial management, complementary to United Nations-led peace efforts and in support of the future establishment of <ins>a sovereign state with </ins>democratic institutions and the rule of law in Libya.
- (b) Additional elements— <del>The </del><ins>To the extent consistent with broader United States national interests, the </ins>framework described in subsection (a) shall include the following policy proposals:
  - (1) To <del>reunify </del><ins>restore, respect, and safeguard </ins>the <del>leadership </del><ins>integrity, unity, </ins>and <del>operations </del><ins>lawful governance </ins>of Libya’s key economic ministries and <del>institutions.</del><ins>institutions, in particular the Central Bank of Libya, the Libya Investment Authority, the National Oil Corporation, and the Audit Bureau (AB).</ins>
  - (2) To improve the <del>efficiency </del><ins>accountability </ins>and <del>reach </del><ins>effectiveness </ins>of Libyan <del>government programs that support poverty alleviation </del><ins>authorities, including sovereign economic institutions, in providing services </ins>and <del>a social safety net.</del><ins>opportunity to the Libyan people.</ins>
  - (3) To assist in <ins>improving public financial management and </ins>reconciling the public accounts of national financial institutions and letters of credit issued by private Libyan financial <del>institutions.</del><ins>institutions as needed pursuant to a political process.</ins>
  - (4) To restore the <del>production and </del><ins>production, </ins>efficient <del>management </del><ins>management, and development </ins>of Libya’s oil <del>industry, including rebuilding any damaged energy infrastructure.</del><ins>and gas industries so such industries are resilient against malign foreign influence and can generate prosperity on behalf of the Libyan people.</ins>
  - (5) To promote the development of private sector enterprise.
  - (6) To improve the transparency and accountability of public sector employment and wage distribution.
  - (7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of Libyan financial <del>institutions to minimize corruption and ensure resources equitably serve the Libyan people.</del><ins>institutions.</ins>
  - (8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls and market distorting subsidies in the Libyan economy.
  - (9) <ins>To support opportunities for United States businesses.</ins>
- (c) Consultation— In supporting the framework described in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to encourage the institution to consult with relevant stakeholders in the financial, governance, and energy sectors.
- (d) Definition of international financial institution— In this section, the term <del>international </del><ins>“international </ins>financial <del>institution </del><ins>institution” </ins>means the International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.
- (e) Termination— The requirements of this section shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2024.

## Sec. 304 Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people

- (a) Sense of <del>Congress—</del><ins>congress—</ins> It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General <del>should </del><ins>should, to the extent practicable, </ins>advance a coordinated international effort—
  - (1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of <del>Libyan </del><ins>Libya </ins>through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other illicit means; and
  - (2) to work with foreign governments—
    - (A) to share financial investigations intelligence, as appropriate;
    - (B) to oversee the assets identified pursuant to paragraph (1); and
    - (C) to provide technical assistance to help governments establish the necessary legal framework to carry out asset forfeitures.
- (b) Additional elements— The coordinated international effort described in subsection (a) should include input from—
  - (1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes of the Department of the Treasury;
  - (2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury; and
  - (3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section of the Department of Justice.
